SIDDARAMAPPA S. SAJJAN AND ORS vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA



KALABURAGI BENCH

TH
DATED THIS THE 5 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026


PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK S. KINAGI

AND


THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMANYA RANGARAO

WRIT PETITION NO. 201730 OF 2022 (S-KAT)


BETWEEN:

1. SRI SIDDARAMAPPA S. SAJJAN
S/O SHARANAPPA SAJJAN,
AGE: 79 YEARS,
OCC: RETIRED EDUCATIONAL OFFICER,
R/O. AT 10-2/182,
COURT TEMPLE ROAD,
ANANDANAGAR, KALABURAGI,
DIST.KALABURAGI- 585102.

2. SRI. K.S. HIREMATHA
S/O SANGAIAH HIREMATH,
AGE: 73 YEARS,
OCC: RETIRED DIRECTOR,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
R/O. AT GURUSADANA,
H.NO.1-891/76-64,
KARUNESWAR,
KALABURAGI,
DIST.KALABURAGI-585102.








Digitally signed by
B NAGAVENI
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA

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3. SRI. CHANDRAKANTH DANTKALE
S/O GOVINDARAO DANTKALE,
AGE: 77 YEARS,
OCC: RETIRED JOINT DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
R/O. PLOT NO.55,
SANTOSH COLONY,
UDNOOR ROAD,
KALABURAGI,
DIST.KALABURAGI-585102.


4. SRI. GURUPADAPPA N. SWADI
S/O NAGAPPA,
AGE: 75 YEARS,
OCC: RETIRED DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
R/O. NO.11, GANGANILAYA,
BENDRE NAGAR,
NEW JEVARGI COLONY,
BIDDAPUR ROAD,
KALABURAGI-585102.

5.



A)
SRI. SIDDANNA HAKEEM
SINCE DEAD,
REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL HEIRS,

SMT. VASUMATI
W/O SIDDANNA HAKEEM,

B) SMT. PREETI
D/O SIDDANNA HAKEEM,

C) SMT. PRIYA
D/O SIDDANNA HAKEEM,

ALL ARE RESIDING AT C/O. L.M.PUJARI,
VENKATESH NAGAR,
KALABURAGI-585102.

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6. SRI. SHANKRAPPA KANNI,
SINCE DEAD,
REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL HEIRS,

A) SMT. SHAKUNTALA
W/O SHARANAPPA KANNI,

B) MISS. ANNAPURNA
D/O SHARANAPPA KANNI,

C) MISS SUREKHA
D/O SHARANAPPA KANNI,

D) SANJEEV KUMAR
S/O SHARANAPPA KANNI,

E) SATHISHKUMAR
S/O SHARANAPPA KANNI,

ALL ARE RESIDING AT
H.NO.1-1495/42/E-3,
SHARANA BASAVA NILAYA,
GODUTAI NAGAR,
KALABURAGI-585102.
…PETITIONERS

(BY SRI. K. M. GHATE, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
(PRIMARY AND SECONDARY),
M.S. BUILDING,
SACHIVALAYA-2,
BENGALURU-560001.

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2. THE COMMISSIONER FOR
PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
K.R. CIRCLE, BANGALORE-560001.

3. THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS,
KALABURAGI, DIST. KALABURAGI.

4. THE PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTANT
GENERAL A & E,
KARNATAKA PARK HOUSE ROAD,
BENGALURU-560001.

…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. VEERANAGOUDA MALIPATIL, AGA)

THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO
ISSUE WRIT OF CERTIORARI/ORDER/ DIRECTIONS, QUASHING
THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL IN APPLICATIONS
NO.10263-71/2016 BEFORE THE KARNATAKA STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AT KALABURAGI BENCH DATED
22.10.2021 VIDE ANNEXURE-B TO THE WRIT PETITION, IN SO
FAR AS THE PETITIONERS ARE CONCERNED AND ETC.

THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
IN B GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS
UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK S. KINAGI
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMANYA RANGARAO

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ORAL ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK S. KINAGI)

1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioners
challenging the order dated 22.10.2021 passed in
Application Nos.10263 to 10271 of 2016 by the
Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Kalaburagi
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’).

2. Brief facts giving rise to filing of this petition are as
under:
The petitioners were initially appointed as Assistant
Teachers in the then Taluk Development Board/
Municipal Units, which were subsequently taken over
by the State Government in 1971. The petitioners
retired from service in the year 1994. The petitioners
noticed regarding the order passed by the Tribunal in
Application Nos.5472-78 of 1997 challenging the cut-
off date of 01.07.1994 and the said applications were
partly allowed by the Tribunal by order dated

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04.07.2002 observing that the claim of the
applicants be reworked relating to their entitlement
of pension and pensionary benefits on the basis of
the seniority to be determined in terms of sub-
paragraphs-1 to 3 of paragraph-17 of the order
passed in Application Nos.1565-66 of 1995. It is
contended that the State Government challenged the
order passed by the Tribunal in Application
Nos.5472-78 of 1997 in Writ Petition Nos.4888-94 of
2003. The said writ petitions were dismissed by order
dated 20.09.2004. The petitioners contending that
they are entitled for similar benefit granted in
Application Nos.1565-66 of 1995 on the ground of
parity, approached the Tribunal in the year 2016
along with an application for condonation of delay.
The Tribunal dismissed the applications for
condonation of delay on the ground that there is a
delay of about 20 years and consequently, dismissed
the applications. Hence, this writ petition is filed.

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3. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the
petitioners and learned Additional Government
Advocate appearing for the respondents.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the
petitioners are entitled for similar orders passed in
Application Nos.1565-66 of 1995 on the ground of
parity. He also submits that the Government has
issued the Government Order in the year 2014.
Based on the said Government Order, the petitioners
approached the Tribunal in the year 2016. Hence,
there is no delay in approaching the Tribunal. The
said aspect was not considered by the Tribunal and
committed an error in dismissing the applications on
the ground of delay and latches. He submits that
since similarly situated petitioners have been
extended the benefit, the petitioners are also entitled
for similar benefits on the ground of parity. Hence,
on these grounds, he prays to allow the writ petition.

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5. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel for the
petitioners placed reliance on the judgment passed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Autar
Singh Yadav v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and
others in Civil Appeal No.13806 of 2024
disposed of on 04.12.2024 .

6. Per contra , learned Additional Government Advocate
appearing for the respondents submits that the order
in Application Nos.1565-66 of 1995 was passed on
31.10.1996. The petitioners retired from service in
the year 1994. The petitioners have not chosen to
approach the Tribunal within a reasonable time. He
submits that mere issuance of Government Order in
the year 2014, does not extend the period of
limitation. He submits that there is a delay of 20
years in approaching the Tribunal. He submits that
the petitioners ought to have approached the
Tribunal within a reasonable time. Therefore, the
Tribunal was justified in dismissing the applications

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on the ground of inordinate delay and laches. Hence,
on these grounds, he prays to dismiss the writ
petition.

7. Learned Additional Government Advocate has placed
reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs' Vs.
1
Karnataka Housing Board and Ors. , wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court has declined to condone the
delay and also in the case of Lingeswaran Etc. vs.
Thirunagalingam in Special Leave to Appeal (C)
Nos.2054-2055/2022 disposed of on 25.02.2022 ,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has declined to
condone the delay of 465 days.

8. Perused the records and considered the submissions
of the learned counsel for the parties.

9. It is an undisputed fact that similarly placed
employees approached the Karnataka State

1
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969

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Administrative Tribunal in the year 1995 in
Application Nos.1565-66 of 1995. The said
applications came to be allowed vide order dated
31.10.1996. It is also an undisputed fact that the
State Government preferred writ petition before this
Court challenging the order passed in Application
Nos.5472-78 of 1997. The said writ petition was
dismissed in the year 2004. Though the petitioners
retired from service in the year 1994, they did not
approach the Tribunal within a reasonable time.
Meanwhile, the State Government has issued
Government Order in the year 2014. By the time, the
Government Order is issued, the claim of the
petitioners has become a stale claim and there is a
delay of 20 years in approaching the Tribunal. The
Tribunal is justified in holding that the petitioners
have failed to show sufficient cause for condoning
the delay of about 20 years.

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10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chennai
Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board
2
v. T.T. Murali Babu , has declined to condone the
delay of 465 days. Paragraph-16 of the said
judgment reads as under:
“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches
should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court
is required to weigh the explanation offered and
the acceptability of the same. The court should
bear in mind that it is exercising an
extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a
constitutional court it has a duty to protect the
rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to
keep itself alive to the primary principle that
when an aggrieved person, without adequate
reason, approaches the court at his own leisure
or pleasure, the court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a
belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it
noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In
certain circumstances delay and laches may not
be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate
delay would only invite disaster for the litigant

2
(2014) 4 SCC 108

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who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay
reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a
litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic
norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest
thief of time” and second, law does not permit
one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does
bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.”


11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Damor
Nanabhai Manabhai and Others v. State of
3
Gujarat and Others at paragraph-9 has held as
under:
“9. In the present case, the petitioners, whose
services stand terminated, are not identically
situated as the writ petitioner in Special Civil
Application No.4293 of 2021, who raised a claim
in respect of higher grade pay scales while being
in service. Similarly, while a court order in
favour of a set of persons may, in appropriate
cases, be extended to others who are identically
situated, this is subject to recognised
exceptions, including delay, laches and
acquiescence. Those who seek to claim the

3
2025 SCC Online SC 3105

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benefit after long delay, merely upon noticing
that others have succeeded, cannot as a matter
of course demand similar relief. In State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1
SCC 347, this Court has explained these
principles succinctly in the following portion:
"22. The legal principles which emerge from
the reading of the aforesaid judgments,
cited both by the appellants as well as the
respondents, can be summed up as under.
22.1. The normal rule is that when a
particular set of employees is given relief
by the court, all other identically situated
persons need to be treated alike by
extending that benefit. Not doing so would
amount to discrimination and would be
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. This principle needs to be applied in
service matters more emphatically as the
service jurisprudence evolved by this Court
from time to time postulates that all
similarly situated persons should be treated
similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would
be that merely because other similarly
situated persons did not approach the Court

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earlier, they are not to be treated
differently.
22.2. However, this principle is subject to
well-recognised exceptions in the form of
laches and delays as well as acquiescence.
Those persons who did not challenge the
wrongful action in their cases and
acquiesced into the same and woke up
after long delay only because of the reason
that their counterparts who had approached
the court earlier in time succeeded in their
efforts, then such employees cannot claim
that the benefit of the judgment rendered
in the case of similarly situated persons be
extended to them. They would be treated
as fence-sitters and laches and delays,
and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid
ground to dismiss their claim."

12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shivamma
supra, at paragraphs-261 to 264 has held as under:
“261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the
impugned order of the High Court deserves to
be set aside. Before we proceed to close this
judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it
abundantly clear that administrative lethargy

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and laxity can never stand as a sufficient
ground for condonation of delay, and we want
to convey an emphatic message to all the
High Courts that delays shall not be condoned
on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a
proper case of sufficient cause is made out,
wherein the State-machinery is able to
establish that it acted with bona fides and
remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is
a handmaid to justice, as is famously said.
But courts, and more particularly the
constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the
procedure for a litigating State agency, who
also equally suffer the bars of limitation from
pursuing litigations due to its own
lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a
legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of
State authorities or its instrumentalities, and
should remain extra cautious, if the party
seeking condonation of delay is a State-
authority. They should not become surrogates
for State laxity and lethargy. The
constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of
the apathy and pangs of a private litigant.
Litigants cannot be placed in situations of
perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of

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their decrees or favourable orders are
frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to
reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the
High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters
with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause
exists, as by doing so the courts only add
insult to the injury, more particularly in
appeals under Section 100 of the CPC,
wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to
questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to
maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain
for finality. More than the importance of
judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a
litigant with limited means, who is to contest
against an enormous State, and its elaborate
and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such
litigations deserve to be disposed of at the
very threshold, because, say if a party
litigating against the State, for whatever
reason, is unable to contest the condonation
of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it
reopens the lis for another round of litigation,
and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As
courts of conscience, it is our obligation that
we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar
to post to seek justice.

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264. No litigant should be permitted to be
so lethargic and apathetic, much less be
permitted by the courts to misuse the process
of law."

13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of New Delhi
4
Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and others at
paragraph-16 has observed as under:
“16. There is another aspect of the matter
which cannot be lost sight of. The
respondents herein filed a writ petition after
17 years. They did not agitate their
grievances for a long time. They, as noticed
herein, did not claim parity with the 17
workmen at the earliest possible opportunity.
They did not implead themselves as parties
even in the reference made by the State
before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their
case that after 1982, those employees who
were employed or who were recruited after
the cut-off date have been granted the said
scale of pay. After such a long time,
therefore, the writ petitions could not have
been entertained even if they are similarly

4
(2007)9 SCC 278

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situated. It is trite that the discretionary
jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of
those who approach the court after a long
time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for
exercise of equitable jurisdiction.”

14. In view of the proposition laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the cases referred to supra, we are of
the view that the Tribunal is justified in passing the
impugned order. We do not find any error in the
impugned order passed by the Tribunal.

15. Accordingly, we proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
The writ petition is dismissed .

Sd/-
(ASHOK S. KINAGI)
JUDGE


Sd/-
(SUBRAMANYA RANGARAO)
JUDGE

NB/List No.: 1 Sl No.: 5/Ct:pk