SMT. CHHAYA SINGH vs HONBLE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH

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2026:CGHC:26195
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally
signed by
VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
VISHAKHA
BEOHAR
WPS No. 7379 of 2023
Order Reserved on 24.04.2026
Order Delivered on 29.06.2026
1 - Smt. Chhaya Singh W/o Mr. Abhimanyu Singh Aged About 41
Years Presently Posted As Chief Judicial Magistrate, District
Gariyaband (Civil District Raipur) Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Honble High Court Of Chhattisgarh Through Registrar General
Bodri, Bilaspur.
2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Principal Secretary (Law),
Mahanadi Bhavan, Atal Nagar, Raipur Chhattisgarh.
3 - The District And Session Judge, District Janjgir Champa
Chhattisgarh
4 - Smt. Kiran Thawait Additional District And Sessions Judge,
Pendra Road Chhattisgarh.
5 - Ashok Kumar Lal Vi Additional District And Sessions Judge,
Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
6 - Sumit Kapoor Iii Additional District And Sessions Judge,
Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
7 - Awadh Kishore Additional Registrar (Admn), High Court Of
Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur

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8 - Jitendra Kumar Singh Ii Additional District And Sessions Judge,
Katghora Chhattisgarh.
9 - Shailesh Sharma Additional District And Session Judge (Ftc),
Dantewara Chhattisgarh.
10 - Vikram Pratap Chandra Additional District And Sessions
Judge, Ftsc (Pocso), Korba Chhattisgarh.
11 - Krishna Pal Singh Bhadauriya Deputy Secretary, Chhattisgarh
Lok Ayog, Raipur Chhattisgarh.
12 - Sanjay Agrawal Additional District And Sessions Judge,
Pratappur Chhattisgarh.
13 - Santanoo Kumar Deshlahre A.D.J. Of The Special Court For
Trial Of Naxalite Cases, Dantewara Chhattisgarh.
14 - Avinash Kumar Tripathi X Additional District And Sessions
Judge, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
15 - Vinay Kumar Pradhan Additional District And Sessions Judge,
Baikunthpur Chhattisgarh.
16 - Abhishek Sharma Additional District And Sessions Judge
(F.T.C.), Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh.
17 - Agam Kumar Kashyap Ix Additional District And Sessions
Judge, Raipur Chhattisgarh.
18 - Shrinivas Tiwari Additional District And Sessions Judge,
Kawardha Chhattisgarh.
19 - Om Prakash Jaiswal V Additional District And Sessions Judge,
Ambikapur Chhattisgarh.
20 - Jagmohan Shankar Patel Additional District And Sessions
Judge, Ftsc (Pocso), Jagdalpur Chhattisgarh.
21 - Ganesh Ram Patel Additional District And Sessions Judge
(F.T.C.), Durg Chhattisgarh.
22 - Smt. Monika Jaiswal II Additional District And Sessions Judge,
Ambikapur Chhattisgarh.

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23 - Santosh Kumar Mahobiya II Additional District And Sessions
Judge, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
24 - Ku. Pushplata Markande IV Additional District And Sessions
Judge, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
25 - Smt. Mona Chauhan Joint Registrar, Cg State Consumer
Dispute Redressal Commission, Raipur Chhattisgarh
26 - Krishna Kumar Suryawanshi II Additional District And Sessions
Judge, Korba Chhattisgarh.
27 - Ku. Vandana Verma Additional District And Sessions Judge,
(F.T.C.), Jagdalpur Chhattisgarh.
28 - Santosh Thakur I Civil Judge Class-I And Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Durg Chhattisgarh.
29 - Narendra Kumar I Civil Judge Class -I And Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Ambikapur Chhattisgarh.
30 - Smt. Shyamwati Maravi I Civil Judge Class -I And Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Balod Chhattisgarh.
31 - Smt. Sushma Lakra I Civil Judge Class -I And Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Surajpur Chhattisgarh.
32 - Anil Prabhat Minj I Civil Judge Class -I And Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Dhamtari Chhattisgarh.
33 - Deepak Kumar Koshley I Civil Judge Class-I And Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Raigarh Chhattisgarh.
34 - Bhupendra Kumar Vasnikar I Civil Judge Class -I And Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Kanker Chhattisgarh.
35 - Damarudhar Chouhan I Civil Judge Class-I And Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Jashpur Chhattisgarh.
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from the Case Information System)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Petitioner : Mr. T.K. Jha & Mr. Anumeh Shrivastava, Advocates
For Respondents No. 1 to 3 : Mr. Ashish Surana, Advocate

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For Respondents No. 4, 7, 8, 10, 16, 22, 29 & 30 : Mr. Abhishek
Gupta, Advocate
For Respondents No. 5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 23, 24, 25 & 34 : Mr. Gourav
Singhal, Advocate
For Respondent No. 9 : Mr. Aman Kesharwani, Advocate
For Respondent No. 19 : Mr. Raja Sharma & Ms. Aditi Parakh,
Advocates
For Respondent No. 28 : Ms. Smriti Ekka, Advocate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
1. By way of the present petition, the petitioner has invoked the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India challenging the action of the respondents
in deferring her promotion from the post of Civil Judge Class-II
(Junior Division) to Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) vide order
dated 14.08.2014 and subsequently denying her restoration of
original seniority despite her later promotion vide order dated
12.08.2016. The petitioner further seeks grant of consequential
seniority and all attendant service benefits. The petitioner has also
prayed for appropriate directions to the respondents to consider
her case for further promotion to the post of District Judge (Entry
Level) by restoring her rightful seniority in accordance with the
applicable service rules.
2. Subject matter in brief is that the petitioner was initially
appointed as Civil Judge Class-II (Junior Division) on 26.12.2008

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and was posted at District Court, Durg. In terms of Rule 5(2) read
with Schedule-II of the Rules of 2006, the petitioner had completed
the requisite qualifying service of five years with unblemished
Annual Confidential Reports and without any adverse remarks,
thereby becoming entitled for consideration for promotion to the
post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division). However, vide
promotion order dated 14.08.2014, the petitioner’s case was kept
in the category of deferred candidates, whereas her juniors were
granted promotion. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner submitted a
representation dated 15.04.2015 seeking grant of promotion and
consequential benefits, but neither the said representation was
decided nor was any communication made regarding its outcome.
Subsequently, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Civil
Judge Class-I (Senior Division) vide order dated 12.08.2016,
though she was denied her original seniority despite the fact that
her promotion had merely been deferred and she was never
declared unfit. According to the petitioner, under Rule 12(D) of the
C.G. Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961,
she was entitled to restoration of her original seniority, particularly
when similarly situated judicial officers had been granted such
benefit by the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 17.05.2006.
Thereafter, the petitioner was promoted to the next higher
scale/post of Chief Judicial Magistrate vide order dated

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02.07.2019, whereas her batchmates had already secured
promotion to the post of Additional District Judge nearly two years
earlier. It is further averred that during her posting as Civil Judge
Class-I at Akaltara, District Janjgir-Champa, certain adverse
remarks and grading of “D” and “E” were recorded against her by
the concerned District Judge in an arbitrary and mala fide manner,
though subsequently the Hon’ble High Court was pleased to
upgrade the Grade “E” to Grade “D”. The petitioner apprehends
that despite availability of approximately 16 promotional posts of
Additional District Judge in the near future, her present placement
at Serial No. 23 in the seniority list may again deprive her of timely
promotion on account of denial of original seniority.
3. Following reliefs have been prayed by the petitioner by way of
this petition:-
“10.1 That this Hon'ble Court may kindly allow
this petition and call for the entire record of the
case.
10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court be pleased to
allow the petition and direct the competent
authority to restore the seniority of the
petitioner from the date her batch mates (year
2008) were given promotion vide order dated
14.08.2014.
10.3 Deleted as per Hon’ble Court order
dated 04.12.2025.
10.4 That, Hon'ble Court may kindly be

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pleased to allow this petition and grant all the
consequential benefits.”
4. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the case are that the
petitioner was selected and appointed as Civil Judge Class-II
(Junior Division) in the year 2008, having secured 14th position in
the merit list amongst 60 selected candidates. Pursuant to such
selection, the petitioner was appointed on 26.12.2008 and joined
service at the District & Sessions Court, Durg. The service
conditions of the petitioner are governed by the Chhattisgarh Lower
Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules,
2006. During the course of service, the petitioner discharged her
judicial duties with sincerity, honesty and devotion, on account
whereof she was confirmed in service by the Hon’ble High Court
vide order dated 01.09.2012 maintaining her original merit position.
After completion of five years of service as Civil Judge Class-II
(Junior Division), the petitioner became entitled for consideration
for promotion to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division)
under Rule 5(2) read with Schedule-II of the Rules of 2006. The
petitioner’s ACRs for the relevant period were unblemished and
there existed no adverse remarks against her. The petitioner
consistently secured “C” grading from the year 2009-10 to 2012-13
and “B” grading in the year 2013-14. During her posting at Durg,
one complaint was made against the petitioner by the then

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Superintendent of Police in relation to judicial proceedings initiated
on a complaint filed by one Virendra Kurre under Sections 200 and
202 Cr.P.C., arising out of an application under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. The petitioner, while functioning as the Presiding Officer,
had passed judicial orders in accordance with law directing
registration of FIR against the concerned officials. On the basis of
said complaint, when an explanation was sought, the petitioner
duly submitted her explanation to the said complaint on
04.03.2013. Thereafter, no communication, departmental enquiry
or disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner and,
therefore, she bona fidely believed that the matter stood closed.
Thereafter, the Hon’ble High Court issued promotion order dated
14.08.2014 promoting members of the 2008 batch from the post of
Civil Judge Class-II (Junior Division) to Civil Judge Class-I (Senior
Division). In the said order, 45 judicial officers were promoted, 5 officers
including the petitioner were kept in the category of “deferred”, whereas
3 officers were declared unfit. At the relevant point of time, the petitioner
had no knowledge regarding the reasons for deferment and was not
even aware of the implications of such deferment. Aggrieved by the said
action, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 15.04.2015
seeking consideration of her promotion and grant of consequential
benefits, however, the said representation remained undecided and no
communication was ever made to her regarding the same. After

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nearly two years, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Civil
Judge Class-I (Senior Division) vide order dated 12.08.2016 and
was posted at Akaltara, District Janjgir-Champa. However, despite
the fact that her case had merely been deferred and she was never
declared unfit, the petitioner was denied restoration of her original
seniority. As per Sub Rule 12(D) of the C.G. Civil Services (General
Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961, an employee whose case was
deferred and who is subsequently found fit is entitled to restoration
of original seniority from the date his or her immediate junior was
promoted. Denial of such benefit to the petitioner resulted in loss of
seniority and adversely affected her future promotional prospects.
Thereafter, the petitioner again submitted a representation dated
09.11.2017 seeking grant of original seniority and consequential
benefits. However, the same came to be rejected vide
memorandum dated 21.02.2018 by a non-speaking and
unreasoned order communicated through the Registrar General.
During her posting as Civil Judge Class-I at Akaltara, District
Janjgir-Champa, adverse remarks along with grading “D” were
communicated to the petitioner for the period from 01.04.2016 to
31.03.2017. In the subsequent year also, the petitioner received
adverse remarks along with grading “E” for the period from
01.04.2017 to 31.03.2018. The petitioner submitted detailed
representations against the said adverse entries and grading.

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Subsequently, the Hon’ble High Court was pleased to upgrade the
grading from “E” to “D”, though the prayer for expunging the
adverse remarks was rejected. Thereafter, the petitioner was
promoted to the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate vide order dated
02.07.2019 and was posted at Surajpur and later transferred to
Gariyaband. From the year 2014 till date, no complaint or
disciplinary proceedings have ever been initiated against the
petitioner and her subsequent ACR gradings have remained
satisfactory, including “B” gradings in later years. In the year 2021,
vacancies for promotion to the post of District Judge (Entry Level)
under Rule 5(1)(a) and Rule 5(1)(b) of the Chhattisgarh Higher
Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules,
2006 were notified. However, due to denial of original seniority, the
petitioner was placed at Serial No. 23 in the seniority list of eligible
judicial officers and consequently could neither secure promotion
nor effectively compete for selection. Similarly, in the eligible list
issued in the year 2022 for promotion to the post of District Judge
(Entry Level), the petitioner was placed at Serial No. 14 and her
chances of promotion again became remote solely because of
denial of restoration of her original seniority. The petitioner, despite
suffering continuous prejudice in service career, initially lacked the
courage to challenge the actions of her own department as she
genuinely apprehended that pursuing legal remedies against the

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department may further adversely affect her future promotional
prospects. However, in view of recurring prejudice and continuous
denial of legitimate service benefits, the petitioner has now been
constrained to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court by
filing the present petition.
5. Mr. T.K. Jha & Mr. Anumeh Shrivastava, learned counsel for
the petitioner submit that the petitioner had an unblemished service
record till the year 2014 and there existed neither any adverse ACR
nor any departmental enquiry or disciplinary proceedings against
her. Despite such clean service record, her promotion to the post of
Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) was deferred vide order dated
14.08.2014 without assigning any reason, which action is arbitrary,
unjust and contrary to the provisions of Sub Rule 12(D) of the C.G.
Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961. It is
further submitted that when the petitioner was subsequently
promoted vide order dated 12.08.2016, she was legally entitled to
restoration of her original seniority in terms of Rule 12(D), however
the same was illegally denied, thereby causing serious prejudice to
her future promotional prospects. Learned counsel further submits
that similarly situated officers, including one Shri Pradeep Kumar
Shrivastava, who had earlier been deferred, were granted
restoration of original seniority by the Hon’ble High Court vide order
dated 17.05.2006, and therefore denial of the same benefit to the

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petitioner is discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India. It is also contended that during her posting at
Akaltara, District Janjgir-Champa, the petitioner was facing
considerable personal and medical difficulties, including post-
delivery health complications while simultaneously taking care of
her two minor children aged about six years and six months
respectively. Despite such circumstances, the petitioner discharged
her judicial duties with utmost sincerity and dedication and
maintained satisfactory judicial performance, including good
disposal of old civil and criminal cases, Lok Adalat matters and
legal aid activities conducted pursuant to directions of the Hon’ble
High Court. It is submitted that the adverse gradings of “D” for the
year 2016-17 and “E” for the year 2017-18, later upgraded to “D”
by the Hon’ble High Court, were arbitrary and mala fide in nature
and not reflective of her actual performance and integrity.
6. Learned counsel submit that due to denial of original seniority,
the petitioner’s position in the gradation list drastically fell from 14th
rank in her batch to 47th rank and presently she stands much lower
in the gradation list than what she would otherwise have occupied.
Such loss of seniority has seriously affected her service career,
morale and chances of promotion to the Higher Judicial Service. It
is argued that seniority is a valuable civil right having direct nexus
with promotional avenues and service benefits. In support of the

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aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed upon the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in H.S. Vankani v. State
of Gujarat AIR 2010 SC 1714 wherein it has been held that
seniority is a vital civil right affecting the future career progression
of a government servant and that unsettling seniority causes
bitterness, resentment and adversely impacts efficiency in
administration. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishna Prasad v. State of Bihar

AIR 2020 (1) SCCD 272 (SC) wherein it has been held that
disciplinary action against a judicial officer cannot be initiated
merely because erroneous judicial orders have been passed
unless there exists material to show that such orders were passed
for extraneous considerations. Learned counsel submit that the
complaint made against the petitioner arose purely from discharge
of judicial functions and no departmental enquiry or misconduct
was ever established against her.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submit that the
petitioner was denied promotion without there being any plausible
or justifiable reason, despite being fully eligible and entitled for
promotion to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) when
the cases of other similarly situated judicial officers were
considered and promotions were granted vide order dated
14.08.2014. It is submitted that the petitioner’s case was merely

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deferred by the Departmental Promotion Committee on the ground
that a complaint had been submitted by the Superintendent of
Police, Durg. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner was called upon to
submit her explanation and she duly furnished a detailed reply to
the allegations levelled against her. Thereafter, neither any
departmental enquiry nor any disciplinary proceedings were
initiated against the petitioner. Thus, the very basis on which her
case was deferred stood completely diluted and ceased to survive.
Learned counsel submits that the petitioner was subsequently
promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) vide
order dated 12.08.2016. From the said promotion order itself, it is
evident that the petitioner was found fit and suitable for promotion.
According to learned counsel, once the petitioner was ultimately
found fit and promoted, there remained no justification for denying
her promotion from the date on which her batchmates and other
similarly situated officers were promoted, namely 14.08.2014. It is
contended that the petitioner was, in fact, entitled to promotion
from the said date itself. Learned counsel for the petitioner further
contends that the objection raised by the respondents that the
petitioner never challenged the rejection of her representation
seeking promotion and restoration of seniority at par with other
similarly situated judicial officers is misconceived. It is submitted
that the representation was never decided on merits and no

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reasons whatsoever were assigned while rejecting the same. The
order merely states that the representation dated 09.11.2017
seeking grant of original seniority stood rejected after due
consideration. Such a cryptic and non-speaking order, devoid of
any reasons, cannot be treated as a valid adjudication on merits
and, therefore, the petitioner cannot be non-suited on the ground
that the said order was not separately challenged.
8. Learned counsel further submit that the objection regarding
delay and laches is also unsustainable. The petitioner had been
continuously pursuing her claim by submitting representations
before the competent authorities seeking promotion and restoration
of seniority at par with those officers who were promoted vide order
dated 14.08.2014. It is argued that matters relating to promotion
and seniority have recurring civil consequences throughout the
tenure of service and, therefore, constitute a continuing cause of
action. It is further submitted that owing to the intervening Covid-19
pandemic and certain personal difficulties, the petitioner could not
approach this Court at an earlier point of time. However, the same
cannot be a ground to deny her legitimate service benefits.
Learned counsel argue that the sole reason for deferment of the
petitioner's case by the Departmental Promotion Committee was
the complaint made by the Superintendent of Police, Durg. Had
any departmental enquiry or disciplinary proceedings been initiated

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against the petitioner pursuant to the said complaint, the matter
would have stood on a different footing. However, admittedly, no
action whatsoever was taken on the said complaint and no enquiry
was ever instituted. According to learned counsel, this clearly
demonstrates that the respondents were satisfied with the
explanation furnished by the petitioner and did not find any
substance warranting further action. Consequently, the complaint
could not have been relied upon to permanently deprive the
petitioner of her rightful promotion and consequential seniority. In
the aforesaid circumstances, learned counsel submit that once the
petitioner was ultimately promoted in the year 2016 and no adverse
action was ever initiated against her, she is entitled to be treated at
par with the officers who were promoted on 14.08.2014. It is,
therefore, prayed that the petition be allowed and the petitioner be
granted promotion notionally with effect from 14.08.2014, along
with restoration of her original seniority and all consequential
service benefits, including consideration for further promotional
avenues on that basis.
9. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab
and Haryana (1988) 3 SCC 370 to contend that independence of
the judiciary and protection of honest judicial officers is an essential
constitutional mandate under Article 235 of the Constitution of India

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and that judicial officers should not be victimized on the basis of
motivated or frivolous complaints arising out of judicial orders
passed in discharge of official duties. Learned counsel therefore
submits that the action of the respondents in deferring the
petitioner’s promotion, denying restoration of original seniority and
recording arbitrary adverse remarks is illegal, arbitrary and violative
of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and deserves
to be interfered with by this Hon’ble Court. Reliance has also been
placed upon the judgments in the matters of Krishnadatt Awasthy
vs. State of M.P. (2025) 7 SCC 545, Madhyamam Broadcasting
Ltd. vs. Union of India (2023) 13 SCC 401, S.N. Mukherjee vs.
Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 594, Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. vs.
Masood Ahmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496, Salik Ram
Chandrakar vs. State of Chhattisgarh 2025 SCC OnLine Chh
11503, Pushpa Kiran Bhagat vs. State of Chhattisgarh 2025
SCC OnLine Chh 13914, Mahendra Kumar Shrivastava vs.
Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited 2025
OnLine Chh 11506, Union of India vs, K.V. Jankiraman (1991) 4
SCC 109, Shatruhan Prasad Kurrey vs. The State of
Chhattisgarh & Ors. SLP(C) Diary No. 33707/2022 and Union of
India vs. Sangram Keshari Nayak (2007) 6 SCC 704 .
10. Per contra, Mr. Ashish Surana, learned counsel appearing for
respondent Nos. 1 to 3 vehemently opposes the petition and

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submits that the petitioner is not entitled to claim promotion with
effect from 14.08.2014, i.e., the date on which other eligible judicial
officers were promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior
Division). It is submitted that at the relevant point of time, the case
of the petitioner was specifically deferred by the Departmental
Promotion Committee on account of a complaint received from the
Superintendent of Police, Durg. The deferment was, therefore,
based upon a conscious decision taken by the competent authority
while considering the suitability of eligible officers for promotion.
Learned counsel submits that although no departmental enquiry
was ultimately initiated and no disciplinary action came to be taken
against the petitioner on the basis of the said complaint, the fact
remains that the petitioner was not found suitable for promotion by
the Departmental Promotion Committee in the promotion exercise
conducted in the year 2014. The petitioner accepted the said
position and did not challenge either the decision of the
Departmental Promotion Committee or the promotion order dated
14.08.2014 before any competent forum at the relevant point of
time. It is further contended that the petitioner was subsequently
promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division) in the
year 2016 and thereafter continued to avail the benefits flowing
from such promotion without raising any legal challenge regarding
her earlier non-promotion. According to learned counsel, the

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acceptance of the subsequent promotion without protest clearly
indicates that the petitioner had acquiesced in the decision taken
by the authorities and had accepted her position in the service
hierarchy. Having accepted the subsequent promotion and all
consequential benefits, the petitioner cannot now seek to reopen
issues which had attained finality long ago. Learned counsel further
submits that the present petition suffers from gross delay and
laches. The promotion order sought to be indirectly questioned was
issued on 14.08.2014, whereas the petitioner has approached this
Court after an inordinate lapse of several years. During this
intervening period, not only was the petitioner promoted in the year
2016, but several other service-related developments and
promotions also took place. Entertaining the petition at such a
belated stage would unsettle the settled seniority position and
adversely affect the rights of several officers who are not before
this Court. It is also argued that the petitioner had submitted a
representation seeking restoration of original seniority and grant of
promotion from the year 2014, which representation came to be
rejected by the competent authority vide communication issued in
the year 2018. Despite rejection of her claim, the petitioner neither
challenged the said order nor questioned its legality before any
Court of law within a reasonable period. Consequently, the order
rejecting her representation has attained finality and cannot now be

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indirectly assailed through the present proceedings. Learned
counsel submits that merely because the order rejecting the
representation may not contain elaborate reasons, the petitioner
was nevertheless required to challenge the same if she intended to
dispute the decision of the authorities. Having failed to do so, she
cannot be permitted to circumvent the effect of the said order by
filing the present petition after several years. It is, therefore, argued
that the petitioner is guilty of acquiescence, waiver and delay, and
having accepted her subsequent promotions as well as the
seniority position assigned to her, she is estopped from claiming
retrospective promotion from 14.08.2014. In view of the aforesaid
facts and circumstances, learned counsel submits that the
petitioner is not entitled to any relief and the writ petition deserves
to be dismissed.
11. Mr. Gourav Singhal, learned counsel appearing for
respondent Nos. 5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 23, 24, 25 and 34 submits that
the writ petition is liable to be dismissed at the threshold on
account of gross delay and laches. It is contended that the
petitioner has challenged actions pertaining to the years 2014,
2016 and 2018 by filing the present petition only in the year 2023
without furnishing any satisfactory explanation for such inordinate
delay. According to learned counsel, the petitioner is a judicial
officer well acquainted with legal remedies and, therefore, cannot

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seek indulgence after allowing her alleged grievance to remain
dormant for several years. Learned counsel further submits that so
far as the challenge to the Annual Confidential Reports for the
years 2016-17 and 2017-18 is concerned, the petitioner has
directly approached this Court without first availing the appropriate
remedy before the competent authority for seeking upgradation of
the gradings. In the absence of any material demonstrating that the
petitioner had pursued the prescribed departmental remedy, the
challenge to the ACR gradings is premature and not maintainable.
It is also argued that the writ petition suffers from misjoinder of
causes of action. The claim relating to restoration of seniority and
grant of promotion from the year 2014 constitutes a distinct cause
of action, whereas the challenge to the ACR gradings for the years
2016-17 and 2017-18 gives rise to a separate and independent
cause of action. Both claims cannot be conveniently adjudicated in
a single writ petition and, therefore, the petition is misconceived. It
is accordingly prayed that the writ petition, being devoid of merit
and suffering from delay, non-maintainability and misjoinder of
causes of action, deserves to be dismissed.
12. Ms. Smriti Ekka, learned counsel appearing for respondent
No. 28 adopts the submissions advanced on behalf of respondent
Nos. 1 to 3 and further submits that the present writ petition
deserves to be dismissed on the grounds of delay, laches and

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acquiescence. It is contended that the petitioner seeks restoration
of seniority and consequential promotion from 14.08.2014,
whereas the present petition has been filed only in the year 2023
after an unexplained delay of nearly nine years. Despite being
aware that her promotion had been deferred in 2014 and that she
was subsequently promoted in 2016, the petitioner neither
challenged the deferment nor the promotion order dated
14.08.2014. It is further submitted that her representation seeking
restoration of seniority was rejected on 21.02.2018 and the said
order was also never challenged, thereby attaining finality. Learned
counsel submits that the petitioner accepted her subsequent
promotions, including promotions to higher posts in the judicial
service, without protest and, therefore, is deemed to have
acquiesced in the seniority position assigned to her. It is argued
that entertaining the petition at this stage would unsettle the settled
seniority of several judicial officers and adversely affect rights
which have crystallized over the years. It is further contended that
the petition suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties, as any
direction regarding retrospective seniority would directly affect the
service rights and promotional prospects of several officers who
have not been impleaded in the present proceedings. Learned
counsel also submits that retrospective seniority cannot be claimed
as a matter of right. The petitioner was considered by the

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Departmental Promotion Committee in the year 2014 but was not
found fit for promotion at that stage, whereafter she was promoted
in the year 2016. Since promotion is not a vested right and only
consideration for promotion can be claimed, no legal right of the
petitioner can be said to have been infringed. Learned counsel
further submits that the petitioner has approached this Court only
after failing to secure further promotional benefits and is seeking
alteration of a long-settled seniority position for consequential
advantages. It is lastly contended that Rule 12(D) of the
Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules,
1961 does not confer an automatic right to restoration of seniority
and the competent authority was justified in assigning seniority to
the petitioner from the date she was found fit and promoted in the
year 2016. On these grounds, it is prayed that the writ petition be
dismissed.
13. She has placed reliance upon the judgments in the matters of
Vijay Kumar Kaul vs. Union of India (2012) 7 SCC 610, Union
of India vs. Chaman Rana (2018) 5 SCC 798, Public Service
Commission, Uttaranchal vs. Mamta Bisht & Ors. [AIR 2010
SC 2613, Jitendra Naidu vs. Union of India & Ors (WPS
No.1115/2017), Mrs. Lata Dadsena & Anr. vs. State of
Chhattisgarh & Ors.(WPS No.4027/2023), State of Bihar & Ors.
vs. Akhouri Sachindra Narth & Ors. 1991 Supp (1) SCC 334,

24
Chandu Lal Thakur vs. State of Chhattisgarh (WPS No.
90/2016) and Kumar Lal Uikey vs. Chhattisgarh State Power
Holding Co. Ltd. & Ors. (WPS No.583/2014).
14. Mr. Raja Sharma & Ms. Aditi Parakh, learned counsel
appearing for respondent No. 19 oppose the writ petition and
submits that the same is liable to be dismissed on the grounds of
delay, laches, acquiescence and finality. It is contended that the
petition has been filed in the year 2023 seeking to challenge
matters relating to promotion and seniority arising in the years
2014, 2016 and 2018. Despite being fully aware that her case was
deferred by the Departmental Promotion Committee in the year
2014 and that she was subsequently promoted in the year 2016,
the petitioner never challenged either the deferment order or the
promotion granted to her batchmates. It is further submitted that
the petitioner's representation seeking restoration of original
seniority was rejected on 21.02.2018 and the said order was also
never assailed, thereby attaining finality. In support of the aforesaid
submissions, reliance has been placed on various judgments cited
in the written submissions filed on behalf of respondent No. 19. Learned
counsel further submits that the petitioner, after accepting her promotion
as Civil Judge Class-I in the year 2016 and subsequent promotions
granted thereafter, cannot now seek to challenge the very process from
which she has derived benefits.
The conduct of the petitioner

25
clearly attracts the principles of acquiescence, waiver and
approbate and reprobate. It is argued that any interference at this
stage would seriously prejudice the rights of several judicial officers
whose seniority and promotional prospects have crystallized over
the years. It is also contended that the relief sought by the
petitioner for grant of retrospective seniority from 14.08.2014 is
legally impermissible inasmuch as on the said date she was
admittedly not borne in the promoted cadre and had not been
found fit for promotion by the Departmental Promotion Committee.
According to learned counsel, seniority can flow only from a valid
promotion and assumption of charge in the promoted post and
cannot be granted retrospectively so as to unsettle the settled
rights of others. Learned counsel further submits that Rule 12(D) of
the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (General Conditions of Service)
Rules, 1961 does not confer any automatic or vested right upon the
petitioner to claim restoration of original seniority. The said
provision operates only in the realm of determination of seniority
after promotion and cannot be invoked to reopen or nullify the
decision of the Departmental Promotion Committee deferring the
petitioner's promotion in the year 2014. It is argued that the
petitioner is seeking to indirectly challenge a decision which has
long attained finality.

26
15. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India, inter alia: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State
of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152, State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv
Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, K.R. Mudgal v.
R.P. Singh, (1986) 4 SCC 531, H.S. Vankani v. State of Gujarat,
(2010) 4 SCC 301, Shiba Shankar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa,
(2010) 12 SCC 47, Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2
SCC 25, State of Punjab v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, (2014) 15
SCC 144, Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers'
Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715,
Government of West Bengal v. Dr. Amal Satpathi, 2024 INSC
906, Dr. Krushna Chandra Sahu v. State of Orissa, 1995 Supp
(3) SCR 419, Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 5 SCC
604; Ajay Kumar Shukla v. Arvind Rai, (2022) 12 SCC 579;
Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana,
(2001) 2 SCC 276, R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka, (1992)
1 SCC 335; Ashok Ram Parhad v. State of Maharashtra, 2023
SCC OnLine SC 311; Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v. L.V.A.
Dikshitulu, (1979) 2 SCC 34 and All India Judges' Association
(3) v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247. On the aforesaid
grounds, and placing reliance upon the various aforesaid
judgments, learned counsel for respondent No. 19 submits that the
writ petition is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed.

27
16. Mr. Abhishek Gupta, learned counsel appearing for
respondent Nos. 4, 7, 8, 10, 16, 22, 29 & 30 submits that the writ
petition is not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed. It is
submitted that the petitioner, after an inordinate delay of nearly
nine years, seeks to unsettle a long-settled position of promotion
and inter se seniority which has attained finality and has been
acted upon by several officers whose rights have crystallized. The
petitioner was duly considered by the Departmental Promotion
Committee in 2014 and her case was deferred in accordance with
the applicable rules; she was subsequently promoted in 2016 and
cannot now seek retrospective promotion from 14.08.2014. It is
further submitted that the petition suffers from gross delay and
laches, acquiescence and waiver, as the petitioner accepted her
promotion in 2016 without protest and never challenged the 2014
or 2018 orders within a reasonable time. Entertaining such a
belated claim would unsettle settled seniority and prejudice third-
party rights of officers not before this Court. It is also submitted that
the petition suffers from non-joinder of necessary parties. It is
further contended that Rule 12(D) of the Chhattisgarh Civil
Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961 does not
confer any automatic right to retrospective seniority from an earlier
date of consideration, and seniority can only flow from valid

28
promotion and assumption of charge. On these grounds, the writ
petition is liable to be dismissed.
17. Mr. Aman Kesharwani, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No. 9 submits that the present writ petition is liable to
be dismissed as being devoid of merit and suffering from gross
delay and laches. It is submitted that the petitioner seeks to
challenge the settled position of promotion and inter se seniority
after an inordinate lapse of time, thereby unsettling the rights of
several judicial officers who have been functioning on the basis of
the promotion order dated 14.08.2014 and subsequent service
developments. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner, having
been duly considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee
and having been subsequently promoted in the year 2016, cannot
claim retrospective promotion or restoration of seniority from
14.08.2014, as such a claim is not recognized under the applicable
service jurisprudence. It is further submitted that the writ petition is
barred by acquiescence and waiver, as the petitioner accepted her
promotion without protest and failed to challenge the relevant
orders within a reasonable period. It is also contended that
entertaining the present petition would adversely affect third-party
rights of officers who are not before this Hon’ble Court and would
lead to unsettling of a long-standing and settled seniority position.

29
On these grounds, learned counsel submits that the writ petition
deserves to be dismissed.
18. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record carefully.
19. Upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court
finds that the petitioner was not promoted to the post of Civil Judge
Class-I (Senior Division) in the promotion exercise undertaken in
the year 2014 solely on account of a complaint submitted by the
then Superintendent of Police, Durg. The Departmental Promotion
Committee (DPC), instead of rejecting the petitioner's candidature,
merely deferred consideration of her case on the basis of the said
complaint. It is not in dispute that pursuant to the complaint, a
show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner and she submitted
her explanation thereto. However, thereafter no departmental
enquiry was initiated, no disciplinary proceedings were instituted,
and no adverse order was ever passed against the petitioner.
Thus, the complaint never culminated into any finding of
misconduct or any action prejudicial to the petitioner.
20. It is significant to note that the DPC did not declare the
petitioner unfit for promotion. Her case was only kept in a deferred
category. Subsequently, vide order dated 12.08.2016, the petitioner
was promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division).
Nothing has been brought on record to demonstrate that between

30
the years 2014 and 2016 any new material emerged in favour of
the petitioner or that any circumstance which rendered her
unsuitable in 2014 had ceased to exist by 2016. Rather, the record
indicates that the petitioner was promoted on the basis of the same
service profile and ACRs which were available at the time when her
case was initially considered. This clearly demonstrates that the
petitioner was otherwise fit and eligible for promotion when her
batchmates were promoted in the year 2014. The only impediment
was the pendency of a complaint which ultimately resulted in no
adverse action whatsoever. In such circumstances, the deferment
of her case could at best have been temporary and precautionary
in nature. Once the complaint did not culminate in any disciplinary
proceedings, enquiry, punishment or adverse finding, the
deferment ceased to have any legal significance. Consequently,
the petitioner cannot be made to suffer adverse service
consequences merely because her case was temporarily deferred
pending consideration of a complaint that ultimately proved
inconsequential.
21. The contention advanced on behalf of the respondents that
the petitioner's claim is liable to be rejected because her
representation stood rejected and the said rejection order was
never challenged also does not merit acceptance. A perusal of the
communication dated 21.02.2018 reveals that the representation

31
was rejected by a cryptic order merely stating that upon
consideration the claim was not found fit to be accepted. No
reasons whatsoever have been assigned. It is now well settled that
reasons are the heartbeat of every administrative or quasi-judicial
decision and ensure transparency, fairness and accountability in
decision-making. An order affecting valuable service rights, such as
seniority and promotional prospects, cannot be sustained when it is
completely devoid of reasons.
22. Further, the claim raised by the petitioner pertains to
promotion and consequential seniority during the subsistence of
service. Such issues have recurring civil consequences affecting
future promotional avenues and service benefits. Therefore, the
objection regarding delay and laches cannot be examined in a
purely technical manner, particularly when the petitioner continues
to suffer the consequences of the impugned action throughout her
service career. The subsequent adverse ACR gradings recorded
against the petitioner for later years also cannot be relied upon to
deny the relief sought in the present petition. The petitioner's claim
relates to her entitlement for promotion in the year 2014 and is
required to be assessed on the basis of the service record and
material which were available at the relevant point of time.
Admittedly, the petitioner possessed the requisite eligibility and
satisfactory ACRs for consideration to the post of Civil Judge

32
Class-I (Senior Division) when the promotion exercise of 2014 was
undertaken.
23. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that once the
complaint, which formed the sole basis for deferment of the
petitioner's case, did not result in any disciplinary action or adverse
finding and the petitioner was subsequently found fit and promoted,
the respondents were not justified in allowing the deferment to
operate to her detriment for all future purposes. The petitioner,
therefore, cannot be denied consideration for consequential service
benefits solely on account of such deferment.
24. In the matter of Major General H.M. Singh v. Union of India
2014) 3 SCC 670 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“28. The question that arises for consideration is,
whether the non-consideration of the claim of the
appellant would violate the fundamental rights
vested in him under Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India. The answer to the aforesaid
query would be in the affirmative... if the appellant
was the senior most serving Major General eligible
for consideration, he most definitely had the
fundamental right of being considered against the
vacancy, and also the fundamental right of being
promoted if he was adjudged suitable. Failing
which, he would be deprived of his fundamental
right of equality before the law and equal protection

33
of the laws extended by Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.”
25. In the matter of Harpal Singh vs. State of Punjab and
others 2026 SCC OnLine P & H 9451 , it has been held as under:-
“7. The Supreme Court in Yunus (Baboobhai) A
Hamid Padvekar v. State of Maharashtra Through
its Secretary, (2009) 2 SCT 24, while referring to
the issue of delay and laches, had held as
follows:
“8. Delay or laches is one of the factors
which is to be borne in mind by the High
Courts when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226
of the Constitution of India (in short the
‘Constitution’). In an appropriate case
the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if there is such
negligence or omission on the part of
the applicant to assert his right as taken
in conjunction with the lapse of time and
other circumstances, causes prejudice
to the opposite party. Even where
fundamental right is involved the matter
is still within the discretion of the Court
as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Chief
Controller of Imports and Exports (1964
SCC OnLine SC 1 : AIR 1970 SC 769).
Of course, the discretion has to be
exercised judicially and reasonably.
9. What was stated in this regard by Sir
Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum
Company v. Prosper Armstrong Hurde,
etc. [L.R.] 5 P.C. 221 at page 239 was
approved by this Court in Moon Mills
Ltd. v. Industrial Courts (1967 SCC

34
OnLine SC 117 : AIR 1967 SC 1450)
and Maharashtra State Transport
Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor
Service (1968 SCC OnLine SC 54 : AIR
1969 SC 329), Sir Barnes had stated:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of
Equity is not an arbitrary or technical
doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy either because
the party has, by his conduct done that
which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by
his conduct and neglect he has though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put
the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if
the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted, in either of these cases, lapse
of time and delay are most material. But
in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, if
founded upon mere delay, that delay of
course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitation, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two
circumstances always important in such
cases are, the length of the delay and
the nature of the acts done during the
interval which might affect either party
and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the
other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
10. It would be appropriate to note
certain decisions of this Court in which
this aspect has been dealt with in
relation with Article 32 of the
Constitution. It is apparent that what has
been stated as regards that Article

35
would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It
was observed in R.N. Bose v. Union of
India ((1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC
470) that no relief can be given to the
petitioner who without any reasonable
Explanation approaches this Court
under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It
was stated that though Article 32 is itself
a guaranteed right, it does not follow
from this that it was the intention of the
Constitution makers that this Court
should disregard all principles and grant
relief in petitions filed after inordinate
delay.
11. It was stated in State of M.P. v.
Nandlal ((1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987
SC 251) that the High Court in exercise
of its discretion does not ordinarily assist
the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the
petitioner and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court
may decline to intervene and grant relief
in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was
stated that this rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does
not ordinarily permit a belated resort to
the extraordinary remedy because it is
likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in its trail new
injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is
exercised after unreasonable delay, it
may have the effect of inflicting not only
hardship and inconvenience but also
injustice on third parties. It was pointed
out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the
creation of third party rights in the
meantime is an important factor which

36
also weighs with the High Court in
deciding whether or not to exercise such
jurisdiction.
12. In view of the aforesaid position we
are not inclined to interfere in this appeal
which is dismissed accordingly.”
8. Further the Supreme Court in State of
Uttaranchal v. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari,
(2013) 12 SCC 179, while considering the issue
regarding delay and laches and referring to earlier
judgments on the issue, opined that repeated
representations made will not keep the issues
alive. A state or a dead issue/dispute cannot be
revived even if such a representation has been
decided either by the authority or got decided by
getting a direction from the court as the issue
regarding delay and laches is to be decided with
reference to original cause of action and not with
reference to any such order passed. Delay and
laches on the part of a government servant may
disentitle him from receiving the benefit that had
been granted to others. Article 14 of the
Constitution of India would not be attracted as it is
well established principle that the law favours
those who are alert and vigilant. Even equality
has to be claimed at the right juncture and not on
expiry of reasonable time. Even if there is no
period prescribed for filing the writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, yet it
should be filed within a reasonable time. Though
it is not a strict rule, the courts can always
interfere even subsequent thereto, but relief to a

37
person, who allows things to happen and then
approach the court and puts forward a state claim
and try to unsettle settled matters, can certainly
be refused on account of delay and laches.
Anyone who sleeps over his rights is bound to
suffer the consequences. An employee who
remains dormant like a “Rip Van Winkle” and
awakens from his slumber at his own
convenience, cannot claim relief, as such conduct
justifies denial on the ground of delay and latches.
Relevant paragraphs from the aforesaid judgment
are extracted below:
“13. We have no trace of doubt that the
respondents could have challenged the
ad hoc promotion conferred on the
junior employee at the relevant time.
They chose not to do so for six years
and the junior employee held the
promotional post for six years till regular
promotion took place. The submission
of the learned counsel for the
respondents is that they had given
representations at the relevant time but
the same fell in deaf ears. It is
interesting to note that when the regular
selection took place, they accepted the
position solely because the seniority
was maintained and, thereafter, they
knocked at the doors of the Tribunal
only in 2003. It is clear as noon day that
the cause of action had arisen for
assailing the order when the junior
employee was promoted on ad hoc
basis on 15-11-1983. In C. Jacob v.
Director of Geology and Mining, (2008)
10 SCC 115 : (2008) 4 SCT 604, a two-

38
Judge Bench was dealing with the
concept of representations and the
directions issued by the court or
Tribunal to consider the representations
and the challenge to the said rejection
thereafter. In that context, the court has
expressed thus:
“Every representation to the
Government for relief, may not be
replied on merits. Representations
relating to matters which have become
state or barred by limitation, can be
rejected on that ground alone, without
examining the merits of the claim. In
regard to representations unrelated to
the Department, the reply may be only
to inform that the matter did not
concern the Department or to inform
the appropriate Department.
Representations with incomplete
particulars may be replied by seeking
relevant particulars. The replies to such
representations, cannot furnish a fresh
cause of action or revive a state or
dead claim.”
14. xx xx xx xx
15. xx xx xx xx
16. xx xx xx xx
17. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v.
Ghanshyam Dass (2), (2011) 4 SCC
374 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 268 : (2011) 2
SCT 712, a three-Judge Bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the
principle stated in Jagdish Lal v. State
of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538 : (1998)
1 SCT 26 and proceeded to observe
that as the respondents therein
preferred to sleep over their rights and

39
approached the Tribunal in 1997, they
would not get the benefit of the order
dated 7-7-1992.
18. In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam,
(2007) 10 SCC 137 : (2007) 4 SCT 472,
this Court, testing the equality clause
on the bedrock of delay and laches
pertaining to grant of service benefit,
has ruled thus:
“… filing of representations alone would
not save the period of limitation. Delay
or laches is a relevant factor for a court
of law to determine the question as to
whether the claim made by an applicant
deserves consideration. Delay and/or
laches on the part of a government
servant may deprive him of the benefit
which had been given to others. Article
14 of the Constitution of India would
not, in a situation of that nature, be
attracted as it is well known that law
leans in favour of those who are alert
and vigilant.
19. xx xx xx xx
20. In New Delhi Municipal Council v.
Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278 : (2007)
2 SCT 601, the Court has opined that
though there is no period of limitation
provided for filing a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
yet ordinarily a writ petition should be
filed within a reasonable time. In the
said case the respondents had filed the
writ petition after seventeen years and
the court, as stated earlier, took note of
the delay and laches as relevant factors
and set aside the order passed by the
High Court which had exercised the
discretionary jurisdiction.”

40
9. In a recent judgment by a Division Bench of
this Court in Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana,
(2022) 3 SCT 346, while rejecting the claim of the
petitioner for counting of his ad hoc service, for
the purpose of seniority/pension and
regularization in service on completion of 02
years as per policy, held that the petition filed by
him suffered from gross, inordinate and
unexplained delay in approaching the High Court.
In the said judgment, it has been held as under:
“10. What we wish to emphasize, in
particular, is that services of the
appellant were regularized w.e.f. 1-4-
1997. And, he was assigned a specific
seniority position in the cadre. Where
after, he continued to serve the
department for nearly twenty five
years, before attaining the age of
superannuation in January, 2022.
Needless to assert that during all these
years, he availed all admissible
benefits, promotions, and retired as
Inspector. Thus, it rather appears that
institution of the petition by the
appellant was speculative and an
attempt to resurrect a state and dead
claim. The Supreme Court, in New
Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh,
(2007) 9 SCC 278, observed:
“15. There is another aspect of the
matter which cannot be lost sight of
Respondents herein filed a Writ
Petition after 17 years. They did not
agitate their grievances for a long time.
They, as noticed herein, did not claim
parity with the 17 workmen at the

41
earliest possible opportunity. They did
not implead themselves as parties
even in the reference made by the
State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is
not their case that after 1982, those
employees who were employed or who
were recruited after the cut-off date
have been granted the said scale of
pay. After such a long time, therefore,
the Writ Petitions could not have been
entertained even if they are similarly
situated. It is trite that the discretionary
jurisdiction may not be exercised in
favour of those who approach the
Court after a long time. Delay and
laches are relevant factors for exercise
of equitable jurisdiction. See Govt. of
W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy [(2004) 1 SCC
347], Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam v.
Jaswant Singh [(2006) 12 Scale 347]
and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd.
through its Chairman & Managing
Director v. K. Thangappan [(2006) 4
SCC 322]”
11. Similarly, in Jagdish Lal v. State of
Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538, it was
held by the Supreme Court:
“That apart, as this Court has
repeatedly held, the delay disentitles
the party to the discretionary relief
under Article 226 or 32 of the
Constitution. It is not necessary to
reiterate all catena of precedents in
this behalf. Suffice it to state that the
appellant kept sleeping over their rights
for long and elected to wake up when
they had the impetus from Vir Pal
Chauhan and Ajit Singh's
ratios………………….. Therefore,

42
desperate attempts of the appellants to
re-do the seniority had by them in
various cadres/grades though in the
same services according to 1974
Rules or 1980 Rule, are not amenable
to judicial review at this belated
stage….”
12. In the wake of the position as
sketched out above, we are dissuaded
to interfere with the impugned order
and judgment rendered by the learned
Single Judge. The appeal being bereft
of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.”
12. In the present case, the petitioner was
promoted to the post of Head Warder on 27-10-
2004 and he retired from service, on attaining the
age of superannuation, in the year 2016, whereas
he approached this Court first time by filing
CWP-2808-2019 in the year 2019, seeking
promotion to the post of Head Warder w.e.f. 5-7-
1995 when the persons junior to him were
promoted, after a delay of more than 14 years
from the date of his promotion i.e. 27-10-2004.
Further, pursuant to the order dated 1-2-2019,
passed by this Court in CWP-2808-2019, the
respondent-department rejected the claim of the
petitioner, vide impugned order dated 23-5-2019,
and against the said order, the petitioner again
approached this Court by filing CWP-18413-2024
in the year 2024 i.e. after a delay of about 05
years. Now, after the lapse of a period of more
than 30 years, since 5-7-1995 i.e. the date when
persons junior to the petitioner were promoted to

43
the post of Head Warder, the petitioners cannot
be granted the said benefit. Such belated
invocation of the writ jurisdiction, without
furnishing any satisfactory Explanation for the
prolonged silence, defeats the very object of
equitable relief and disentitles the petitioners from
any discretionary relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.”
26. In Mahendra Kumar Shrivastava (Supra) , it has been held
as under:-
“26.The plea of delay and laches raised by the
respondents also does not impress this Court.
The claim pertains to pay fixation, which is a
continuing cause of action, and the petitioner
continues to be deprived of monetary benefits
each month. It is now well-settled that in matters
relating to fixation of pay, seniority, pension and
service benefits, the mere passage of time cannot
extinguish the legitimate and legal entitlement of
an employee, unless there is material showing
that the delay has caused prejudice to the
administration. No such prejudice has been
demonstrated in the present case.”
27. In the matter of Union of India and Others vs. Doly Loyi
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2613 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
as under:-
“9. Shri Wasim Qadri, learned senior counsel

44
appearing on behalf of the appellants drew the
Court's attention towards the Office Memorandum
th
(in short ‘OM’) dated 14 September, 1992
dealing with the ‘Promotion of Government
servants against whom disciplinary/court
proceedings are pending or whose conduct is
under investigation-Procedure and guidelines to
th
be followed’. The extract of the OM dated 14
September, 1992 relied upon by the learned
counsel for the appellants is reproduced below:—
“2. At the time of consideration of the
cases of Government servant for
promotion, details of Government
servant in the consideration zone for
promotion falling under the following
category should be specifically brought
to the notice of the Departmental
Promotion Committee:—
i) Government servants under
suspension;
ii) Government servants in respect of
whom a charge sheet has been issued
and the disciplinary proceedings are
pending; and
iii) Government servants in respect of
whom prosecution for criminal charge
is pending.
2.1 The Departmental Promotion
Committee shall assess the suitability
of Government servants coming within
the purview of the circumstances

45
mentioned above along with other
eligible candidates without taking into
consideration the disciplinary
case/criminal prosecution pending. The
assessment of the DPC including ‘unfit
for promotion’ and the grading awarded
by it will be kept in a sealed cover. The
cover will be superscribed ‘Findings
regarding suitability for promotion to
the grade/post of of Shri.. …in respect
(name of the Government servant). Not
to be opened till the termination of the
disciplinary case/criminal prosecution
against Shri…….’. The proceeding of
the DPC need only contain the note.
The findings are contained in the
attached sealed cover’. The authority
competent to fill the vacancy should be
separately advised to fill the vacancy in
the higher grade only in an officiating
capacity when the findings of the DPC
in respect of the suitability of a
Government servant for his promotion
are kept in a sealed cover.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. Learned counsel for appellant made a
pertinent submission that the case of the
respondent falls under the third clause of the
above OM, i.e. Government servants in respect of
whom prosecution for criminal charges is
pending. Thus, the question requiring

46
consideration is as to whether a mere grant of
prosecution sanction would be sufficient to infer
that the prosecution for a criminal charge was
pending against the respondent. Similar issue
came up for consideration before this Court in the
case of Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman 1 ,
wherein it was held that sealed cover procedure is
to be resorted to only after the charge
memo/charge sheet is issued. The relevant
extract is reproduced hereinbelow:
“16. On the first question, viz., as to
when for the purposes of the sealed
cover procedure the
disciplinary/criminal proceedings can
be said to have commenced, the Full
Bench of the Tribunal has held that it is
only when a charge-memo in a
disciplinary proceedings or a charge-
sheet in a criminal prosecution is
issued to the employee that it can be
said that the departmental
proceedings/criminal prosecution is
initiated against the employee. The
sealed cover procedure is to be
resorted to only after the charge-
memo/charge-sheet is issued. The
pendency of preliminary investigation
prior to that stage will not be sufficient
to enable the authorities to adopt the
sealed cover procedure. We are in
agreement with the Tribunal on this

47
point. The contention advanced by the
learned counsel for the appellant-
authorities that when there are serious
allegations and it takes time to collect
necessary evidence to prepare and
issue charge-memo/charge-sheet, it
would not be in the interest of the
purity of administration to reward the
employee with a promotion, increment
etc. does not impress us. The
acceptance of this contention would
result in injustice to the employees in
many cases. As has been the
experience so far, the preliminary
investigations take an inordinately long
time and particularly when they are
initiated at the instance of the
interested persons, they are kept
pending deliberately. Many times they
never result in the issue of any charge-
memo/charge-sheet. If the allegations
are serious and the authorities are
keen in investigating them, ordinarily it
should not take much time to collect
the relevant evidence and finalise the
charges. What is further, if the charges
are that serious, the authorities have
the power to suspend the employee
under the relevant rules, and the
suspension by itself permits a resort to
the sealed cover procedure. The

48
authorities thus are not without a
remedy.”(emphasis supplied)
24. Considering the above position, the
disciplinary/criminal proceedings can be said to
be initiated against the employee only when a
charge memo is issued to the employee in a
disciplinary proceeding or a charge-sheet for a
criminal prosecution is filed in the competent
Court. The sealed cover procedure is to be
resorted to only after issuance of the charge-
memo/charge-sheet is issued. The pendency of
investigation and grant of prosecution sanction
will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to
adopt the sealed cover procedure.”
28. In K.V. Jankiraman (Supra), it is held that in a case where
the promotion of the concerned employee was not done with
sealed cover procedure adopted by the authorities. The concerned
CAT has directed the authorities to open the sealed cover and
consider the case of the petitioner for grant of promotion in case he
is entitled. The said order was confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court while stating that the CAT has rightly passed the order.
29. The Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh, while deciding
the matter of Kanvar Lal Yadav vs. State of MP and Others in WP
No.13046/2019 has also reiterated the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.V. Jankiraman (Supra) and held that
where no charge-sheet was pending against an employee on the

49
date of the original DPC, the sealed cover procedure cannot be
applied merely because a charge-sheet was issued subsequently.
The Court further held that a deferred DPC relates back to the date
of the original DPC, and an employee cannot be prejudiced due to
administrative lapses such as the non-availability of ACRs.
30. In Shatruhan Prasad Kurrey (Supra) , it was held that :-
“Since the disciplinary proceedings have been
initiated against the petitioner, the adoption of
sealed cover procedure, cannot be faulted with.
However, the authorities cannot keep the
disciplinary proceedings pending for an indefinite
period, thereby causing adverse impact on the
service career of the petitioner.”
31. Further in the matter of Sangram Keshari Nayak (Supra) ,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“6. An original application filed by the respondent
before the Calcutta Bench of the Central
Administrative Tribunal, which was eventually
transferred to the Cuttack Bench, praying for a
direction to the appellants to promote him to the
said post from the date when his junior was
appointed, was allowed by a judgment and order
dated 19-8-2003. A writ petition filed by the
appellants there against has been dismissed by
the High Court, by reason of the impugned
judgment.
14. Thus, there was no bar in promoting the

50
respondent during the period 14-1-1999 to 27-8-
1999. No material was placed before the DPC to
take recourse to the sealed cover procedure. In
fact, none existed at the material time. Para 2 of
the said circular specifically refers to submission
of charge-sheet as the cut-off date when a
departmental proceeding can be said to have
been initiated. Even otherwise such a meaning
had been given thereto by this Court in K. V.
Jankiraman…”
32. Reliance may also be placed upon the Constitution
Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.N.
Mukherjee v. Union of India , (1990) 4 SCC 594 , wherein it
has been held that recording of reasons by an administrative
or quasi-judicial authority is an essential requirement of fair
decision-making. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that
recording of reasons guarantees due consideration of the
matter by the authority, introduces clarity in the decision-
making process and minimizes arbitrariness. It was further
held that, except where specifically excluded, every
administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions is required to record reasons for its decision and
such reasons must be clear and explicit so as to indicate due
consideration of the issues involved. In the present case, the
communication dated 21.02.2018 rejecting the petitioner's
representation merely states that the claim was rejected after

51
consideration and does not disclose any reason whatsoever.
Such a cryptic and non-speaking order is therefore
unsustainable in law in view of the principles laid down in S.N.
Mukherjee (supra).
33. It is a settled proposition of law that an employee cannot
be made to suffer because of negligence, inaction or
procedural lapses on the part of the employer or the
In P.N. Premachandran vs. State of Kerala (2004) 1
department.
SCC 245 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an employee
cannot be prejudiced for faults attributable to the department.
34. In Krishna Prasad Verma (Dead) through legal
representatives v. State of Bihar and Others (2019) 10 SCC
640 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that judicial
independence is a basic feature of the Constitution and that judicial
officers must be free from external pressures while discharging
their judicial functions. It has further been held that mere erroneous
or incorrect judicial orders do not constitute misconduct unless
accompanied by mala fides or extraneous considerations.
35. There can be no dispute with the settled proposition of
law that promotion is not a vested right. However, the right to
be fairly considered for promotion is a fundamental right
flowing from Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajit Singh (II) vs. State of Punjab

52
(1999) 7 SCC 209 has reiterated that seniority and
promotional rights form part of the equality clause under
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and arbitrary
supersession or denial of promotional consideration cannot be
sustained in law.
36. This Court also finds support from the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala vs. E.K.
Bhaskaran Pillai (2007) 6 SCC 524 , wherein it has been held
that when an employee is wrongly denied promotion due to
arbitrary or illegal action of the employer, such employee
becomes entitled to notional promotion with consequential
service benefits. The principle flowing from the aforesaid
judgment is that once the denial of promotion is found to be
unjustified, the employer cannot deny consequential notional
benefits merely on technical grounds.
37. In the present case, the petitioner seeks consideration of
her claim for promotion and consequential seniority from the
year 2014, i.e., the date on which other judicial officers of the
same batch were promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class-I
(Senior Division). The respondents have failed to place any
material on record to demonstrate that the denial of promotion
to the petitioner in the year 2014 was in accordance with law or

53
that she was found unsuitable for promotion by the
Departmental Promotion Committee. In fact, it is not the case
of the respondents that the petitioner was ever declared unfit
for promotion. The sole justification advanced by the
respondents is that consideration of the petitioner's case was
deferred on account of a complaint received against her.
38. However, it is an admitted position that no departmental
enquiry was ever initiated pursuant to the said complaint, nor
was any disciplinary action taken against the petitioner. It is
further undisputed that after a period of approximately two
years, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Civil Judge
Class-I (Senior Division) vide order dated 12.08.2016 on the
basis of the same service record, Annual Confidential Reports
and other relevant materials which were available for
consideration before the earlier DPC. No subsequent
development or additional material has been brought on record
to show that any circumstance existed in 2014 which rendered
the petitioner unsuitable for promotion and which ceased to
exist in 2016. Therefore, once the petitioner was ultimately
found fit and suitable for promotion on the basis of the very
same material which was available at the time of the promotion
exercise conducted in the year 2014, this Court finds no
justifiable reason as to why she was denied promotion when

54
her batchmates were promoted. Mere deferment of
consideration, which was founded solely upon a complaint that
did not culminate in any adverse action, cannot be permitted to
operate permanently to the detriment of the petitioner's service
career. The action of the respondents, therefore, does not
withstand scrutiny on the touchstone of fairness and equality
enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
39. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the
case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
petitioner's claim for promotion and consequential seniority
deserves reconsideration by the competent authority. As
discussed hereinabove, the petitioner was not declared unfit
for promotion by the Departmental Promotion Committee in the
promotion exercise conducted in the year 2014. Her case was
merely deferred on account of a complaint which admittedly
did not culminate in any departmental enquiry, disciplinary
proceedings or adverse finding against her. It is also an
undisputed position that the petitioner was subsequently
promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior Division)
vide order dated 12.08.2016 on the basis of substantially the
same service record and material which was available before
the Departmental Promotion Committee in the year 2014.

55
40. In such circumstances, the matter requires
reconsideration by the competent authority for examining
whether the petitioner is entitled to be accorded promotion
from the date on which her batchmates and other similarly
situated judicial officers were promoted, namely 14.08.2014,
along with all consequential benefits flowing therefrom.
41. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Respondent
Nos. 1 to 3 are directed to consider the case of the petitioner
for grant of promotion to the post of Civil Judge Class-I (Senior
Division) with effect from 14.08.2014, i.e., the date on which
other eligible officers of her batch were promoted, and to
examine her claim for restoration of seniority and all
consequential service benefits in accordance with law.
42. While undertaking such exercise, the competent authority
shall keep in view the observations made in the present order
and shall ascertain whether any legal impediment exists which
may disentitle the petitioner from claiming such benefit. In the
event no such legal impediment is found to exist, appropriate
orders shall be passed granting the petitioner all consequential
benefits, including fixation of seniority in accordance with the
applicable rules.

56
43. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed and a
reasoned and speaking order shall be passed by the
competent authority within a period of three months from the
date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
44. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Vishakha