Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited vs The District Revenue Officer (Stamps)
- Court
- Supreme Court
NON-REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 963
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.______ OF 2026
[Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 37096 OF 2025]
BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED … APPELLANT
VS.
THE DISTRICT REVENUE OFFICER
(STAMPS) & ANR. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal, by special leave, is at the instance of the vendee in the
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relevant sale deed. Such vendee assails the correctness of the final
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judgment and order dated 4 September, 2025 of a Division Bench
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of the High Court of Judicature at Madras allowing an intra-court
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.09.07
17:17:56 IST
Reason:
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appellant
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impugned judgment
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High Court
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appeal preferred by the respondents. The impugned judgment set
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aside the order dated 8 September, 2022 of a Single Judge of the
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High Court allowing the writ petition of the appellants, thereby
resulting in its dismissal, in effect.
3. The facts are simple and undisputed. Appellant purchased a parcel of
land from the Government of India for a fixed sale consideration,
which was fully discharged through cheques issued on different dates
in the year 2014. Upon receipt of the entire consideration, possession
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of the land was delivered to the appellant on 21 January, 2014.
Thereafter, a deed of transfer in respect of the said land was executed
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by the Government of India in favour of the appellant on 24 June,
2016. At the time of execution and presentation of the instrument for
registration, the appellant paid stamp duty and registration charges
on the full sale consideration reflected therein. However, instead of
releasing the registered instrument, the registering authority, who is
the second respondent in the appeal, made a reference under Section
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47-A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 to the District Revenue Officer,
the first respondent. Consequent thereto, the appellant was served
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with a show cause notice in Form-I dated 22 August, 2016 calling
upon it to pay an additional sum towards the alleged deficit stamp
duty. Questioning the legality of such reference and the
consequential notice, the appellant invoked the writ jurisdiction of the
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Writ Appeal No. 2540 of 2023
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Writ Petition No. 16834 of 2017
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the Stamp Act
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High Court contending, inter alia , that in the absence of any material
suggesting want of bona fides on the part of the appellant or the
T RANSFEROR , recourse to Section 47-A of the Stamp Act was wholly
unwarranted.
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4. The Single Judge by an order dated 8 September, 2022 allowed the
challenge to the show cause notice. According to the Single Judge,
the proceedings under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act had been
initiated solely on the premise that the guideline value of the property
was ₹500 per square foot, whereas the instrument had been
presented for registration on the basis of a value of ₹168.30 per
square foot, leading to a demand for differential stamp duty. Placing
reliance on the decision of this Court in V.N. Devadoss v. Chief
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Revenue Control Officer-cum-Inspector of Stamps , the Single
Judge held that the jurisdiction under Section 47-A can be invoked
only where the registering authority has reason to believe that the
property has been deliberately undervalued with a fraudulent intent
to evade payment of the requisite stamp duty. It was further noticed
that the entire sale consideration stipulated under the transfer deed
had admittedly been paid and that no material existed to indicate
payment of any amount over and above the consideration reflected
in the instrument. The Single Judge also observed that the guideline
value, prepared by the revenue authorities for administrative
purposes, furnishes only a prima facie indication of value and cannot,
7
(2009) 7 SCC 438
3
by itself, constitute conclusive evidence of the market value of the
property. On such reasoning, it was held that in the absence of any
material suggestive of deliberate undervaluation, recourse to Section
47-A could not be taken as a matter of course. Consequently, the
show cause notice issued by the first respondent was quashed and
the second respondent directed to release the transfer deed within
two months from the date of receipt of the order.
5. Aggrieved by the order of the Single Judge, the respondents carried
the same in appeal before the Division Bench. The Division Bench
allowed the writ appeal, set aside the order under challenge, and
restored the proceedings to the file of the first respondent for
adjudication in accordance with law. While doing so, the Division
Bench examined the scheme of the Stamp Act and the provisions of
the Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instruments)
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Rules, 1968 . It observed that once the registering authority, namely
the second respondent, entertained a doubt regarding undervaluation
of the instrument, it was competent to make a reference under
Section 47-A, whereupon the matter was required to be adjudicated
by the Collector, i.e., the first respondent. The Division Bench further
noticed that Section 47-A provides a complete statutory mechanism
for determination of market value and levy of stamp duty. Particular
emphasis was placed on sub-section (5) thereof, which confers a right
of appeal upon any person aggrieved by an order of the Collector, to
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the Stamp Rules
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be preferred within the prescribed period before the competent
appellate authority. Reference was also made to Rule 9 of the Stamp
Rules, under which the Inspector General of Registration functions as
the appellate authority. The Division Bench additionally noted that
the statutory scheme envisages an appeal before the High Court
against the order of the appellate authority.
6. Upon applying the aforesaid statutory framework to the facts in hand,
the Division Bench found that the appellant had elected not to
participate in the proceedings initiated pursuant to the reference
under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act and had instead challenged the
show cause notice at the threshold. In the view of the Division Bench,
a writ petition directed merely against a show cause notice was
ordinarily not maintainable, particularly when the appellant had an
adequate opportunity to place its defence before the competent
authority. It was further observed that in exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court ought not to
embark upon an enquiry into disputed questions bearing upon the
merits of the proceedings at a stage when the statutory authority was
yet to render its determination. Holding that the appellant had
bypassed the statutory procedure and that the efficacious alternative
remedy available under the Stamp Act ought to have been exhausted
before invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, the Division
Bench restored the proceedings to the file of the first respondent and
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granted liberty to the appellant to file its defence statement together
with such documents as it might seek to rely upon.
7. Aggrieved by reversal of the order of the Single Judge by the Division
Bench, the appellant has questioned its correctness before this Court.
8. Having noticed the factual panorama engendering the present lis , the
extant controversy before us, at this stage, is not as to what is the
true market value of the property in question or the merits of the
procedure adopted in the valuation. That is an enquiry which is
entrusted to the competent authority by the statute itself. Nor is it
for us, in these proceedings, to determine whether the appellant is
ultimately liable to pay any additional stamp duty. The question
behoving our consideration is, whether the statutory machinery
under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act could validly have been set in
motion at all and, if so, what is the consequence of a challenge to the
(non)-existence of the condition precedent for exercise of that power?
9. As an exordial note for the discussion, we consider it appropriate to
set out Section 47A which reads:
47-A. Instruments under-valued, how to be dealt with .-
(1) If the Registering Officer, appointed under the Registration Act,
1908 (16 of 1908) while registering any instrument relating to the
transfer of any property, has reason to believe that the market value
of the property or the consideration, as the case 1. Subs. by Act 5 of
1927, s. 5, for “promissory note or cheque”. 2. Subs. by Act 19 of
1958, s. 7, for “with the duty of one anna” (w.e.f. 1-10-1958). 3.
Subs. by Act 5 of 1927, s. 5, for “note or cheque”. 45 may be, has
not been truly set forth in the instrument, he may, after registering
such instrument, refer the same to the Collector for determination of
the market value or consideration, as the case may be, and the
proper duty payable thereon.
(2) On receipt of reference under sub-section (1), the Collector shall,
after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard and
after holding an enquiry in such manner, as may be prescribed by
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rules, made under this Act, determine the market value or
consideration and the duty, as aforesaid, and the deficient amount
of duty, if any, shall be payable by the person liable to pay the duty.
(3) The Collector may, suo moto or on receipt of reference from the
Inspector General of Registration or the Registrar of a District, in
whose jurisdiction the property, or any portion thereof, which is the
subject-matter of the instrument, is situated, appointed under the
Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) shall, within three years from the
date of registration of any instrument, not already referred to him
under sub-section (1), call for and examine the instrument for the
purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of its market value
or consideration, as the case may be, and the duty payable thereon
and if, after such examination, he has reason to believe that the
market value or consideration has not been truely set forth in the
instrument, he may determine the market value or consideration and
the duty, as aforesaid, in accordance with procedure provided for in
sub-section (2), and the deficient amount of duty, if any, shall be
payable by the person liable to pay the duty: Provided that nothing
in this sub-section shall apply to any instrument registered before
the date of the commencement of the Indian Stamp (Himachal
Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1988.
(4) Where for any reason the original document called for by the
Collector under sub-section (3) is not produced or cannot be
produced, the Collector may, after recording the reasons for its
nonproduction, call for a certified copy of the entries of the document
from the registering officer concerned and exercise the powers
conferred on him under sub-section (3).
(5) Any person, aggrieved by an order of the Collector, under
subsection (2) or sub-section (3), may, within thirty days from the
date of the order, prefer an appeal before the District Judge and all
such appeals shall be heard and disposed off in such manner as may
be prescribed by rules made under this Act.
(6) For the purpose of this section “market value” of any property
shall be estimated to be the price which, in the opinion of the
Collector or the appellate authority, as the case may be, such
property would have fetched, if sold in the open market on the date
of execution of the instrument relating to the transfer of such
property.
10. In the present case, the Single Judge arrested the entirety of the
proceedings at its inception only, thereby pronouncing upon a
controversy which has been statutorily entrusted, in the first
instance, to another forum. Nonetheless, despite such a statutory
relegation, two narrow doors do exist through which a writ court may
entertain a challenge to a show cause notice: i) want of jurisdiction
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and ii) abuse of jurisdiction (i.e., mala fide exercise of jurisdiction).
Where the authority is vested with no power in law to embark upon
an enquiry in the first place, the notice issued by such authority is
non est. Also, in cases where the power is exercised mala fide or as
an abuse of the process of law, the constitutional court may interdict
it even at the threshold. However, these are engrafted as exceptions
and not as routine measures to litigate every show cause notice under
Article 226.
11. Ms. Haripriya Padmanabhan, learned senior counsel for the
respondents, relying on the decisions of this Court in Special
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Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse , Union of India v. Kunisetty
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Satyanarayana and Union of India v. VICCO Laboratories
has contended that the enquiry that ordinarily follows consequent
upon issuance of a show cause notice should not have been
interdicted by the Single Judge. It was neither a case of lack of
jurisdiction to issue the show cause notice nor a case of mala fides .
According to her, absolutely no case for interference had been set up
and the Single Judge grossly erred in entertaining and allowing the
writ petition at the stage of show cause, which was duly rectified by
the Division Bench in judicious exercise of discretion. She,
accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
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(2004) 3 SCC 440
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(2006) 12 SCC 28
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2023 SCC Online SC 489
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12. Adverting to the factual milieu at hand, the present case does not fall
within the first category. The District Revenue Officer (Stamps), the
first respondent, is the authority who issued the impugned notice. He
is no stranger to the statute, nor is the present controversy relatable
to a subject matter beyond the field entrusted to it. The notice,
therefore, is not one issued by an authority possessing no jurisdiction
whatsoever. What is assailed is the way an existing jurisdiction has
been set in motion. That distinction, though apparently fine, is in law
rudimentary. Arguendo , even assuming that the manner in which the
existing jurisdiction was set in motion was beset by an improper
exercise of jurisdiction, could the Single Judge have quashed the
proceedings in its entirety, thereby rendering any prospective
exercise of power by the authority a nullity, sans relegating the liberty
to the authority to issue a fresh notice in accordance with law?
13. Mr. N. Venkataraman, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing
on behalf of the appellant has forcefully argued that there was a
jurisdictional error at the inception of the proceedings for which the
show cause notice was rightly interdicted by the Single Judge.
According to him, the “reason to believe” that is supposed to kickstart
the proceedings under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act was absent in
the first place. Referring to the Single Judge’s order, he contended
that the court proceeded to quash the show cause notice on the
ground that no satisfaction was reached of there being a “fraudulent
intent” for the purported undervaluation to cause harm to the
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revenue. Such an exercise of reading the requirement of “fraudulent
intent” into Section 47-A of the Stamp Act, though there is no express
stipulation to that effect therein, was justified by the Single Judge on
the anvil of V.N. Devadoss (supra). Reliance in this behalf was
placed on the relevant passages from the said decision, which are
extracted below:
13. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 47-A clearly reveal the
intention of the legislature that there must be a reason to believe
that the market value of the property which is the subject-matter of
the conveyance has not been truly set out in the instrument. It is not
a routine procedure to be followed in respect of each and every
document of conveyance presented for registration without any
evidence to show lack of bona fides of the parties to the document
by attempting fraudulently to undervalue the subject of conveyance
with a view to evade payment of proper stamp duty and thereby
cause loss to the revenue. Therefore, the basis for exercise of power
under Section 47-A of the Act is wilful undervaluation of the subject
of transfer with fraudulent intention to evade payment of proper
stamp duty.
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18. On the facts of the case it cannot be said that Section 47-A has
any application because there is no scope for entertaining a doubt
that there was any undervaluation. That being so, the High Court's
order is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. The registration shall
be done at the price disclosed in the document of conveyance. There
is no scope for exercising power under Section 47-A of the Act as
there is no basis for even entertaining a belief that the market value
of the property which is the subject-matter of conveyance has not
been truly set forth with a view to fraudulently evade payment of
proper stamp duty.
(emphasis supplied by the ASG)
14. Mr. Venkatraman submitted that the Single Judge faithfully followed
the precedent which was binding and, therefore, the Division Bench
clearly erred in taking a contrary view without due consideration of
the decision in V.N. Devadoss (supra).
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15. Mr. Venkataraman further contended that the instrument in question
was executed between the President of India and the appellant and
that, in such a transaction, the element of fraudulent intention or
mens rea , as contemplated in V.N. Devadoss (supra), could not
legitimately emanate. We are unable to accede to the submission in
the manner canvassed. The reference in the instrument to the
President of India as the T RANSFEROR does not indicate that the
President personally executes the instrument or participates in the
transaction in his individual capacity. The constitutional and statutory
scheme necessarily contemplates that contracts and instruments
entered into, in the exercise of the executive power of the Union, are
expressed in the name of the President and are executed on his
behalf by persons authorised in that behalf. In the present case, the
instrument itself records the President of India as represented by the
Deputy/Assistant Salt Commissioner. The mere fact that the
constitutional nomenclature of the President of India figuring in the
instrument as the T RANSFEROR , therefore, cannot by itself preclude an
enquiry into whether the consideration or market value has been truly
set forth in the instrument, nor can it render the question of
fraudulent intention incapable of arising as a matter of law.
16. We have read V.N. Devadoss (supra) in between the lines. The
afore-mentioned decision by a Bench of three Judges declares the
law that while exercising the power under Section 47-A of the Stamp
Act, there must exist material evincing lack of bona fides and a
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fraudulent attempt to undervalue the subject of conveyance in a bid
to evade stamp duty. The basis, therefore, per the ratio of the said
decision, is “wilful undervaluation with fraudulent intention to evade
proper stamp duty” . However, the expressions “wilful
undervaluation” and/or “fraudulent intention” is/are conspicuously
absent in the plain phraseology of sub-section (1) of the said
provision. On its own terms, Section 47-A does not require the
registering authority to issue notice having “reason to believe” of a
culpable mindset being the motive behind the transaction; it merely
requires reason to believe that the market value of the property has
not been truly set forth in the instrument presented before him for
consideration. It is one thing to require that the authority should have
relevant material preceding the formulation of reasons, followed by
exercise of power under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act; and, it is
totally another thing to require that, in addition to the explicitly spelt
out statutory requirement, the officer must also have material
demonstrating wilful or fraudulent intent to evade stamp duty. The
latter proposition, if sought to be pressed as an independent
ingredient for the invocation of power under the said provision, would
be tantamount to judicial legislation under a provision, de hors the
precincts of the plain text of the statute. The language is plain and
the symmetry is straightforward, which should not be distorted in its
purpose, through legal lexicalism .
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17. We may also notice that the view expressed in V.N. Devadoss
(supra), was subsequently noticed by a three-Judge Bench of this
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Court in Registrar of Assurances v. ASL Vyapar (P) Ltd . In this
decision, the three-Judge Bench, while referring to V.N. Devadoss
(supra), observed that there has to be wilful undervaluation of the
subject of transfer with fraudulent intention to evade payment of
proper stamp duty. The three-Judge Bench, however, did not enter
into the nitty-gritty of the statutory provision and, on that aspect,
expressed its disagreement with the view earlier taken in the context
of court-monitored public auction. We are, with respect, unable to
agree with the approach adopted in V.N. Devadoss (supra) as well
as in ASL Vyapar (P) Ltd. (supra), insofar as both decisions proceed
on the footing of reading an element of fraudulent intention into the
plain statutory provision without examining the provision in its full
statutory milieu and the scheme underpinning the power conferred
upon the registering/revenue authority. The question before us,
therefore, requires to be canvassed independently on the plain
language of the provision, its legislative purpose, operational remit
and the statutory mechanism contemplated thereunder.
18. The decision in Ramesh Chand Bansal v. District
13
Magistrate/Collector , is apposite as far as the raison d’ etre of
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(2024) 17 SCC 572
13
(1999) 5 SCC 62
13
Section 47-A of the Stamp Act is concerned. Relevant passages
therefrom are extracted below:
5. The object of the Indian Stamp Act is to collect proper stamp duty
on an instrument or conveyance on which such duty is payable. This
is to protect the State revenue. It is a matter of common knowledge
that in order to escape such duty by unfair practice, many a time
undervaluation of a property or lower consideration is mentioned in
a sale deed. The imposition of stamp duty on sale deeds is on the
actual market value of such property and not the value described in
the instrument. Thus, an obligation is cast on the authority to
properly ascertain its true value for which he is not bound by the
apparent tenor of the instrument. He has to truly decide the real
nature of the transaction and value of such property. For this, the
Act empowers an authority to charge stamp duty on the instrument
presented before it for registration. The market value of a property
may vary from village to village, from location to location and even
may differ from the sizes of area and other relevant factors. This
apart there has to be some material before such authority as to what
is the likely value of such property in that area. In its absence it
would be very difficult for such registering authority to assess the
valuation of such instrument. It is to give such support to the
registering authority that Rule 340-A is introduced. Under this the
Collector has to satisfy himself based on various factors mentioned
therein before recording the circle rate, which would at best be the
prima facie rate of that area concerned. This is merely a guideline
which helps the registering authority to assess the true valuation of
a transaction in an instrument. This gives him material to test prima
facie whether the description of valuation in an instrument is proper
or not.
*
(emphasis ours)
19. Furthermore, in our considered opinion, “wilful undervaluation”
and/or “fraudulent intention” cannot be read as an intra-sentential
component into Section 47-A of the Stamp Act for its invocation, and
any distinction, if purportedly demarcated between bona fide
undervaluation and wilful undervaluation, is alien to the plain
phraseology of the provision as well as the spirit of the statute. The
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following passage from the decision in Shanti Bhushan v. State of
14
U.P. , lends credence to the afore-mentioned proposition:
20. At this stage, we may note that the Stamp Act is a taxing statute.
In interpreting such a statute, equitable considerations cannot be
applied. A taxing statute has to be interpreted in accordance with
what is clearly expressed therein. While interpreting such a statute
and determining the liability to pay tax, the provisions are required
to be construed strictly. In other words, the rule of literal construction
must be applied while interpreting a taxing statute. It must be
interpreted in terms of the natural construction of the words used.
There is no scope to imply anything which is not expressly provided.
20. The afore-canvassed decision affords a close parallel to the extant
controversy qua the interpretation of Section 47-A.
21. However, we hasten to add that Ramesh Chand Bansal (supra) and
Shanti Bhushan (supra) are coordinate Bench decisions whereas
V.N. Devadoss (supra), since followed in ASL Vyapar (P) Ltd.
(supra), is a decision of a three-Judge Bench. Thus, in these
proceedings, we are not empowered to pronounce upon the
correctness of V.N. Devadoss (supra) for whatever our prima facie
impression may be, about the textual interplay between Section 47-
A and the additional requirement of “wilful undervaluation” and/or
“fraudulent intention” articulated in V.N. Devadoss (supra). Judicial
propriety and discipline require us to follow a binding decision of a
larger Bench. Nonetheless, if the proposition in V.N. Devadoss
(supra) does not commend our acceptance and we strongly feel that
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2023 SCC OnLine SC 489
15
it requires reconsideration, the appropriate course is to leave the
question for consideration by a Bench of appropriate strength.
22. It would be profitable to consider two situations of an honest and a
dishonest sale, delineated below, to consider the effect of V.N.
Devadoss (supra).
a. The honest sale:
S owns a property, the circle rate whereof is ₹2 cr. However, it is a
tenanted property and the tenants enjoy protection of the relevant
Rent Control Act. Additionally, the road access to such property is not
too wide and a litigation is also pending between S and one of his
tenants. These facts are sufficient for any valuer to confirm true
depressed market value as ₹1.5 cr. After due diligence, P agrees to
purchase the property and offers ₹1.5 cr. The offer of P is accepted
by S who sells the property to P for ₹1.5 cr. Being the entire sale
consideration, ₹1.5 cr. is shown in the instrument. There is not an
iota of fraud, no cash dealing. As is customary, P as the purchaser
bears stamp duty assessed on ₹1.5 cr.
Two courses are possible on such instrument.
First, if Section 47-A is taken on its own terms and the registering
authority has reason to believe that market value has not been truly
set forth, the enquiry would be a pure valuation-based enquiry, i.e.,
whether ₹1.5 cr. is the true market value given the encumbrances,
though circle rate is ₹2 cr.? The burden would be on P to prove the
market value of the property sold as ₹1.5 cr., not to disprove fraud.
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However, if the test in V. N. Devadoss (supra) is applied to such a
situation, a fraudulent intention has to be the sine qua non for
issuance of notice and the enquiry would shift from valuation to
culpable mindset. P, who has been entirely honest, will now be called
upon to prove absence of fraudulent intention. The honest
undervaluation, even when fully explained by objective market
factors, could be presumptively treated as dishonest, unless P
disproves culpable mindset.
This, in our opinion, gives rise to a cause for injustice. In a valuation-
centric proceeding, an honest purchaser has only to show what the
property is actually worth. Under a fraud-centric test, the same
honest purchaser has to defend his character, i.e., merely because
he bought an encumbered property at its true, albeit low price, he
did not intend to cheat the exchequer. The ratio of V. N. Devadoss
(supra), by importing culpable mindset into a provision which, on its
own terms, is about true market value, converts a market value
enquiry into a quasi-criminal enquiry.
b. The fraudulent sale:
Conversely, take an illustration where S sells his property worth ₹2
cr. to P. However, the sale price of the property is shown as ₹1.5 cr.
in the instrument. S receives such amount by cheque, and the
balance ₹50 lakh in cash, which happens to be P’s unaccounted
money; all these, inter alia , to evade stamp duty. Though culpable
mindset undoubtedly exists, yet, the registering authority may have
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no access to material to form a reason to believe that the transaction
is tainted by fraudulent intent to evade stamp duty. If a demonstrable
wilful undervaluation and/or fraudulent intention were made the
jurisdictional pre-condition for issuing notice, the enquiry would be
still-born. Notice, in such a case, can never be issued. Would that not
defeat the very object of the provision which is to protect government
revenue?
23. The test propounded in V.N. Devadoss (supra) fails to do justice in
either situation. In a genuine sale of encumbered property, it exposes
an honest purchaser to a roving enquiry for no fault of his; in a case
of a clandestine cash consideration, it disables the registering
authority from even initiating an enquiry for want of material which,
by its very nature, lies within the exclusive knowledge of the parties.
In the former, it is too harsh; in the latter, too lax.
24. Having bestowed our anxious thoughts and in the circumstances
discussed above, we have serious doubt regarding the efficacy of the
law declared in V.N. Devadoss (supra) as a binding precedent and
find ourselves unable to accept the proposition laid down therein as
correct law. V.N. Devadoss (supra) being a larger Bench decision,
the only option now open to us is to refer the following questions for
consideration by a Bench larger than the present Bench:
a. Whether, V.N. Devadoss (supra), since followed in ASL
Vyapar (P) Ltd. (supra), correctly interprets and declares that the
basis for exercise of power under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act is
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wilful undervaluation of the subject of transfer with fraudulent
intention to evade payment of proper stamp duty? Or, whether on
the very terms of Section 47-A, power thereunder can be and ought
to be exercised by the registering authority, irrespective of absence
of any culpable mindset of the parties to the sale, by truly deciding
the real nature of the transaction and value of the subject property,
without being bound by the apparent tenor of the instrument?
b. Whether the decisions in Ramesh Chand Bansal (supra) and
Shanti Bhushan (supra) do not lay down correct law?
25. Let the referred questions and the papers be placed before the
Hon’ble the Chief Justice for an appropriate order.
26. Needless to observe, if V.N. Devadoss (supra) is upheld as laying
down correct law, the decision of the Single Judge quashing the
notice would be entirely justified; otherwise not.
………………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
………………………………J.
(SHEEL NAGU)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 07, 2026.
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