THE STATE PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER, vs THE KERALA STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION,

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE MOHAMMED NIAS C.P.
th th
MONDAY, THE 25 DAY OF MAY 2026 / 4 JYAISHTA, 1948
WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019
PETITIONERS:
1 THE STATE PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER AND UNDER
SECRETARY, KERALA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
PATTOM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
2 THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY AND JOINT SECRETARY,
ADVICE (LITIGATION), PATTOM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
3 KERALA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, PATTOM,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
BY ADVS. SHRI.P.C.SASIDHARAN, SC, KPSC
SRI.MILLU DANDAPANI
RESPONDENTS:
1 THE KERALA STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF THE STATE INFORMATION COMMISSION,
PUNNAN ROAD, THIRUVANNATHPAURAM-695001.
2 RANI WILDFRED, DEPUTY SECRETARY,
KERALA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
O/O KERALA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695001.
BY ADVS. SHRI.AYPE JOSEPH
SRI.L.T.LEJU KUMAR
SRI. M. AJAY, SC
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
30.01.2026, THE COURT ON 25.05.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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'CR'
JUDGMENT
“ In fact, paradoxically, government is more open when it is less open”

Sir Humphrey Appleby in 'Yes Minister'
The State Public Information Officer of the Kerala Public
Service Commission and the Appellate Authority constituted under
the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter RTI Act), and the
Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC) are the petitioners in the
writ petition, filed against the order passed by the Kerala State
Information Commission.
nd
2. The 2 respondent, who worked as Joint Secretary under
KPSC, sought Ext.P1 RTI application seeking copies of the extract of
the orders in File No.SS I (1) 162/14/GW, which relates to
disciplinary proceedings initiated against her, alleging grave
irregularities in handling cash, and that the physical balance of the
cash did not tally with the book balance and a shortage of

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Rs.25341/- as found out by the Internal Audit Wing. Following this,
the second respondent was suspended pending enquiry, and a
memo of charges was issued. In the enquiry, it was found that the
nd
2 respondent made false entries in the cash transactions, and a
punishment of barring increment was imposed on her apart from
nd
the recovery of the amount determined as loss to PSC, and the 2
respondent remitted the amount with interest. An appeal was filed
against the imposition of the punishment, which the Commission
considered and rejected by order dated 13.10.2008.
nd
2.1. On 7.4.2014, a petition was preferred by the 2
respondent, six years after imposing the punishment, to reconsider
the matter. She also filed another petition to review the decision
dated 13.10.2008, which the Chairman examined and rejected by
order dated 16.01.2017. It is with reference to the above-mentioned
file, i.e., File No. SS I (1) 162/14/GW that the information was sought
for under the RTI Act through Ext.P1 application. The Information
Officer gave Ext.P2 reply dated 9.05.2017, stating that the

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information requested cannot be disclosed under the RTI Act.
nd
Aggrieved by Ext.P2 reply, the 2 respondent preferred an appeal
nd
before the 2 petitioner, Appellate Authority, which rejected the
same vide Ext.P3, dated 22.06.2017.
nd
2.2. Aggrieved by Ext.P3, the 2 respondent preferred Ext.P4
st
appeal, dated 28.06.2017, before the 1 respondent. The first
respondent issued Ext.P5 order, dated 28.07.2018, directing the PSC
to make available all the documents sought for, without referring to
any specific document or information to be supplied, and also
ordered proceedings under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. Ext.P5
order states that the denial of information under Sections 8(1)(e)
and 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act was unsustainable, since the information
sought related to disciplinary proceedings initiated against the
applicant herself and consisted of materials which she would
ordinarily be entitled to receive in the course of such proceedings.
It was further observed that such records, when subjected to
judicial scrutiny in disciplinary proceedings, are ordinarily

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produced before courts and are not treated as confidential
documents. Further reasoning was that the exemption relating to
privacy under Section 8(1)(j) could not be invoked, as the
information was sought by the very person to whom the alleged
invasion of privacy pertained, and that a person whose integrity or
reputation is affected through disciplinary proceedings has a right
to know the contents of the inquiry and related materials.
2.3. The Commission also relied upon the proviso to Section
8(1)(j), holding that since such information could not be denied to
the Parliament or Legislature, the same could not be denied to the
applicant under the RTI Act. It is submitted by the petitioners that
the file note sought by the delinquent employee contains the
notings and opinions of various officers and Members of the Kerala
Public Service Commission, and that the same does not constitute a
public document to which a delinquent employee is entitled to
claim access under the RTI Act. It is therefore contended that Ext.P5
is liable to be quashed.

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nd
3. In the counter affidavit filed by the 2 respondent, Rani
Wilfred (party respondent) submits that the disciplinary
proceedings initiated against her while she was working as a
Cashier in the Kerala Public Service Commission were wholly
unwarranted and amounted to victimisation, particularly when she
was on the verge of promotion as Section Officer. The allegation
pertained to an alleged shortage in cash handling during the period
from 2004 to 2006, which was subsequently remitted by her with
interest. It is submitted that the then Chairman and Secretary of
the KPSC, after considering the matter, had fully exonerated the
respondent from all charges in the year 2014 in File No.
SSI(1)162/14/GW. However, despite repeated requests dated
17.10.2016 and 20.01.2017, copies of the exoneration order, enquiry
report and monitoring committee report were not furnished to her,
compelling her to invoke the provisions of the Right to Information
Act. The respondent contends that the information sought relates
exclusively to the disciplinary proceedings initiated against her and

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pertains to her own service records and enquiry files, and therefore
cannot be denied by invoking Sections 8(1)(e) and 8(1)(j) of the RTI
Act. It is further submitted that the disclosure of such information
does not involve any fiduciary relationship or invasion of privacy,
especially when the applicant herself seeks information affecting
her integrity, dignity and service rights.
3.1. It is further submitted that the petitioners have
deliberately withheld the information, despite the order passed by
the State Information Commission directing disclosure under
Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. Though the said order was passed on
28.07.2018, the writ petition challenging the same was filed only on
11.01.2019 after considerable delay, solely with an intention to
continue the harassment and victimisation of the respondent. The
allegations regarding shortage and misconduct, as stated in the writ
petition, are specifically denied as false and incorrect. The
respondent submits that once she stood exonerated from all
liabilities in 2014, she became legally entitled to obtain copies of the

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relevant enquiry records and orders. The denial of the same is
arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the provisions of the RTI Act. It is
therefore prayed that the writ petition be dismissed with costs and
the petitioners be directed to produce the relevant files before this
Hon’ble Court and implement the order of the Information
Commission forthwith.
4. Heard Sri. P.C. Sasidharan, the learned counsel for the
petitioners and Sri. M. Ajay, the learned Standing Counsel for the
respondent and Smt. Surya Binoy, the learned Amicus Curiae.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the
materials relied on for initiating the disciplinary proceedings and
the reason for imposing the punishment were all furnished, and the
nd
2 respondent (party respondent) has accepted the same. What is
sought under RTI is the file note with reference to the review
petition, which cannot be sought for under the Act. The disclosure
of a confidential file related to disciplinary action initiated against a
delinquent incumbent will hamper the fiduciary relationship

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between the Commission and officers concerned. The request made
nd
by the 2 respondent does not come within the purview of
“information” which is defined under Section 2(f) of the Act, and
does not relate to individual files, but to the general working of the
Commission. Moreover, the information sought has no public
interest and is purely a personal matter, and if disclosed, will
adversely affect the functioning of the Commission. The petitioners
rely on Central Board of Secondary Education and Another v. Aditya
Bandopadhyay and Others [2011 KHC 4686] in which the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that while the right to information is a
cherished and vital tool to promote transparency, accountability,
and combat corruption, indiscriminate or impractical demands for
disclosure of all information, unrelated to these objectives, would
be counterproductive, as they may impair administrative efficiency,
burden public authorities, and lead to misuse of the Act as a means
of obstruction, intimidation, or diversion of resources from core
public functions.

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5.1. It is submitted that Section 20(1) of the RTI Act can be
invoked only in cases where without any reasonable cause and
persistently failed to receive an application for information or has
not furnished information within the time specified under sub-
section (1) of Section 7 or malafidely denied the request for
information or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or
misleading information or destroyed information which was the
subject of the request or obstructed in any manner in furnishing
the information, it shall recommend for disciplinary action against
the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public
Information Officer. Mens rea is an important ingredient for
initiating proceedings under Section 20(1), and no such finding is
st
there, and therefore 1 respondent ought not to have ordered the
initiation of proceedings under the said section. The counsel also
relied on Kerala Public Service Commission v. State Information
Commission, Kerala and Others [2011 (2) KHC 87], Kerala Public
Service Commission and Others v. State Information Commission and

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Another [2016 (1) KHC 533], Union Public Service Commission v.
Angesh Kumar and Others [2018 KHC 6133], Chief Information
Commissioner and Another v. State of Manipur and Another [2011
KHC 5099], Canara Bank Rep. by its Deputy Gen. Manager v. C.S.
Shyam and Another [2017 (4) KHC 784 = MANU/SC/1068/2017],
Central Board of Secondary Education and Another v. Aditya
Bandopadhyay and Others [2011 KHC 4686] and Bihar Public Service
Commission v. Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi and Another [2012 KHC
4749 = MANU/SC/1103/2012].
st
6. Learned counsel for the 1 respondent, Kerala State
Information Commission, submits that the definition of information
under Section 2(f) in RTI Act means any material in form, including
records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press
releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers,
samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and
information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a
public authority under any other law for the time being in force.

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Under Section 2(i), record is defined as it includes any document,
manuscript and file; further under Section 2(j), right to information
is defined as the right to information accessible under this Act
which is held by or under the control of any public authority and
includes the right to inspection of work, documents, and records.
Therefore, it is argued that a cumulative reading of all this shows
that the file notes are included under the definition of information
under the Act, and therefore, the information sought by the
applicant is to be disclosed.
6.1. It is further argued that the information sought pertains
to disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant herself
and, therefore, cannot be treated as personal information exempt
from disclosure under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act on the ground of
unwarranted invasion of privacy. It is contended that the plea of
privacy is misconceived, since the information is sought by the very
person to whom the proceedings relate, and no question of invasion
of privacy arises in such circumstances. It is further submitted that

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where disciplinary proceedings affect the integrity, reputation, or
service rights of an individual, such a person is entitled to know the
contents of the inquiry report and connected materials, and such
entitlement cannot be defeated by invoking the exemption under
Section 8(1)(j).
6.2. It is also contended that the information sought is of a
nature which the applicant would ordinarily be entitled to receive
in the course of the disciplinary proceedings themselves. It is
contended that when disciplinary proceedings are subjected to
judicial scrutiny, the connected records, including inquiry materials
and note files, are ordinarily produced before courts as part of the
regular records and are not treated as documents to be furnished
exclusively in sealed cover. Therefore, the exemption under Section
8(1)(e) of the RTI Act cannot be invoked by contending that the
materials are held in a fiduciary capacity.
6.3. It is further argued that the proviso to Section 8(1)(j)
expressly provides that information which cannot be denied to

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Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be denied to any person.
According to the respondent, if the information sought is of a
nature capable of being called for by a member in the Legislative
Assembly, the concerned records would have to be produced before
the House, and therefore, the applicant is equally entitled to obtain
the same under the RTI Act.
7. By order dated 30.01.2026, Smt. Surya Binoy was appointed
as an Amicus Curiae. Learned Counsel contends that information
rights operate in two dimensions, namely, the right to access
information held by public authorities and the right to protect
personal information, and that the governing framework now
comprises the Right to Information Act, 2005 and the Digital
Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (hereinafter DPDP Act). It is
contended that Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act stood amended by
Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act, 2023, which came into force on
30.11.2025, expanding the exemption relating to personal
information. The validity of the said amendment and the Digital

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Personal Data Protection Rules (hereinafter DPDP Rules) 2025 is
presently under challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
7.1. The learned Amicus Curiae also points out that the DPDP
Act introduces a comprehensive data protection framework
founded on principles such as consent, purpose limitation and data
security. It is further submitted that the scheme of the RTI Act, as
reflected in its preamble, requires a balance between transparency
and competing public interests such as efficient governance and
confidentiality, and therefore Section 8(1)(j) must be construed
purposively, adopting a balanced and pragmatic approach rather
than a narrow or literal interpretation. It is also submitted that
after the enactment of the DPDP Act, 2023, Section 8(1)(j) leans
towards a broader protection of personal information. However, at
the relevant time, the unamended provision applied, under which
service and disciplinary records were treated as personal
information exempt from disclosure unless a larger public interest
justified disclosure.

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7.2. Referring to Jamia Millia Islamia v. Ikramuddin [2012 KHC
2171 = MANU/DE/4461/2011] (Delhi High Court), it is contended
that the term ‘person’ includes a juristic person; however,
“personal information” does not relate to information pertaining to
a public authority to whom the query for disclosure of information
is directed. In Orissa Power Generation Corporation Ltd. v. Orissa
State Information Commission and Ors [2024 KHC OnLine 2393 =
MANU/OR/1552/2023], (Orissa High Court), the court held that the
principle of proportionality is to apply when the right to privacy
and the right to information are balanced against each other. In The
Muppathadam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. The State Chief
Information Commissioner and Ors [2025 KHC OnLine 412 =
MANU/KE/1628/2025] (Kerala High Court), a case where copies of
the construction contract entered into by the society and minutes
of the general body meeting were sought, the Division Bench of this
court held that those documents do not fall within the exemption of
Section 8. In John George Nechupadom v. Kerala State Information

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Commission and Ors [2022 KHC OnLine 8035 =
MANU/KE/3576/2022], (Kerala High Court), this court held that as
the minutes of the board meeting after its approval are sent to the
Registrar of Companies, it becomes a public document and cannot
be personal information.
7.3. It is asserted that the question of disclosure under Section
8(1)(j) depends upon balancing privacy, confidentiality and public
interest. In Arun Luthra v. Chhattisgarh State Information
Commission & Others [2011 KHC 2574 = AIR 2011 Chh 128]
(Chattisgargh High Court), and Union of India v. R.S. Khan [2011
KHC 2169 = AIR 2011 DELHI 50] (Delhi High Court), disclosure of file
notings relating to official functions was permitted in appropriate
cases, whereas in Gulab Singh Rana v. The Central Public
Information Officer, Indian Overseas Bank and Ors [2022 KHC 2828 =
MANU/TN/4282/2022] (Madras High Court), internal note files in
disciplinary proceedings were held to be protected to preserve
institutional functioning. In Central Board of Secondary Education

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and Another v. Aditya Bandopadhyay and Others [2011 KHC 4686],
information sought was pertaining to answer sheets of the
applicant and their valuation, and held that Section 8(1)(e) cannot
be invoked to deny supply of information to the beneficiary and the
contention that the disclosure may affect the physical safety of the
examiners within the meaning of Section 8(1)(g) was also to not
avail. In Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India
v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal [MANU/SC/1561/2019 = 2019 (5) KHC
499], the Supreme Court recognised the need to balance
transparency with protection of fiduciary and deliberative
processes. Similarly, Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central
Information Commissioner & Others [(2013) 1 SCC 212], affirmed in
R.K. Jain v. Union of India and Ors. [2013 KHC 4310 =
MANU/SC/0291/1993], treated the performance of an
employee/officer in an organisation is primarily a matter between
the employee and the employer and normally those aspects are
govern by the service rules and fall under the expression ‘personal

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information’, absent larger public interest, while Bihar Public
Service Commission (Supra), Public Information Officer and
Registrar v. Onkar Dattatray Kalmankar [2025 KHC OnLine 7133]
and Ravi Prakash Soni v. Central Information Commission [2024 KHC
Online 5044] emphasise that disclosure ultimately depends upon the
nature of the information, the existence of genuine public interest,
and the impact of disclosure on protected institutional interests.
7.4. It is submitted that the proviso to Section 8(1)(j), relating
to information that cannot be denied to Parliament or the
Legislature, has received divergent interpretation from various
High Courts. In Canara Bank v. The Central Information Commission
and Ors [2007 (3) KHC 185 = MANU/KE/0346/2007] [Kerala High
Court (DB)], Treesa Irish v. Central Public Information Officer and
Ors [2010 (3) KHC 940 = MANU/KE/2875/2010], Surupsingh Hrya
Naik v. State of Maharashtra & Ors [2007 KHC 4190 =
MANU/MH/0170/2007] (Bombay High Court) and University of
Calcutta & Ors v. Pritam Rooj [2009 KHC 6284 =

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MANU/WB/0084/2009](Calcutta High Court), favoured disclosure
adopted a broader view. However, the said approach in Canara
Bank v. The Central Information Commission and Ors [2007 (3) KHC
185 = MANU/KE/0346/2007] [Kerala High Court (DB)] was
subsequently reversed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C.S. Shyam
(Supra), which held that the proviso does not override the
protection available under Section 8(1)(j), and that service-related
personal information cannot be disclosed absent a larger public
interest.
7.5. Referring to Vijay Prakash v. Union of India & Others
[2010 KHC 6477 = AIR 2010 DELHI 7] and Shailesh Gandhi v. Central
Information Commission, New Delhi and Others [2015 KHC 3833], it is
contended that the Courts adopted a narrower interpretation of the
proviso to Section 8(1)(j), holding that it does not override privacy
protections or permit unrestricted access to personal information
merely because Parliament may, in a given case, call for such
information. The powers of Parliament and Legislative Assemblies

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under Article 105(3) are structured and regulated by procedural
rules, relevance and legislative necessity, and questions concerning
personal service matters or individual grievances are ordinarily not
admissible. In Chief Information Commissioner v. High Court of
Gujarat & Ors [2020 (2) KHC 322 = MANU/SC/0275/2020], it was
further held that the Act recognises the need to protect the
institutional interest to make optimum use of limited fiscal
resources and preservation of sensitive information and in the
absence of any inherent inconsistency between the provisions of
the RTI Act and the other law an overriding effect of the RTI Act
would not apply. The Manual of Office Procedure Other than
Secretariat also indicates that Note Files, inter-departmental
correspondence and internal deliberations form part of the
decision-making process and are generally treated as confidential,
particularly in disciplinary matters, with disclosure being limited to
the operative decision and reasons communicated under the
applicable service rules.

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8. The question that arises for consideration is whether Ext.P5
order passed by the State Information Commission, directing
disclosure of file notings and initiating proceedings under Section
20(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, is sustainable in law,
particularly having regard to the scope of exemption under Section
nd
8(1)(j) of the Act and the nature of the information sought by the 2
respondent.
9. The information sought in the present case pertains to file
notings, internal communications, inter-departmental opinions and
deliberative materials forming part of disciplinary proceedings
nd
initiated against the 2 respondent. Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act is
extracted below:
“ 8. Exemption from disclosure of information : - (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall
be no obligation to give any citizen -
… ...............
(j) information which relates to personal information the
disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity

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or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of
the privacy of the individual unless the Central Public
Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or
the appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that
the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such
information:
Provided that the information which cannot be denied to the
Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any
person”.
10. Before dealing with the provisions per se , it is pertinent to
look into the preamble of the RTI Act, which recognises the need to
balance the right to information with other public interests,
including efficient operations of the Government and preservation
of confidentiality of sensitive information. The provision of Section
8(1) is not merely a fetter on the right to information, and it
shouldn’t be construed literally, narrowly or strictly, but a
purposive construction involving a balanced and pragmatic
approach, balancing the two objects of the Act is to be adopted. The
first component of the provision is personal information and the
law relating to it has evolved through judicial pronouncements and

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is now well settled that the expression “personal information”
occurring in Section 8(1)(j), as it stood at the relevant time, takes
within its fold not merely personal records, but also professional
records, including service records, disciplinary proceedings,
confidential assessments and employment-related materials.
Personal information is thereby identified as such information
which, if disclosed, would lead to unwarranted invasion of privacy,
as it does not have any correlation with public information.
11. The Courts have also extended the term ‘personal
information’ to persons other than individuals. The question boils
down to whether the information is such that its disclosure
amounts to unwarranted invasion into privacy that has no relation
to the public activity or interest relevant to the institution. Further
component of the provision is the ‘unwarranted invasion into
privacy’, which focuses on the protection of human autonomy and
dignity and which is also a fundamental right. It is relevant to note
that in Orissa Power Generation Corporation (Supra), the applicant

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requested details as regards his own performance, and the Orissa
High Court found that this information was supplied to Odisha
Mining Corporation Ltd. The information was not personal
information pertaining to the applicant, and it involved disclosure
of a private communication between two corporations, even though
it may concern the applicant, and there was no public interest or
activity involved. The court found that the principle of
proportionality applies when the right to privacy and the right to
information are balanced against each other. The third component
of the provision is the requirement of a larger public interest, i.e.,
that the disclosure of the information is justified notwithstanding
the claim of privacy or exemption. In Subhash Chandra Agarwal
(supra), it was held that the Court’s duty is to balance one public
interest against the other.
12. In Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information
Commissioner & Others (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
categorically held that memos, show-cause notices, censure orders

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and service-related materials constitute personal information,
disclosure of which ordinarily bears no nexus to public activity and
would amount to unwarranted invasion of privacy unless justified
by demonstrable larger public interest. The said principle was
reiterated in R.K. Jain (Supra) and C.S. Shyam (Supra) .
13. The scope of the right to information and the necessity of
maintaining a balance between transparency and confidentiality
was explained by the Supreme Court in Central Board of Secondary
Education and Another v. Aditya Bandopadhyay and Others (Supra)
wherein it was held that the RTI Act does not contemplate
indiscriminate disclosure of every category of information held by a
public authority and that competing interests such as
confidentiality, fiduciary protection, privacy and efficient
administration are equally protected under the statutory scheme.
The request in the present case is not confined to the ultimate
decision taken in the disciplinary proceedings or the reasons
communicated to the employee, but extends to the entire Note File

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containing internal deliberations, evaluative comments and
decision-making processes within the department. Such materials
stand on a fundamentally different footing from final orders
communicated in discharge of statutory duties.
14. Though certain decisions, including Arun Luthra (Supra)
and Union of India v. R.S. Khan (Supra), recognised that file notings
connected with official action may in appropriate cases be
disclosed, the said decisions do not lay down an inflexible
proposition that all internal note files are liable to be disclosed
irrespective of context, nature of proceedings or institutional
consequences. If no merit is found in the apprehension that
disclosure would pose potential danger to the officers concerned,
file notings may be disclosed, except for the exempted information.
On the contrary, in Gulab Singh Rana (Supra), Indian Overseas Bank
(Supra) , the petitioner sought inter alia internal documents
containing the opinions/views of his disciplinary authority on
sanctioning his prosecution by the CBI. Exemption was sought

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under Section 8(1)(d)(g) and (h) of the Act, and it was the
petitioner’s case that at the relevant time, the investigation was
already complete. The Court held that if a copy of the opinion and
views is supplied, it will create unnecessary hindrance for the
peaceful investigation, interrogation, and departmental disciplinary
proceedings/criminal proceedings.
15. The doctrine of candour recognises the need for protecting
a certain class of documents as they concern decision-making at the
highest level of government, and only complete freedom from
public gaze will enable freedom of expression and candour amongst
government functionaries. This was recognised by the Constitution
Bench in Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra), in which it was
observed that candour, frankness and confidentiality, though
integral to the common genus, i.e. efficient governmental
functioning, per se , are not conclusive but should be kept in view in
weighing the balancing act. Its weight will vary according to the
nature of proceedings in which disclosure is sought, the level at

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which the matter was considered, the subject matter of
consideration, the relevance of documents and the degree of
likelihood that the document will be of importance in the litigation.
16. Given the above, when the request is tested against the
essential components of the provision that may warrant disclosure,
the present case does not satisfy any of them. The information
sought pertains to internal disciplinary records constituting
personal information, the disclosure of which has no relationship to
any public activity or public interest, and would result in an
unwarranted invasion of privacy. Further, no larger or overriding
nd
public interest has either been pleaded or established by the 2
respondent so as to justify disclosure of the said information.
Ext.P5, however, proceeds on the assumption that the entire note
file is mechanically disclosable without undertaking any balancing
exercise between transparency, privacy, confidentiality and
institutional integrity. Such an approach is legally unsustainable.
Even assuming the contention of the learned counsel for the

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 30 2026:KER:34827
respondent that file notings fall within the definition of
“information” under the RTI Act is correct, the disclosure of such
information would nevertheless remain subject to the exemptions
and procedural safeguards contemplated under Sections 8 and 11 of
the Act.
st
17. The principal contention advanced by the 1 respondent
(Kerala State Information Commission) in the Ext.P5 order and
nd
raised by the 2 respondent (applicant) in the counter affidavit, is
that the proviso to Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act states that
information which cannot be denied to Parliament or the
Legislature cannot be denied to any person. The scope and effect of
the said proviso, however, have been the subject matter of
divergent judicial interpretation. In Canara Bank v. Central
Information Commission [MANU/KE/0357/2007] [Kerala High Court
(SB)], this Court adopted an expansive interpretation of the proviso
and held that information relating to transfers and postings of
employees, being matters capable to place before Parliament or the

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 31 2026:KER:34827
Legislature, could not ordinarily be denied under Section 8(1)(j).
The reasoning adopted therein effectively elevated the proviso
above the substantive exemption and considerably diluted the
protection afforded to personal information under Section 8(1)(j).
18. In Treesa Irish (Supra), the question was whether a valued
answer sheet of an examination returned to a public authority by
the examiner is exempt from disclosure. In Para 22, the Court said
that the proviso "takes the sheen out of the main section". It was
stated: "it does not require much racking of the brains to conclude
that if a question is raised in the Parliament or the State Legislature
regarding any irregularity or corruption in the valuation of the
answer papers in this case, then certainly the answer papers cannot
be denied to the parliament and the State Legislature and therefore
the respondents cannot deny the information to the petitioner as
well, claiming exemption under Section 8(1)(j)." The Court thus
extended the proviso to the facts before it on the premise that if the
fairness of a public examination is called into question, the

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 32 2026:KER:34827
parliament or the legislature would have had the authority to seek
such information.
19. Likewise, in Surupsingh (Supra), the Bombay High Court
held that even confidential medical records maintained in a
government hospital could be disclosed on the premise that public
institutions remain accountable to the Parliament and Legislature.
The said line of reasoning was followed in Pritam Rooj (Supra)
wherein the Calcutta High Court considered the question whether
an examiner can seek inspection of his answer scripts under the RTI
Act and, after noting the right to information as a facet of the right
to freedom and speech of expression, directed the access to
information.
20. However, the interpretation of the proviso of Section 8(1)
(j) was considered in Vijay Prakash v. Union of India [2010 KHC
6477], in which the Delhi High Court expressly disagreed with the
reasoning in Surupsingh Harya Naik (supra) and held that undue,
even overwhelming defence to parliamentary privilege in seeking

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 33 2026:KER:34827
information cannot be accepted. It was stated that proviso has to be
only as confined to what it enacts, to the class of information that
Parliament can ordinarily seek; if it were held that all information
relating to all public servants, even private information, can be
accessed by Parliament, Section 8(1)(j) would be devoid of any
substance, because the provision makes no distinction between
public and private information. Moreover, no law enables
Parliament to demand such information, and it has to be necessarily
in the context of some matter or investigation.
21. The legal position thereafter stood settled by the Supreme
Court in C.S. Shyam (Supra), which reversed the earlier Division
Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court in Canara Bank v. Central
Information Commission and Ors (Supra), which affirmed the Single
Bench judgment in Canara Bank v. Central Information Commission
and Ors (MANU/KE/0357/2007). The question considered before the
Kerala High Court by the Single Bench was whether information
relating to the transfer and posting of clerical staff and other

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 34 2026:KER:34827
service particulars of employees could be denied under Section 8(1)
(j) of the RTI Act. The Kerala High Court held that such information
could not be denied and observed that “by no stretch of
imagination can it be held that the information requested for by the
nd
2 respondent are information which can be denied to the
Parliament and a State Legislature” and further that the proviso to
Section 8(1)(j) “effectively nullifies the impact of the main provision
to a great extent.”
22. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reversed the said
view, holding that “the information sought by respondent No.1 of
individual employees working in the Bank was personal in nature”
and was therefore “exempted from being disclosed under Section
8(1)(j) of the Act”. Relying upon Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v.
Central Information Commissioner & Others (supra) and R.K. Jain
(Supra), the Supreme Court held that “the performance of an
employee/officer in an organisation is primarily a matter between
the employee and the employer” and that such matters “fall under

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 35 2026:KER:34827
the expression ‘personal information’, the disclosure of which has
no relationship to any public activity or public interest”, disclosure
of which “would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of that
individual.” The Court further held that “neither respondent No.1
disclosed any public interest much less larger public interest
involved in seeking such information” and nor was any finding
recorded regarding the involvement of any larger public interest,
and accordingly set aside the judgment of the High Court.
23. Apart from the above, the Manual of Office Procedure
Other than Secretariat (hereinafter 'MOP') defines Current File,
Note and Note File.26. Chapter VII of the MOP deals with 'Noting'.
Rule 49 of Chapter VII of the Manual of Office Procedure states that
the aim of a note is to present, in the most intelligible, condensed
and convenient form, the facts of the case, including, where
necessary, its past history, points for decision, useful precedents
and provisions of law, while Rule 52 provides that the note file shall
be maintained separately from the current file. Rule 72 further

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 36 2026:KER:34827
provides that though the purport of the order and the text having
immediate bearing on the petitioner’s representation may be
communicated, “the full text of the order should never be
communicated, much less the whole correspondence embodied in
the proceedings”. Rule 92(iii) also recognises that matters relating
to individual officers may, depending on the circumstances, require
confidential treatment. The said framework indicates that internal
note files and deliberative correspondence are treated distinctly
from the final decision communicated to the affected party.
24. The powers of Parliament and Legislative Assemblies to
call for information are themselves circumscribed by constitutional
practice, procedural rules and limitations relating to relevance,
confidentiality and public importance. By virtue of Article 105(3) of
the Constitution of India, Parliament possesses the privileges of the
House of Commons, including the power of Parliamentary
Committees to “send for persons, papers and records”. Among its
privileges, the parliament has the following powers in respect of

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 37 2026:KER:34827
receipt of information: (a) right to receive immediate information
on the arrest, detention, conviction and imprisonment of its
members; (b) all parliamentary committees are empowered to send
for persons, papers, and records relevant to the purpose of enquiry
by a committee.
25. However, the exercise of such power is regulated by the
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Lok Sabha (LS
Rules of Procedure) and the Directions issued by the Speaker of the
Lok Sabha. Rule 269 limits the power of the House to summon
witnesses or direct production of documents only insofar as they
are required for the purposes of the Committee, while Rule 270
confines the power to call for reports and records to matters
relevant to the enquiry. The Rules further recognise confidentiality
and public interest limitations, including situations where
disclosure may prejudice the safety or interests of the State. Even
the Speaker’s Directions contemplate that evidence may be treated
as confidential and that disputes regarding disclosure and relevance

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 38 2026:KER:34827
are to be resolved contextually between the concerned Department
and the Committee. The Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business
in the Kerala Legislative Assembly contain provisions that are pari
materia to the above on the powers of the Committee of the
Assembly to call for information.
26. Questions that can be raised on the floor of the House are
only to the extent that they are within the special cognisance of the
Minister concerned. Rule 41 of the LS Rules of Procedure lays down
the parameters of the admissibility of a question. Rule 43(1) states
that the Speaker shall decide whether a question, or a part thereof,
is or is not admissible. While admitting the questions, ordinarily,
names of the individuals are omitted, and if they are officials, their
designation is given so as to render the question intelligible. In
practice, questions relating entirely to personal matters are not
admissible. Questions relating to comparative figures of dismissal,
removal, reduction in rank, etc. of SC/ST officers in Central and
State Government for the last 10 years were held to be inadmissible.

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 39 2026:KER:34827
Direction 13 of the Directions of the Chairman of Rajya Sabha states
that questions which relate to matters of day-to-day administration
of Government employees, like their service conditions, postings,
transfers, TA/DA, etc., or questions which tend to further the
interest of an individual or a few individuals or private companies
are not admissible. Government can withhold information in public
interest, and the Government is the sole judge as to what
constitutes a public interest in a given circumstance (Subash C
Kashyap Volume II Parliamentary Procedure). Therefore, the
finding in Ext.P5 that the information would have been supplied to
the House if a question on the floor was raised was rendered
without ascertaining if such a question would have been allowed to
be raised in the first place.
27. Thereby, it has to be held that the proviso of Section 8(1)(j)
does not confer an unrestricted right to seek every information, nor
does it mandate disclosure in all cases, as such an interpretation
would render the protections and exemptions contemplated under

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 40 2026:KER:34827
Sections 8 and 11 of the Act otiose. It is a settled principle of
statutory interpretation that a proviso cannot be read in a way
which nullifies the provision to which it is a proviso, unless such an
intention is manifest. Moreover, it is also a settled law that if the
substantive provision is clear on fair interpretation, the language in
the proviso cannot be used to defeat the basic intent expressed in
the said provision.
28. Consequently, the very foundation of the respondent’s
contention in the present case, namely, that the information sought
would have been supplied to the Legislature and therefore cannot
be denied under the Act, cannot be sustained for the
aforementioned reasons. It is also relevant to note that, by virtue of
the amendments introduced through the DPDP Act, 2023, the said
proviso itself has since been omitted, albeit prospectively.
29. The amendment introduced through the DPDP Act, 2023,
which came into force on 30.11.2025, Section 8(1)(j) now stands
substantially widened so as to exempt “information which relates to

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 41 2026:KER:34827
personal information”, thereby materially curtailing the earlier
disclosure framework founded upon the balancing of public
interest. Though the said amendment operates prospectively and
does not directly govern the present dispute, the legislative
development unmistakably demonstrates the statutory shift
towards greater protection of personal and service-related
information. Thus, even independently of its prospective operation,
the very basis upon which expansive arguments founded on the
proviso to Section 8(1)(j) were earlier advanced stands substantially
diluted under the amended provision as well.
30. Insofar as the direction under Section 20(1) is concerned,
penal consequences can arise only upon a clear finding of malafide
denial, unreasonable refusal, or deliberate obstruction in furnishing
information. The stand adopted by the petitioners/PSC was founded
on a plausible and legally sustainable interpretation of Section 8(1)
(j), supported by binding precedents recognising that service and
disciplinary records constitute personal information unless

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 42 2026:KER:34827
outweighed by demonstrable larger public interest. Though
disclosure may in appropriate cases be warranted on grounds of
overriding public interest, as noticed in Onkar Dattatray Kalmankar
(Supra) and Ravi Prakash Soni (Supra), the existence of such public
interest is necessarily case-specific and cannot be presumed.
Therefore, the legal position under Section 8(1)(j) not being free
from complexity or doubt, the stand taken by the petitioners
cannot be characterised as malafide, contumacious, or deliberately
obstructive so as to attract proceedings under Section 20(1) of the
Act.
31. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the firm view that Ext.P5
order, insofar as it directs indiscriminate disclosure of file notings
and initiates proceedings under Section 20(1) of the Act, is contrary
to the statutory framework, the settled principles governing
protection of personal information, and the limits of the
Commission’s jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Ext. P5 is quashed. The writ petition is allowed.

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 43 2026:KER:34827
This Court places on record its profound appreciation for the
exemplary assistance rendered by the learned Amicus Curiae,
Smt. Surya Binoy, whose incisive research, meticulous preparation
and erudite submissions greatly aided the Court in adjudication of
the issues involved.
Sd/-
MOHAMMED NIAS C.P.
JUDGE
DMR/-

WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019 44 2026:KER:34827
APPENDIX OF WP(C) NO. 493 OF 2019
PETITIONERS' EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE REQUISITION DATED
15/4/2017 MADE BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT
BEFORE THE 1ST PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 9/5/2017
GIVEN TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT BY THE 1ST
PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 22/6/2017
ISSUED BY THE 2ND PETITIONER TO THE 2ND
RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF THE APPEAL PETITION FILED
BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT DATED 28/6/2017
BEFORE THE 1ST RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28/7/2018
ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT.