RAJENDRA vs STATE

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRA No.47 of 1997

CNR No. ODHC010004561997
(In the matter of an application under Section 374 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 )

Rajendra Kumar Sahu ……. Appellant


-Versus-
State of Orissa ……. Respondent

For the Appellant : Mr. Bijaya Kumar Ragada, Amicus Curiae

For the Respondent : Mr. A.K. Apat, AGA

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 06.10.2026 : Date of Judgment: 31.10.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 22.02.1997 passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Bhadrak, in Sessions Trial No. 13/128 of
1995, arising out of G.R. Case No. 308 of 1994, whereby the appellant

was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian
Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period
of three years.
2. The present appeal has been pending since 1997. When the matter
was called for hearing, consistently none appeared for the appellant.
Therefore, on 15.07.2025, this Court requested Mr. Bijaya Kumar
Ragada, learned counsel, who was present in Court to assist the Court as
Amicus Curiae. He has readily accepted the same and after obtaining
entire record, assisted the Court very effectively. This Court records
appreciation for the meaningful assistance rendered by Mr. Ragada.

3. Heard Mr. Bijaya Kumar Ragada, learned Amicus Curiae
appearing for the appellant and Mr. A.K. Apat, learned Additional
Government Advocate appearing for the Respondent-State.
4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 16.03.1994 at about 5.00
P.M., while the injured, Ramakanta Sahu, was returning to his house, the
appellant confronted him regarding a case instituted against the
appellant’s father. When the injured denied the allegation and did not
agree to withdraw the case, the appellant allegedly threatened to finish

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him, took out a knife from his pocket and inflicted three blows on his
person. The blows were stated to have landed on the left side of his
chest, the head and the back below the shoulder. As a result of the
assault, the injured sustained bleeding injuries and fell to the ground. On
witnessing the occurrence, his daughter, P.W.2, intervened and struck
the hand of the appellant with a broom, whereupon the knife fell from
his hand. The appellant thereafter allegedly picked up the knife,
threatened the persons present and fled from the spot.
5. P.W.1, Niranjan Dixit, submitted a written report before the
Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police at Sabranga Outpost while the injured
was being taken to the hospital. On the basis of the report, Bhadrak Rural
Police Station Case No. 84 of 1994 was registered. Upon completion of
investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet against the appellant for
the offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, and
the case was committed to the Court of Session.
6. The prosecution examined seven witnesses. P.W.1 is the
informant; P.W.4 is the injured; P.W.2 and P.W.3 are the daughters of
the injured, who claimed to have witnessed the occurrence; P.W.5 was

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the doctor who initially examined the injured at Bhadrak Hospital; P.W.6
was the surgery specialist who examined the nature of the injuries; and
P.W.7 was the investigating officer. The defence examined one witness,
D.W.1, who sought to dispute the occurrence.
7. The learned trial Court upon appreciation of the oral and medical
evidence, accepted the testimony of the injured and his daughters,
holding that their evidence was substantially corroborated by the medical
opinion. It found that the appellant had inflicted successive knife blows
on vital parts of the body of the injured and that the intervention of
P.W.2 had prevented the appellant from proceeding further with the
assault. The learned trial Court concluded that the appellant had acted
with the intention to commit murder and accordingly convicted him
under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. The relevant part of the
aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“ 14. From the aforesaid evidences on record it
reveals that the intention of the accused was to kill
the injured P.W.4 but due to intervention of daughter
of the injured P.W.2 the knife fell down from the
hand of the accused. It is an established principle in
law that a person is criminally responsible for an
attempt to commit murder when with the intention or
knowledge requisite to its commission he has done

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the last proximate act necessary to constitute the
completed offence and when the completion of
offence is prevented by some cause independent of
his volition. The nature of injury caused may give
some assistance in coming to a finding as to the
intention of the accused but such intention may also
be caused from other circumstances and may be
ascertained in some cases without reference to actual
wounds. An attempt in order to be criminal need not
be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law if there
is present an intent coupled with some overt act in
execution thereof. The intention of the assailant may
be gathered from the nature of the weapon used and
the parts of the body where the injuries inflicted.
Keeping in mind the above principle of law it is
noticed that in the present case the accused inflicted
the stab injuries on the vital part of the body of the
injured P.W.4 with an intention to kill him but due to
intervention of the daughter of the injured the knife
fell down from his hand. So from the facts and
circumstances of the case as discussed above it must
be held that the prosecution has successfully bring
home the charge U/S 307 of the I.P.C. against the
accused beyond all shades of reasonable doubt.

14. In the result, I hold the accused guilty U/S 307
I.P.C. and convict him thereunder. After taking into
consideration the nature of the offence and the
circumstances under which the accused committed
the offence I feel it not to extend the benefit of the
provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act to the
accused.”

8. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and
the learned counsel for the State and have carefully examined the

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evidence available on record, the findings recorded by the learned trial
Court and the grounds urged in appeal. The principal question requiring
determination is whether the prosecution has established beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant committed an act with such intention
or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if death had been
caused by that act, he would have been guilty of murder, thereby
attracting Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. If the evidence does not
establish the requisite ingredients of that offence, it would be necessary
to determine whether the proved facts nevertheless constitute an offence
punishable under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code.

9. The evidence of the injured witness, P.W.4, regarding the assault
finds corroboration from the testimony of his daughters, P.Ws.2 and 3,
and the medical evidence adduced through P.Ws.5 and 6. The fact that
the witnesses are related to the injured does not, by itself, render their
testimony unreliable, particularly when no material contradiction has
been elicited to discredit their account of the occurrence.
10. The medical evidence establishes that the injured sustained three
injuries, including an injury on the chest, an incised wound on the head

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and a punctured wound on the back, caused by a sharp-pointed weapon.
However, the alleged knife was not recovered during investigation, and
no bed-head ticket relating to the subsequent treatment of the injured at
S.C.B. Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack, was seized and proved.
Though these omissions do not, by themselves, discredit the prosecution
case regarding the assault, they assume relevance while assessing the
precise nature of the offence established by the evidence.
11. Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code requires proof that the
accused acted with such intention or knowledge and under such
circumstances that, had death ensued, the act would have amounted to
murder. The nature and location of the injuries, the weapon allegedly
used, the number of blows and the surrounding circumstances are
relevant in determining such intention or knowledge. In the present case,
although the appellant inflicted successive blows on the injured
following a dispute concerning litigation against his father, the medical
evidence describes two injuries as simple and the remaining injury as
dangerous, with the opinion that it could have caused death if left
untreated. Upon an overall assessment of the evidence, the conviction

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under Section 307 IPC is not sustainable. Nevertheless, the evidence
establishes a deliberate assault resulting in serious bodily injury.
Accordingly, the conviction is altered to one under Section 325 IPC,
subject to the legal requirement that the injury proved falls within the
definition of grievous hurt under Section 320 IPC.
12. Coming to the question of sentence, the record indicates that the
occurrence is of the year 1994. More than three decades have elapsed
since the occurrence. The appellant was approximately twenty-five years
of age at the time of the occurrence. The learned trial Court itself
recorded that this was his first offence.

13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chellammal and Another v. State
1
represented by the Inspector of Police , has held that it is the statutory
obligation of the sentencing Court to consider the applicability of the
provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act and that any refusal to
extend such benefit must be supported by reasons.

1
2025 INSC 540

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chellammal (supra) has
elaborately explained the scope, object and significance of the Probation
of Offenders Act, 1958 while considering the question of extending the
benefit of probation to a convict. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has
underscored that the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
Probation of Offenders Act is essentially reformative in nature, aiming to
provide an opportunity to first-time or less serious offenders to reform
themselves rather than subjecting them to incarceration. It has been
emphasized that the provisions of the Act are intended to prevent the
deleterious effects of imprisonment on individuals who can otherwise be
rehabilitated as responsible members of society. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court has observed as follows:
“26. On consideration of the precedents and based on a
comparative study of Section 360, Cr. PC and sub-section (1)
of Section 4 of the Probation Act, what is revealed is that the
latter is wider and expansive in its coverage than the former.
Inter alia, while Section 360 permits release of an offender,
more twenty-one years old, on probation when he is sentenced
to imprisonment for less than seven years or fine, Section 4 of
the Probation Act enables a court to exercise its discretion in
any case where the offender is found to have committed an
offence such that he is punishable with any sentence other than
death or life imprisonment. Additionally, the non-obstante
clause in sub-section gives overriding effect to sub-section (1)
of Section 4 over any other law for the time being in force.
Also, it is noteworthy that Section 361, Cr. PC itself, being a

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subsequent legislation, engrafts a provision that in any case
where the court could have dealt with an accused under the
provisions of the Probation Act but has not done so, it shall
record in its judgment the special reasons therefor.
27. What logically follows from a conjoint reading of sub-
section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act and Section 361,
Cr. PC is that if Section 360, Cr. PC were not applicable in a
particular case, there is no reason why Section 4 of the
Probation Act would not be attracted.
28. Summing up the legal position, it can be said that while an
offender cannot seek an order for grant of probation as a
matter of right but having noticed the object that the statutory
provisions seek to achieve by grant of probation and the
several decisions of this Court on the point of applicability of
Section 4 of the Probation Act, we hold that, unless
applicability is excluded, in a case where the circumstances
stated in subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are
attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its
consideration release of the offender on probation; on the
contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the court to consider
whether the case before it warrants releasing the offender upon
fulfilment of the stated circumstances. The question of grant of
probation could be decided either way. In the event, the court
in its discretion decides to extend the benefit of probation, it
may upon considering the report of the probation officer
impose such conditions as deemed just and proper. However, if
the answer be in the negative, it would only be just and proper
for the court to record the reasons therefor.”

Considering the altered conviction under Section 325 of the
Indian Penal Code, the age of the appellant at the time of the occurrence,
the absence of any previous conviction established on record and the
overall circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered view
that the appellant deserves to be extended the benefit contemplated under
Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, instead of directing

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the appellant to undergo the remaining part of the sentence. In view of
the aforesaid, this Court is inclined to extend the appellant the benefit
contemplated under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act.
14. As regards monetary liability, Section 5 of the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958, empowers the Court, when releasing an offender
under Section 3 or Section 4, to direct him to pay such compensation as
the Court considers reasonable for the loss or injury caused by the
commission of the offence, along with the costs of the proceedings,
where appropriate. In view of the injuries sustained by P.W.4,
Ramakanta Sahu, and the circumstances of the assault, the appellant is
directed to pay compensation of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty-five
thousand only) to the injured under Section 5 of the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958 within a period of one month.
15. Instead of sentencing the appellant to suffer imprisonment, this
Court directs the appellant to be released under Section 4 of the
Probation of Offenders Act for a period of one year on his executing
bond of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) within one month with one
surety for the like amount to appear and receive the sentence when called

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upon during such period and in the meantime, the appellant shall keep
peace and good behavior and he shall remain under the supervision of
the concerned Probation Officer during the aforementioned period of one
year.
16. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is partly allowed.
17. This Court acknowledges the effective and meaningful assistance
rendered by Mr. Bijaya Kumar Ragada, learned Amicus Curiae in this
case. Learned Amicus Curiae is entitled to an honorarium of Rs.7,500/-
(Rupees seven thousand five hundred) to be paid as a token of
appreciation.

(S.S. Mishra)
Judge








The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
st
Dated the 31 October, 2026/Subhasis Mohanty
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SUBHASIS MOHANTY
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.
Date: 04-Nov-2026 10:37:49

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