M/S INTERNATIONAL TRIMMINGS AND LABELS vs THE ADDTIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY

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WP No. 229 of 2021


IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
R

ND
DATED THIS THE 2 DAY OF JUNE, 2026


BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE

WRIT PETITION NO. 229 OF 2021 (L-RES)

BETWEEN:

M/S INTERNATIONAL TRIMMINGS AND LABELS
INDIA PRIVATE LIMITED
NO. 463/1, KIADB MAIN ROAD,
TH
4 PHASE, PEENYA INDUSTRIAL AREA,
BANGLAORE - 560058,
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR,
MR. PRASANNA M HEGDE.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI PRASHANTH B.K, ADVOCATE)






AND:


1. THE ADDTIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY TO
DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR,
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
VIKASA SOUDHA, DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BANGALORE - 560001.

2. THE LABOUR COMMISSIONER,
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
KARMIKA BHAVANA, BANNERGHATTA ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 029.

3. THE ADDITIONAL LABOUR COMMISIONER (IR),
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
KARMIKA BHAVANA, BANNERGHATTA ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 029.

4. INTERNATIONAL TRIMMINGS AND
LABELS INDIA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
NO. 138, GROUND FLOOR,
TH TH
9 CROSS, 4 MAIN, CHAMARAJPET,
BANGALORE - 560018.
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI M RAJAKUMAR, AGA FOR R1 TO R3,
SRI G V P REDDY, ADVOCATE FOR R4)







Digitally signed by
VIJAYALAKSHMI M
KANKUPPI
Location: HIGH COURT
OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DHARWAD

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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER
DATED 07.12.2020 PASSED BY THE R-1 ANNEXURE-N TO THIS WRIT
PETITION.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
TH
ORDERS ON 24 MARCH, 2026 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE
FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE

CAV JUDGMENT

1
Whether Section 34* of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(“Act, 1947”) can be invoked to seek authorisation for
prosecution, for an alleged violation of the provisions of the
Act, 1947 even before adjudication of the underlying ‘ industrial
dispute’ arising out of such alleged violation?

2. If so, whether the appropriate Government can
defer the consideration of such application under Section 34 of
the Act, 1947, till the ‘adjudication of the dispute’ under
Section 10 of the Act, 1947?

3. These two questions arise in this petition where the
petitioner-Establishment seeks to quash the order dated
07.12.2020 passed under Section 34 of the Act, 1947 granting

1
Wrongly quoted as Section 31 in the impugned order

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authorisation to prosecute the petitioner, for alleged violation of
Section 25M of the Act, 1947.

FACTS:

4. The petitioner–Establishment employed about 157
employees and 112 among them were workmen. The
petitioner–Establishment laid-off 61 workmen during the
COVID-19 pandemic. The decision to lay-off 61 workmen was
th
taken on 5 May, 2020.

5. The said lay-off is the subject matter of an
industrial dispute pending adjudication before the
Tribunal/Labour Court.

6. On a complaint by the Union alleging violation of
Section 25M of the Act, 1947, the Labour Commissioner
submitted a report to the appropriate Government. Acting
thereon, the appropriate Government, in terms of the
impugned order has accorded sanction under Section 34 of the
Act, 1947 to prosecute the petitioner.

7. The petitioner’s contention that the Covid-19
pandemic is a “natural calamity”, as such, the decision to lay-

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off does not require prior permission under Section 25M of the
Act, 1947, is rejected. Thus, the petitioner is before this Court.

8. Submissions on behalf of the petitioner:
(8.1) The impugned order is vitiated by non-application of
mind. The appropriate Government has mechanically
acted upon the report of the Labour Commissioner,
without independently examining whether a case for
prosecution is made out or not.
(8.2) The decision to lay-off 61 workmen was taken in during
the COVID-19 pandemic, which according to the
petitioner, is a “natural calamity” and, as such, there is no
need to seek permission from the appropriate
Government, under Section 25M of the Act, 1947.
(8.3) The question relating to the validity of the lay-off is
pending adjudication before the Labour Court and unless
the said adjudication takes place, the application under
Section 34 of the Act, 1947 is not maintainable.

9. Contentions on behalf of the respondents:
(9.1) The prior permission under Section 25M of the Act, 1947
is mandatory to lay-off the workmen and admittedly, no

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such permission was obtained. Thus admittedly, there is
violation of Section 25M of Act, 1947.
(9.2) The proceeding under Section 34 of the Act,1947 is
independent of the finding in adjudication proceeding
under Section 10 of the Act, 1947 and appropriate
Government can proceed under Section 34 of the
Act,1947, notwithstanding the pendency of adjudication
proceeding under Section 10 of the Act,1947.
CONSIDERATION

10. Admittedly, the petitioner has not obtained prior
permission under Section 25M of the Act, 1947 before the lay-
off was effected. The justification put forth by the petitioner is
that, the lay-off was occasioned by the COVID-19 pandemic,
which according to the petitioner is a “natural calamity”, under
Section 25M of the Act, 1947 and the prior permission is not
required.

11. Whether the COVID-19 pandemic would fall within
the scope of “natural calamity” under Section 25M of the Act,
1947 or the lay-off is otherwise justified without there being a
prior permission, are matters which are presently pending
adjudication before the Tribunal/Labour Court under Section 10

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of the Act, 1947. This Court does not propose to examine the
said issue in this petition.

12. The petitioner contends that the proceeding under
Section 34 of the Act, 1947 should await the adjudication under
Section 10 of Act, 1947, when the dispute under Section 10 of
the Act, 1947 is on the same allegation of the violation
complained of under Section 34 of the Act, 1947.

13. The petitioner’s contention that criminal prosecution
cannot be initiated under Section 34 of the Act, 1947 pending
adjudication of the dispute under Section 10, where the
allegations in both proceedings are one and the same cannot be
accepted in absolute terms. In appropriate cases, there can be
simultaneous proceedings under Sections 10 and 34 of the Act,
1947. In some cases, the simultaneous proceedings may not
be desirable.

14. While considering such a question on permissibility
of simultaneous criminal prosecution pending adjudication
proceeding, in the context of two different enactments, the
Apex Court in P. Jayappan v. S.K. Perumal, First Income
2
Tax Officer , and Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West

2

1984 (Supp) SCC 437

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3
Bengal and another has held that such criminal prosecution
pending adjudication of dispute is permissible. On behalf of the
respondent-Union, these two judgments are cited to justify the
simultaneous application under Sections 10 and 34 of the Act,
1947.

15. In P. Jayappan (supra) , the Apex Court was
considering Section 276-C of Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act,1961)
and in Radheshyam Kejriwal (supra) , Section 56 of the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (Act, 1973). In both the
enactments, the provisions of law provide for simultaneous
criminal prosecution pending adjudication of a claim or liability
under the said Acts.

16. Section 276-C of Act, 1961 which provides for
criminal prosecution, uses the expression “without prejudice
to any penalty that may be imposable on him under any
other provisions of this Act”. Likewise, Section 56 of the
Act, 1973, uses the expression “Without prejudice to any
award of penalty by the adjudicating officer under this
Act” .

3
(2011) 3 SCC 581

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17. From the language employed in the aforementioned
two provisions, it is explicit that, the simultaneous criminal
prosecution for the violation of the provisions of the
aforementioned two Acts, even before the adjudication takes
place on the claim or liability under the respective Acts, is
expressly provided.

18. In the Act, 1947 there is no provision which uses
similar expression which expressly provides for simultaneous
criminal prosecution and adjudication of a claim or liability
under the Act, 1947. Thus, in a way it is possible to urge a
contention that, the simultaneous prosecution pending
adjudication of the dispute alleging violation of the provisions of
the Act, 1947 is not permissible.

19. At the same time, one has to notice that there is no
provision which specifically bars simultaneous criminal
prosecution pending adjudication of any claim or liability by any
other authority/Tribunal/Court under the Act, 1947.

20. To answer the questions raised, the Court has to
keep in mind the object of the Act, 1947. One of the objects is
to provide efficacious remedy to the workmen against the
violations of the provisions of the Act, 1947. At the same time,

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among other, the Act, 1947 also aims in securing industrial
peace.

21. If these two aspects are borne in mind, it is not
permissible to accept the contention that the complaint under
Section 34 alleging violation of the provisions of the Act, 1947
is permissible only in a situation where the adjudication gets
concluded by the authority/Court/Tribunal relating to the
violation of the provisions of the Act, 1947.

22. At the same time it is not possible to accept the
contention that every application alleging violation of the
provisions of the Act, 1947, seeking permission to prosecute for
alleged violation of the provisions of the Act, 1947, will have to
be allowed pending adjudication of the dispute arising from
such violations of the provisions of the Act, 1947.

23. Both contentions referred to above are extreme
contentions and such an interpretation also does not augur well
with the object and purpose of Section 34 of the Act, 1947.

24. At this juncture, it is relevant to notice the ratio in
Radheshyam Kejriwal (supra) , where the Act, 1973 expressly

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provided simultaneous prosecution. Paragraph No.38 of the said
judgment reads as under:
“38. The ratio which can be culled out from these
decisions can broadly be stated as follows:
(i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution
can be launched simultaneously;
(ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not
necessary before initiating criminal prosecution;
(iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings
are independent in nature to each other;
(iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in
the adjudication proceedings is not binding on the
proceeding for criminal prosecution;
(v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement
Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court
of law to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of
the Constitution or Section 300 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure;
(vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in
favour of the person facing trial for identical
violation will depend upon the nature of finding. If
the exoneration in adjudication proceedings is on
technical ground and not on merit, prosecution may
continue; and
(vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where
the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all
and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution
on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot
be allowed to continue, the underlying principle
being the higher standard of proof in criminal
cases.”
(emphasis supplied)


25. The ratio is laid down in the context of Act, 1973.
Section 56 of said Act, 1973 which provides for simultaneous

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criminal prosecution and uses the expression “without prejudice
to any award of penalty by the adjudicating officer under the
Act.”

26. Even though the Act, 1973, provides for
simultaneous criminal prosecution, in addition to penalty by the
adjudicating authority, the Apex Court in paragraph No. 38(vi)
of the aforementioned judgement has held that, where the
person is exonerated on merits, criminal prosecution is
unwarranted.

27. This Court is dealing with Section 34 of the Act,
1947. As already noticed, there is no provision in the Act, 1947
which expressly provides for simultaneous criminal prosecution
or expressly bars simultaneous criminal prosecution pending
adjudication of an industrial dispute .

28. In the instant case the adjudication under Section
10 of the Act, 1947 is not yet over and is still pending
consideration.

29. It is true that the expression “without prejudice to
any award of penalty by the adjudicating officer under the Act,
found in the Act, 1973 or any other similar expression
conveying similar meaning is not used in Section 34 of the Act,

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1947. However, as already noticed, the provision if analysed
under the scheme of the Act, 1947, is there to provide an
additional remedy to an aggrieved party to initiate a criminal
prosecution (after obtaining authorisation), in the event of
violation of the provisions of the Act, 1947 which attract penal
consequences. At the same time, one should not lose sight of
the fact that the Act, 1947, also aims at securing industrial
peace over unrest and confrontation.

30. Precisely for these reasons, though the application
under Section 34 of the Act, 1947, to seek authorisation to
prosecute the person who violates the provisions of the Act,
1947, which attract penal consequences is maintainable,
sufficient safeguard is also built in the provision to prevent
indiscriminate criminal prosecution and the abuse of the said
provision. The aforesaid view is evident from the manner in
which Section 34 of the Act, 1947 is couched, where there is a
requirement to obtain authorisation to lodge the complaint.

31. The appropriate Government acting under Section
34 of the Act, 1947, is required to apply its mind before passing
any order on the application under Section 34 of the Act, 1947
and in this behalf the law is well settled.

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32. The appropriate Government has to apply its mind
to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out alleging
violation of the provision of the Act, 1947 which attracts penal
consequence under Section 34 of the Act, 1947.

33. Cases where the violation is prima facie established,
or not established, or, where the alleged violation is doubtful
and requires a finding by the adjudicatory authority, cannot be
enlisted exhaustively. Suffice it to say that such consideration
depends on the materials placed before the appropriate
Government alleging violation or denying the allegation of
violation.

34. Based on the materials placed before it, the
appropriate Government has to take the decision as to whether
the permission to prosecute has to be accorded, or has to be
rejected or has to be deferred until the adjudication takes place
before the adjudicating authority. In any case, the order has to
be supported by reason/s.

35. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents
have placed reliance on the judgment in Bhushan Power and
4
Steel Limited vs Grid Corporation of Orissa rendered by

4
Appeal No.226/2015

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the New Delhi Electricity Appellate Tribunal to contend that the
expression “natural calamity” used in explanatory clause is not
followed by the expression “such other circumstances”.

36. In addition, the learned counsel also placed reliance
on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Halliburton
5
Offshore Services Inc. vs Vedanta Limited and Another
to contend that force majeure clause should be construed
narrowly and not broadly.

37. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex
Court in Papnasum Labour Union vs Madura Coats Limited
6
and another .

38. The Court has considered the ratio laid down in the
aforementioned judgments. The questions raised in the present
petition are not answered in the aforementioned judgments.

39. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would urge that
if simultaneous proceedings are permitted, there is a possibility
of conflicting orders/findings.

40. As to the effect or consequence of any finding by
the appropriate Government on the question as to whether or

5

2020 SCC OnLine Del 542
6

AIR 1995 SC 2200

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not COVID-19 pandemic would be a “natural calamity” or not,
under Section 25M of the Act, 1947, where same question is
pending adjudication under Section 10 of the Act, 1947, there
is no difficulty in holding that the provisions of Sections 34 to
37 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 would guide the
course of action in such an eventuality.

41. Learned counsel for respondent No.4 has also
placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Mysore
Structurals Limited and others vs State of Karnataka and
7
Anr to urge that once prima facie satisfaction is recorded on
the allegation of violation of the provisions of the Act, 1947, the
order granting permission to prosecute should not be interfered
with.

42. In the aforesaid case the application under Section
34 of Act, 1947, was filed for not complying with the award
which has attained finality. Section 29 of the Act, 1947
expressly provides for penal consequence in case of breach of
the settlement or award. Thus, in the said case, the breach was
apparent, as admittedly award was not satisfied. Hence, the
ratio in the said case cannot have the application in the present

7
2002 (1) SCC 477

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case as the petitioner has raised a defence citing Covid-19
pandemic as a natural calamity.

43. From the discussions and reasons recorded
supra, the following principles would emerge:
(a) The application under Section 34 of the Act, 1947 seeking
authorisation to initiate criminal proceedings is
maintainable, even before the adjudication takes place on
the allegations relating to violation of the provisions of
the Act, 1947 which attract penal consequences under the
Act, 1947.
(b) Mere allegation of violations of the provisions of the Act,
1947 by itself does not mandate the appropriate
Government to accord sanction to prosecute. The grant of
sanction or rejection of application under Section 34 of
the Act, 1947 is not an empty formality. The appropriate
Government is required to arrive at an independent
satisfaction before passing orders on such application.
The reason/s for granting or rejecting such application
must be forthcoming in the order.
(c) In deserving cases, the appropriate Government may
take a view that the application seeking permission to

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prosecute the concerned, for the violation of the
provisions of the Act, 1947, relating to alleged violation,
has to be allowed or rejected pending consideration
before the adjudicating authority/Court/Tribunal. Such an
order must be supported by the reason/s.
(d) In deserving cases, the appropriate Government may
take a view that the application seeking permission to
prosecute for the violation of the provisions of the Act,
1947, for the reasons to be recorded has to be deferred,
pending consideration of the dispute relating to alleged
violation pending before the adjudicating authority/
Court/Tribunal.
(e) In which case, the application under Section 34 of the
Act, 1947 has to be allowed, or rejected or deferred
cannot be explained exhaustively. Such consideration
depends on the materials placed before the appropriate
Government alleging violation or denying the allegation of
violation. In any case, the order under Section 34 of the
Act, 1947 has to be supported by the reason/s.

44. In the present case, the very question as to
whether there is a contravention of Section 25M of the Act,

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1947 is seriously disputed on the premise that the case is
covered under second part of Section 25M(1) of the Act, 1947
which exempts application seeking permission under certain
circumstances. In such circumstances, it was incumbent upon
the appropriate Government to consider:
•

the nature of the allegation and the defense;
•

the pendency of adjudicatory proceeding and the
questions raised in such proceeding; and
•
whether a prima facie case for grant / rejection of
application for prosecution is made out or not, or whether
the appropriate Government is required to defer the
consideration of the said application till the adjudication
of the dispute under Section 10 of the Act, 1947 or not.


45. It is also noticed that the impugned order does not
assign reasons for according sanction to prosecute. The Full
Bench of this Court in S. N. Hada & Others vs The Binny
8
Limited Staff Association has held that the order granting
sanction to prosecute under Section 34 of the Act, 1947 must
be supported by reasons.

46. In the instant case, the appropriate Government
has not assigned the reasons for allowing the application except

8
ILR 1987 Kar 3762

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recording a statement that the application is perused in detail,
in addition to referring to the report dated 24.08.2020 of the
Labour Commissioner. There is no independent application of
mind and independent reasons assigned for passing the
impugned order. Hence, the impugned order has to be set
aside.
ORDER
(i) The Writ Petition is allowed in part .
(ii) The impugned order dated 07.12.2020
marked at Annexure–N passed by respondent
No.1 granting authorisation for prosecution
under Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 is quashed.
(iii) The Appropriate Government to reconsider
the application afresh in accordance with law
and pass appropriate orders, keeping in mind
the observations made above.
(iv) The exercise shall be completed within three
months from the date of receipt of a copy of
this order.
(v) No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(ANANT RAMANATH HEGDE)
JUDGE

BRN