YOUNUS MUSHTAQ BHAT vs UNION TERRITORY THROUGH POLICE STATION KAKAPORA (POLICE / HOME)
- Court
- Jammu and Kashmir High Court
Serial No. 48
Suppl Cause List
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
CrlA(D) 116/2025
Reserved on: 13/11/2026.
Pronounced on: 18/11/2026.
Uploaded on: 18/11/2026.
Whether operative part
or full judgment is pronounced: Full
Younis Mushtaq Bhat
S/o. Mushtaq Ahmad Bhat
R/o. Laribal Kakapora,
Pulwama
(Through his father)
…Appellant
Through: Mr. Adil Pandit, Advocate
Vs.
Union Territory of Jammu and
Kashmir through Police Station
Kakapora, Pulwama
...Respondent
Through: Mr. Mohsin Qadri, Sr. AAG with
Ms. Maha Majeed, Assisting Counsel.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHD YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
(Mohd Yousuf Wani-J)
1. Impugned in the instant appeal, having been filed in terms of the
provisions of Section 21(3) of the National Investigation Agency
Act, 2008 [hereinafter referred to as the “NIA Act” for short], is the
order dated 17-11-2025 passed by the learned Special Court
designated under the NIA Act [Court of Additional Sessions Judge,
Pulwama and hereinafter referred to as the “Trial Court” for short],
on the application of the appellant for grant of bail in his favour in
case FIR No. 29/2022 under Sections 302 IPC, 7/25, 7/27 Arms Act
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 1
and Sections 16, 18, 20, 38 and 39 of the ULA(P) Act of Police
Station Kakapora, Pulwama, while rejecting the same.
2. The impugned order has been assailed in this appeal on the grounds,
inter alia , that the appellant is innocent and has been falsely and
frivolously implicated in the case FIR. That the learned Trial Court
has denied bail to the appellant without any justifiable reason by
referring to the law, which does not hold good in the case alleged
against him. That no evidence has been either collected during
investigation of the case or even brought at the trial, so far, in
support of the allegations against the appellant regarding his
involvement in the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 18 and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
["ULA(P) Act" for short].
That the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and some High Courts of the
country, including this High Court, regarding the quality of the
evidence needed for presuming the commission of offence of
conspiracy as defined under Section 18 of the ULA(P) Act. That the
learned Trial Court has committed a grave error and illegality by
non-appreciation and underestimation of the fact to the effect that the
bar created under the provisions of Section 43D of the ULA(P) Act is
not attracted in the case of the appellant in the given facts and
circumstances of the case. That the afore-referred bar created under
the provisions of Section 43D(5) is applicable only in cases where
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 2
there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation
against the accused person is prima facie true.
That there was no material on record before the learned Trial
Court to be convinced and satisfied that the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 18 and 39 of the ULA(P) Act is prima
facie made out against the appellant-accused. That there is not an iota
of evidence on the record of the file to substantiate the allegation of
hatching of conspiracy by the appellant, as no recovery of any kind
came to be made from him or at his instance. That the learned Trial
Court has been mainly influenced by the heinousness and seriousness
of the offences alleged against the appellant without appreciating the
fact that no reasonable ground appeared to be made out for
presuming the commission of the said offences by the appellant. That
the co-accused, namely, Tawheed Bashir Bhat, under similar
allegations, was first discharged by the learned Trial Court in the
offences under Sections 18 and 39 of the ULA[P] Act and
subsequently enlarged on bail on 23-07-2024 in the offence under
Section 13 of the ULA[P] Act, under which only he was charged.
That the appellant has been arrested in the case on 23-04-2022
and, as such, he has been facing detention in the case for about three
years and eight months. That the material witnesses so far examined
at the trial have not incriminated the appellant, when the unexamined
witnesses happen to be formal witnesses who are attributed to have
deposed nothing even in their 161 Cr.P.C statements recorded during
investigation. That the impugned rejection order has been passed by
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 3
the learned Trial Court on mere surmises and conjectures while
underestimating the legal principles governing the case. That there
appear no reasonable grounds, in the light of the evidence collected
during investigation and even adduced at the trial so far, for
believing that the accusation against the appellant is prima facie true.
That the continued detention of the accused in the case FIR
tantamounts to his pre-trial conviction. That the continued
incarceration of the appellant is also violative of his fundamental
right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India.
That the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence is that an
accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty at the trial and
the burden of proving his guilt lies on the prosecution. That the
object of bail is mainly the securing of attendance of the accused at
the trial, which can be taken care of by imposing reasonable
conditions in respect of his release order. That the appellant, during
his continued detention in the case, has developed multiple ailments
in the jail, including cardiac problem, and there are not proper
medical facilities available within the jail. That the appellant has not
filed any other petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court or even
before this Court. That the appellant shall abide by any conditions
that may be imposed by this Court.
3. We have heard the Learned counsel for the parties in respect of the
matter.
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 4
4. We have perused the record of the instant appeal as also the scanned
copy of the trial court record, especially the order impugned.
5. The case of the prosecution relevant for disposal of this appeal is that
police station Kakapora Pulwama on 18-4-2022 received an
information from reliable sources to the effect that some unknown
terrorists have resorted to indiscriminate firing by their illegally
obtained weapons at railway station Kakapora resulting into the on-
spot death of Head Constable Surinder Singh and the sustaining of
grievous injuries by other police personnel. That on the receipt of the
said information, case FIR number 29 of 2022 dated 18-4-2022 came
to be registered with the said police station with the initiation of the
investigation proceedings by the PW 42. That during investigation,
necessary site map came to be prepared with the seizure of four
empty cartridges of pistol from the spot. That dead body of the
deceased Head Constable Surinder Singh was taken to hospital
Kakapora for fulfillment of the departmental formalities. When the
SI-Dev Raj (injured) was referred to SMHS hospital for treatment.
That the statements of the witnesses came to be recorded by the
investigating officer.
That the injured SI-Dev Raj also succumbed to his injuries in the
hospital on 23-4-2022. That during investigation, CCTV footage was
obtained from the railway authorities which led to the identification
of some suspects including the present appellant Younis Mushtaq
alias Imtiaz S/o. Mushtaq Ahmad Bhat, R/o. Laribal Kakapora. That
the appellant initially disowned his involvement in the case but when
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 5
he was confronted with the CCTV footage, he admitted his
involvement in the case whereupon he was formally arrested. That
the disclosure of the appellant was got recorded in presence of the
Executive Magistrate. That the disclosure of the appellant led to the
involvement of one-Mukhtar Ahmad Bhat, S/o. Mohd Maqbool Bhat
R/o. Laribal, Kakapora also in the case, whose search was started.
That the statement of PW 34 namely Irfan Ahmad Dar who happens
to be the friend of accused Mukhtar Ahmad came to be recorded
during investigation in terms of Section 164A CRPC before the
Magistrate. That the site maps of some other places came to be
prepared at the instance of the appellant accused. That the appellant
during investigation also disclosed about the involvement of one
more person namely Tawheed Bashir Bhat S/o. Bashir Ahmad Bhat
R/o. Laribal, Kakapora in the case who was also brought for
questioning purposes.
That the appellant/accused in his disclosure statement before the
Executive Magistrate, inter alia, disclosed that on 18-4-2022, the
accused Mukhtar Ahmad Bhat told him to meet him near the water
tank at 5:20 p.m., whereupon he reached the fixed place in time,
where the accused Mukhtar Ahmad Bhat was standing with his red-
coloured Pulsar bike. That the number plate of the bike had been
kept wrapped by the said Mukhtar Ahmad with a black tape, and he
was wearing a yellow coloured upper, in the cap of which he had
hidden his head. That he also provided him a similar yellow coloured
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 6
upper, which he wore on, and thereafter both of them proceeded
towards the railway station Kakapora on the motorcycle.
That the accused Mukhtar Ahmad told him that he has to perform
a terrorist activity at railway station Kakapora. That upon reaching
the entry point of the railway station, the accused Mukhtar Ahmad
directed him, that is, appellant Younis Mushtaq, to keep the
motorcycle in running position ahead of entry point, and then he
himself came down from the motorcycle, cocked the pistol and
proceeded towards the railway station. That after a while the said
Mukhtar Ahmad fired upon two Railway Police Force employees,
who were having tea at a table, with intention to kill them,
whereafter he came running towards him, i.e., the appellant,
whereafter both of them boarded the motorcycle and proceeded
towards Sangoo Narbal. That the accused Mukhtar Ahmad along the
way told somebody that mission was successful. That the accused
Mukhtar Ahmad thereafter dropped him, i.e., the appellant, when he
himself went to some unknown place.
That the accused Tawheed Bashir also, during investigation,
admitted his own involvement as well as the involvement of the
accused Mukhtar Ahmad in the case. That during investigation, the
search of Babar terrorist, whose name also surfaced in the process,
was started, and it surfaced that, he is, in fact, a terrorist commander
Reyaz Ahmad Dar @ Khalid @ Sheeraz @ Babar, R/o. Suthergund
Kakapora, who had kept different code names to avoid his
identification and arrest by the security forces. That during
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 7
investigation, the commission of the offences punishable under
Section 18 and 39 ULA[P] Act were found established against the
appellant and Tawheed Bashir, when against the accused Mukhtar
Ahmad, the offences punishable under Sections 7/25, 7/27 Arms Act,
16, 18, 20, 38 ULA[P] Act were found established. That as against
the accused Reyaz Ahmad Dar, the offences punishable under
Sections 18, 20, 38 ULA[P] Act were found established.
That the investigation in the case was finally concluded in the
form of challan/final report against four accused persons (1) Younis
Mushtaq Bhat S/o. Mushtaq Ahmad Bhat R/o. Laribal Kakapora
(appellant) (2) Tawheed Bashir Bhat S/o. Bashir Ahmad Bhat R/o.
Laribal Kakapora (3) Mukhtar Maqbool Bhat S/o. Mohd Maqbool
Bhat R/o. Laribal Kakapora and (4) Riyaz Ahmad Dar S/o. Aziz
Ahmad Dar R/o. Sathergund Kakapora. That since the accused
persons Mukhtar Maqbool Bhat and Riyaz Ahmad Dar were found to
have joined terrorists and, as such, could not be arrested, therefore,
prayer was made in the final report/challan regarding initiation of
proceedings in terms of provisions of Section 299 of the Code
against them, which was accordingly done by the ld. Trial Court
upon presentation of the challan/final report pursuant to grant of
sanction by the Govt. Home Department vide SO 507 dated:
12.10.2022.
6. The perusal of the scanned copy of the Trial Court record reveals that
the appellant/accused came to be formally charged by the ld. Trial
Court for the commission of the offences punishable under Sections
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 8
18 and 39 UAPA vide order dated 27.12.2022. As on the date of
passing of the impugned bail order dated 17.11.2025, the prosecution
had examined Seventeen (17) witnesses out of total list of 42
witnesses.
7. In the backdrop of the aforementioned perusal and the consideration
of the rival arguments advanced on both the sides, we are of the
opinion that the impugned order dated 17.11.2025 passed by the ld.
Trial Court on the bail application of the appellant, while dismissing
the same, does not suffer from any illegality due to any
misappreciation of the facts and the law governing the case. The
application of the appellant resulting in the passing of the impugned
order appears to have been considered in accordance with the law, in
the facts and circumstances of the case especially the evidence of the
prosecution. As hereinbefore mentioned, Seventeen (17) witnesses
have been examined by the prosecution at the trial out of the total list
of Forty-Two (42) witnesses.
8. The appellant is facing trial on the charge under Sections 18 and 39
ULA(P) Act already framed against him vide order dated 27.12.2022
by the ld. Trial Court. The offences respectively fall under Chapters
IV and VI of the ULA(P) Act and, thus, attract the bar in terms of
provisions of Section 43D(5) of the ULA(P) Act.
9. The provisions of clause (5) of Section 43-D ULA (P) Act place an
embargo on the grant of bail to an accused involved in the offence(s)
falling under the Chapters IV and VI of ULA (P) Act when, the
accusation against him appears to be prima facie true . Such
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 9
restrictions imposed by the ULA (P) Act are an addition to the
restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being in
force on granting bail.
10. It is apt to reproduce the provisions of clauses (5) and (6) of the
Section 43D of ULA (P) Act for ready reference: -
“43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code.
(1)…………………………..
(2)………………………….
(3)………………………….
(4)…………………………….
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no
person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV
and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or
on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given
an opportunity of being heard on the application for such
release: Provided that such accused person shall not be
released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal
of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the
Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation against such person is prima
facie true.
(6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub-
section (5) are in addition to the restrictions under the Code
or any other law for the time being in force on granting of
bail.
(7)……………………………………………….”
11. Thus, it is clear that an accused alleged to have committed the
offences falling under the Chapters IV and VI of the ULA (P) Act,
whether facing investigation or trial has to first come out of the
embargo placed by the Section 43D (5) of the Act, whereafter his
case for grant of bail can be considered under the provisions of
Sections 437 & 439 of the “Code” respectively corresponding to the
Sections 480 & 483 of “BNSS”. If the court is of the opinion on the
perusal of the Case Diary file or the record of the police
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 1 0
report/challan in case of pendency of the trial, that accusation against
the accused appears to be prima facie true, bail cannot be granted.
The inference regarding the “ prima facie true ” or “otherwise” of the
prosecution case during the investigation stage can be drawn from
the perusal of the case diary and during trial from the record of the
Police report/challan.
The words “ prima facie true ” cannot be read and understood to
mean “proved” as used in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
Such an interpretation would set at naught the power vested in a
Court to grant bail pending trial. The expression “ prima facie true ”
would obviously mean something more than mere
suspicion/conjectures and something less than “proved”. The
inference regarding “ Prima facie true ” would vary from case to case
and from one accused to another. What may be “ Prima facie true ” in
one case may not be so in another and therefore, the said expression
cannot on account of a discretion vested in the Court be put in a
straightjacket. Each case would have to be dealt with and examined
on its own facts and decided.
12. The consideration at the time of taking up a bail application for
consideration, is different from the consideration to be adopted at the
end of the trial for holding an accused, guilty or not guilty.
In considering an application for bail, the court is not required to
conduct a preliminary trial of the case and consider the probabilities
of the accused being found guilty or innocent.
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 1 1
The Courts while deciding the bail applications in respect of
which the Code/BNSS or some Special Statute places
embargo/limitations as in the instant case, will be traversing beyond
their proper ambit and would be exceeding the limit of their
functions, if they get engaged in discovering the guilt or innocence of
the Applicant/accused, which can only be determined at the
conclusion of the trial.
13. The restrictions on granting of bail specified sub section (5) of
Section 43D ULA (P) Act are in addition to the restrictions under the
Code or any other law for the time being in force for granting bail.
14. The offence under Section 18 ULA(P) Act also charged against the
appellant carries a punishment of life imprisonment. The ld. Trial
Court in its order dated 27.12.2022 regarding consideration of
framing of charge has, inter alia, observed that there is sufficient
material to charge the accused No. 1 namely Younis Mushtaq Bhat
(appellant) for commission of offences under Sections 18 and 39
ULA(P) Act.
15. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant made during
arguments to the effect that no substantial evidence was collected
during investigation of the case supporting the involvement of the
appellant who, instead, has been robed in, in the case on the basis of
surmises and conjectures, does not appear to be bearing any weight
at this stage of the trial. He inter alia contended that appellant has
been falsely and frivolously implicated in the case FIR on account of
some extra-judicial confession attributed to have been made by him
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 1 2
which, even if supposed to be true for arguments sake, has no value
in the eyes of law and cannot be accordingly relied upon for want of
any subsequent recovery from him or at his instance or even for want
of identification of a new fact.
16. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended during his
arguments that the appellant has been facing detention in the case
since his arrest in the case on 23.04.2022 and, as such, he has already
spent more than four and a half years in jail when trial of the case is
likely to take some more years to conclude as about 50% of the
witnesses are yet to be examined at the trial. He submitted that the
statutory restriction in terms of Section 43D(5) ULA(P) Act and the
appellants fundamental right to his liberty needs to be
harmonized/balanced. He submitted that it is well settled that when a
constitutional court is approached upon violation of the Fundamental
Right to Liberty of an accused due to his long incarceration without
any immediate prospect of the conclusion of the trial, then the
provisions regarding the statutory bar on his bail melt down.
17. The learned counsel for the appellant in support of his arguments
placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court cited as:
i. Union of India vs. K A Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713
ii. National Investigating Agency vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah
Watali (2019) 5 SCC 1.
iii. Gurvinder Singh vs State of Punjab and Anr (2024) Livelaw
(SC) 100
18. He contended that in KA Najeeb’s case (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court granted bail to an accused who was facing
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 1 3
prosecution for offences under Sections 16, 18, 18B, 19 and 20 of
ULA(P) Act, when he had only spent Five (5) Years in jail.
19. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended during his
arguments that the bar created in terms of provisions of Section
43D(5) of the ULA(P) Act operates only when there appear
reasonable grounds for believing the accusation against the accused
as “prima facie true”. He submitted that the words “prima facie true”
are to be distinguished from the words “reasonable grounds of
Involvement” as the earlier phrase requires a higher degree of belief.
20. The learned counsel for the respondent-UT, however, during his
arguments and while rebutting the contentions of the learned counsel
for the appellant submitted that the case of the appellant attracts the
bar in terms of provisions of Section 43D(5) of ULA(P) Act as the
grounds of involvement of the appellant in the offences charged
against him apparently look to be prima facie true in the light of the
evidence collected by the investigating officer during the
investigation of the case and as also adduced at the trial so far. He
contended that it has come in the evidence in the case that the
appellant was apprehended as a suspect on the basis of CCTV
footage collected from the authorities of the Railway Police,
Kakapora Station. That the appellant, who initially negated his
involvement in the case, however, admitted the same upon being
confronted with the CCTV footage of the occurrence.
21. The ld. Sr. AAG submitted that pursuant to his disclosure made
before the Executive Magistrate, the Investigating Agency succeeded
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 1 4
in getting his disclosure corroborated through the evidence of PW’s
5, 31 and 34. He submitted that PW 34 in his statement recorded
during investigation before the Magistrate as well as made by him at
the trial of the case supported the involvement of the present
appellant as, according to the statement of the said PW 34, the
appellant after commission of the occurrence revealed the fact to the
said PW.
22. The Ld. Sr. AAG further contended that the appellant stands already
charged in the case for the commission of the offences punishable
under Sections 18 and 39 of the ULA(P) Act vide order dated
27.12.2022 of the ld. Trial Court which fact lends support to his
prima facie involvement in the case. He further contended that the
Investigating Agency has obtained the CCTV footage of the
occurrence in a CD which has been seized in the case and is figuring
against Item No. 20 in the enclosures to the final report/challan. That
the prosecution will prove the contents of the CD at the trial of the
case. The learned Senior AAG further contended that PW 38 Shri.
Rajesh Kumar RPF 100566 stands listed as such in respect of the
CCTV footage who has to depose at the trial.
23. Having regard to the evidence collected during investigation and as
adduced at the trial so far, the Court is of the opinion that the bar in
terms of provisions of Section 43D(5) of ULA(P) Act stands
justifiably attracted in the case. In the light of the statements of the
PWs 5, 31 and 34, the Court has reason to believe at this early stage
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 1 5
of the trail of the case that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusation against the appellant is prima facie true.
24. It is needful to mention that in view of Clause (6) of Section 43D of
the ULA(P) Act, restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub-
section 5 of that section are in addition to the restrictions under the
Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting the
bail. So, it is justified to say that had there been no bar imposed in
terms of Section 43D(5) of the ULA(P) Act, the case is nevertheless
meant to be considered by the ld. Trial Court as well as by this Court
in the light of the guiding factors that are being laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in respect of the consideration of a bail
application touching the non-bailable offences of heinous nature.
25. There is no single golden rule or any single litmus test for
consideration of bail application even in respect or ordinary non-
bailable offences. However, the following guidelines/governing
principles, which are not exhaustive are to be kept in mind while
considering a bail application.
i) The judicial discretion must be exercised with the utmost care
and circumspection.
ii) That the Court must duly consider the nature and the
circumstances of the case including:
a) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
tampered;
b) investigation being hampered or
c) the judicial process being impeded or subverted.
iii) The liberty of an individual must be balanced against the
larger interests of the society and the State.
iv) The court must weigh in the judicial scales, pros and cons
varying from case to case all along bearing in mind two
paramount considerations viz:
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 1 6
i) grant of bail quo an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life is an exception and not the
Rule;
ii) the court at this stage is not conducting a preliminary
trial;
iii) the nature of the charge is the vital factor, the nature
of evidence is also pertinent, the punishment to
which the party may be liable also bears upon the
matter and the likelihood of the applicant interfering
with the witnesses or otherwise polluting the course
or justice;
iv) the facts and circumstances of the case play a
predominant role.
26. The presumption of innocence of the accused till the proof of his
guilt will not be affected even if bail is rejected and is for the
prosecution to establish the guilt of an accused beyond any shadow
of doubt.
27. It has been held in State of Rajasthan Jaipur vs. Balchand AIR 1977
SC 2447, that it is true that the gravity of the offence involved is
likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must
weigh with the court when considering the question of bail.”
28. The learned Trial Court for the purpose of passing the impugned
order was not required to conduct a mini trial and to scan and weigh
the evidence as is being done at the conclusion of the trial. In the
instant case he had to only see whether the involvement of the
appellant appears to be “Prima Facie True” which aspect appears to
have been rightly considered in the facto-legal scenario of the case.
29. We feel fortified in our opinion with the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled “Jalaluddin Khan vs Union of
India 2024 INSC 604 decided on 13th August, 2024” .
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 1 7
While examining Section 43D(5) of the ULA(P) Act, the
Hon’ble Apex Court considered its decisions in “Shoma Kanti Sen
vs. The State of Maharashtra”, “Gurvinder Singh vs. State of
Punjab”, “National Investigation Agency vs Zahoor Ahmad Shah
Watali”, and “Thwaha Fasal vs Union of India”, and reiterated that
a bail Court must consider whether the chargesheet and supporting
material discloses requisite grounds for believing that the accusation
is prima facie true. That the assessment does not require a mini trial
or detailed examination of the merits and demerits of the evidence.
That the prosecution material must be considered as a whole and
ordinarily taken as presented but the statutory restriction cannot be
invoked without material connecting the accused to the ingredients
of the alleged offences.
30. It is felt profitable to reproduce the Paras 13, 14 and 15 of the
judgment in Jalaluddin Khan vs Union of India (supra):
“ 13. Learned ASG relied upon a decision of this Court in the case
of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab and Another². This Court
extensively considered its earlier decision in the case of National
Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali³, which deals
with interpretation of Section 43D(5). Paragraph 32 of the said
decision reads thus:
“32. In this regard, we need to look no further than Watali case
[NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1: (2019) 2
SCC (Cri) 383\] which has laid down elaborate guidelines on the
approach that courts must partake in, in their application of the bail
limitations under the UAP Act. On a perusal of paras 23 to 24 and
26 to 27, the following 8-point propositions emerge and they are
summarised as follows:
C r l A ( D ) 1 1 6 / 2 0 2 5 P a g e N o . 1 8
32.1. Meaning of “prima facie true”:
On the face of it, the materials must show the complicity of the
accused in commission of the offence. The materials/evidence
must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of
facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or
contradicted by other evidence.
32.2. Degree of satisfaction at pre-charge-sheet, post charge-sheet
and post-charges — compared:
“26. … once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume
that a very strong suspicion was founded upon the materials
before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a
presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual
ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused,
to justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused
may have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court that
despite the framing of charge, the materials presented along
with the charge-sheet (report under Section 173 of CrPC), do
not make out reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusation against him is prima facie true. Similar opinion is
required to be formed by the Court whilst considering the
prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report made under
Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case.”
32.3. Reasoning, necessary but no detailed evaluation of evidence:
“24. … the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this
stage—of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail—is
markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the
evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the
evidence is not required to be done at this stage.”
32.4. Record a finding on broad probabilities, not based on proof
beyond doubt:
“The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis
of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused
in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.”
32.5. Duration of the limitation under Section 43-D(5):
“26. … the special provision, Section 43-D of the 1967 Act,
applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the
offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the
conclusion of the trial thereof.”
32.6. Material on record must be analysed as a “whole”; no
piecemeal analysis
“27. … the totality of the material gathered by the investigating
agency and presented along with the report and including the
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case diary, is required to be reckoned and not by analysing
individual pieces of evidence or circumstance.”
32.7. Contents of documents to be presumed as true:
“27. … The Court must look at the contents of the document
and take such document into account as it is.”
32.8. Admissibility of documents relied upon by prosecution
cannot be questioned:
The materials/evidence collected by the investigation agency in
support of the accusation against the accused in the first
information report must prevail until contradicted and
overcome or disproved by other evidence…. In any case, the
question of discarding the document at this stage, on the
ground of being inadmissible in evidence, is not permissible.”
(emphasis added)
1 4. There is one more decision of this Court in the case of Thwaha
Fasal v. Union of India⁴, which again deals with the scope of
Section 43D(5) of UAPA. After considering the decision in the
case of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali³, in fact, in paragraph 24, the
case has been extensively reproduced.
Thereafter, in paragraph 26, this Court held thus:
“26. Therefore, while deciding a bail petition filed by an
accused against whom offences under Chapters IV and VI of
the 1967 Act have been alleged, the court has to consider
whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusation against the accused is prima facie true. If the court
is satisfied after examining the material on record that there are
no reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against
the accused is prima facie true, then the accused is entitled to
bail. Thus, the scope of inquiry is to decide whether prima
facie material is available against the accused of commission of
the offences alleged under Chapters IV and VI.
The grounds for believing that the accusation against the
accused is prima facie true must be reasonable grounds.
However, the court while examining the issue of prima facie
case as required by sub-section (5) of Section 43-D is not
expected to hold a mini trial. The court is not supposed to
examine the merits and demerits of the evidence. If a charge-
sheet is already filed, the court has to examine the material
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forming a part of charge-sheet for deciding the issue whether
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation
against such a person is prima facie true. While doing so, the
court has to take the material in the charge-sheet as it is.”
(emphasis added)
15. As held in the case of Thwaha Fasal⁴, the Court has to examine
the material forming part of the charge sheet to decide whether
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations
against the person applying for bail are prima facie true. While
doing so, the court must take the charge sheet as it is.
31. We have gone through the impugned order and do not find any fault
therein in terms of law. The ld. Trial Court has justifiably
distinguished the facts of the present case from the one that was
before the Hon’ble Apex Court through “Union of India vs. K A
Najeeb”.
32. Admittedly, an accused person has got a fundamental right to speedy
trial as guaranteed to him under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India, but a balance needs to be struck in between the interests of the
state including the society and that of an individual accused.
33. The offence under Section 18 of the ULA(P) Act also charged
against the appellant carries a sentence upto the imprisonment for
life. The appellant has been under detention in the case since last
more than four and a half years so he is not supposed to have
completed either one-half or even two-third of the maximum
punishment even by invoking the provisions of Section 6 of the
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, to seek his entitlement for bail in
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terms of provisions of Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Surkasha Sanhita, 2023.
34. For the foregoing discussion, there seems to be no merit in the
instant appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.
35. However, it is needful to mention that the observations made in this
order have been made for the limited purpose of the consideration of
the instant appeal and nothing herein shall be construed as any pre-
judging of or interference with the merits of the case which have to
be decided at the conclusion of the trial.
36. The ld. Trial Court is, however, requested to expedite the trial in the
main case.
(MOHD YOUSUF WANI) (SANJEEV KUMAR)
JUDGE JUDGE
SRINAGAR
18.11.2026
Shahid Manzoor
Whether the judgment is speaking? Yes
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
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