VISHAL JAIN vs RAJENDRA KUMAR PARAKH AND ANR

Court
Calcutta High Court

In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side


The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Md. Shabbar Rashidi





F.M.A. No.1248 of 2026
+
CAN 1 of 2026




Vishal Jain

-Versus-

Rajendra Kumar Parakh and Another


For the appellant : Mr. Shounak Mukhopadhyay,
Mr. Shivam Bhimsaria,
Ms. Akansha Singhania, ... Advs.

For the respondent no.1 : Mr. Probal Mukherjee, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. Swarnavo Roy,
Mr. Shoham Sanyal, … Advs.

Heard on : 13.11.2026

Reserved on : 13.11.2026

Judgment on : 17.11.2026

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. The present appeal has been preferred against the dismissal of an
application for temporary injunction filed by the plaintiff/appellant in his
money suit. The primary grounds on which the learned trial Judge
dismissed the application were that the plaintiff did not pray for any
injunction order in the plaint and that there is nothing pleaded by the

2

plaintiff to the effect that the defendant is actively trying to alienate his
properties and that since there are no particulars given by the plaintiff on
the allegation of attempting to evade the dues of the plaintiff, the provisions
of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, “the Code”) are not
attracted on the facts alleged in the application and no inherent power
would justify the reliefs.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the suit has been filed on the
strength of a promissory note dated February 12, 2018, executed by the
defendant/respondent no.1 in favour of the plaintiff/appellant, to pay a sum
of Rs.40,00,000/- (Rs.31,00,000/- as principal amount and Rs.9,00,000/-
as lumpsum interest) on demand. It is submitted that the said promissory
note was the culmination of the acknowledgment of the legal fees due and
payable by the defendant no.1 to the plaintiff for professional services
rendered by the plaintiff/appellant.
3. Learned counsel submits that the learned Trial Judge, upon being satisfied
that a prima facie case has been made out and all the yardsticks for grant of
injunction being satisfied, had initially granted ad interim injunction as
prayed for. Such ad interim order subsisted for about five years. No written
objection, however, was filed by the defendants/respondents to the
temporary injunction application. Hence, the averments made in the
application stood uncontroverted. It is contended that the tests for grant of
injunction at the ex parte ad interim stage are higher, in view of the
defendant not having any opportunity to controvert the averments made in
the injunction application. However, if the said averments remained

3

uncontroverted by non-filing of any written objection by the defendant,
despite getting opportunity, the learned trial Judge had to go by the
averments made in the plaint as sacrosanct and pass an order on the basis
of the same.
4. It is contended that there are sufficient averments in Paragraph No.35 of the
plaint as to the specific properties which the defendant no.1 is trying to
dispose of in order to defraud his creditors, including the plaintiff/appellant.
Thus, there is no dearth of particulars in the plaint pleadings. Similar
pleadings find place in Paragraph No.36 of the injunction application as
well. Read in conjunction with the other pleadings in the injunction
application, it is evident that the defendant/respondent no.1 is deliberately
trying to defraud his creditors, including the plaintiff/appellant, by
attempting to dispose of the enumerated properties. Thus, it is argued, the
provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 1(b) of the Code are squarely applicable.
5. Learned counsel places reliance on Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi
and others, reported at (2021) 6 Supreme Court Cases 418 , for the
proposition that in a suit for payment of money, before settlement of issues,
the defendant may be required to disclose his assets on oath, to the extent
that he is being made liable in a suit and that the Court may further, at any
stage, in appropriate cases during the pendency of the suit, using powers
under Section 151 of the Code, demand security to ensure satisfaction of
any decree. Thus, it is argued that the parameters of Order XXXVIII Rule 5
of the Code and the reliefs contemplated therein can also be applied and
granted respectively in connection with an injunction application.

4


6. Learned counsel next cites Tata Chemicals Limited v. Kshitish Bardhan
Chunilal Nath and Others , reported at (2022) 1 High Court Cases (Cal) 275 ,
where it was held, inter alia , that if there were doubts about exercising
power under any of the provisions mentioned therein, that is, Order XXXVIII
to Order XL of the Code, it can safely be stated that the Court has inherent
power to pass an order of injunction or attachment upon an unimpeachable
liquidated claim being demonstrated and upon it being established that the
respondents are taking steps to improperly deny the realisation of the claim.
When a huge sum of money is claimed and the plaintiff prima facie
establishes such amount, it was held, he would be entitled to secure his
interest keeping in view the amount involved in the suit.

7. It is next argued by the appellant that during pendency of the injunction
application, an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code was filed
by the appellant, alleging violation of the ad interim order passed by the trial
Court by the defendant no.1 by selling another flat in the self-same building,
which houses residential flat at 13, Kedar Bose Lane, Police Station
Bhowanipur, Kolkata – 700 025, which is one of the properties in respect of
which ad interim injunction was granted. This, by itself, vindicates the
allegation of the plaintiff/appellant that the defendant/respondent no.1 is
attempting to defraud his creditors by disposing of his available properties,
thereby justifying the grant of injunction. The respondent no.1, despite
being fully aware of the injunction order, has entered into such deed, which
was also produced in the trial Court.

5


8. Learned counsel submits that in the absence of any rebuttal to the
categorical averments made in the injunction application, the learned trial
Judge erred in law and in facts in unnecessarily insisting upon further
particulars to refuse injunction.
9. Learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant/respondent no.1
controverts the contentions of the appellant and argues that Order XXXIX
Rule 1 of the Code contemplates injunction only in respect of the suit
properties and not any and every property. The present suit being in the
nature of a money suit, the corporeal rights in the immovable properties in
respect of which injunction was sought cannot be termed as “suit
properties”. Thus, the learned trial Judge was justified in holding that
Order XXXIX of the Code is not applicable to the prayer for injunction.

10. It is next argued that there is no concept of any advocate’s lien in Indian
law. As per the plaint, the premise of the promissory note, which is the
plinth of the plaint case, is alleged past dues owed by defendant no.1 to the
plaintiff/appellant. Thus, the said premise itself is invalid to raise a claim of
a monetary amount.
11. Learned senior counsel further argues that the purported promissory note is
conditional/qualified in nature, being dependent on the receipt of
consideration upon sale of a “property situated at Nonadanga, behind
Ruby”, as evident from the purported promissory note itself. Thus, it cannot
be said that the plaintiff has an unimpeachable liquidated claim on the
basis of such promissory note alone.

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12. Learned senior counsel contends that in order to meet the high tests of
injunction akin to attachment before judgment in respect of immovable
properties in a money suit, the plaintiff/appellant was required at least to
furnish the particulars and the names of the alleged creditors of the
defendant/respondent no.1 whom the said respondent is seeking to defraud
and as to the particulars of the proposed vendors and the properties which
are sought to be disposed of. In order to establish that there are several
other creditors in the corporate and legal field, as alleged in the plant and
injunction application, the relevant accounts, balance-sheets, etc., ought to
have been produced to establish such allegation, which are conspicuous by
their absence in the present case.

13. Learned senior counsel submits that three valuable properties have been
enumerated in the plaint and injunction has been sought in respect thereof.
The cumulative value of the said properties would much exceed
Rs.40,00,000/-, which is the claim of the appellant on the basis of the
promissory note. The rest of the money claim is the subject-matter of
adjudication in the suit upon being established by evidence, being in the
nature of damages. Thus, the respondent no.1 cannot be held at ransom by
obtaining an injunction merely for the asking, on the allegation of dues of a
much lesser amount than the valuation of the said properties.
14. It is further argued that the nature of the averments made in the plaint and
the injunction application are general in nature, devoid of particulars, as
rightly observed by the learned trial Judge.

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15. The purported deed of conveyance filed with the application under Order
XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code by the appellant merely indicates that the
respondent no.1 signed the same in the capacity of the Director of a
company which is referred to as a “developer” in the deed. Even the said
developer is not described as a vendor. That apart, the Director of a
company cannot be said to be the owner of the assets of the company.
Thus, the argument that the respondent no.1 has transferred a property
situated in the self-same building is devoid of any merit whatsoever.
16. Learned senior counsel cites an unreported judgment in the matter of Shree
Vaishnavi Ispat Ltd. v. M/s. Sharp Ferro Alloys Ltd. , passed in FMAT No.75 of
2025 , where a co-ordinate Bench of this Court was pleased to observe that
while it is true that the Court has the power to secure even a pure money
claim, there must be good reason for doing so. The plaintiff, it was held,
must make out a case with supporting material that the defendant is trying
to dispose of its properties with the fraudulent motive of rendering
infructuous any money decree that may be passed in favour of the plaintiff
and against the defendant; some material for the plaintiff’s apprehension
must be disclosed. It was further held that ordinarily, a money claim shall
not be secured, since it would be granting an undue advantage to an
unsecured creditor.
17. Learned senior counsel cites another co-ordinate Bench judgment of this
Court in the matter of Kohinoor Steel Private Limited v. Pravesh Chandra
, reported at , where the Division Bench
Kapoor 2010 SCC OnLine Cal 1856
had observed that in the said case there was no averment in the plaint or

8

the injunction application that the defendant intended or threatened to
remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors. A
vague allegation that the defendant is unable to pay its debts to the
creditors, it was held, is not sufficient so long the intention to remove or
dispose of the property with a view to defrauding the creditors is alleged. It
was further taken note of that no name of any creditor had been given in the
said case. Thus, it was held, Order XXXIX Rule 1 had no application to the
facts of the said case.
18. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the Court comes to the
following conclusions:
19. In the present case, a salient feature is that no written objection was filed at
any point of time by the defendants/respondents to controvert the
allegations made in the temporary injunction application. Thus, the doctrine
of non-traverse is squarely applicable and the Court, at the time of final
disposal of the injunction application, had to proceed on the basis that the
averments in the injunction application were true, being uncontroverted.
20. Learned counsel for the appellant is justified in arguing that since the
learned trial Court itself had recorded its satisfaction that a prima facie case
for trial had been made out at the ad interim stage, in the absence of any
subsequent fact being brought to the notice of the Court on the part of the
defendants, the factual scenario remained the same and in view of lack of
any change of circumstances, there could be no reason as to why such
position should be deviated from.

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21. This Court is aware of the settled position of law that the considerations at
the ex parte ad interim stage of injunction are different from the final
hearing of a temporary injunction application. However, insofar as the
plaintiff is concerned, the stand remains the same. The cardinal distinction
between the ad interim and final stage of an injunction application is the
additional facts brought on record by the defendants to resist the injunction
application, which would lead the Court to appreciate the materials
produced by both parties and, upon evaluation of the same, to come to the
conclusion as to whether injunction ought to be granted or not. However,
even at the temporary injunction stage, the considerations are at a prima
facie level, as opposed to the suit, where the plaint averments are to be
established independently by evidence led by the plaintiff, even if no written
statement is filed by the defendants.
22. Proceeding from such perspective, since the defendants/respondents have
not even controverted the pleadings in the injunction application, the tests,
on a prima facie footing, remained the same for the trial Court as at the ad
interim stage.
23. Having held so, the Court is to consider as to whether the learned trial
Judge ought to have granted injunction on the basis of the case made out in
the plaint and the temporary injunction application.
24. In Paragraph No.36 of the injunction application, there is a specific
averment that the defendant/respondent no.1 is heavily indebted to several
persons across the corporate and legal community and is attempting to
evade the dues of the petitioner. It was further averred that it is

10

apprehended that the defendants and each of them would attempt to
alienate the assets and/or properties which can be used to liquidate the
dues of the petitioner, as reflected in the demand promissory note dated
February 12, 2018 and that, in such circumstances, the plaintiff/appellant
prayed for an appropriate order of injunction restraining the defendant no.1
from alienating and/or transferring and/or incumbering the assets of the
properties, as mentioned in the Schedule of the injunction application.
25. In Prayer (a) of the application, injunction has been sought to restrain the
defendant/respondent no.1 from creating any third-party interest in respect
of the premises mentioned in Paragraph No.35 thereinabove. Although
Paragraph No.35 of the injunction application does not specifically give the
particulars of any such property, it is evident that the reference was to
Paragraph No.35 of the plaint, which contains a chart of three different
immovable properties, including the residential flat of defendant/respondent
no.1 at 13, Kedar Bose Lane.
26. On a composite reading of the plaint and the injunction application, thus, it
would be evident that the properties referred to in Paragraph No.35 of the
plaint, which are also reproduced in Schedule-A of the injunction
application, are the properties alleged to be owned by the defendants and in
respect of which injunction was sought.
27. At the initial stage, that learned trial Judge, vide Order dated March 14,
2021, had been pleased to grant an order of injunction on the self-same
averments, restraining the defendants from alienating the suit properties for

11

a limited period, in terms of the prayers made in the temporary injunction
application.
28. In the said order, it was specifically recorded that it appeared from the “huge
documents” filed on behalf of the plaintiff that there is every possibility to
defraud the creditor by the defendants. It was further observed that on
careful perusal of the documents filed by the plaintiff, it appeared that the
plaintiff rendered service as solicitor to the defendants but payment was not
made and under such circumstances, if the apprehension of the plaintiff is
materialised by the defendants, then the very purpose of the suit would be
frustrated. It was also held that in view of the facts and circumstances
ascribed in the plaint and the injunction application, supported by the
documents from the side of the plaintiff, it appeared to the Court that there
was a strong prima facie case which favoured the plaintiff to get an order of
injunction and if no injunction was granted, the plaintiff would suffer
irreparable loss and injury.
29. Thus, the learned trial Judge had recorded clear satisfaction on a prima
facie case having been made out even at the ex parte ad interim stage. In the
absence of any written objection to the injunction application, the self-same
averments of the injunction application, on the strength of which ad interim
order was passed, remained uncontroverted and acquired finality insofar as
the temporary injunction stage was concerned, by application of the doctrine
of non-traverse. Thus, the learned trial Judge erred in law in deviating from
such position as it stood on the date of grant of ad interim injunction,
without recording any specific reason for doing so.

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30. The next facet of the matter is the yardstick applicable in grant of injunction
of the nature as prayed for by the plaintiff/appellant in a money suit. The
relevant portion of Order XXXIX Rule 1(b), as culled out from the said
provision, stipulates that where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or
otherwise that the defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of
his property with a view to defrauding his creditors, the Court may by order
grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act.
31. The next part of the second limb of Rule 1 of Order XXXIX relates to the
property in dispute in the suit, whereas the first limb of the second portion
of Rule 1 operates irrespective of whether the subject matter of the
injunction is the suit property or any other property. The governing rider is
whether the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of “his
property” “with a view to defrauding his creditors”, in which case the Court
may, by injunction, restrain “such act”, that is, the act of disposing of the
defendant’s property, whether it is the suit property or otherwise.
32. Applying the said framework, injunction may very well be granted in a
money suit as well, provided the parameters of Rule 1(b) are satisfied. Order
XXXVIII, Rule 5 of the Code operates in a somewhat different matrix,
although there is substantial overlap between the two provisions. As per
Rule 5, where the Court is satisfied at any stage, by affidavit or otherwise,
that the defendant “with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of any
decree that may be passed against him”, is about to dispose of the whole or
any part of his property or to remove the whole or any part of his property
from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court may direct

13

the defendant either to furnish security or to pass necessary orders
attaching the property. In the latter case, however, the Court has to specify
the property required to be attached and the estimated value thereof.
33. As opposed to Order XXXVIII Rule 5, where the Court is mandated to
estimate the value of the property proposed to be attached, under Order
XXXIX, Rule 1(b), the Court has blanket power to grant an ad interim
temporary injunction to restrain the defendant from disposing of any of his
properties, provided the same is, with a view to defraud his creditors,
threatened or intended to be disposed of.
34. Thus, the argument of the respondent no.1 that the valuation of the
property-in-question is disproportionate with the monetary claim made by
the plaintiff is not applicable to an injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 1(b),
although it might have been a relevant consideration under Order XXXVIII
Rule 5 of the Code.
35. However, the Court is not oblivious to the fact that even as per the
averments made in Paragraph No.35 of the plaint, the injunction has been
sought in particular against the defendant/respondent no.1, two of whose
properties have been enumerated in the said Paragraph. The third property
belongs, as per the said averments, to the defendant no.2 and cannot be the
subject-matter of injunction.
36. Thus, in principle, the Court is not powerless to grant injunction under
Order XXXIX Rule 1(b), provided the conditions laid down in the said
provision are satisfied.

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37. In Paragraph No.36 of the injunction application, the plaintiff/appellant has
specifically averred that the defendant/respondent no.1 is heavily indebted
to several persons across the corporate and legal community and is
attempting to evade the dues of the plaintiff and it is apprehended that the
defendants will attempt to alienate the assets and/or the properties which
can be used to liquidate the dues of the plaintiff in terms of the promissory
note dated February 12, 2018, as enumerated in Schedule-A of the
injunction application.
38. Since no written objection had been filed at any point of time to the said
injunction application, the said averment was mandatorily to be accepted as
true by the learned trial Judge for the purpose of disposing of the temporary
injunction application, by invocation of the doctrine of non-traverse.

39. The appellant is justified in contending that although, at the ex parte ad
interim stage, furnishing of particulars might be of relevance, after the stage
of affidavits is over and the defendants having chosen not to controvert the
allegations made in the injunction application, Paragraph No.36 of the said
application would suffice to attract the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 1(b)
of the Code.
1
40. In Shree Vaishnavi Ispat Ltd. (supra) , the co-ordinate Bench recognized the
power of the Court to secure even a pure money claim, if there is a good
reason to do so. The expression “with supporting material” used in the said
judgment need not necessarily refer to documentary evidence, since, at the
stage of disposal of an injunction application, it might not be possible for the

1
Shree Vaishnavi Ispat Ltd. v. M/s. Sharp Ferro Alloys Ltd. [FMAT No.75 of 2025]

15

plaintiff to collect specific documents showing that the defendant is actually
attempting to dispose of its properties. In the circumstances of the present
case, the averments in the injunction application would suffice as truth, in
the absence of any rebuttal of the same by filing of any written objection by
the defendants.
41. Thus, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the prayer for injunction
was justified by the averments in the injunction application, which stood
uncontroverted till the date of disposal of such application.
42. It is trite law that in an injunction application, the plaintiff is not required to
prove to the hilt the prima facie title or the plaint case, which can only be
the subject-matter of trial on evidence, but to establish a prima facie
arguable case, raising triable issues to be decided at the final hearing of the
suit. In the facts of the present case, such test was sufficiently met by the
plaintiff/appellant.
43. As opposed to an order of attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII
Rule 5 of the Code, where the bar is higher since the plaintiff has to
establish a strong prima facie case that there is a fair chance of a decree
being passed in its favour, to avoid execution of which the defendant is
attempting to dispose of the property-in-question, in the case of injunction
under Order XXXIX Rule 1 (b), it is only required to be shown that there is
an apprehension of disposal of the property to defraud creditors.

16

2

44. In Kohinoor Steel Private Limited (supra) , the co-ordinate Bench merely
observed that in the said case, there was no specific averment in the plaint
or the injunction application that the defendant intended or threatened to
remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors and
merely a vague allegation was made that the defendant was unable to pay
its debts to the creditors, which was held to be insufficient so long the
intention to remove or dispose of property with a view to defrauding the
creditors is not alleged.
45. In sharp contradistinction therewith, in Paragraph No.36 of the injunction
application in the present case, a specific allegation was made that the
defendants are trying to defraud their creditors by disposing of their
properties, bringing the narrative within the fold of Order XXXIX Rule 1(b) of
the Code. Thus, the said decision does not come to the aid of the
respondents.
3
46. In Tata Chemicals Limited (supra) , relied on by the appellant, however, the
co-ordinate Bench merely reiterated the provisions of law as laid down in
Order XXXVIII Rule 5, Order XXXIX, and Section 151 of the Code. In
Paragraph No.100 thereof, the co-ordinate Bench reiterated that a prima
facie case is distinguishable from a foolproof case and when the Court finds
that a prima facie case is made out by the plaintiff then it passes an order of
injunction so that the ultimate relief which is claimed by the plaintiff in the
suit is not frustrated and the decree which may be passed will remain

2
Kohinoor Steel Private Limited v. Pravesh Chandra Kapoor, reported at 2010 SCC OnLine Cal
1856
3
Tata Chemicals Limited v. Kshitish Bardhan Chunilal Nath and Others, reported at (2022) 1 High
Court Cases (Cal) 275

17

inexecutable. It was further observed that the Court’s power to grant
temporary injunction cannot be treated at par with its power to pass an
order of attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the
Code. It was observed that the standard of proof in the latter case was
higher than for grant of injunction. Having held above that Order XXXIX
Rule 1(b) of the Code is applicable in the present case, the said observations
are rendered academic in the instant context.
47. In Paragraph No.101 of the Judgment, the co-ordinate Bench clearly
observed that Section 151 of the Code empowers the Court to invoke its
inherent jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or abuse of process
and that such powers are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on
the Court by the Code of Civil Procedure, being complementary to those
powers.
48. It was also observed in Paragraph No.110 of the said report that “if there
were doubts about exercising power” under Order XXXVIII to Order XL of
the Code, it can be safely stated that the Court has inherent power to pass
an order of injunction or attachment. However, by such observation, the
Court tacitly recognized the established legal proposition that the inherent
power of the Court under Section 151 of the Code can only be invoked either
when there is no provision governing the factual matrix or there is no
prohibition to exercise such power. Since, in the present case, the facts of
the case are clearly governed by Order XXXIX Rule 1(b) of the Code, the
invocation of the Court’s inherent power is unwarranted. Such power cannot
be exercised where a particular provision is applicable but its parameters

18

are not met, merely to bypass the rigours of such provision. Only when the
factual conspectus does not attract any particular provision of law can the
Court invoke its inherent power ex debito justitiae , that is, for the ends of
justice.
49. Hence, the said decision does not come to the aid of the plaintiff/appellant,
although we have otherwise held that the plaintiff is entitled to get relief
under Order XXXIX Rule 1(b) of the Code.
4
50. In Rahul S. Shah (supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in a suit for
payment of money, before settlement of issues, disclosure of assets on oath
and/or payment of security for satisfaction of the decree may be required on
the part of the defendant by the Court, in appropriate cases, using powers
under Section 151 of the Code.
51. However, in Paragraph No.41 of the said report, it was clearly observed that
having regard to the background discussed therein, there was urgent need
to reduce delays in the execution proceedings, for which certain directions
were required to be issued to do complete justice in larger public interest
under Article 142, read with Articles 141 and 144, of the Constitution of
India, to subserve the process of justice so as to bring to an end the
unnecessary ordeal of litigation faced by parties awaiting fruits of decree
and, in larger perspective, affecting the faith of the litigants in the process of
law.
52. However, the invocation of inherent powers, as enumerated therein, is
restricted to the direction of disclosure of assets and furnishing of security

4
Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi and others, reported at (2021) 6 Supreme Court Cases
418

19

and not the grant of injunction. Such general observations, in the particular
context of early disposal of execution cases and suits, are not directly
attracted in the present context.
53. However, irrespective of the ratio laid down in the said judgment, the
plaintiff/appellant is otherwise entitled to relief as per our discussions.
54. Insofar as the argument of the respondent no.1 is concerned, to the effect
that the respondent no.1 merely signed in the capacity of the Director of the
developer company in the deed produced in connection with the Order
XXXIX Rule 2A proceeding, we find that the defendant/respondent no.1,
although acting in the capacity of a Director of the developer company, dealt
with a flat at the self-same address, that is 13, Kedar Bose Road, where his
own flat, as enumerated in the plaint, is also situated. This, at least, shows
that the respondent no.1 is not averse to transferring the properties in the
said premises. A Director has a major role to play in the management of a
company and from the deed-in-question, it would be evident that the
subject-matter of the conveyance fell within the proportionate share of the
developer-company, of which the respondent no.1 was a Director. Thus, it
cannot be said that such document is entirely irrelevant in the present
context.
55. Lastly, the argument of the respondent no.1, that the promissory note is a
conditional one, cannot be prima facie accepted. From a bare perusal of the
said document, it would be evident that the same clearly contemplated that
merely on demand, the respondent no.1 promised to pay to the appellant an
amount of Rs.40,00,000/-, which is a settled amount. The fact, that the

20

said sum was on the premise of the value finalized on account of a
Nonadanga property behind Ruby and/or other properties, was merely
incidental, furnishing the premise of execution of the demand promissory
note, and not a condition qualifying the same. The said promissory note is
unequivocal, mandating the respondent no.1 to pay the amount of
Rs.40,00,000/- merely on demand by the appellant and, thus, is unqualified
in nature.
56. Even otherwise, it would be premature at this juncture to direct evaluation
of the property in respect of which injunction has been sought, since the
present exercise is not under Order XXXVIII Rule 5, but under Order XXXIX
Rule 1(b), of the Code, the latter not contemplating any such evaluation.

57. The learned trial Judge, it must be noted, also took into consideration the
fact that there was no prayer for injunction in the plaint. However, as
reiterated repeatedly in the judgements cited by the parties and
contemplated in Order XXXIX Rule 1(b) of the Code, there is no bar to seek
injunction in aid of the final reliefs sought in the plaint, even if there is no
specific prayer for injunction in the plaint. In a money suit, the final relief is
in the form of recovery of a sum of money which, if granted, may not require
any further permanent injunction. Thus, in such a situation, the plaintiff
need not pray for a relief of permanent injunction in the suit. As opposed to
permanent injunction in the form of a decree to be passed at the final stage
of the suit, a temporary injunction is operative during pendency of the suit
and is intended to preserve the subject-matter of the suit till the final relief
is adjudicated upon. Thus, the lack of any prayer for permanent injunction

21

in the plaint does not invalidate a temporary injunction being sought during
pendency of the suit, in aid of the final relief, in a money suit or otherwise.
Hence, such logic of the learned trial Judge is also not tenable in the eye of
law.
58. In view of the above, the impugned order cannot be sustained. However,
since the unimpeachable liquidated claim at this juncture is restricted to
Rs.40,00,000/-, an option ought to be given to the respondent no.1 to make
good such sum to avoid the rigour of injunction. Moreover, the injunction
ought to be restricted to the properties which are relatable to the
defendant/respondent no.1, since the injunction has been sought primarily
against the said defendant/respondent.

59. Accordingly, F.M.A. No.1248 of 2026 is partially allowed on contest, thereby
setting aside the impugned order dated September 19, 2026 passed by the
learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Fourth Court at Alipore, District –
South 24 Parganas, in Money Suit No.64 of 2021 and partially allowing the
temporary injunction application filed by the plaintiff/appellant in the said
suit, granting injunction restraining the defendant/respondent no.1 from
selling, transferring, alienating and/or creating any third-party interest in
respect of the residential flat of the defendant/respondent no.1 situated at
Orbit Sky Garden, 30, Bondel Road, Kolkata – 700 019 and the residential
flat of the defendant/respondent no.1, situated at 13, Kedar Bose Lane,
Police Station Bhowanipur, Kolkata – 700 025, till disposal of Money Suit
No.64 of 2021.

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60. However, it will be open to the defendant/respondent no. 1 to deposit the
amount of Rs. 40,00,000/- as security in the trial Court in the name of the
suit within a month from date. If such deposit is made, the injunction order
shall stand automatically vacated. In such event, the said amount shall be
invested in a short-term interest-bearing account or scheme by the Registrar
of the trial Court with any nationalized bank and shall be subject to the
outcome of the suit and the orders passed by the trial Court with regard to
such amount at the time of final disposal of the suit.
61. Consequentially, CAN 1 of 2026 stands disposed of as well.
62. It is made clear that the aforesaid observations are tentative in nature
insofar as the suit is concerned, and it will be open to the learned trial
Judge to decide the suit independently of the above observations, in
accordance with law.
63. There will be no order as to costs.
64. Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied
to the parties upon compliance of all formalities.


(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

I agree.

(Md. Shabbar Rashidi, J.)