Balbir Kumar vs State Of Haryana And Others

CRM-M-46976-2021 (O&M) -1-


IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND

HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
140


CRM-M-46976-2021 (O&M)
Date of decision: 07.09.2026
Balbir Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Haryana and others ...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE MANISHA BATRA

Present:- Mr. Ivneet Singh Pabla, Advocate
for the petitioner.

Mr. Apoorv Garg, Addl. A.G., Haryana.

MANISHA BATRA, J. (Oral)

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) seeking quashing of FIR
No.448 dated 03.05.2018, registered under Section 10 of the Haryana
Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (for short ‘the Act,
1975’) at Police Station Thanesar City, District Kurukshetra, along with all
subsequent proceedings arising therefrom.
2. Brief facts of the case relevant for the purpose of disposal of this
petition are that the aforementioned FIR was registered on the basis a written
complaint submitted by complainant Satish Kumar, the then District Town
Planner, Kurukshetra alleging therein that petitioner Balbir Kumar along with
Ranjeet Singh, Harvinder Singh and Rajesh Kumar, was carving out an
unauthorized colony in the shape of roads over land comprised in Khasra
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CRM-M-46976-2021 (O&M) -2-

Nos. 16/7/2/1, 7/1 and 4/8/24, situated in village Ratgal, Tehsil Thanesar,
District Kurukshetra. The site was stated to fall within the Urban Area,
Kurukshetra. It was alleged by the complainant that the land owners were
required to obtain a licence under Section 3 of the Act, 1975 before carving
out a colony in the urban area. It was alleged that the accused had violated
Sections 3 and 7(i) of the Act, 1975 by carving out the unauthorized colony
and subdividing the land into plots without obtaining the requisite licence.
The complainant/District Town Planner requested the police to stop the
unauthorized colonization, investigate the matter and register an FIR against
the persons named in the complaint as well as other persons found involved
during investigation.
3. After registration of the FIR, investigation proceedings were
initiated. The revenue record relating to the land in question was obtained.
The petitioner was arrested on 03.08.2018 and produced before the Court. He
was granted concession of bail. After completion of investigation and usual
formalities, challan/final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was presented by
the police on 15.08.2018. Aggrieved from the same, the petitioner filed this
petition. Vide order dated 09.11.2021, while issuing notice of motion, this
Court had directed the learned trial Court to adjourn the case beyond the date
fixed before this Court, which is still continuing.
4. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that he has
falsely been implicated in this case. The land in question falls within the
municipal limits of Municipal Council, Thanesar. It is argued that, in view of
the judgment dated 23.08.2012 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in
CWP-17048-2007 , titled Rajat Kuchhal and others v. State of Haryana and
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CRM-M-46976-2021 (O&M) -3-

others , the Town and Country Planning Department has no jurisdiction to take
action in respect of land falling within the municipal limits. It is further
argued that the Principal Secretary, Urban Local Bodies Department,
Haryana, had also issued a communication dated 20.11.2012 clarifying that
action in respect of such land was to be taken by the Urban Local Bodies
Department. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that the plot
in question is a small plot and, therefore, there was no requirement of
obtaining a licence under Section 3 of the Act, 1975.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the
complainant had no jurisdiction to initiate any proceeding against the
petitioner. He has relied upon the order dated 14.12.2018 passed by this Court
in CRM-M-29958-2016 , titled as Rimpy Kansal and another v. State of
Haryana and others , whereby an FIR registered under Sections 3 and 7(ii) of
the Act, 1975 was quashed on the ground that the land involved therein fell
within municipal limits. It is, thus, argued that the present FIR has also been
registered without jurisdiction and, therefore, deserves to be quashed along
with all the subsequent proceedings having emanated therefrom.
6. Status report on behalf of respondent No. 1 has been filed.
Separate reply on behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3 has also been filed. On
the strength of the same, learned State counsel has argued that the FIR has
been rightly registered. It is argued that merely because the land falls within
the municipal limits of Municipal Council, Thanesar, the jurisdiction of the
Town and Country Planning Department under the Act, 1975 is not ousted. It
is further argued that the judgment in Rajat Kuchhal’s case (supra) dealt with
the provisions of the Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas
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Restriction of Unregulated Development Act, 1963 and did not bar action
under the Act, 1975. It is further argued that the reliance placed by the
petitioner on the judgment dated 14.12.2018 passed in Rimpy Kansal ’s case is
no longer available to the petitioner in view of the subsequent judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.
3208/2019, tilted as The State of Haryana and others v. Rimpy Kansal and
another , dated 20.10.2023. It is pointed out that the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
in the aforesaid case had allowed the appeal and set aside the order of this
Court, observing that a blanket order restraining registration of FIRs at the
instance of the District Town Planner or Senior Town Planner ought not to
have been passed.
7. It is further argued by learned State counsel that the petitioner,
along with the other persons named in the complaint, had jointly owned the
land and had carved out a commercial colony by constructing roads and
dividing the land into plots without obtaining a licence. The allegation is not
merely in respect of the petitioner’s individual plot but relates to the carving
out of an unauthorized colony. The definition of “urban area” under Section
2(o) of the Act, 1975 specifically includes land falling within municipal
limits. The fact that the land falls within the municipal limits does not, by
itself, take the case outside the scope of the Act, 1975. With these
submissions, it is urged that no case for quashing of the FIR has been made
out and the petition is liable to be dismissed.
8. This Court has heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for
the parties.
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9. At the outset, it will be profitable to look into the scope and
ambit of the Court’s power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (which is pari materia
with Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) as spelt out in
several judicial pronouncements of Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as
different High Courts. The well settled proposition of law is that in exercise of
inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court is not expected to
analyze all the facts, which are to be placed before the High Court. The power
conferred under this section is very specific. To secure the ends of justice, to
prevent the abuse of process of Court or to make any such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, such power can be
exercised to prevent abuse of process of Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
has drawn up some guidelines in some categories of cases by way of
illustration to circumscribe the exercise of inherent power under Section 482
of Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process of any Court or to secure the ends of
the justice or to give effect to an order of the Court. A celebrated
pronouncement on this point is the case cited as State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan
Lal : 1992 SUPP (1) SCC 335 , wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court had
discussed different categories of cases wherein the power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. could be exercised either to prevent abuse of process of law or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, while observing that it might not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined, sufficiently channelized,
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list or myriad
kind of cases where such powers should be exercised. The following
principles have been culled out:-
“102 (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information
Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
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CRM-M-46976-2021 (O&M) -6-

value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused;
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code;
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same
do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out
a case against the accused;
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155 (2) of the Code;
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party;
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
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CRM-M-46976-2021 (O&M) -7-

the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and

personal grudge.”
10. The principles of law as laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Bhajan Lal’ s case (supra) have been followed in a catena of judgments. In
Paramjeet Batra vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673 , it was
observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court that although the inherent powers of a
High Court under Section 482 of the Code should be exercised sparingly and
only for the purpose of preventing abuse of process of any Court or otherwise
to secure ends of justice, yet, the High Court must not hesitate in quashing
such criminal proceedings, where essential ingredients of the offence are not
made out. In Mahendra K.C. vs. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129:
(2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 , Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the test to be
applied is whether the allegations in the complaint, as they stand, without
adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients
of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of
the allegations, nor, for that matter, can it proceed in the manner that a judge
conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of
the trial. In Priyanka Jaiswal vs. State of Jharkhand, 2024 SCC Online SC
685 , Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the Court exercising extraordinary
jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot conduct a mini trial or enter
into appreciation of evidence of a particular case. The following observations
were made:
“13. We say so for reasons more than one. This Court in
catena of Judgments has consistently held that at the time
of examining the prayer for quashing of the criminal
proceedings, the court exercising extra-ordinary
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CRM-M-46976-2021 (O&M) -8-

jurisdiction can neither undertake to conduct a mini trial
nor enter into appreciation of evidence of a particular case.
The correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the
complaint cannot be examined on the touchstone of the
probable defence that the accused may raise to stave off the
prosecution and any such misadventure by the Courts
resulting in proceedings being quashed would be set aside.
This Court in the case of Akhil Sharda held to the
following effect:
“28. Having gone through the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court
by which the High Court has set aside the
criminal proceedings in exercise of powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., it appears that the
High Court has virtually conducted a mini
trial, which as such is not permissible at this
stage and while deciding the application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. As observed and held by
this Court in a catena of decisions no mini trial
can be conducted by the High Court in
exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
jurisdiction and at the stage of deciding the
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the
High Court cannot get into appreciation of
evidence of the particular case being
considered.”
11. Similar view was taken in Minakshi Yadav vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh, 2024 SCC Online 643 , wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court observed
that the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the
reliability and genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or
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the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C.
12. Reference can further be made to Gian Singh vs. State of
Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 , wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that
the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal complaint or an FIR, in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, is distinct and different from the power
given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of
the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but
it has to be exercised in accordance with the guidelines engrafted in such
power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court.
13. In Neeharika Infrastructure vs. State of Maharashtra : 2021
SCC OnLine SC 315 , the Apex Court observed that the Courts ought to be
cautious in exercising powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. They do have
power to quash. The test is whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose
the commission of a cognizable offence? The merits of the allegations are not
to be entered into nor the power of the investigating agency to investigate into
allegations involving the commission of a cognizable offence is to be trenched
upon.
14. Similar position of law was reiterated by Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Ajay Malik vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein
it was observed as follows:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may
issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to
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secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature
of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly.
The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded
within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or
where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of
justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting
the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial
Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate
the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has
been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse
of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made
out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint
contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the
parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute
amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335 ).”
15. On applying the aforesaid principles of law to the facts of the
present case, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the FIR at this stage.
The principal submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the land
in question falls within the municipal limits and, therefore, the District Town
Planner had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under the Act, 1975.
Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of this Court in Rajat Kuchhal’s
case (supra) . The said judgment, however, was rendered in the context of the
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Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas Restriction of Unregulated
Development Act, 1963, read with the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 and the
Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994. The Court was considering the
question of overlapping jurisdiction under those enactments and held that the
Director, Town and Country Planning was competent in respect of controlled
areas and scheduled roads outside the municipal limits, whereas the
authorities under the municipal enactments were competent within the
municipal limits. The ratio of Rajat Kuchhal’s case (supra) cannot, therefore,
be extended to hold that the District Town Planner has no jurisdiction under
the Act, 1975 merely because the land happens to fall within municipal limits.
The present FIR is not under the Act, 1963. It has been registered under
Section 10 of the Act, 1975 on the allegation that the land was being
developed by carving out plots and laying roads without obtaining the
requisite licence. The respondents have specifically taken the stand that the
mere inclusion of the land within municipal limits does not take away the
jurisdiction of the Town and Country Planning Department under the Act,
1975.
16. The petitioner has also relied upon the small size of the plot to
argue that no licence was required under the Act, 1975. The said argument is
not sufficient to warrant quashing of the FIR. The specific case of the
respondents is that the petitioner, along with other alleged violators, had
carved out a commercial colony by laying roads and dividing the land into
small plots without obtaining the requisite licence. Thus, the dispute is not
about the size of the plots alone but whether such carving out of the land into
plots, without a licence, attracted Sections 3 and 7(i) of the Act, 1975. This
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question cannot be conclusively determined in proceedings under Section 482
Cr.P.C. on the basis of the petitioner's assertion alone.”
17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the
order dated 14.12.2018 passed in Rimpy Kansal's case (supra) . However, the
said order was subsequently examined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State
of Haryana and others v. Rimpy Kansal and another , decided on
20.10.2023. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noticed that this Court had issued a
blanket direction that requests made by the District Town Planner or Senior
Town Planner for registration of FIRs for violation of Sections 3 and 7 of the
Act, 1975 in respect of land falling within municipal limits should not be
entertained by the police. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that such a blanket
order restraining lodging of FIRs ought not to have been passed and
accordingly set aside the order of this Court. Thus, the judgment in Rimpy
Kansal’s case (supra) does not confer any right upon the petitioner to seek
quashing of the present FIR. Rather, the order of this Court dated 14.12.2018,
on which the petitioner seeks to rely, no longer survives after having been set
aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. At the same time, the judgment of the
Supreme Court cannot be read as a finding that every FIR registered at the
instance of the District Town Planner in respect of land falling within
municipal limits is necessarily maintainable. The question in the present case
has to be examined on its own facts and the provisions under which the FIR
has been registered.
18. In the present case, the FIR specifically alleges that the land was
being used for the purpose of carving out an unauthorised colony by laying
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roads and dividing the land into plots without the requisite licence. These
allegations, on their face, disclose the ingredients of the offence alleged under
the Act, 1975. The defence of the petitioner that the land falls within
municipal limits and that the plots are small raises questions which cannot be
conclusively determined merely on the basis of the pleadings in a petition
filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., particularly when the investigation has
already been completed and the final report/challan has been presented.
19. The judgment in Rajat Kuchhal’s case (supra) , therefore, does
not assist the petitioner in the facts of the present case, as it dealt with a
different statutory scheme. The order in Rimpy Kansal's case (supra) , on
which the petitioner relies, having been set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, also does not provide any basis for quashing the FIR. No ground is
made out for holding that the registration of the FIR or the subsequent
proceedings constitute an abuse of the process of law. Consequently, no
interference is called for in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.
The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
20. It is, however, clarified that the observations made hereinabove
are only for the purposes of deciding the present petition and the same shall
not be construed as expression of opinion on the merits of the case.


07.09.2026
(MANISHA BATRA)
Waseem R. Ansari Waseem R. Ansari Waseem R. Ansari Waseem R. Ansari
JUDGE



Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No

Whether reportable Yes/No
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