State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Home, Lucknow vs Munna @ Sunil Kumar And Another

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
GOVERNMENT APPEAL No. - 111 of 2026
State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Home,
Lucknow
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
Munna @ Sunil Kumar And Another
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : G.A.
Counsel for Respondent(s) :

Court No. - 11
HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.
HON'BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
. Heard the learned A.G.A.
1
2 . Instant appeal has been preferred by the State being aggrieved with the
judgment and order dated 20th of April, 2022 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 9, Lucknow in Sessions Trial No.
38 of 2014 in Case Crime No. 240 of 2013 under Sections 376, 120B, 506
and 313 of the IPC, Police Station Gomti Nagar, District Lucknow In Re
State versus Munna @ Sunil Kumar, per which the accused has been
acquitted.
. From a perusal of the records, it emerges that a tahrir was given by the
3
complainant/victim on 08.06.2013 at the police station that the accused
Munna had met the victim along with his family and had assured her of
marriage. Subsequently, she had been appointed as a Safaiwali in
Ambedkar Park, Lucknow where she took a room and started residing.
The accused is said to have come to the room of the complainant and
resided with her for about two years as husband and wife. Repeatedly, the
accused assured her of marriage but also continued to exploit her
sexually. Later, the complainant came to know that the accused has got
his marriage fixed elsewhere and upon the complainant objecting to the
same, the accused along with his relatives prevailed upon the complainant
to not get married with the accused else she would be forced to leave her
job. The accused is also said to have threatened the complainant.

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. On the basis of the tahrir given by the complainant, an FIR was lodged
4
and the investigation started.
. A charge sheet under Sections 376, 120B, 506 and 313 of the IPC was
5
filed against the accused.
. Upon the accused having denied the offences, the trial started.
6
7 . The learned trial court, after considering the statements of the witnesses
and the evidence on record, acquitted the accused. Hence, the appeal by
the State.
. Prior to considering the ground (s) as raised by the learned AGA, we
8
may consider the law on the point of acquittal in an appeal.
. In the case of Bannareddy and others vs. State of Karnataka and
9
others, (2018) 5 SCC 790 , in paragraph 10, the Hon'ble Apex Court has
considered the power and jurisdiction of the High Court while interfering
in an appeal against acquittal and in paragraph 26 it has been held that:-
"the High Court should not have reappreciated the evidence in its
entirety, especially when there existed no grave infirmity in the
findings of the trial Court. There exists no justification behind
setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court,
especially when the prosecution case suffers from several
contradictions and infirmities "
10 . In Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka, 2021 (6) SCC 213 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has been pleased to explain the limitations of exercise of
power of scrutiny by the High Court in an appeal against against an order
of acquittal passed by a Trial Court in the following words:
"The power of scrutiny exercisable by the High Court under
Section 378, CrPC should not be routinely invoked where the
view formed by the trial court was a ''possible view'. The
judgment of the trial court cannot be set aside merely because
the High Court finds its own view more probable, save where the
judgment of the trial court suffers from perversity or the
conclusions drawn by it were impossible if there was a correct
reading and analysis of the evidence on record. To say it
differently, unless the High Court finds that there is complete
misreading of the material evidence which has led to
miscarriage of justice, the view taken by the trial court which
can also possibly be a correct view, need not be interfered with.
This self-restraint doctrine, of course, does not denude the High

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Court of its powers to re-appreciate the evidence, including in
an appeal against acquittal and arrive at a different firm finding
of fact."
11 . In a judgment of this Court in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP and
the law on the issue involved has been
others, 2022 (3) ADJ 354 DB,
considered. For ready reference, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 are quoted as
under:
"10. In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 :
(2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed
that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate
court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to
arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court
were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court
is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact,
the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible
evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence
brought on record contrary to law. Paragraphs 12 to 19 of the
aforesaid judgment are quoted as under:-
"12. This court time and again has laid down the
guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the
judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial
Court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set
aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two
views are possible, though the view of the appellate
court may be more, the probable one. While dealing
with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has
to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to
arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the
trial Court were perverse or otherwise
unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to
consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the
trial Court had failed to take into consideration
admissible evidence and/or had taken into
consideration the evidence brought on record
contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden
of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by
the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of
U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shambhoo Missir & Anr.
v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 315; Shailendra
Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 2003 SC 1104;
Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC
699; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 2006
SC 2500; State of U.P. v. Ramveer Singh AIR 2007

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SC 3075; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by
his LRs. & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr.
Vs. State (2009) 10 SCC 206; Perla Somasekhara
Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98;
and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal
Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 445).
13. In Sheo Swarup and Ors. King Emperor AIR
1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under:
"...the High Court should and will always give
proper weight and consideration to such matters as
(1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility
of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in
favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not
weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at
his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of
any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate
court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a
Judge who had the advantage of seeing the
witnesses...."
14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently
been followed by this Court. (See: Tulsiram Kanu v.
The State AIR 1954 SC 1; Balbir Singh v. State of
Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v. State of
Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton &
Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66; Sambasivan
and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412;
Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4
SCC 85; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and
Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755).
15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka
(2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal
position as under:
"(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-
appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which
the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of
such power and an appellate court on the evidence
before it may reach its own conclusion, both on
questions of fact and of law.

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(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and
compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds",
"very strong circumstances", "distorted
conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not
intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes
of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an
appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to
curtail the power of the court to review the evidence
and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind
that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the
presumption of innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent
unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of
law. Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by
the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
court should not disturb the finding of acquittal
recorded by the trial court."
16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008)
10 SCC 450, this Court re-iterated the said view,
observing that the appellate court in dealing with
the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the
accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's
acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is
innocent. The appellate court must give due weight
and consideration to the decision of the trial court
as the trial court had the distinct advantage of
watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was
in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh
(2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the
earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that
an "order of acquittal should not be lightly
interfered with even if the court believes that there

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6
is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the
accused."
18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne alias
Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave
certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court
would be justified in interfering with a judgment of
acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances
includes:
i) The High Court's decision is based on totally
erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal
position;
ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to
evidence and documents on record;
iii) The entire approach of the High Court in
dealing with the evidence was patently illegal
leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust
and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts
on the record of the case;
v) This Court must always give proper weight and
consideration to the findings of the High Court;
vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in
interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court
and the High Court have recorded an order of
acquittal.
A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras
(2009) 10 SCC 401.
19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that in exceptional cases where there are
compelling circumstances, and the judgment under
appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court
can interfere with the order of acquittal. The
appellate court should bear in mind the presumption
of innocence of the accused and further that the trial
Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his
innocence. Interference in a routine manner where
the other view is possible should be avoided, unless
there are good reasons for interference."

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. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
12 Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State
of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972 has observed that
while deciding appeal against acquittal, the High Court has to first record
its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court
dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusion arrived by it
is wholly untenable which alone will justify interference in an order of
acquittal.
13 . The aforesaid judgments were taken note of with approval by
Supreme Court in the case of Anwar Ali and another vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh (2020) 10 SCC 166 , Nagabhushan vs. State of
Karnataka (2021) 5 SCC 222 and Babu (supra) in Achhar Singh vs.
,
State of Himachal Pradesh (2021) 5 SCC 543.
. Similar view has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in
14 Rajesh
Prasad vs. State of Bihar and another, (2022) 3 SCC 471.
. Being armed with the aforesaid principles of law laid down by the
15
Hon'ble Apex Court, now we proceed to consider the argument(s) as
raised by the learned AGA.
16 . The learned AGA has argued that the learned trial court has patently
erred in law in acquitting the accused and has failed to appreciate the
evidence which was led before it and has been persuaded by the minor
inconsistencies which has emerged in the statements of the victims / other
witnesses and has prayed that all the accused merit to be convicted of the
charges as levelled against them.
17 . In order to appreciate the arguments and the grounds as raised by the
learned AGA, we have proceeded to consider the judgment of the learned
trial court and the material on record.
. From perusal of the appeal as well as the judgment on record, it
18
emerges that the learned trial court has considered the statement of the
victim wherein she categorically stated that she and the accused had
resided for about two years as husband and wife and that she was also
willing to get married with the accused.
19 . The father of the complainant/victim has indicated that no proposal

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for marriage was sent from their end, rather the proposal of marriage had
come from the side of the accused.
. From the statements and the evidence on record, the learned trial court
20
has concluded that initially, both the parties had decided to get married
and, on the basis of the same, the accused and the victim resided together
for about two years as husband and wife.
. From the evidence on record, it also emerged that there was a dispute
21
between the accused and the father of the victim pertaining to a piece of
land in the village, per which both the parties had agreed to sell the land
but despite having given an advance, the other party resiled from the
same, with the result that a dispute arose between the parties. The learned
trial court was of the view that although the marriage had been fixed
between the parties and that even though the victim also wanted to marry
the accused and also resided with him for about two years as husband and
wife, but the proposed marriage broke down on account of the dispute
between the parties and hence, was of the view that the charge under
Sections 376, 120B, 506 and 313 of the IPC was not made out.
22 . From the admitted facts, it is apparent that the accused and the victim
resided together for about two years and it was only subsequent thereto
that an FIR was lodged under Sections 376, 120B, 506 and 313 of the
IPC. Thus, their having resided together as husband and wife for a long
period clearly emerges from a perusal of the record.
. In this regard, although there are a catena of judgments, it would be
23
pertinent to refer to the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Martanda Singh vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Another, 2026
INSC 1081 , wherein a relationship spanning three years eventually
resulted in a criminal case being lodged by the victim on the allegation
that the accused had refused to marry her after exploiting her on the
pretext of marriage.
24 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court after observing that as the physical
relationship had continued for about three years unabated, the parties later
separated and the marriage proposal mooted by both families also fell
through, following which the complaint was lodged, held as under:–

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"6. Admittedly, the physical relationship continued for three years
unabated and later they separated. The marriage proposal mooted
by both the families, also fell through, upon which the present
complaint was raised. It was also asserted that the appellant had
nd
agreed to marry the 2 respondent before the Mahila Thana
Counselling Centre, Bilaspur which was not complied with.
Immediately, we have to observe that the undertaking would have
been on the threat of criminal prosecution; which even otherwise is
unenforceable. The undertaking also cannot be alleged to be a
promise to marry, since by then admittedly there was a courtship of
nd
three years, when the 2 respondent admittedly had permitted
physical relationship. The consent obviously was not on coercion or
misrepresentation.
7. We cannot but reiterate the proposition as enumerated in the
above extract that the consent under fear or misconception cannot
be loosely inferred to fasten criminal liability on one of the parties
when both admittedly, had a consensual relationship and the other
party willingly permitted physical relationship....."
(Emphasized by the Court)
25 . Keeping in view the aforesaid observations, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court set aside the entire proceedings including the charge sheet.
26 . Likewise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaspal Singh
Kaural vs. State of NCT of Delhi and another, 2025 (5) SCC 756 ,
considering that the physical relationship between the parties was
consensual from the very beginning held that it cannot be said that the
said relationship was against the will or without the consent of the victim
and hence, quashed the criminal proceedings which arose on account of
the FIR lodged by the victim.
. For the sake of convenience the relevant observations of the Hon’ble
27
Supreme Court in the case of Jaspal Singh Kaural (supra) are
reproduced below:-
The physical relationship between the appellant and
"15.1.
Respondent 2 was consensual from the very beginning and
cannot be said to be against the will or without the consent of
the prosecutrix. Even if the case of the prosecutrix is accepted,
there is no material on record to show that there was any
dishonest inducement, or incitement on part of the appellant."

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. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that benefit of doubt
28
ensues to accused. If two views are possible, the benefit of doubt must be
granted to accused. It has been further held that if two views are possible,
the order of acquittal should not be set aside by High Court because there
is double presumption of innocence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para
39 in Dhanapal v. State By Public Prosecutor, Madras, (2009) 10 SCC
401 while dealing with scope of interference at appellate stage has held:
"39. The following principles emerge from the cases above:
1. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty.
The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the
trial court. The trial court acquittal bolsters the presumption that
he is innocent.
2. The power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate
court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can
review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and
law, but the appellate court must give due weight and
consideration to the decision of the trial court.
3. The appellate court should always keep in mind that the trial
court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of
the witnesses. The trial court is in a better position to evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses.
4. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the
trial court acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling
reasons" for doing so.
5. If two reasonable or possible views can be reached-one that
leads to acquittal, the other to conviction-the High
Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused."
. In the case in hand, the opinion expressed by the trial court is not
29
only a possible view, but also it is fair and reasonable and cannot be
termed as perverse in any manner, thus, it does not warrant
interference.
30 . Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, no case for interference is
made out. The appeal is dismissed summarily.
(Pramod Kumar Srivastava,J.) (Abdul Moin,J.)
October 15, 2026
prateek
Digitally signed by :-
PRATEEK ARORA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench