Narender Kumar vs State Of Haryana And Another

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH



151 CRM-M-46260-2026 (O&M)
Date of decision: 03.11.2026
Date of uploading: 03.11.2026
Narender Kumar ....Petitioner

V/s

State of Haryana and another ....Respondents

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. Krishan Singh, Advocate for the petitioner.


Ms. Mahima Yashpal Singla, Senior DAG, Haryana.
Mr. Baljeet Bhardwaj, Advocate for respondent No.2.
*
SUMEET GOEL , J. (Oral)
1. The present has been filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) seeking quashing of the judgment
dated 10.03.2025 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa &
the judgment as also the order of sentence dated 25.07.2022 passed by
st
Judicial Magistrate 1 Class, Sirsa, whereby the petitioner has been
convicted and sentenced for offence under Section 138 of Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, on the basis of compromise.
It would be apt to mention herein that the petitioner had earlier
approached this Court, challenging the abovesaid orders vide CRR-1095-
2025 and the said petition was dismissed by this Court on merits thereof,
vide order dated 25.05.2026. The instant petition has now been filed for
setting aside the impugned orders, solely on the basis of compromise
entered into between the parties dated 05.08.2026 (copy whereof has been
NAVEEN NAGPAL
2026.11.04 09:57
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authenticity of this order/judgment.
High Court Chandigarh.
appended as Annexure P-4 with the present petition).

CRM-M-46260-2026 (O&M) 2

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
petitioner and respondent No.2/complainant have now entered into a
settlement/compromise dated 05.08.2026 (copy whereof appended as
Annexure P-4 with the present petition). Learned counsel for the petitioner
has further submitted that since the parties have amicably settled their
dispute(s), the matter may be compounded and the petitioner be acquitted.
In order to buttress his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has
relied upon the dicta of the judgment of this Court passed in CRM-13907-
2023 in CRR No.3183 of 2014 titled as Amarjeet Singh Vs. Om Pal and
another, decided on 29.03.2023, relevant whereof reads thus:
“5. The Counsel for the applicant/petitioner contends that after
the revision petition came to be dismissed by this Court, vide
judgment dated 17.03.2023 a compromise has been arrived at
between the parties and the applicant/petitioner is ready and
willing to compensate the complainant adequately. It is his
contention that even post recording of conviction the Court can, in
the interest of justice, allow the parties to compound the offence
pursuant to a compromise. Reliance is placed on K. Subramanian
Vs. R. Rajathi Rep. By P.O.A. Review Petition (Crl) No.355 of
2009 in Spl. Leave Petition (Crl.)6974 of 2008 Decided on
05.11.2009, Smt. Kamlesh Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan S.B.
Criminal Writ No.1186 of 2018 Decided on 02.01.2019, O.T.G.
Global Finance Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Mohan Mandelia & Ors.
2014(9) RCR (Criminal) 2384 and Kirpalsingh Pratapsingh Ori
Vs. Balvinder Kaur Hardipsingh Lobana 2004 Cril.J 3786.
6. The Counsel for the complainant has accepted the factum of
compromise having been arrived at between the parties as per
which an amount of Rs.4,50,000/- has been paid by the
petitioner/applicant to the complainant/respondent. He states that
he has no objection if the offence is allowed to be compounded
and the accused acquitted for having committed
7. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties.
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Subramanian Vs. R. Rajathi
Rep. By P.O.A. Review Petition (Crl) No.355 of 2009 in Spl.
Leave Petition (Crl.)6974 of 2008 Decided on 05.11.2009 has
NAVEEN NAGPAL
2026.11.04 09:57
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
High Court Chandigarh.
held that having regard to the salutary provisions of Section 147

CRM-M-46260-2026 (O&M) 3

of Negotiable Instruments Act read with Section 320 Cr.PC, as a
compromise had been arrived at between the parties they could be
allowed to compound the offence committed by the convicted
accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, even
though the Special Leave Petition of the accused against his
conviction already stood dismissed. A similar view has been taken
by various Hon’ble High Courts as is evident from the judgments
in Smt. Kamlesh Sharma’s case (supra), O.T.G. Global Finance
Ltd. & Ors.’s case (supra) and Kirpalsingh Pratapsingh Ori’s
case (supra) .”
3. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent
No.2/complainant has ratified the factum of compromise/settlement having
been arrived at between the parties and has further vouched the genuineness
of the compromise/settlement dated 05.08.2026 stated to be arrived between
the parties. Accordingly, he has iterated that the respondent-complainant has
no objection in case the offence is permitted to be compounded and the
petitioner is ordered to be acquitted.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have
perused the available record.
4.1 Vide order dated 14.09.2026, the concerned rival parties were
directed to get their respective statements recorded regarding the factum of
compromise. A report dated 05.10.2026 has been received from the learned
Judicial Magistrate 1st Class concerned, which reflects that the parties have
entered into a settlement/compromise.
5. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment passed by
three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court titled as Damodar S.
Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal H., AIR 2010(SC) 1907, relevant whereof reads
thus:
“15. With regard to the progression of litigation in cheque bouncing cases,
the learned Attorney General has urged this Court to frame guidelines for a
graded scheme of imposing costs on parties who unduly delay compounding
NAVEEN NAGPAL
2026.11.04 09:57
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authenticity of this order/judgment.
High Court Chandigarh.
of the offence. It was submitted that the requirement of deposit of the costs

CRM-M-46260-2026 (O&M) 4

will act as a deterrent for delayed composition, since at present, free and
easy compounding of offences at any stage, however belated, gives an
incentive to the drawer of the cheque to delay settling the cases for years. An
application for compounding made after several years not only results in the
system being burdened but the complainant is also deprived of effective
justice. In view of this submission, we direct that the following guidelines be
followed:-
THE GUIDELINES
(i) In the circumstances, it is proposed as follows:
(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of Summons be suitably
modified making it clear to the accused that he could make an
application for compounding of the offences at the first or second
hearing of the case and that if such an application is made,
compounding may be allowed by the court without imposing any
costs on the accused.
(b) If the accused does not make an application for compounding as
aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made before the
Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed
subject to the condition that the accused will be required to pay 10%
of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for compounding
with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the Court
deems fit.
(c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is made before the
Sessions Court or a High Court in revision or appeal, such
compounding may be allowed on the condition that the accused pays
15% of the cheque amount by way of costs.
(d) Finally, if the application for compounding is made before the
Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 20% of the cheque
amount.
Let it also be clarified that any costs imposed in accordance with these
guidelines should be deposited with the Legal Services Authority operating at
the level of the Court before which compounding takes place. For instance, in
case of compounding during the pendency of proceedings before a
Magistrate's Court or a Court of Sessions, such costs should be deposited
with the District Legal Services Authority. Likewise, costs imposed in
connection with composition before the High Court should be deposited with
the State Legal Services Authority and those imposed in connection with
composition before the Supreme Court should be deposited with the National
Legal Services Authority.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx xxx
17. We are also conscious of the view that the judicial endorsement of
NAVEEN NAGPAL
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High Court Chandigarh.
the above quoted guidelines could be seen as an act of judicial law-making

CRM-M-46260-2026 (O&M) 5

and therefore an intrusion into the legislative domain. It must be kept in mind
that Section 147 of the Act does not carry any guidance on how to proceed
with the compounding of offences under the Act. We have already explained
that the scheme contemplated under Section 320 of the CrPC cannot be
followed in the strict sense. In view of the legislative vacuum, we see no
hurdle to the endorsement of some suggestions which have been designed to
discourage litigants from unduly delaying the composition of the offence in
cases involving Section 138 of the Act. The graded scheme for imposing costs
is a means to encourage compounding at an early stage of litigation. In the
status quo, valuable time of the Court is spent on the trial of these cases and
the parties are not liable to pay any Court fee since the proceedings are
governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though the impact of the
offence is largely confined to the private parties. Even though the imposition
of costs by the competent court is a matter of discretion, the scale of costs
has been suggested in the interest of uniformity. The competent Court can of
course reduce the costs with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of
a case, while recording reasons in writing for such variance. Bona fide
litigants should of course contest the proceedings to their logical end. Even
in the past, this Court has used its power to do complete justice under Article
142 of the Constitution to frame guidelines in relation to subject-matter
where there was a legislative vacuum.”
5.1. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as M/s
New Win Export &Anr. vs. A. Subramaniam 2024 INSC 535 : 2024(3)
Law Herald (SC) 2098, relevant whereof reads as under:
“6. At this juncture, we would also like to reiterate a few words
regarding the principles of compounding of offences in the context of NI
Act. It is to be remembered that dishonour of cheques is a regulatory
offence which was made an offence only in view of public interest so that
the reliability of these instruments can be ensured. A large number of
cases involving dishonour of cheques are pending before courts which is
a serious concern for our judicial system. Keeping in mind that the
‘compensatory aspect’ of remedy shall have priority over the ‘punitive
aspect’, courts should encourage compounding of offences under the NI
Act if parties are willing to do so. (See: Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed
Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663 (Para 18) , Gimpex Private Limited v.
Manoj Goel (2022) 11 SCC 705 (Para 29) , Meters And Instruments
Private Limited And Anr. v. Kanchan Mehta (2018) 1 SCC 560 (Para
18.2)”
NAVEEN NAGPAL
2026.11.04 09:57
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
High Court Chandigarh.

CRM-M-46260-2026 (O&M) 6

5.2. More recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment tiled
as Sanjabij Tari vs. Kishore S. Borcar and another = 2025 INSC 1158, has
held as under:
“38. Since a very large number of cheque bouncing cases are still

pending and interest rates have fallen in the last few years, this Court is
of the view that it is time to 'revisit and tweak the guidelines'.
Accordingly, the aforesaid guidelines of compounding are modified as
under:-
(a) If the accused pays the cheque amount before recording of his
evidence (namely defence evidence), then the Trial Court may allow
compounding of the offence without imposing any cost or penalty on the
accused.
(b) If the accused makes the payment of the cheque amount post the
recording of his evidence but prior to the pronouncement of judgment by
the Trial Court, the Magistrate may allow compounding of the offence on
payment of additional 5% of the cheque amount with the Legal Services
Authority or such other Authority as the Court deems fit.
(c) Similarly, if the payment of cheque amount is made before the Sessions
Court or a High Court in Revision or Appeal, such Court may compound
the offence on the condition that the accused pays 7.5% of the cheque
amount by way of costs.
(d) Finally, if the cheque amount is tendered before this Court, the figure
would increase to 10% of the cheque amount.”
5.3. The statutory provision of Section 359 of BNSS, 2023 (Section
320 of Cr.P.C., 1973) and Section 147 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
when examined alongwith Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 in the guiding light
of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases of Damodar S.
Prabhu (supra), M/s New Win Export (supra) and Sanjabij Tari (supra),
lead to the unequivocal conclusion that the offence under Section 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be compounded at all stages of
litigation, including when the matter has reached the High Court after
having been conclusively dealt with by the Magisterial as also the Sessions
Court. In other words, such an offence can be compromised/compounded
NAVEEN NAGPAL
2026.11.04 09:57
I attest to the accuracy and
authenticity of this order/judgment.
High Court Chandigarh.

CRM-M-46260-2026 (O&M) 7

even after the petitioner-accused has been convicted by the Court of learned
Magistrate and his appeal against the same has been dismissed by the
learned Sessions Court.
5.4. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Damodar S.
Prabhu (supra) has also enunciated that, ordinarily, costs ought to be
imposed when the offence under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act
of 1881 is compounded at a stage when substantial proceedings have
already been undertaken by the Courts so as to dissuade the unscrupulous
litigant from unduly delaying the compounding of such offences. However,
discretion has been reserved in favour of the concerned Court to
reduce/waive such costs, in case facts/circumstances of a given case so
warrant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sanjabij Tari (supra) has
revisited the guidelines, insofar as it relates to the quantum of imposition of
costs upon the accused, but has not modified the leeway granted in the
judgment of Damodar S. Prabhu (supra) which permits reduction or waiver
of costs based on the factual milieu of a particular case albeit subject to the
recording of reasons for such variance. For the sake of clarity it is reiterated
that liberty reserved in favour of the courts to waive the imposition of costs
may be exercised by any of the courts seized of the matter—be it the High
Court, the Sessions Court or the magisterial Court conducting trial. It is,
however, imperative to bear in mind that discretion to waive the imposition
of costs is not to be invoked as a matter of ordinary course. The exercise of
such discretion must be predicated upon exceptional, compelling and
accentuating circumstances which, in the considered opinion of the
concerned Court seized of the matter, warrant deviation from the general
rule of imposition of cost. The Court, while invoking such discretion, must
NAVEEN NAGPAL
2026.11.04 09:57
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authenticity of this order/judgment.
High Court Chandigarh.
record clear, cogent and reasoned findings delineating the special factors

CRM-M-46260-2026 (O&M) 8

that justify the waiver. This requirement is in consonance with the
legislative intent and the underlying purpose sought to be achieved by the
criminalization of the act of dishonor of cheque, i.e. to inculcate financial
discipline and uphold the credibility and sanctity of negotiable instruments.
5.5. Still further, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 528 BNSS, 2023 is primarily aimed at preventing abuse of judicial
process and securing the ends of justice. Thus, where the dispute is
essentially personal in nature and a genuine compromise has been reached,
the High Court may intervene to quash the conviction, recognizing that
continued proceedings would be non-productive and unjust in the given
circumstances. The inherent powers of a High Court are incidental replete
powers, in the absence of which, the Court would be obliged to sit still and
helplessly witness the process of law being abused for the purposes of
injustice. In other words; such power(s) is intrinsic to the High Court,
forming its very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without
such power(s), a High Court would retain form but lack substance. These
powers of a High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest
possible amplitude. These inherent powers are in consonance with the
nature of a High Court which ought to be, and has in fact been, invested
with power(s) to maintain its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts
from being obstructed or abused. It is a trite posit of jurisprudence that
though laws attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety
of circumstances which shape events and the imperfections of language
make it impossible to lay down provisions capable of governing every case,
which in fact arises. A High Court which exists for the furtherance of justice
in an indefatigable manner, should therefore, have unfettered power(s) to
NAVEEN NAGPAL
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authenticity of this order/judgment.
High Court Chandigarh.
deal with situations which, though not expressly provided for by the law,

CRM-M-46260-2026 (O&M) 9

need to be dealt with, to prevent injustice or the abuse of the process of law
and Courts. The juridical basis of these plenary power(s) is the authority; in
fact the seminal duty and responsibility of a High Court; to uphold, to
protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice, in
accordance with law, in a regular, orderly and effective manner. In other
words; Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects peerless and inherent powers, of
a High Court which may be invoked whenever it is just and equitable to do
so, in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to
prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice nay substantial justice between
the parties and to secure the ends of justice. Therefore, the High Court, in
the exercise of its inherent power under section 528 BNSS, 2023 has the
discretion to quash a conviction where the parties have reached an amicable
settlement, provided that such compromise neither impinge upon the public
interest nor undermine the cause justice, as well as the substantial justice.
6. Reverting to the facts of the case in hand, it is not disputed by
the concerned rival parties that an amicable settlement has been arrived at
between them and, therefore, compounding of the offence and necessary
further directions have been sought from this Court. A perusal of the
compromise/settlement dated 05.08.2026 stated to be arrived between the
parties, though post-conviction, reflects that the parties have sought to
resolve their dispute(s) in toto and bury the hatchet. Consequently, in the
considered opinion of this Court, the factual matrix of the case requires that
the offence(s) ought to be permitted to be compounded and the petitioner
deserves to be acquitted.
6.1. Keeping in view the entirety of the attending
facts/circumstances of the case; especially factum of the petitioner having
NAVEEN NAGPAL
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High Court Chandigarh.
faced the wrath of criminal litigation since about the year 2016 and the

CRM-M-46260-2026 (O&M) 10

petitioner being a person aged 39 years of age; this Court does not deem it
appropriate to saddle the petitioner with costs.
7. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:
(i) The impugned judgment dated 10.03.2025 passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa & the judgment as also the order of
st
sentence dated 25.07.2022 passed by Judicial Magistrate 1 Class, Sirsa are
set-aside and the petitioner is acquitted.
(ii) The rival parties shall remain bound by the terms of the
settlement/compromise dated 05.08.2026 (Annexure P-4) entered into
between the parties. In case of non-compliance thereof, the aggrieved party
shall be at liberty to seek recall of this order, albeit upon showing sufficient
cause. It is clarified that in case non-compliance is found to be shown, the
erring party may be saddled with exemplary punitive measure(s).
(iii) No order as to costs.
(iv) Pending application(s), if any, shall also stands disposed of.




(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
03.11.2026
Naveen

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No

NAVEEN NAGPAL
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authenticity of this order/judgment.
High Court Chandigarh.