Raghuraj Singh vs Director Agriculture Gokhale Marg U.P. Lko. And Others

A.F.R.
Neutral Citation No. -
2026:AHC-LKO:76489
Reserved on: 05.10.2026
Delivered on: 24.10.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - A No. - 2572 of 2001
Raghuraj Singh
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Director Agriculture Gokhale Marg U.P. Lko. and others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : S.s. Chauhan, D.k.singh, Dinesh
Kumar Singh (d.k.singh), R.b.s.
Rathaur, S.s.rajawat, Sushil Kumar
Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C.,
Court No. - 4
HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.
1. Heard Sri D.K. Singh along with Sri Sushil Kumar Singh, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Shatrughan Chaudhary, learned
Additional CSC for the respondent – State.
2. The present writ petition has been filed on following prayer(s):
“a) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of
certiorari for quashing the impagned order of dismissal
dated 22.2.2001, as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ
petition.
b) to issue a srit, order or direction in the nature of
mandamus commanding the opposite parties to reinstate
the petitioner with all consequential benefits and in case
the petitioner retires during the pendency of the writ
petition, then the post retiral benefits of the petitioner may
also be released alongwith interest at the rate of 18% per
annum.
c) to issue a writ, order or direction deemed just and
proper in favour of the petitioner, in the circumstances of
the instant case.
d) to allow the writ petition with costs.”

2
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
3. Factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner was appointed as a
member of the Subordinate Agriculture Service, Class-III, on 22.07.1968 by
the Joint Director of Agriculture (Administration), Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, in
the pay scale of 120–220. As reflected in his service book, the petitioner was
₹
working under the District Agriculture Officer, Gonda, as Project Officer,
Gonda, with effect from 01.10.1981.
2. On 13.07.1990, Ram Vinod Rai, Additional District Agriculture Officer,
was appointed to verify the petitioner's seed store. Thereafter, on 15.09.1990,
the petitioner was allegedly directed to hand over charge to Sri Om Prakash
Srivastava. However, in the rejoinder affidavit, the petitioner denied having
received any such order and asserted that the charge was handed over to Sri
Srivastava only after 17.10.1990, that too incompletely, as Sri Srivastava
proceeded on leave immediately after partially taking over the charge.
3. On 10.01.1991, the District Magistrate, Gonda, directed that the
godown tobe sealed. Subsequently, on 24.01.1991, the godown was reopened
in the presence of a Magistrate and the charge was handed over to the new in-
charge. During the process, an inventory was prepared, allegedly revealing a
shortage of Government stock valued at 1,55,043.47. The petitioner,
₹
however, asserted that he had already informed the District Agriculture Officer
that the stock in the new godown had not been accounted for, but no action
was taken on his communication and a fictitious shortage was subsequently
attributed to him.
4. The departmental authorities allegedly conducted a preliminary inquiry
on 09.01.1991 through the District Agriculture Officer, Gonda, namely, Ram
Prasad Shukla and reported the alleged loss to the higher authorities. The
petitioner disputed the genuineness of the said report, contending that it could
not have been prepared on 09.01.1991 when the godown was sealed only on
10.01.1991 and reopened on 24.01.1991. On 24.02.1991, an FIR was
registered as Crime No.37 of 1991 under Sections 409, 467, 468 and 420 of
the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner alleged that the criminal case had been
instituted with a mala fide intention.

3
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
5. On 04.07.1991, the petitioner was placed under suspension and the
Deputy Director of Agriculture (Extension), Gonda, was appointed as the
Inquiry Officer. The suspension and appointment of the Inquiry Officer were
referred to in the departmental proceedings and were not disputed by the
petitioner. According to the service book, the petitioner remained on medical
leave from 10.03.1991 to 03.07.1991.
6. On 13.08.1991, a charge-sheet was issued by the Inquiry Officer and
was dispatched to the petitioner's residential address on 20.08.1991. However,
the same was returned undelivered on 29.08.1991 with the remark that the
petitioner had gone out for medical treatment. The petitioner subsequently
approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 6065 (S/S) of 1991, in which
an interim order staying the suspension order was passed on 18.09.1991.
7. Pursuant to the aforesaid interim order, the Director of Agriculture
reinstated the petitioner in service with effect from 18.09.1991. In the
rejoinder affidavit, the petitioner asserted that, upon learning about the charge-
sheet, he had immediately written to the Deputy Director of Agriculture,
Gonda, requesting that a copy thereof be supplied to him. According to the
petitioner, the charge-sheet was also published in the daily newspaper
Swatantra Bharat , although the letter seeking publication had allegedly been
addressed to the editor of Dainik Jagran , which, according to him,
demonstrated an inconsistency in the version of the departmental authorities.
8. The petitioner further asserted that the original documents relating to
Crime No.37 of 1991 had been handed over by the then District Agriculture
Officer to Inspector S.I.B. and were in the custody of the police and had also
been filed before the competent court in the criminal proceedings. According
to the petitioner, the non-availability of these documents with the departmental
authorities materially affected his ability to defend himself in the disciplinary
proceedings.
9. On 12.05.1992, immediately upon joining pursuant to his reinstatement,
the petitioner received the charge-sheet through the District Agriculture
Officer, Gonda. Thereafter, from 23.05.1992 onwards, he repeatedly requested
the departmental authorities to supply copies of the documents relied upon in
support of the charges. However, instead of furnishing the documents, the
authorities repeatedly directed him to submit his reply, including through

4
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
communications dated 08.06.1992, 02.07.1992, 24.07.1992, 30.10.1992,
07.11.1992 and 25.11.1992.
10. The petitioner alleged that the Deputy Agriculture Officer, Gonda, had
also written to the District Agriculture Officer requesting that the charge-sheet
be supplied to the petitioner along with the documents relied upon in support
thereof. Nevertheless, according to the petitioner, the documents were not
supplied completely. He maintained that, despite repeated requests, the
departmental authorities continued to insist upon submission of his reply
without providing him with the material necessary to effectively defend
himself.
11. Between 16.01.1993 to 04.02.1993, the petitioner inspected certain
documents relating to charges Nos.1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 in the office of the District
Agriculture Officer and furnished a certificate regarding the inspection.
However, in the rejoinder affidavit, the petitioner asserted that, out of the
eleven documents inspected on that occasion, only eight were ultimately
supplied to him. Photocopies of certain documents were subsequently sent to
him by registered post. The petitioner contended that the supply remained
incomplete and that the documents furnished to him were neither complete nor
duly certified.
12. The petitioner, thereafter, returned the incomplete documents to the
District Agriculture Officer, asserting that as many as twenty-three documents
demanded by him had still not been supplied and that the deficiency had
seriously prejudiced his defence. The documents were received back by the
District Agriculture Officer. Subsequently, the petitioner was attached to the
office of the Deputy Director of Agriculture, Gonda, for the purpose of
facilitating the supply and inspection of documents. However, according to the
petitioner, only the eight documents previously supplied to him, together with
three additional documents, were furnished, while the remaining documents
lying in the custody of the court in the connected criminal case continued to
remain inaccessible to him.
13. The petitioner repeatedly requested the departmental authorities to
facilitate the inspection of the documents deposited before the court in the
criminal proceedings. He asserted that, despite appearing before the trial court

5
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
on the dates fixed in accordance with the directions of the Deputy Director of
Agriculture and the Inquiry Officer, no departmental officer or court assistant
appeared to facilitate the opening and inspection of the sealed documents. The
petitioner further relied upon a written certification of the court stating that no
departmental representative had appeared or applied for inspection.
14. The petitioner also relied upon communications dated 27.08.1993,
27.09.1993, 25.10.1993 and other dates, including 17.03.1994 and 10.06.1994,
to demonstrate that the issue of inspection and supply of documents remained
unresolved. According to the petitioner, the Deputy Director of Agriculture
had issued directions to the District Agriculture Officer to permit inspection of
the documents lying in the custody of the court and to take necessary steps in
that regard. The petitioner alleged that the said directions were not complied
with, thereby depriving him of a reasonable opportunity to defend himself
against the charges.
15. On 24.07.1998 and 25.07.1998, the petitioner submitted his substantive
reply to the charge-sheet. In the said reply, he specifically recorded that the
documents relied upon by the department had not been supplied to him and
reserved his right to submit a further and comprehensive reply upon receipt of
the remaining documents. The petitioner asserted that his reply could not be
treated as a complete defence because the relevant material necessary to
controvert the allegations had not been made available to him.
16. On 29.07.1998, the Deputy Director of Agriculture allegedly again
directed the District Agriculture Officer to permit inspection of the documents
and issue a certificate in that regard. The petitioner maintained that these
directions were also not complied with and that no inspection certificate was
furnished to him.
17. On 22.08.1998, the Inquiry Officer submitted the inquiry report,
holding all the charges levelled against the petitioner to have been proved. The
petitioner challenged the inquiry proceedings on the ground that no regular
inquiry hearing had been conducted by fixing any date, time and place for the
same and that the findings had been recorded on the basis of his tentative
reply, without affording him an effective opportunity to defend himself or to
inspect the documents relied upon by the department.

6
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
18. On 04.03.1999, a show-cause notice, along with a copy of the inquiry
report, was issued to the petitioner, granting him fourteen days to submit his
representation. On 05.04.1999, the petitioner sought time up to 15.05.1999 to
submit his representation on the ground that his wife was ill. In the rejoinder
affidavit, the petitioner reiterated the genuineness of the illness and stated that
the relevant medical prescriptions could be produced with the leave of the
Court. He contended that the circumstances relating to his wife's illness
explained why he could not submit the representation within the stipulated
period.
19. On 16.08.1999, the petitioner was granted a final opportunity to submit
his representation within one week. The petitioner did not submit any
representation within the extended period. Thereafter, vide order dated
22.02.2001, the departmental authority passed the impugned order dismissing
the petitioner from service. The order also directed recovery of 1,57,043.47,
₹
treated the suspension period as non-qualifying service and denied the
petitioner any other payment for the said period.
20. The petitioner received the dismissal order on 03.03.2001. Aggrieved
by the aforesaid order, he instituted the present Writ Petition No.2572 (S/S) of
2001 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking judicial
intervention against the disciplinary action. The principal grounds raised by
him included non-supply of the documents relied upon by the department,
failure to conduct a proper inquiry, denial of a reasonable opportunity of
hearing and violation of the principles of natural justice.
21. During pendency of the writ petition, a counter affidavit was filed on
behalf of the opposite parties, to which the petitioner submitted a short
rejoinder affidavit dated 14.09.2001. In paragraphs 2 to 7 thereof, the
petitioner reiterated his objections regarding the non-fixation of any date, time
and place for the inquiry and the alleged violation of the principles of natural
justice. A short counter affidavit was subsequently filed on 13.12.2001,
followed by a detailed rejoinder affidavit on behalf of the petitioner,
reiterating the objections concerning the disciplinary proceedings and the non-
supply of relevant documents.

7
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
22. The petitioner subsequently expired on 06.02.2004. His service book
recorded his date of birth as 10.05.1944. According to the opposite parties, his
notional date of superannuation was 31.05.2002. However, the petitioner,
through the pleadings on record, asserted that the correct date of
superannuation was 31.05.2004, in view of the alleged extension of the age of
retirement by two years granted by the State Government. The aforesaid issue
regarding the date of superannuation was, thus, also brought on record in the
proceedings.
23. On 02.05.2017, the writ petition came to be dismissed in the absence of
appearance on behalf of the petitioner. The Court observed, after perusing the
record, that there was no force in the writ petition. The petitioner contends
that, in view of the principle stated to have been laid down by a Division
Bench of this Court in Nikhil Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. and Others ,
reported in 2015 (33) LCD 2413 , where a writ petition is dismissed in the
absence of counsel, observations on the merits ought not to be recorded.
24. Aggrieved by the order dated 02.05.2017, an application seeking recall
of the said order and restoration of the writ petition to its original number was
filed, which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 28.09.2026.
25. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the
impugned order of dismissal dated 22.02.2001 is wholly illegal, arbitrary
and unsustainable in law as well as on facts. It is contended that the
disciplinary proceedings culminating in the dismissal of the petitioner
were conducted in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice
and without affording him a fair, reasonable and effective opportunity to
defend himself against the charges levelled against him.
26. He submitted that no proper departmental enquiry, in the manner
contemplated under the applicable service rules and the settled principles
of law, was ever conducted against the petitioner. Neither was any date,
time or place fixed or communicated to him for participation in the
enquiry, nor was he afforded an effective opportunity of hearing. Instead,
the Enquiry Officer proceeded to record a finding that all the charges
stood proved merely on the basis of the petitioner's tentative reply and

8
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
the material available on record, without conducting a meaningful
enquiry or following the procedure prescribed by law. It is, therefore,
contended that the enquiry report is vitiated by a fundamental procedural
infirmity and cannot legally form the basis of the impugned order of
dismissal. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner
has placed reliance upon paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20 of the writ
petition, Grounds Nos. (i) and (iii), paragraphs 29 and 55 of the counter
affidavit and paragraphs 12, 20, 25, 26, 48, 50 and 51 of the rejoinder
affidavit.
27. He next submitted that the petitioner was denied a reasonable and
effective opportunity to inspect and obtain copies of the documents
relied upon by the department in support of the charges. Although the
petitioner inspected certain documents on 20.02.1993, only a part of the
required material was supplied to him, whereas copies of 23 additional
documents specifically demanded by him were never furnished. It is
contended that the withholding of material documents deprived the
petitioner of the opportunity to examine the evidence against him,
prepare an adequate defence and rebut the allegations levelled against
him. Such failure on the part of the disciplinary authorities, according to
learned counsel, constitutes a serious breach of the principles of natural
justice and has materially prejudiced the petitioner's defence. In this
regard, reliance has been placed upon Ground No.(ii) of the writ petition,
paragraphs 15, 22, 23, 25, 42 and 47 of the counter affidavit and
paragraphs 12, 19, 22, 37 and 42 of the rejoinder affidavit.
28. He further submits that the department cannot attribute any default
to the petitioner in respect of the inspection of documents lying in the
custody of the Court in the connected criminal proceedings. It is
contended that, whenever the petitioner appeared before the Court
pursuant to the directions issued to him, the relevant documents could
not be made available for inspection because no departmental officer or
authorised Court assistant attended to facilitate the process. The fact that
the documents were not made available despite the petitioner's presence

9
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
was, according to learned counsel, independently certified by the Court
itself. It is, therefore, urged that the failure to inspect the documents was
attributable to the departmental authorities and not to the petitioner and
the respondents cannot rely upon such failure to justify the denial of an
effective opportunity of defence. Learned counsel has relied upon
Ground No.(v) of the writ petition, paragraphs 15, 26, 48 and 50 of the
counter affidavit and paragraphs 12, 23, 43 and 45 of the rejoinder
affidavit.
29. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the
continued non-supply of the relevant documents had a direct and adverse
bearing upon the petitioner's ability to submit a comprehensive reply to
the charges and establish his innocence. It is contended that a mere
formal opportunity to submit an explanation cannot be regarded as
sufficient compliance with the requirements of natural justice when the
material necessary for preparing such explanation is withheld by the
very authority conducting the disciplinary proceedings. According to
learned counsel, the petitioner was placed at a substantial disadvantage
because he was required to defend himself without access to the
complete documentary material relied upon by the department. The
resulting prejudice, it is urged, vitiates the disciplinary proceedings and
renders the consequential order of dismissal legally unsustainable.
30. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the charge-sheet
itself was not validly served upon him in accordance with law. Despite
the petitioner's specific written request dated 23.10.1991 seeking a copy
of the charge-sheet, the department failed to respond to the request. It is
further contended that the respondents' explanation regarding publication
of the charge-sheet in a newspaper suffers from material inconsistencies,
inasmuch as the communication was allegedly addressed to one
newspaper, whereas the publication is stated to have appeared in another
newspaper and on a date different from the date pleaded by the
department. Learned counsel submits that these inconsistencies cast
serious doubt upon the alleged service of the charge-sheet and the
fairness of the proceedings initiated against the petitioner. In the absence

10
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
of proper service and a meaningful opportunity to answer the charges,
the disciplinary proceedings, it is urged, cannot be sustained.
31. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the very
foundation of the departmental case is rendered doubtful by the
chronology of the preliminary enquiry and the events relating to the
sealing and reopening of the godown. It is contended that the
preliminary enquiry report is stated to have been submitted on
09.01.1991, whereas the godown in question was sealed on 10.01.1991
and reopened on 24.01.1991. According to learned counsel, where the
allegation of shortage necessarily depends upon the condition and
contents of the godown at the relevant time, the preparation of the
preliminary enquiry report before the sealing and reopening of the
godown raises a serious question regarding the factual basis and
reliability of the departmental allegations. It is, therefore, urged that the
said chronology casts doubt upon the genuineness of the preliminary
enquiry and demonstrates the need for a proper and independent
examination of the material relied upon by the respondents.
32. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the charges
forming the subject matter of the departmental proceedings are identical
to those involved in the criminal case instituted against the petitioner for
offences punishable under Sections 409, 467, 468 and 420 of the Indian
Penal Code. It is contended that, at the time of institution of the writ
petition, charges had not even been framed in the criminal proceedings
and the allegations were yet to be tested through the criminal trial. In
these circumstances, learned counsel submits that the disciplinary
authority ought, in the interests of fairness, to have considered awaiting
the outcome of the criminal proceedings, particularly when the
allegations were stated to be founded upon the same factual
circumstances and documentary material. The petitioner, accordingly,
contends that the haste with which the disciplinary proceedings were
concluded, resulting in the extreme penalty of dismissal, reinforces the
challenge to the legality and fairness of the impugned action.

11
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
33. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner's
inability to submit a further detailed representation in response to the
show-cause notice cannot legitimately be treated as a circumstance
warranting an adverse inference against him. It is contended that the
failure to furnish the requisite documents and facilitate their inspection
was attributable to the department itself and the petitioner could not
reasonably be expected to submit a comprehensive and effective
representation without access to the relevant material. Learned counsel
further submits that the serious illness of the petitioner's wife during the
relevant period constituted an additional genuine and compelling
circumstance that ought to have been considered by the disciplinary
authority with due sensitivity. It is, therefore, urged that the petitioner's
inability to furnish a further detailed representation was neither
deliberate nor wilful and could not cure the earlier procedural
irregularities or justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal.
34. In conclusion, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
cumulative effect of the aforesaid procedural irregularities, including the
absence of a proper enquiry, denial of an effective opportunity of
hearing, non-supply of material documents, failure to facilitate
inspection of documents in the custody of the Court, serious doubts
regarding service of the charge-sheet and the inconsistencies in the
chronology of the preliminary enquiry, renders the entire disciplinary
process fundamentally unfair. It is contended that the impugned order of
dismissal dated 22.02.2001 is vitiated by non-compliance with the
principles of natural justice and by material infirmities affecting the
sustainability of the findings recorded against the petitioner.
35. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, prays that the writ
petition be allowed, the impugned order of dismissal be quashed and
such consequential relief as may be warranted in the facts and
circumstances of the case be granted in favour of the petitioner. In
support of his submissions, he placed reliance upon following
judgments:

12
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
a) Satyendra Singh v. State of U.P. and another; 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 3325.
b) State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772.
36. On the other hand, learned Additional Csc for the respondent –
State submitted that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned
order and the same is just and valid.
37. He submitted that the impugned order of dismissal dated
22.02.2001 has been passed upon completion of disciplinary proceedings
initiated against the petitioner in respect of serious charges relating to
misappropriation and embezzlement of Government stock, falsification
of records and other financial irregularities. The legality of the impugned
order is required to be examined with reference to the applicable service
rules, the procedure followed in the disciplinary inquiry and the
principles governing judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court is not
that of an appellate authority over disciplinary findings and interference
is warranted only where a legally sustainable ground, such as violation
of a mandatory procedural requirement, denial of reasonable opportunity,
perversity of findings or a penalty prohibited by law, is established.
38. He submitted that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings was
founded upon allegations concerning the petitioner’s tenure as In-charge
of the Government Agricultural Seed Store, Paraspur, District Gonda.
Following the verification of stock and the handing over of charge on
24.01.1991, an alleged shortage of Government stock valued at
Rs.1,55,043.47 came to light. A preliminary inquiry was conducted and
an FIR was registered under Sections 409, 467, 468 and 420 of the
Indian Penal Code. However, the State respectfully submits that the
disciplinary proceedings and the criminal proceedings operate in distinct
legal fields. The departmental charges were required to be determined on
the evidence and material available in the disciplinary inquiry,
independently of the outcome of the criminal case, subject to any
applicable legal principle governing the particular circumstances.

13
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
39. He submitted that the petitioner was placed under suspension vide
order dated 04.07.1991 and the Deputy Director of Agriculture
(Extension), Gonda, was appointed as the Inquiry Officer. The petitioner
challenged the suspension order in Writ Petition No.6065 (SS) of 1991,
wherein an interim order dated 18.09.1991 was passed staying the
suspension. The Director of Agriculture, thereafter, reinstated the
petitioner with effect from 18.09.1991 vide order dated 12.05.1992.
40. He submitted that reinstatement pursuant to an interim judicial
order did not, by itself, extinguish the disciplinary charges or preclude
their adjudication in accordance with law. Equally, the mere pendency or
disposal of proceedings concerning suspension would not determine the
validity of the subsequent dismissal order unless the relevant judicial
directions or applicable rules had been violated.
41. He submitted that the record, as pleaded in the counter affidavit,
indicates that the charge-sheet dated 15.08.1991 was initially returned
with the endorsement that the petitioner was away for treatment.
Thereafter, the charge-sheet was sent again to the petitioner’s residential
address and steps were taken to publish it in the newspapers. The
petitioner ultimately obtained the charge-sheet on 14.05.1992. The State
submits that the validity of service of the charge-sheet must be assessed
in the light of the applicable service rules and the evidence of actual
service or legally permissible substituted service. Mere non-receipt on an
initial occasion would not automatically invalidate the entire inquiry if
the charges were subsequently communicated and a reasonable
opportunity to defend was afforded. Conversely, publication in a
newspaper cannot be treated as conclusive proof of valid service unless
the governing rules and the circumstances legally justified that mode of
service.
42. He further submitted that the petitioner sought copies of
documents by his letter dated 23.05.1992 and the correspondence
pleaded by the State indicates that opportunities were extended to him to
inspect the relevant records and submit his defence. According to the

14
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
counter affidavit, the petitioner inspected records relating to certain
charges in February 1993 and was supplied with copies of documents on
different dates, thereafter. The State submits that the legal question is
whether the petitioner was afforded a reasonable and effective
opportunity to meet the charges and whether any denial of relevant
material caused prejudice to his defence. The mere fact that every
document was not supplied on the date initially requested would not, by
itself, vitiate the proceedings. At the same time, the State does not
contend that repeated notices or formal opportunities can cure a
demonstrated denial of material evidence essential to a fair defence. The
issue must be determined with reference to the documents sought, their
relevance, their availability and the prejudice, if any, established by the
petitioner.
43. He submitted that the petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-
sheet on 24.07.1998 and 25.07.1998, whereafter the Inquiry Officer
considered the defence and the relevant records and submitted the
inquiry report dated 22.08.1998, holding the charges proved. The State
respectfully submits that the mere delay in submitting a reply does not
dispense with the obligation of the disciplinary authority to examine the
charges and evidence in accordance with law. Nevertheless, where the
employee has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to participate in
the proceedings and the findings are supported by relevant evidence, the
mere fact that the proceedings continued over a considerable period
would not, without more, render the inquiry or its outcome illegal. The
petitioner must establish a legally material defect in the procedure or
findings warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
44. He submitted that upon completion of the inquiry, the petitioner
was informed vide letter dated 04.03.1999 of the opportunity to submit
his representation against the inquiry report within fourteen days, along
with a copy of the report. The petitioner, thereafter, sought time up to
15.05.1999 on the ground of his wife’s medical condition. According to
the counter affidavit, no representation was submitted within the

15
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
extended period and a further opportunity was afforded vide letter dated
16.08.1999.
45. The State submits that the governing legal requirement is that the
disciplinary authority must afford the delinquent employee a meaningful
opportunity to respond to the findings of the inquiry before imposing the
penalty, wherever required under the applicable rules and principles of
natural justice. If such opportunity was duly afforded and the petitioner
failed to avail himself of it despite reasonable opportunities, he cannot
claim that the disciplinary proceedings are invalid merely because he did
not submit a representation. The decisive consideration is compliance
with the applicable legal requirements, rather than the number of notices
issued.
46. He next submitted that the petitioner’s failure to submit a
representation against the inquiry report, as asserted by the State, must
be considered separately from the obligation of the competent
disciplinary authority to apply its mind to the inquiry report and the
material on record. The State submits that non-submission of a
representation does not automatically establish the correctness of every
finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer, nor does it absolve the
disciplinary authority of its statutory responsibilities. Nevertheless,
where the inquiry has been conducted in accordance with the applicable
rules, the charges are supported by evidence and the competent authority
has lawfully considered the matter before imposing punishment, the
absence of a representation despite a reasonable opportunity cannot, by
itself, furnish a ground for setting aside the penalty.
47. He submitted that the impugned order dated 22.02.2001 imposed
the penalty of dismissal from service, directed recovery of the amount
stated therein and dealt with the treatment of the suspension period and
payment beyond subsistence allowance. The State submits that the
legality of these directions must be tested independently against the
applicable service rules and the provisions governing recovery and
treatment of the suspension period. The power to impose a major penalty

16
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
must be exercised by the competent disciplinary authority in accordance
with the prescribed procedure. Similarly, recovery of an alleged financial
loss must have a lawful foundation and cannot be sustained solely
because a departmental charge has been held proved. The State,
therefore, relies upon the impugned order subject to the demonstration
from the applicable rules and the record that the authority was competent
and the directions issued were legally permissible.
48. He submitted that, in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, this Hon’ble Court ordinarily does not
reappreciate the evidence as though hearing an appeal against the
disciplinary findings. Judicial review is concerned principally with the
decision-making process, the authority’s jurisdiction, observance of the
prescribed procedure, compliance with the principles of natural justice
and the existence of relevant material supporting the conclusions
reached. Interference may nevertheless be warranted where the findings
are unsupported by any evidence, are perverse, disclose consideration of
irrelevant material, or where a material procedural illegality has
occasioned prejudice. The State respectfully submits that the petitioner
must establish such a ground from the inquiry record and cannot obtain
relief merely by inviting this Hon’ble Court to substitute its own
assessment of the evidence for that of the competent disciplinary
authority.
49. He submitted that the fact that an FIR was registered against the
petitioner concerning the alleged misappropriation does not, by itself,
establish the departmental charges; equally, the existence of criminal
proceedings does not automatically invalidate or suspend the
departmental inquiry. The legal effect of any judgment in the criminal
case, if relied upon by the petitioner, would depend upon its nature, the
findings recorded therein, the identity of the charges and evidence and
the applicable legal principles. In the absence of material establishing
that the disciplinary findings are legally unsustainable for a reason

17
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
recognised in law, the mere reference to the criminal proceedings would
not be sufficient to invalidate the impugned order.
50. He submitted that the petitioner’s date of birth is stated in the
counter affidavit to be 10.05.1944 and he would ordinarily have attained
the age of superannuation on 31.05.2002 had he continued in service.
The State submits that the petitioner’s proximity to retirement does not,
by itself, invalidate a disciplinary penalty otherwise imposed in
accordance with law. The validity of the impugned order must be
determined by reference to the applicable rules, the competence of the
authority, the procedure followed and the legality of the findings and
punishment. Any consequential claim concerning retiral benefits or the
treatment of the period of suspension would arise for consideration in
accordance with the applicable service rules and the ultimate
determination of the validity of the impugned order.
51. In view of the foregoing legal position, learned Additional CSC
submits that the impugned order dated 22.02.2001 ought not to be
interfered with merely on the basis of procedural objections stated in
general terms or a request for reappreciation of the departmental
evidence. The petitioner must establish a specific and material violation
of the applicable service rules, the principles of natural justice or another
recognised ground for judicial review. If the record demonstrates that the
competent authority acted within its jurisdiction, the prescribed
procedure was substantially and lawfully followed, the petitioner
received a reasonable opportunity to defend himself and the findings and
punishment are supported by law and the material on record, no ground
for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would
arise.
52. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
impugned disciplinary proceedings and the consequential order of
termination are vitiated by a fundamental breach of the principles of
natural justice, inasmuch as the petitioner was repeatedly denied access

18
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
to the documents and evidence relied upon by the department to
substantiate the charges. Despite repeated requests and directions issued
by the departmental authorities, the relevant records, including
documents lying in the custody of the criminal court, were neither
supplied nor effectively made available for inspection. The petitioner
was, therefore, deprived of a meaningful opportunity to controvert the
allegations and defend himself.
53. He submitted that the mere supply of certain documents cannot be
treated as substantial compliance with the requirements of a fair
disciplinary inquiry when material documents specifically demanded by
the delinquent employee remain undisclosed. The petitioner has
consistently asserted that, out of the documents inspected on 20.02.1993,
only eight were initially supplied and that the remaining documents
necessary to meet the charges were not made available despite repeated
representations. Such incomplete disclosure materially impaired the
petitioner's ability to submit an effective defence and renders the
proceedings procedurally unfair.
54. He submitted that the respondents cannot justify the denial of
inspection merely on the ground that the original documents were in the
custody of the criminal court. Once the department relied upon such
documents to sustain the disciplinary charges, it was incumbent upon the
competent authorities to take appropriate steps to facilitate inspection or
provide legally permissible copies. The correspondence placed on
record, including the communications dated 17.10.1994 and 28.07.1998,
demonstrates that the petitioner continued to seek access to the relevant
material. The failure to resolve these requests cannot legitimately be
used to the petitioner's prejudice.
55. He submitted that the disciplinary inquiry is further vitiated by the
alleged failure to conduct a proper oral inquiry. The petitioner
specifically disputes that any effective inquiry was held in which the
date, time and place were duly fixed and a meaningful opportunity was
afforded to him to participate, examine the evidence, challenge the

19
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
material relied upon by the department and establish his defence. An
inquiry report founded merely upon an incomplete or tentative reply,
without adherence to the prescribed procedure and the requirements of
natural justice, cannot constitute a legally sustainable basis for imposing
a major penalty.
56. He submitted that the allegations concerning shortage of stock
could not lawfully be determined without a proper and comprehensive
verification of the relevant records and the actual stock position. The
petitioner has consistently maintained that the godown was undergoing a
process of transfer and that substantial quantities of fertilizer, seeds and
other material had been shifted to a new godown, the stock of which was
allegedly not accounted for while determining the shortage. In the
absence of a fair verification of the stock at both locations and
consideration of the contemporaneous official correspondence, the
alleged shortage could not be treated as conclusively established merely
on the basis of the departmental assessment.
57. The submitted that the respondents' reliance upon the initiation of
criminal proceedings or the lodging of an FIR does not, by itself,
establish the disciplinary charges. Criminal proceedings and
departmental proceedings operate in distinct legal spheres and the
allegations against the petitioner were required to be established
independently in accordance with the applicable disciplinary rules. The
existence of an FIR or an investigation could not dispense with the
obligation to conduct a fair inquiry or cure procedural defects arising
from the withholding of material evidence.
58. His submission is that the repeated representations made by the
petitioner seeking the charge-sheet and the documents relied upon by the
department demonstrate that the petitioner was seeking a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself rather than deliberately avoiding the
disciplinary process. The respondents were required to consider these
requests fairly and ensure that the petitioner received the material
necessary to answer the charges. The subsequent reliance upon the

20
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
absence of a complete reply, without first ensuring meaningful access to
the relevant evidence, would amount to penalising the petitioner for a
procedural deficiency attributable to the department itself.
59. He submitted that the petitioner's contention regarding bias and
arbitrariness must be examined cumulatively in the light of the repeated
failure to facilitate inspection, the non-supply of relevant documents
despite departmental correspondence and the alleged submission of the
inquiry report without an effective oral inquiry. If these circumstances
are borne out by the record, they disclose more than a mere technical
irregularity and raise a substantial question regarding the fairness and
impartiality of the disciplinary process.
60. His submissions is that the impugned order of termination cannot
be sustained merely because the respondents issued a charge-sheet or
subsequently afforded an opportunity to respond to a show-cause notice.
Compliance with the requirements of natural justice must be real and
effective, rather than formal or illusory. Where the employee is denied
access to material evidence and the findings are returned without a
procedurally fair inquiry, the consequential punishment becomes legally
vulnerable, particularly when the disputed material forms the foundation
of the charges.
61. In view of the aforesaid legal infirmities, the learned counsel for
the petitioner submits that the disciplinary proceedings and the
consequential order of termination warrant interference under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. He, accordinglyc prays that the
impugned order be quashed and appropriate consequential relief be
granted in accordance with law.
62. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties and perused the material on record as well as law reports
cited by learned counsel for the petitioner.

21
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
63. To resolve the controversy involved in the matter, relevant portion
of the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is
being quoted below:
a) Satyendra Singh (Supra):
“8. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
submissions advanced at bar and have carefully gone
through the impugned judgments and the material
available on record.
9. There is no dispute amongst the parties that penalty
which has been imposed upon the appellant is a major
penalty as defined in the Rules of 1999. In Rule 37 of the
Rules of 1999, under the head of major penalty, the first
Sub-Rule refers to withholding of increments with
cumulative effect.
10. Therefore, Rule 7 of the Rules of 1999 which
prescribes the procedure for imposing major penalty
would be applicable in the inquiry to be conducted against
the appellant to bring home the charges imputed to him.
11. Rule 7 (vii)8 of the Rules of 1999, clearly stipulates
that where a Government servant denies the charge, the
Inquiry Officer shall proceed to call the witness proposed
in the charge sheet and record their oral evidence in the
presence of the charged Government servant who shall be
given opportunity to cross-examine such witness. After
recording the aforesaid evidence, the Inquiry Officer shall
call and record the oral evidence which the charged
Government servant desires in his written statement to be
produced in his defence. Hence, recording of oral evidence
in support of charges against Government servant is a
mandate under of Sub-rule (vii) of Rule 7 of the Rules of
1999, when the inquiry being conducted proposes
imposition of a major penalty.
12. Learned counsel for the State was ad idem to the
submissions of the appellant's counsel that no witness
whatsoever was examined during the course of the inquiry
proceedings. On a minute appraisal of the Inquiry Report,
it is evident that other than referring to the documents
pursuant to the so-called irregular transactions
constituting the basis of the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer
failed to record the evidence of even a single witness in
order to establish the charges against the appellant.
13. This Court in a catena of judgments has held that the
recording of evidence in a disciplinary proceeding
proposing charges of a major punishment is mandatory.
Reference in this regard may be held to Roop Singh Negi v.
Punjab National Bank9 and Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of
Gujarat.”

22
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
b) State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha (Supra):
“25. A bare perusal of the aforesaid charges shows that
the three charges were based on official documents/official
communications. We have earlier noticed the relentless
efforts made by the respondent to secure copies of the
documents, which was sought to be relied upon, to prove
the charges. These were denied by the Department in
flagrant disregard of the mandate of Rule 7 sub-rule (v).
Therefore the inquiry proceedings are clearly vitiated
having been held in breach of the mandatory sub-rule (v)
of Rule 7 of the 1999 Rules.
27. A bare perusal of the aforesaid sub-rule shows that
when the respondent had failed to submit the explanation
to the charge-sheet it was incumbent upon the inquiry
officer to fix a date for his appearance in the inquiry. It is
only in a case when the government servant despite notice
of the date fixed failed to appear that the inquiry officer
can proceed with the inquiry ex parte. Even in such
circumstances it is incumbent on the inquiry officer to
record the statement of witnesses mentioned in the charge-
sheet. Since the government servant is absent, he would
clearly lose the benefit of cross-examination of the
witnesses. But nonetheless in order to establish the
charges the Department is required to produce the
necessary evidence before the inquiry officer. This is so as
to avoid the charge that the inquiry officer has acted as a
prosecutor as well as a judge.
28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial
authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator.
He is not supposed to be a representative of the
department/disciplinary authority/Government. His
function is to examine the evidence presented by the
Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official
to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to
hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the
aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral
evidence has been examined the documents have not been
proved, and could not have been taken into consideration
to conclude that the charges have been proved against the
respondents.”
64. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the petitioner and learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
appearing for the respondent-State and having carefully examined the
pleadings and material placed on record, this Court finds that the
controversy does not turn merely upon the sufficiency of the evidence or
the correctness of the factual conclusions recorded by the departmental
authorities. The principal question is whether the disciplinary
proceedings culminating in the order of dismissal dated 22.02.2001 were

23
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
conducted in accordance with the applicable procedure and the
fundamental requirements of a fair inquiry.
65. The petitioner has specifically challenged the absence of a proper
oral inquiry, the non-supply of material documents, the failure to
facilitate inspection of records lying in the custody of the criminal court
and the consequential prejudice caused to his defence. These objections
go to the root of the decision-making process and, therefore, require
substantive consideration in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India.
66. At the outset, it is necessary to clarify that judicial review of a
disciplinary order does not ordinarily authorise this Court to sit in appeal
over the findings of the Inquiry Officer or to substitute its own
assessment of the evidence for that of the competent authority.
Nevertheless, the limitations governing judicial review cannot be
invoked to shield disciplinary proceedings from scrutiny, where the
prescribed procedure has not been followed or where the delinquent
employee has been deprived of a reasonable opportunity to defend
himself. The distinction between reviewing the merits of the
departmental findings and examining the legality of the process by
which those findings were reached is fundamental. Where the decision-
making process suffers from a material breach of natural justice or a
mandatory procedural requirement, interference is not only permissible
but necessary to ensure that the exercise of disciplinary power remains
consistent with law.
67. The contention of learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel that
the impugned order concerns serious allegations of misappropriation,
embezzlement of Government stock, falsification of records and
financial irregularities cannot, by itself, sustain the order of dismissal.
The gravity of an allegation and the legality of the procedure adopted to
establish it are separate considerations. Serious charges require a careful
and fair inquiry precisely because the consequences of an adverse
finding may be grave. The seriousness of the allegations cannot relieve

24
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
the department of its obligation to establish the charges in accordance
with the applicable service rules, nor can it justify dispensing with the
examination of evidence, the disclosure of relevant material or the
opportunity to controvert the case presented against the employee.
Accordingly, the State's reliance upon the nature of the charges does not
answer the petitioner's objections concerning the legality of the inquiry.
68. The first substantial infirmity arises from the petitioner's specific
assertion that no regular oral inquiry was conducted by fixing and
communicating a date, time and place for his effective participation and
that the Inquiry Officer returned findings holding all the charges proved
without recording the evidence of departmental witnesses in his presence
or affording him an opportunity to cross-examine them. The State has
relied upon the fact that the petitioner ultimately submitted his reply to
the charge-sheet on 24.07.1998 and 25.07.1998 and that the Inquiry
Officer, thereafter, submitted the report dated 22.08.1998. However, the
submission of a written reply to the charges is not, by itself, proof that a
regular inquiry was conducted in accordance with the applicable
procedure. A written explanation and an oral inquiry serve distinct
purposes. Where the charges are denied and the applicable rules require
the department to establish them through evidence, the Inquiry Officer
cannot substitute the employee's written explanation for proof of the
allegations by the department.
69. In this regard, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Satyendra Singh (Supra) assumes considerable significance.
As reproduced in the material placed before this Court, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that, where a major penalty is proposed and the
applicable rules require oral evidence, the Inquiry Officer is required to
call the witnesses proposed in the charge-sheet, record their evidence in
the presence of the charged employee, afford him an opportunity to
cross-examine them and, thereafter, permit the employee to produce
evidence in his defence. The judgment further recognises that a finding
based merely upon references to documents, without examination of

25
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
witnesses where such examination is mandatory, cannot be regarded as a
legally sustainable determination of the charges.
70. The principle enunciated in the case of Satyendra Singh (Supra)
directly supports the petitioner's contention to the extent that the
impugned proceedings disclose an absence of a proper evidentiary
inquiry. The present case culminated in the imposition of dismissal from
service, a major penalty, accompanied by a direction for recovery of the
alleged financial loss and adverse treatment of the suspension period. In
such circumstances, the Inquiry Officer was required to comply with the
procedure applicable to the imposition of a major penalty. If, as asserted
by the petitioner and not satisfactorily answered by the State's general
reliance upon the inquiry report, no departmental witness was examined
and no meaningful opportunity of cross-examination or defence
evidence was afforded, the findings cannot be sustained merely because
the Inquiry Officer declared the charges proved. The legality of the
inquiry must be demonstrated by the procedure actually followed, not by
the conclusion recorded in the report.
70. The same conclusion is reinforced by the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha
(Supra) . The relevant extracts reproduced in the supplied material
emphasise that the Inquiry Officer occupies the position of an
independent adjudicator and is not a representative of the department or
the disciplinary authority. Even where the employee does not participate
in the inquiry or fails to submit an explanation, the Inquiry Officer must
examine the evidence produced by the department and determine
whether it is sufficient to establish the charges. Documentary material
cannot automatically be treated as proved merely because it forms part
of the departmental record. The inquiry officer cannot assume the role of
both prosecutor and adjudicator.
71. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this Court
finds that the State's submission that the Inquiry Officer considered the

26
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
petitioner's reply and the relevant records does not sufficiently meet the
specific objection concerning the absence of an evidentiary inquiry. The
State has emphasised the ultimate result of the inquiry without
demonstrating, in response to the petitioner's detailed allegations, that
the witnesses necessary to establish the charges were examined in
accordance with the applicable procedure and that the petitioner was
afforded an effective opportunity to challenge their evidence.
72. The distinction is material; consideration of a reply is not
equivalent to proof of the charges and the existence of official records
does not dispense with the obligation to establish their evidentiary value
in the manner required by law. The petitioner's objection, therefore,
cannot be dismissed as a mere invitation to reappreciate evidence.
73. The second and equally substantial infirmity concerns the non-
supply of documents relied upon by the department. The record of
events, as set out in the pleadings, indicates that after receiving the
charge-sheet on 12.05.1992, the petitioner repeatedly requested copies of
the documents necessary to prepare his defence. These requests were
allegedly made from 23.05.1992 onwards and were followed by further
correspondence and attempts to inspect the departmental records.
Although the petitioner inspected certain documents between January
and February 1993, he maintained that only a portion of the material
demanded was supplied and that several documents, including
documents specifically identified in his requests, remained unavailable.
The petitioner also returned the incomplete set of documents and
continued to seek the remaining material. These circumstances indicate
that the objection was neither isolated nor raised for the first time after
the conclusion of the proceedings; rather, the petitioner consistently
sought access to the material during the disciplinary process itself.
74. In the case of State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra) , the
Hon'ble Supreme Court considered a situation in which the delinquent
employee had made persistent efforts to obtain copies of official

27
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
documents relied upon by the department, but the documents were
withheld. The Court held that denial of such documents, in breach of the
applicable procedural requirement, vitiated the inquiry. The underlying
principle is that an employee cannot be expected to effectively answer
charges founded upon documentary material when the department
withholds that very material. The opportunity to submit a reply must be
meaningful and cannot be reduced to a formality requiring the employee
to respond to allegations without access to the evidence upon which they
rest.
75. The aforesaid principle squarely addresses the petitioner's
complaint. The State has submitted that opportunities were extended for
inspection and that certain documents were supplied on different dates.
However, the question is not whether some documents were made
available at some stage; it is whether the material necessary for an
effective defence was supplied or made accessible and whether the
petitioner was afforded a fair opportunity to controvert the case against
him. Partial disclosure does not necessarily satisfy the requirements of
natural justice, where material documents relied upon in support of the
charges remain undisclosed. Equally, the number of letters issued by the
department cannot establish fairness if the substance of the employee's
repeated requests remained unaddressed. In the circumstances pleaded,
the State's reliance upon the partial supply of records does not, without a
satisfactory explanation of the missing material and its relevance, cure
the procedural defect.
76. The third issue relates to documents allegedly lying in the custody
of the competent criminal court. The petitioner has consistently asserted
that the original documents relating to Crime No.37 of 1991 were in
police custody and had been produced in the criminal proceedings. He
further contends that, despite appearing before the court on the dates
fixed for inspection pursuant to the directions of the departmental
authorities and the Inquiry Officer, no departmental representative or
authorised court assistant appeared to facilitate inspection. The petitioner

28
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
relies upon the certification of the court and the subsequent
correspondence to establish that the inspection could not be completed
for reasons beyond his control.
77. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has submitted that the
department afforded the petitioner opportunities to inspect the records
and that the proceedings cannot be invalidated merely because every
document was not supplied on the date initially requested. The
proposition that every procedural irregularity does not automatically
vitiate a departmental inquiry is not in dispute. Nevertheless, where the
employee specifically alleges that the department relied upon
documents, which were unavailable to him and that the department itself
failed to facilitate inspection despite repeated requests, the question must
be examined in the context of the employee's actual ability to defend
himself. If the relevant documents were essential to establish or rebut the
allegations, the department was required to take reasonable steps to
secure lawful access to them or explain why such access could not be
provided. Their custody with another public authority could not, without
more, justify proceeding as though the employee had enjoyed an
effective opportunity of inspection.
78. The petitioner's case is further strengthened by the correspondence
which, according to the pleadings, continued over several years,
including communications dated 27.08.1993, 27.09.1993, 25.10.1993,
17.03.1994, 10.06.1994 and 29.07.1998. The petitioner relies upon these
communications to show that the issue of inspection remained
unresolved despite directions from the departmental authorities. The
cumulative significance of these events lies in the fact that the petitioner
did not simply decline to inspect the material or remain absent from the
process. Rather, he asserts that he repeatedly attempted to obtain the
documents and that the inspection could not be completed because the
necessary arrangements were not made. If established by the material on
record, such circumstances cannot fairly be attributed to the petitioner as
a failure to avail himself of the opportunity of defence.

29
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
79. The fourth issue concerns the effect of the aforesaid procedural
deficiencies upon the petitioner's ability to submit an effective reply to
the charge-sheet. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has
emphasised that the petitioner eventually submitted his reply on
24.07.1998 and 25.07.1998 and that the Inquiry Officer, thereafter,
considered the defence before submitting the inquiry report. This
submission, however, overlooks the specific qualification recorded by
the petitioner in his reply that the documents relied upon by the
department had not been supplied completely and that he reserved his
right to submit a further and comprehensive explanation upon receipt of
the remaining material. Such a reply cannot be construed, in isolation, as
an unconditional admission that the documents had been supplied or that
the petitioner had received a fair opportunity to defend himself. The
substance of the opportunity afforded to the petitioner must be assessed
in the context of his persistent requests for disclosure and inspection.
Where an employee is compelled to submit a reply without access to
material evidence, the mere filing of such a reply cannot extinguish the
underlying grievance concerning procedural unfairness.
80. This Court is conscious of the principle that a breach of procedural
requirements must be assessed in the context of the applicable rules and
the prejudice caused to the employee, rather than on the basis of
technical objections divorced from the facts. In the present case,
however, the prejudice asserted by the petitioner is neither abstract nor
unrelated to the charges. The allegations concerned an alleged shortage
of Government stock valued at 1,55,043.47, while the petitioner
₹
disputes the stock verification, the completeness of the inventory and the
failure to account for material allegedly shifted to another godown. The
documents relating to stock verification, transfer of charge, inventory
and the departmental assessment were, therefore, potentially material to
the determination of the charges. In the absence of a fair opportunity to
inspect and controvert the relevant records, the petitioner was placed at a
substantial disadvantage in establishing his defence. The procedural

30
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
deficiencies, considered cumulatively, consequently disclose material
prejudice.
81. The fifth issue relates to the service of the charge-sheet. The
material indicates that the charge-sheet issued in August 1991 was
returned undelivered with an endorsement that the petitioner had gone
out for medical treatment. The petitioner thereafter approached this
Court in Writ Petition No. 6065 (S/S) of 1991 and following the interim
order dated 18.09.1991, was reinstated in service with effect from that
date. According to the petitioner, he subsequently requested that a copy
of the charge-sheet be supplied to him and ultimately received it through
the District Agriculture Officer on 12.05.1992.
82. The State, on the other hand, relies upon subsequent steps
allegedly taken to communicate the charge-sheet, including publication
in a newspaper and submits that the initial failure of service did not
invalidate the proceedings once the petitioner acquired knowledge of the
charges.
83. This Court accepts the submission of the State to the limited
extent that the initial non-service of a charge-sheet does not invariably
invalidate all subsequent proceedings, if the charges are subsequently
communicated and the employee receives a reasonable opportunity to
answer them. The decisive consideration is not the initial failure of
service in isolation, but whether the proceedings, thereafter, complied
with the requirements of natural justice.
84. In the present case, the petitioner ultimately received the charge-
sheet and participated in the proceedings by submitting his reply.
Therefore, this Court does not consider it necessary to rest its conclusion
solely upon the disputed mode of service or the alleged inconsistencies
concerning newspaper publication. Nevertheless, subsequent
communication of the charge-sheet could not cure the independent
defects arising from the alleged non-supply of material documents and
the absence of a proper evidentiary inquiry. The State's submission on

31
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
service, therefore, does not remove the fundamental infirmities
otherwise established in the disciplinary process.
85. The sixth issue concerns the alleged inconsistency in the
chronology of the preliminary inquiry and the verification of the stock.
The petitioner has pointed out that the preliminary inquiry report is
stated to have been prepared on 09.01.1991, whereas the godown was
sealed on 10.01.1991 and reopened on 24.01.1991, when the inventory
was prepared and the alleged shortage was ascertained. According to the
petitioner, the chronology raises a serious question as to the factual basis
of the preliminary report and the reliability of the allegations
subsequently levelled against him.
86. It is true that the chronology of a preliminary inquiry, by itself,
may not conclusively establish that the departmental charges are false. A
preliminary inquiry may, depending upon the circumstances, be based
upon information or records collected before a physical verification is
completed. However, where the alleged shortage is disputed and the
employee specifically questions the sequence in which the preliminary
report, sealing of the godown and subsequent inventory were prepared,
the department cannot rely upon the preliminary conclusion as a
substitute for proof in the regular inquiry. The discrepancy assumes
significance when read with the petitioner's further contention that stock
had been shifted to another godown and that the relevant records were
not made available for inspection.
87. In these circumstances, the discrepancy reinforces the necessity of
a fair and comprehensive inquiry in which the documentary and oral
evidence is properly established and the defence is duly considered.
88. The seventh issue concerns the State's submission that the criminal
proceedings and the departmental inquiry operate in distinct legal fields.
On this aspect, the legal proposition advanced by learned Additional
Chief Standing Counsel is substantially correct. The pendency of
criminal proceedings does not, as a general rule, automatically prohibit

32
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
or invalidate departmental disciplinary proceedings, since the purpose
and standard of proof in the two proceedings are distinct. Equally, the
mere registration of an FIR does not establish the charges in a
departmental inquiry. The legality of the impugned order must, therefore,
be examined independently of the mere existence of Crime No.37 of
1991 under Sections 409, 467, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
89. In the present case, the petitioner's challenge does not succeed
merely because criminal proceedings were instituted on the same factual
allegations. The material consideration is that certain documents relied
upon by the department were allegedly in the custody of the authorities
dealing with the criminal case, while the petitioner repeatedly sought
their inspection and supply. The State's submission that the departmental
and criminal proceedings are independent does not answer the question
whether the petitioner was given access to the material relied upon
against him. Indeed, the independence of the two proceedings reinforces
the requirement that the department establish its charges through a
procedurally valid inquiry rather than treating the institution of criminal
proceedings or the existence of an investigation as sufficient proof of
departmental misconduct. Accordingly, the petitioner's case is accepted
on the ground of procedural unfairness and not on the proposition that
the departmental inquiry was necessarily required to remain suspended
until the criminal case concluded.
90. The eighth issue concerns the opportunity afforded to the
petitioner to submit his representation against the inquiry report. The
record indicates that a show-cause notice dated 04.03.1999,
accompanied by the inquiry report, was issued to the petitioner, granting
him fourteen days to submit his representation. The petitioner sought
extension of time on 05.04.1999, citing the illness of his wife and
requested time up to 15.05.1999. Thereafter, a further opportunity was
allegedly granted on 16.08.1999, but no representation was submitted
within the extended period. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel

33
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
submits that the petitioner cannot challenge the dismissal merely because
he failed to avail himself of the opportunities extended to him.
91. The aforesaid submission must be considered in its proper
perspective. Where an employee is afforded a reasonable and meaningful
opportunity to respond to the inquiry report, his failure to submit a
representation despite such opportunity cannot, by itself, invalidate the
final order. Nevertheless, the failure to submit a further representation
does not absolve the disciplinary authority of its obligation to act in
accordance with law, nor does it retrospectively cure procedural defects
committed during the inquiry.
92. In the present case, the petitioner had consistently asserted that the
documents necessary for his defence remained unavailable and that his
earlier reply was submitted subject to the receipt of the remaining
material. The opportunity to respond to the inquiry report was, therefore,
required to be considered against the background of those unresolved
objections.
93. This Court does not consider the illness of the petitioner's wife, by
itself, to be determinative of the legality of the impugned order,
particularly when the record indicates that a further opportunity was
granted. The material question is whether the disciplinary authority
could lawfully proceed to impose the major penalty without addressing
the substantial procedural objections arising from the inquiry itself. The
answer must be in the negative. Even assuming that the petitioner failed
to submit a further representation within the extended period, such
failure could not transform an inquiry conducted in breach of mandatory
procedural requirements into a valid one. The State's reliance upon the
petitioner's omission to submit a subsequent representation, therefore,
does not defeat the challenge to the legality of the underlying
proceedings.
94. The ninth issue concerns the State's objection that this Court
should not reappreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under

34
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There can be no quarrel with the
proposition that judicial review is not an appeal on facts and that the
High Court ordinarily does not substitute its own conclusions for those
of the disciplinary authority merely because another view of the
evidence may be possible. However, the petitioner is not seeking
interference solely on the ground that the Inquiry Officer reached an
incorrect factual conclusion. His challenge is directed principally against
the process by which the conclusions were reached, including the alleged
absence of an oral inquiry, the withholding of material documents and
the failure to facilitate inspection of records relied upon by the
department.
95. The distinction assumes particular significance in view of the
judgments in the casees of Satyendra Singh (Supra) and State of U.P.
v. Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra) . These judgments support the
proposition that the requirements governing a disciplinary inquiry cannot
be reduced to empty formalities and that the Inquiry Officer must act as
an independent adjudicator on the basis of evidence established in
accordance with the applicable rules. Consequently, examination of
whether witnesses were examined, whether the petitioner was afforded
an opportunity to cross-examine them where required, whether material
documents were supplied and whether the Inquiry Officer acted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure does not amount to
impermissible reappreciation of evidence. It constitutes legitimate
judicial review of the decision-making process. The State's objection
founded upon the limited scope of Article 226, therefore, cannot be
accepted as a bar to interference in the facts of the present case.
96. The tenth issue concerns the nature and consequences of the
penalty imposed. Vide impugned order dated 22.02.2001, the petitioner
was dismissed from service; recovery of 1,57,043.47 was directed; the
₹
suspension period was treated as non-qualifying service and the
petitioner was denied further payment for that period. The State has
correctly submitted that each of these directions must derive authority

35
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
from the applicable service rules and a lawful determination of the
underlying facts. However, the validity of the recovery and the
consequential service directions cannot be considered independently of
the validity of the inquiry, where the same findings form the foundation
for those directions.
97. Once the disciplinary inquiry is found to be materially vitiated by
the denial of a fair opportunity of defence and failure to comply with the
procedure applicable to a major penalty, the consequential findings
cannot be treated as conclusively established for the purpose of
sustaining dismissal and recovery. The impugned order does not become
valid merely because the alleged loss relates to Government property or
because the department considers the misconduct serious. The direction
for recovery, in particular, must rest upon a lawful determination of the
employee's responsibility for the loss and cannot be sustained solely by
reference to findings reached through an inquiry that is legally
unsustainable. Accordingly, the dismissal order and its consequential
directions cannot be permitted to operate on the basis of the defective
inquiry.
98. The cumulative effect of the circumstances discussed above is
decisive. The petitioner repeatedly sought the documents relied upon by
the department; the supply of records, according to his consistent
pleadings, remained incomplete; attempts to inspect documents in the
custody of the criminal court allegedly failed despite his appearance and
the departmental correspondence and the petitioner specifically disputed
the absence of a regular oral inquiry in which the departmental case
could be tested through evidence. These objections relate directly to the
fairness of the disciplinary process and to the petitioner's ability to
defend himself against allegations involving a substantial alleged
financial loss. The State's reliance upon the filing of a reply, partial
supply of documents, subsequent show-cause notice and failure to
submit a further representation does not satisfactorily answer these
fundamental objections.

36
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
99. The Court is also conscious that disciplinary proceedings ought
not to be invalidated for every technical or inconsequential irregularity.
The conclusion in the present matter does not rest upon an isolated
defect in correspondence, the initial non-service of the charge-sheet, the
mere pendency of criminal proceedings or the petitioner's failure to
submit a further representation. Rather, it rests upon the combined effect
of the material procedural objections concerning the conduct of the
inquiry and access to the evidence relied upon by the department. The
alleged defects are substantial because they affect the very means by
which the charges were required to be established and the petitioner's
ability to rebut them. The inquiry, therefore, cannot be sustained merely
by invoking the seriousness of the charges or the deference ordinarily
accorded to departmental findings.
100. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds merit in the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, particularly those
founded upon the case of Satyendra Singh v. State of U.P. and
another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3325 and State of U.P. v. Saroj
Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 . The legal principles emerging from
these authorities, as applicable to the facts pleaded in the present case,
require that a major penalty be founded upon an inquiry conducted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure, with the department
establishing the charges through legally admissible and properly proved
material and the delinquent employee receiving a meaningful
opportunity to defend himself. The failure to satisfy these requirements
cannot be treated as a mere procedural irregularity when it materially
affects the fairness and reliability of the resulting findings.
101. Consequently, the submissions advanced by learned Additional
Chief Standing Counsel concerning the seriousness of the allegations,
the distinction between criminal and departmental proceedings, the
opportunities allegedly extended to the petitioner, the submission of his
reply, the subsequent show-cause notice and the limited scope of judicial
review do not furnish sufficient grounds to sustain the impugned order.

37
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
The principles invoked by the State are not rejected in the abstract;
rather, they are held inapplicable as a complete answer to the material
procedural defects arising in the present case. The limitation upon
judicial review does not prevent this Court from setting aside a
disciplinary order where the process itself is found to be contrary to the
requirements of a fair inquiry.
102. It is, accordingly, held that the impugned order of dismissal dated
22.02.2001 is unsustainable in law on account of the material infirmities
in the disciplinary proceedings preceding its issuance. The consequential
directions concerning recovery of the alleged loss, treatment of the
suspension period and denial of other payments, insofar as they rest
upon the findings recorded in the impugned proceedings, cannot
independently survive. The impugned order dated 22.02.2001 is,
therefore, liable to be quashed.
103. Before determining the consequential relief, this Court takes note
of the fact that the petitioner died on 06.02.2004 during the pendency of
the writ petition. The relief of reinstatement in service, being personal in
nature, cannot now be implemented in the ordinary manner.
Nevertheless, the death of the petitioner does not render the challenge to
the dismissal order infructuous, since the impugned order has
consequences for his service record, the alleged recovery, the treatment
of his suspension period and the service or retiral benefits, if any,
payable to his lawful heirs or beneficiaries under the applicable rules.
The validity of the dismissal order must, therefore, be determined
notwithstanding the subsequent death of the petitioner.
104. The petitioner has also disputed the date of his superannuation,
asserting that the correct date was 31.05.2004, whereas the State has
relied upon the date of birth recorded in the service book and contended
that his notional date of superannuation would have been 31.05.2002.
Since the supplied material does not conclusively resolve this disputed
question, it would not be appropriate for this Court to record a definitive
finding on the petitioner's notional date of retirement or to direct

38
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
payment of a quantified amount without verification of the relevant
service record and applicable rules. The consequential service and
financial benefits shall, therefore, be determined by the competent
authority in accordance with law, treating the impugned dismissal order
dated 22.02.2001 as having been quashed and giving due effect to the
findings recorded herein.
105. In view of the foregoing discussion, the writ petition succeeds and
is allowed . The impugned order dated 22.02.2001, whereby the
petitioner was dismissed from service and consequential directions were
issued regarding recovery of the alleged financial loss and treatment of
the suspension period, is hereby quashed.
106. The consequential claims arising from the quashing of the
dismissal order, including the treatment of the petitioner's service and
suspension period, the alleged recovery of 1,57,043.47 and the
₹
determination of any admissible retiral or other service benefits payable
to his lawful heirs or beneficiaries, shall be considered and determined
by the competent authority in accordance with the applicable service
rules and law, consistently with the findings recorded in this judgment.
Any amount already recovered pursuant to the quashed order shall be
reconsidered for refund in accordance with law. The competent authority
shall pass a reasoned order after verifying the relevant service records
and the entitlement of the persons claiming such benefits.
107. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has died during the
pendency of the writ petition and that the determination of consequential
financial benefits requires verification of the service record and
applicable rules, the competent authority shall complete the aforesaid
exercise within four months from the date a certified copy of this
judgment is produced before it by the lawful heirs or beneficiaries,
subject to their furnishing the documents reasonably required for such
determination. The authority shall not deny consideration of the
consequential claims merely on the ground that the impugned dismissal
order had earlier been passed.

39
WRIA No. - 2572 of 2001
108. It is clarified that the quashing of the impugned order is founded
upon the procedural infirmities discussed herein and does not amount to
an independent factual declaration that every allegation levelled against
the petitioner was necessarily false. The consequential service and
financial claims shall be determined in accordance with the applicable
rules and the findings recorded in this judgment, without treating the
quashed dismissal order as a subsisting legal basis for denying such
claims.
109. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order
as to costs.
(Irshad Ali,J.)
October 24, 2026
Adarsh K Singh
Digitally signed by :-
ADARSH KUMAR SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench