Pradeep Kumar Singh vs State Of U.P. Thru. Secy. Secondary Education And Ors.
- Court
- Allahabad High Court
AFR
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - A No. - 30484 of 2016
Pradeep Kumar Singh
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Secy. Secondary Education And
Ors.
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Kartikey Dubey, Bhanu Prakash Dubey
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Prakhar Misra
Court No. - 7
HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.
1. Heard Sri Kartikey Dubey, Advocate, who appeared for the petitioner,
and Sri Devesh Pathak, the learned State counsel & Sri Yogesh Kumar
Awasthi, the learned State counsel, who appeared for the respondent Nos.
1 to 5. No one appeared on behalf of the respondent Nos. 6 and 7, though
the name of Sri Prakhar Misra, Advocate, is printed in the cause list.
2. The present petition has been filed seeking following main relief(s):-
"a) Issue a writ of Certiorari or a writ, order or direction in the nature of
certiorari quashing the Order dated 06-08-2016 and communication
dated 21-09-2016 passed by the O.P. No.- contained as Annexure No. 1 &
2 to the Writ Petition;
(b) Issue a writ of mandamus or a writ, order or direction in the nature of
mandamus commanding the respondents to pay the arrears of salary and
consequential service benefits to the petitioner of which he has been
deprived of 7 years and to allow the petitioner to continue with his work;
(c) Issue a writ of mandamus or a writ, order or direction in the nature of
mandamus commanding the respondents to pay interest on the
outstanding salary of the petitioner;"
3. It is to be noted that in terms of the order dated 06.08.2016, the
petitioner is not getting the salary of the Class IV post, on which he was
appointed by the order dated 30.12.1995 by the Committee of
Management of the Institution namely Khemraj Smarak Rashtriya
Vidyapeeth Inter College, Khmpur, District- Ambedkar Nagar, (in short
"Institution").
4. It is also to be noted that the appointment of the petitioner was
approved by the District Inspector of Schools, Faizabad/Ayodhya on
30.08.1996, as appears from Annexure No. 5 to the present petition.
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5. It is also to be noted that on the date of meeting of the Selection
Committee i.e. on 30.12.1995, the father of the petitioner namely Sri
Babban Singh was the Principal of the Institution and as per the counter
affidavit sworn by one Vinod Kumar Singh, District Inspector of Schools,
Ambedkar Nagar, Sri Babban Singh remained the Principal of the
Institution till 30.06.2009, which fact is not in issue.
6. It is also relevant to indicate that one Dharmendra Singh approached
this court by means of Service Single No. 2648 of 2025 (Dharmendra
Singh vs. State Of U.P. Thru. Secretary Secondary Education & 5 Others)
challenging the order dated 01.01.2015, by which the appointment of
Dharmendra Singh on Class-IV post was disapproved and this petition
was finally disposed of by the order dated 21.05.2015 after taking note of
the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, who
appeared before the Writ Court on that date. According to this order the
salary was paid to the petitioner from the year 1996 till 2009. The order
dated 21.05.2015 is extracted hereunder:-
"Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for
the State-respondents and Shri Pradeep Kumar Gupta, Advocate holding
brief of Shri Pt. S. Chandra, leaned counsel for Shri Pradeep Kumar
Singh.
Under challenge in this petition is an order dated 01.01.2015, passed by
the District Inspector of Schools, Ambedkar Nagar, whereby
selection/appointment of the petitioner against a class-IV post in Khemraj
Smarak Rashtriya Vidyapeeth Inter College, Khemapur, District
Ambedkar Nagar has been disapproved. The reason indicated in the said
impugned order is that the State Government by means of the orders
dated 06.01.2011 and 15.03.2012 has imposed a ban on appointments
against class-IV posts.
Shri Pradeep Kumar Gupta, Advocate holding brief of Shri Pt. S.
Chandra, who has been given right of hearing on behalf of Pradeep
Kumar Singh has submitted that the post against which
appointment/selection of the petitioner has allegedly been made and was
earlier being held and occupied by Pradeep Kumar Singh, who was
regularly appointed class-IV employee and was even paid salary from the
year 1996 till the year 2009.
So far as the Government Order dated 06.01.2011 is concerned, the same
stands quashed by this Court in the case of Committee of Management,
Lala Babu Baijal Memorial Inter College and Another vs. State of U.P.
and others, in Writ-C No.11760 of 2011.
As far as the other Government Order referred to in the impugned order
i.e the Government Order dated 15.03.2012 is concerned, it has been held
by this Court in the case of Vipin vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in
[2013 (7) ADJ 274] that the said Government Order dated 15.03.2012
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cannot be adopted or applied by necessary implication in relation to the
appointment of class-IV employees in the institutions governed by the
Intermediate Education Act, 1921.
Accordingly, the impugned order dated 1.01.2015, passed by the District
Inspector of Schools, Ambedkar Nagar, cannot be permitted to be
sustained, which is hereby quashed and the writ petition is allowed.
The District Inspector of Schools, Ambedkar Nagar is directed to decide
the matter relating to grant of approval to the appointment/selection of
the petitioner afresh strictly in accordance with law and keeping in view
the provisions contained in Regulation of the and requirement thereof,
within a period of three month from the date of production of certified
copy of this order.
It is further directed that the District Inspector of Schools, Ambedkar
Nagar will strictly follow the provisions of the Regulation and law
applicable thereto and will scrutinize as to whether the provisions
contained in the Regulations framed under U.P. Intermediate Education
Act, 1921 right from seeking permission to filling up the post, issuing an
appropriate advertisement and holding proper selection etc. have been
followed or not.
Since it has been submitted on behalf of Pradeep Kumar Singh that the
post against which selection/appointment of the petitioner has allegedly
been made was earlier being occupied by him having been regularly
appointed, it is also provided that the District Inspector of Schools while
deciding the matter in terms of this order shall also provide an
opportunity to Shri Pradeep Kumar Singh of being heard.
There will be no order as to costs."
7. Undisputedly, the appointment of the petitioner was in violation of
Regulation 4 of Chapter III framed under U.P. Intermediate Education
Act, 1921 (in short 'Act of 1921'). Regulation 4 of Chapter III of the Act
of 1921 reads as under:-
“4. No teacher shall be appointed whether a temporary or clear vacancy
in an institution who is related to any member of the Committee of
Management or the Principal or the Head Master, nor shall a
Headmaster or Principal be appointed” in an institution who is related to
any member of the committee of Management. "
8. The present petition is based upon the order of the Division Bench of
this Court dated 08.08.1994 passed in the case of
Rajendra Prasad
Srivastava vs. District Inspector of Schools & others; 1994 SCC OnLine
. The order dated 08.08.1994 reads as under:-
All 436
"Appellant was appointed as a clerk in 1971 in a recognised Intermediate
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College. In 1978 the District Inspector of Schools (hereinafter referred to
as the D.I.O.S.), directed the Management of the College to take
necessary action against the appellant as he was appointed in violation of
Regulation 4 of Chapter III framed under the U.P. Intermediate
Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Pursuant to this
order of D.I.O.S. the Managing Committee terminated the service of the
appellant, vide order dated 8.8.1978, after giving him three months'
notice. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed a writ petition before this
court in 1978, in which interim order was granted. The stay order was
later on confirmed after exchange of affidavits by the parties. However,
the writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single judge, vide judgment
dated 6.8.1991 on the ground that the appellant's appointment was in
violation of Regulation 4 of Chapter III, framed under the Act and was, as
such, illegal, against which this appeal has been filed by the appellant.
2. Regulation 4 of Chapter in is reproduced below:
“4. No teacher shall be appointed whether a temporary or clear vacancy
in an institution who is related to any member of the Committee of
Management or the Principal or the Head Master, nor shall a
Headmaster or Principal be appointed” in an institution who is related to
any member of the committee of Management.
3. The Regulation prohibits the appointment of any Teacher, Principal or
Headmaster in an institution who is related to any member of the
Committee of Management.
4. On the face of it this Regulation does not cover the case of a clerk. But
Regulation 22 of the same Chapter has laid down that the appointment,
probation and confirmation of clerks shall mutatis mutandis be governed
by Regulations 1, 4 to 15 and 21. Thus the prohibition contained in
Regulation 4 against the appointment of a person who is related to a
member of the Committee of management, has been extended to the clerks
also.
5. Appointment of the appellant, as such, was obviously in breach of
Regulation 4, because at the time of his appointment his father was
member of the Managing Committee. The appellant has worked in the
institution right from 1971 to 1978 when his service was terminated.
Order of termination was stayed by this Court, on account of which
appellant has continued to work right upto 1991, when his writ petition
was dismissed. He has, thus, worked for about 20 years. The question that
is required to be decided by this court is as to whether an employee, who
has worked for about 20 years should be permitted to be removed on the
ground that his initial appointment was bad. Learned counsel for the
appellant, Sri R.N. Singh, has contented that it will be highly unfair and
unjust to permit removal of an employee after 20 years. In support of his
submission he has placed reliance on Committee of
Management v. District inspector of Schools, [(1990) 1 U.P.L.B.E.C.
189.] Smt. Rani Srivastava v. State of U.P.. [(1990) 1 U.P.L.B.E.C. 425.]
and Dr. M.S. Mudhol v. S.D. Halegkar, [1993 (2) Education Service
cases 245 (SC).] Sri. R.K. Kakkar, learned counsel for respondent, on the
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5
other hand, has contended that the appointment of the appellant was void,
as such, this court should not interfere with the order of termination of his
service.
6. It is true that the appointment of the appellant was in violation of
Regulation 4 of Chapter III and was as such, illegal, but he has worked in
the institution from 1971 to 1978. When his service was terminated. But
this order of termination was stayed by this Court, on account of which he
continued to work upto the time when his writ petition was dismissed in
August, 1991. It will be highly unfair to remove a person from service
after about 20 years, on the ground that his initial appointment was
illegal. Division Bench of this Court in Committee of
Management v. District Inspector of Schools, (Supra) has held that it will
be unfair and unjust to un-settle the career of an employee who has
worked for about eight years. In Smt. Rani Srivastava v. State of
U.P. (Supra) another Division bench did not permit the appointment of
head mistress to be put to an end after five years, even though there was
infirmity in making her appointment. Supreme Court in Dr. M.S.
Mudhol v. S.D. Halegkar (Supra) has observed that it would be
undesirable to disturb a Principal after 12 years on the ground that he
was not eligible at the time of his appointment, because it would be
inequitous to make him suffer after such a long time.
7. That apart, there was misapprehension about the applicability of
Regulation 4 of Chapter III, to the clerks. This misapprehension was on
account of the language of Regulation 4 which confined its operation to
the Principal, Teachers and Headmaster only. Even this court in Bhopal
Singh v. Deputy Director of Education [1983 U.P.L.B.E.C. 597.] was of
the view that upto 1975, Intermediate Education Act did not contain any
provision relating to the clerks. It is true that this court did not notice
Regulation 22 which made provisions of Regulations 1, 4 to 15 and 21
applicable to the clerks also. Such misapprehension might have been in
the mind of the Committee of Management which appointed the appellant.
Although such misapprehension was unjustified in view of Regulation 22,
but there will be no justification now to un-settle the appellant, who has
worked in the institution for the last about 20 years.
8. For the reasons given above this appeal is allowed. The judgment of
learned Single Judge is set aside. The appellant is directed to be re-
instated with full salary for the period during which he could not work
after the decision of the learned Single Judge.
9. Spl. Appeal Allowed."
9. In addition to above, the petitioner approached this Court for the
relief(s) sought, quoted above, on the ground(s) to the effect that (i)
proper opportunity of hearing was not given to the petitioner and (ii)
the District Inspector of Schools himself has stated that cancellation of
appointment was not in consonance with the law.
10. This Court considered the aforesaid and also the observations made by
the Division Bench of this Court in the
orders dated 06.04.2017 passed in
Special Appeal No. 170 of 2006 (Committee of Management Shia Inter
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6
College, Lucknow through its Manager vs. State of U.P. through
Secretary, Department of Secondary Education and others) & other
connected cases and also the order dated 03.11.2023 passed in Special
Appeal No. 863 of 2019 (Mahesh Chandra Srivastava vs. The State of
.
U.P. Thru. Secry. And 6 Others)
11. Upon reconsideration of the aforesaid, this Court is not inclined to
accede with the main relief(s) sought in this petition, quoted above. It is
for the following reason(s):-
(i) It is settled law that an appointment dehors the rule would be void. The
statutory condition contained in Chapter III Regulation 4 read with
Regulation 100 of the Act of 1921, lay down a prohibition of the
appointment of any of the relatives defined in Regulation 4.
(ii) The father of the petitioner being the principal of the Institution was
an exofficio member of the Committee of Management and in the
aforesaid circumstances the petitioner fell within the prohibited category
of relatives as defined under Regulation 4 of Chapter III of the Act of
1921. By virtue of Regulation 100 the said definition has also been
applied in relation to the post of 'Peon'. Thus the appointment of the
petitioner, to the view of this Court, cannot be saved. Consequently the
other arguments need not be gone into.
(iii) The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Man Singh Vs. The State of
Uttar Pradesh Through Secretary & Others (Civil Appeal No. 7841 of
did not grant reinstatement. On the
2011 decided on 31st March, 2022)
contrary, it noted that though the appellant before it had worked for 24
years and his appointment had been cancelled thereafter on 24th
December, 1998, he was only entitled to pensionary benefit and
protection of recovery of salaries for the work done, in the past.
(iv) In the present case, the petitioner may also have worked for only 13
years before his appointment was cancelled. No recovery was being made
from him of any amount paid for the work done, which shall not be
recovered by the authorities including the State authorities.
(v) In the case of , referred above,
Rajendra Prasad Srivastava (supra)
Rajendra Prasad Srivastava continued on the post for about 20 years and
in the instant case the petitioner continued till 2009 i.e. about 13 years.
Moreover, this Court is of the view that the benefit, as provided in the
judgment passed in the case of by
Rajendra Prasad Srivastava (supra)
this Division Bench of this Court, is not liable to be provided to the
petitioner in view of above referred judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court
passed in the case of and also in the case of
Man Singh (supra) District
Basic Education Officer and another Vs. Dhananjai Kumar Shukla and
, relevant paragraphs 13 and 14 of this
another, 2008 AIR SCW 1224
judgment are extracted hereunder:-
"13. As basic foundational fact stands admitted before us, we are of the
opinion that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. The
appointment of Respondent No.1 being contrary to the mandatory
provisions as contained in Rule 6 of the Rules, the same was a nullity. An
appointment which was per se illegal could not have b een directed to be
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legalised only because the appellant did not file its counter affidavit. It
did not admit the respondent's claim. The question involved in the writ
petition was a legal question. As indicated hereinbefore, the foundational
facts are undisputed.
14. Rules of pleading contained in the Code of Civil Procedure do not
cover questions of law. If a fact stands admitted the same in terms of
Section 56 of the Indian Evidence Act need not be proved. Only because
such a question was not allegedly raised before the High Court, this
Court could not shut its eyes to the legal position. Yet again only because
an illegality has been committed, this Court would not allow its
perpetration. Respondent's father was on leave for a temporary period.
He thereby did not cease to be the Manager of the school. It is apparent
that he went on leave only for defeating the statutory provisions. Such an
act amounts to fraud on the administration."
(vi) The fact that the appointment of the petitioner is in violation
of Regulation 4 of Chapter III of the Act of 1921, quoted above, came
into picture when his father retired from the post of Principal.
(vii) The father of the petitioner, while Principal of the Institution,
appointed his two sons and two daughters namely Pradeep Kumar Singh
(petitioner), Santosh Singh, Kundala Singh and Rekha Singh, which
illegality cannot be permitted to continue for the times to come.
(viii) 'Dura lex sed lex' is a Latin legal maxim, which means 'The law is
harsh, but it is the law' .
12. For the foregoing reasons, the instant petition is .
dismissed
(Saurabh Lavania,J.)
November 17, 2026
Arun/-
Digitally signed by :-
ARUN KUMAR GANGWAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench