Helena Anna Maria Lersch vs State Of Goa

Court
Supreme Court

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
2026 INSC 1248

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 11625 OF 2026)

HELENA ANNA MARIA LERSCH …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF GOA & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G E M E N T

NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

“On the seashore of endless worlds children meet.

The infinite sky is motionless overhead and the restless water is boisterous.
On the seashore of endless worlds the children meet with shouts and dances.
They build their houses with sand, and they play with empty shells. With
withered leaves they weave their boats and smilingly float them on the vast deep.
Children have their play on the seashore of worlds.
They know not how to swim, they know not how to cast nets. Pearl-fishers
dive for pearls, merchants sail in their ships, while children gather pebbles and
scatter them again. They seek not for hidden treasures, they know not how to
cast nets.”
- Rabindranath Tagore, “On the Seashore”.
Leave granted.
2. In this proceeding, we are seeking to protect the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JAGDISH KUMAR
Date: 2026.11.19
15:57:40 IST
Reason:
autonomy of a child and help preserve the child’s magical world,
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which unfortunately appears to be seriously jeopardised by the
bitter bickering between the parents.
3. This Court is confronted with an unusually piquant
situation wherein an unmarried German mother is seeking
access to her minor son of four years, who she claims has
German citizenship and has been issued a German passport, but
is being denied access and custody by the father. She is also
fervently urging this Court to allow her to take the child to
Singapore, where she is presently employed, for his school
education. These pleas obviously have been stoutly resisted by
the father of the child, an Indian citizen, not only on merits, but
also by doubting the jurisdictional competency of this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution in passing any further
orders other than to grant access to the mother of the child, as
the present proceeding arises out of a habeas corpus petition
pending before a High Court, and more particularly, when a
guardianship proceeding has been already initiated by the father
in the meantime in India.
4. While the unwed status of the parents, both of whom
have different nationalities and citizenships, and their complete
lack of convergence on the core issue of the custody of the child
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are facts that may pose challenges to any court in determining
an equitable solution, the problem has been compounded in the
present case by the multiple related proceedings arising out of
the same facts.
5. In view of the pendency of multiple proceedings, this
Court has to address the foundational jurisdiction question
raised by the father. However, in our opinion, it need not be
considered as a preliminary issue and can be addressed in due
course as we consider other issues by delving into the peculiar
facts and circumstances arising in this proceeding, which will
also provide the backdrop in deciding this fundamental
question.
CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS
6. The Petitioner herein is the mother of the minor boy,
while Respondent No. 2 is the father. Their minor son in question
is Master Marcus Johannes Mukerji, born on 15.07.2022, who
is four years of age at the time of passing this order.
7.
The mother is a German citizen who ordinarily lives and
works in Singapore as TikTok’s Vice President of Public Policy,
while the father is a lawyer who runs his own law firm, PLR
Chambers, in New Delhi, India. The parents are not married. The
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parties began a relationship in 2019, and in October 2021, the
mother became pregnant with the child. Two months before the
child’s birth, the mother moved to New Delhi to facilitate the
father’s involvement in the child’s birth and life, as he was
primarily based in India pursuing his legal profession.
8. The child was born on 15.07.2022 in New Delhi. In
October 2022, both parents, the child, and a full-time nanny
shifted to Goa due to Delhi’s worsening winter air pollution.
From the child’s birth until February 2026, per the mother and
father’s own admissions, the child and the parents primarily
lived in New Delhi and Goa, with intermittent time spent in
Germany with the mother and her family. During this time, the
mother also frequently travelled between India and Singapore for
work, as TikTok, the company where she is employed, was
banned in India in 2020, restricting her ability to stay in India
for extended periods. For the purpose of formal schooling, the
child was enrolled in the German Embassy School in New Delhi
and the Yellow House in Goa.
9. During this period, the relationship of the parents came
under considerable strain and underwent rough patches, and at
present, their relationship has ruptured to the extent that they
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have mostly remained separated. However, they continued to
attempt to maintain cordial relations only for the child’s sake,
with limited success.
10.
In October 2025, the mother obtained a negative
declaration from the German Embassy stating that she is the
child's sole legal guardian under German Civil Law, supported
by the German passport issued to the child within a month of
his birth in India. Thereafter, she travelled with the child from
New Delhi to Germany. Within days, the father joined them, and
in November 2025, the father brought the child back from
Germany to Goa, India, with the mother's consent. During the
period the child was in Germany, he was allegedly enrolled in a
school in Germany but was later withdrawn when it was felt that
raising the child in Germany may not be suitable.
11. In December 2025, the parents apparently decided to
consider moving the child to Singapore and explored admission
to United World College South East Asia (hereafter “UWCSEA”),
one of the finest schools in Singapore. According to the mother,
the father assisted in preparing the admissions application over
email throughout December 2025 and January 2026. However,
in a later email dated 04.02.2026, he backtracked, stating that
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he did not consent to the child being enrolled in a school in
Singapore.
12. During that phase in December 2025, both parents took
the child to Germany for Christmas and then went to Singapore.
After a dispute between the parties, which ended with the
mother lodging a complaint against the father with the Singapore
Police on 3rd January 2026, the father brought back the child
to Goa from Singapore, allegedly with the consent of the mother.

13. At the beginning of February 2026, the mother travelled
from Singapore to Goa specifically to spend time with the child,
but the father took the child to Kolkata to allegedly attend a
friend’s wedding, which was a trip the mother had specifically
objected to as soon as she was informed of it.
14. Being prevented from meeting the child despite
communicating her plans and wishes for the same to the father,
the mother filed a habeas corpus writ petition before the Goa
Bench of the High Court of Bombay (hereafter “the Bombay High
Court”) on 17.02.2026. The Bombay High Court granted the
mother interim custody of the child for ten days (from
27.02.2026 to 08.03.2026) in Kolkata. On 04.03.2026, the
mother’s compliance with the conditions imposed was recorded.
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On 08.03.2026, the mother duly returned the child to the
father’s custody.
15. During the pendency of the habeas corpus petition
before the Bombay High Court, the father instituted
guardianship proceedings in the Court of the District Judge at
South-24, Parganas at Alipore, West Bengal and obtained an ex-
parte order on 02.04.2026 restraining the mother from taking
custody of the child, wherein the Family Court noted Kolkata as
the ordinary place of residence of the child.
16. The mother challenged the Family Court's ex-parte
order before the Calcutta High Court, and on 23.04.2026, the
Calcutta High Court directed the Family Court to decide the
jurisdictional issue before passing any substantive orders in the
guardianship proceedings. Thereafter, the mother filed an
application for rejection of the guardianship petition under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which
came to be rejected on 05.05.2025, holding that the question of
jurisdiction required a factual analysis on merits and could not
be decided in an Order VII Rule 11 application.

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17. The mother alleges that during the pendency of
proceedings before the Bombay High Court and in Kolkata, the
father prevented the mother from meeting the child and from
communicating properly with the child.
18. In that background, the Bombay High Court, on
08.04.2026, directed that video interactions between the mother
and child be facilitated and supervised by a state-appointed
counsellor. The Bombay High Court thereafter noted on
15.04.2026 that the counsellor found the interaction between
the mother and the child to be healthy and directed a schedule
for supervised video interactions.
19. The mother, however, alleged that the father obstructed
her interactions. The father allegedly used the court-appointed
counsellor’s non-availability to prevent any communication
between the child and mother. The mother claims that the father
cut off all communication with the child for more than six weeks,
from 16.04.2026 to 25.05.2026, when all calls the mother made
to the father went unanswered.
20. According to the mother, having no other alternative,
she filed an application on 25.05.2026 seeking custody and
urgent directions from the Bombay High Court, stating that
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communication between her and the child had completely
broken down and was being obstructed. On 26.05.2026, the
Bombay High Court granted video interaction with the mother,
but the father retained custody of the child.
21. On 02.06.2026, the mother informed the father by
email that she would be travelling to Kolkata from 05.06.2026 to
08.06.2026 to spend time with the child but received no
response. On 05.06.2026, when the mother arrived in Kolkata
and informed the father, the father replied that he was with the
child in Bangalore. The mother immediately flew to Bangalore
and sought the child's exact location and address. However, on
07.06.2026, the father informed the mother that they were in
Mysore.
22. On 11.06.2026, the mother filed an additional affidavit
before the Bombay High Court regarding the father’s obstruction
across Kolkata, Bangalore, and Mysore in a hide-and-seek
manner. The matter, however, was adjourned on 15.06.2026
until 26.06.2026.
23. Against this adjournment, the mother filed the present
Special Leave Petition before this Court on 19.06.2026, and the
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matter has come up before us and is being considered in this
background.
24. On the first date of hearing, this Court directed both
parties to be present in Court, and the father was directed to
produce the child before this Court. Over the next several
hearings, we encouraged the parties to attempt mediation,
considering the child's best interests and the parents' custody
rights. However, the parents could not reach a consensus on the
child's custody.
25. The parties’ pleadings and submissions before this
Court reveal a deep divide between the parents. Their
relationship appears acrimonious and severely strained, with
tension easing only in the child’s presence. They have been
unable to agree on a mutually acceptable custody arrangement.
We note that their entrenched differences have left the child’s
welfare caught in the vortex of their discord.
26. With the guardianship proceedings pending and in the
absence of any agreement between the parents or court-directed
interim custody granted to either parent, in the backdrop of the
case as discussed above, this Court felt that it would best serve
the welfare of the child if temporary custody is given to one of
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the parents. This would require determining whether the
temporary custody of the child be given to the father, in which
event the child would remain in India; or be given to the mother,
in which case the mother has to be allowed to take the child to
Singapore, where the mother is presently based. There is some
indication that both parents had considered the latter option of
admitting the child in a Singaporean school, before their
relationship irreversibly deteriorated.

27. As the child’s best interests remain paramount and take
precedence over the parents’ interests and other considerations,
and in light of the peculiar background of the case, this Court
considered it appropriate to have the parents and the child
examined by NIMHANS, the country’s premier mental health
institution, to understand their psychological and mental
conditions.

28. Accordingly, this Court, by order dated 11.08.2026,
directed the parents and the child to undergo individual and
family assessments at NIMHANS, Bengaluru.
29. We have thus felt it apposite to reproduce the order of
this Court passed on 11.08.2026, which reads as follows:
“1. This Court is presently seized of the matter pertaining
to the rival claims of the parents in seeking custody of
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their child, who is about four years and one month old
(born on 15.07.2022).

2. Admittedly, the mother and father are not married to
each other. The relationship between the parties
commenced sometime in January 2019 in the course of
their professional interactions. Subsequently, a child was
born on 15.07.2022 at La Femme, Hospital, New Delhi,
India. The mother is a German citizen employed as a Vice
President of Public Policy at TikTok, based in Singapore.
The father is admittedly a practicing lawyer, and partner
of a law firm, PLR Chambers, based in Delhi.

3. This Court is considering the rival claims of the parties
for custody of their child. We have interacted with the
mother and father in person on several occasions and
have also observed the behavior of the child. Though
certain allegations and counterallegations have been
made by the parties against each other, the child does
not appear to have any aversion towards either of the
parents. Both parents also appear to be doting parents.
The child is presently in India. For varying periods of
time, the child has stayed with the parents in India,
including in Delhi and Goa, and has recently stayed with
the father in Kolkata, which according to the mother was
without her consent. The child has also travelled to and
stayed in Singapore on a couple of occasions, along with
his parents, and has travelled to and stayed in Germany
with the family of the mother.

4. The mother initiated writ proceedings before the High
Court of Bombay at Goa Bench, in February 2026,
seeking access to the child, as she claims to have been
denied access to the child by the father without any
reason. The matter is pending before the High Court of
Bombay at Goa Bench out of which the present
proceeding has arisen before this Court. The High Court
initially granted the mother access to the child for 10
days, and thereafter passed certain orders for continued
access to the child, the details of which may not be
necessary to be referred to herein. After the filing of the
writ proceedings before the High Court of Bombay at Goa,
the father filed a petition under the Guardians and Wards
Act, 1890 in the Court of the District Judge, South 24-
Parganas at Alipore in April 2026, seeking protection and
custody of the child. In the writ petition filed by the
mother, she also sought custody of the child and
permission to take the child to Singapore. The mother is
keen to provide education to the child in Singapore, where
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she lived for the last several years. The child’s admission
to one of the best schools in Singapore is stated to be
under process, where the mother would also be able to
provide quality time to the child in Singapore. The father,
on the other hand, seeks to retain custody of the child in
India, which he claims to be the child's habitual residence
and will be in the child's welfare where quality education
can be provided.

5. In considering such rival claims and counter-claims,
this Court has to keep the best interests of the child as
the foremost consideration, apart from the claim of the
biological mother based on maternal love, affection and
maternal instincts, as well as that of the father. In our
view, this would obviously necessitate an evaluation of
the various physical and mental conditions of all
concerned, including the child, as neither have agreed to
joint custody so far.

6. The father is primarily based in India because of his
legal profession, while the mother is primarily based in
Singapore because of her professional commitments.
Therefore, if the child is to remain in India with the father,
the mother will not have access to the child for a
substantial period of time, except during occasional visits
to India. Similarly, if the child is placed in Singapore as
desired by the mother, the father will not be in a position
to spend substantial time with the child, except during
occasional visits. Under such circumstances, accepting
the request of either parent would necessarily entail
dislocation of the other parent for a substantial period of
time. In absence of any agreement between the parties,
the child has to remain either in India or in Singapore.

7. Under the circumstances, this Court has felt the
necessity to seek the views of experts, particularly child
psychologists/behavioural specialists, who may interact
with the child as well as with the parents, either
separately or together, as the psychologists/experts may
deem fit and appropriate, and apprise this Court of their
views. Thereafter, this Court will be in a better position to
understand the psychological impact on the child if either
parent is unable to remain with the child for a prolonged
period of time, and thereafter to determine the issue of
custody of the child. Therefore, this Court would like to
ascertain the comparative psychological impact on the
child of the two possible arrangements, namely, the child
continuing to reside in India with the father in the
absence of the mother for substantial period, or the child
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residing in Singapore with the mother in the absence of
the father for substantial period, and which of these two
arrangements would better serve the welfare and best
interests of the child. The experts may accordingly
examine the comparative merits, demerits and
implications of both alternatives and place their
considered opinion before this Court, keeping in mind that
the child is only about 4 years old, the psychological harm
it may cause if the child is deprived of the maternal love
and affection for a prolonged period, as compared to
deprivation of the love and affection of his father. In either
eventuality, the parent with whom the child does not
ordinarily reside shall have reasonable and meaningful
access to the child, including regular interaction through
video conferencing and appropriate weekly/monthly
visitation rights, as may be feasible and conducive to the
best interests of the child.

8. From the records, we have also seen that the child has
been looked after by nannies named, Kusum and Anu,
for a substantial period of time. If the experts so desire,
they may examine them also, as they may provide
valuable insights into the behaviour predisposition of the
child and the role of the parents.

9. The experts may also give their views as to whether
they need to visit any particular place, either in India or
in Singapore, as the case may be, to ascertain the
proposed physical environment of the child where the
child may be placed for the time being, for which the
parties shall make the necessary arrangements for travel
and stay and both the parties will share the expenses.

10. For the aforesaid purpose, we request the National
institute of mental health and Neuro Sciences (hereinafter
‘NIMHANS’) at Bengaluru to immediately constitute a
panel of experts consisting of such members as they may
deem fit and appropriate who shall examine the child and
parents, considering the aforementioned background and
desire of the parents, keeping in mind the best interests
of the child.

11. Considering the nature of the case and also the
limitations on the mother to physically remain in India
beyond a limited period, which have been appreciated by
all, including the father, we would request the NIMHANS
authorities to initiate the process of interaction without
any further delay.

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12. The parties have agreed to visit NIMHANS,
Bengaluru, with the child immediately and shall report to
NIMHANS at such time and place as may be required. If
the NIMHANS authorities feel that it would be better for
the parties to stay in their complex for some time, the
parties shall cooperate and stay in the complex.
Otherwise, they may stay at a hotel near NIMHANS, as
per their convenience.

13. The mother has expressed that her child is very
proficient in German language and that she would like to
interact with the child in German during the interaction,
and the experts may also interact with the child in
German with the help of an expert/ interpreter.

14. Considering the nature of the case, we have
requested Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned ASG, to assist
the Court for expediting the constitution of the Board of
experts by NIMHANS and also to render necessary
assistance in requesting the services of a
Germanspeaking person fluent in English, preferably a
German national based in Bengaluru to assist the Board
of Experts and also the mother and child.

15. NIMHANS is requested to submit a report before this
Court in a sealed cover, preferably within a period of 2–3
weeks, from today. However, if the NIMHANS authorities
feel the need for extension of time for this exercise, they
may do so, which may be communicated to the learned
ASG, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, who will apprise this Court of
such requirement. NIMHANS shall accordingly inform
both parties through email as well as text messages on
their mobile phones and shall also inform their respective
lawyers/counsels regarding the date and time of their
presence required at NIMHANS, Bengaluru.

16. This Court, for obvious reasons, is not going to make
any observation at this stage regarding the claims and
counter-claims or allegations/counter-allegations of the
parties. However, to apprise the Board of Experts, of the
background of the case, the parties are at liberty to
submit, in writing, their respective cases, with a short
synopsis/list of dates, before the Medical Board of
NIMHANS within two days from today. The same shall
not exceed three pages/2000 words. Further, the parties
shall also submit their updated concrete plan/ proposals
regarding the custody and care of the child to the Board
of Experts also, which was earlier directed to be
submitted before this Court.
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17. During this period, the interim custody of the child
shall remain with the mother during her stay in India.
Obviously, the father will also have access to the child at
such convenient time and place, as may be agreed
between the parents. The respective counsel of the
parties may help in this regard to the parties. It goes
without saying that, in the absence of the mother in India,
the interim custody of the child will revert back to the
father, till the mother returns to India who shall then take
custody of the child again from the father until such order
of the Court.

18. Regarding the pending guardianship petition bearing
‘Act VIII Case No. 69 of 2026 (R-69)’, before the Court of
the District Judge, South 24-Parganas at Alipore, it has
been agreed by the both parties that the same can
conveniently be transferred to an appropriate Court in
Delhi. The Chief Justice of the High Court of Delhi is
requested to assign the matter to a specific Court in Delhi
at the earliest. The concerned Court at Alipore is directed
to send the records immediately to the High Court of
Delhi, which is to be sent to the appropriate Court in Delhi
as per the directions of the Chief Justice of the High Court
of Delhi.

19. The costs of the entire exercise involved in the
assessment to be conducted by NIMHANS shall be borne
by both parents equally, for which each parent shall
deposit a sum of Rs.2 lakhs with the Registry of this
Court within a period of 2 days. The expenses incurred
by NIMHANS towards payment of fees to counsellors,
experts and other ancillary expenditures shall be
reimbursed from the amounts so deposited by the parties
in this regard. Any additional amount, so required, shall
be borne by the parties by depositing the same with the
Registry of this Court, as may be intimated to the Registry
by the NIMHANS.

20. The passport of the petitioner, Helena Anna Maria
Lersch, may be returned to her so as to enable her to
make the necessary arrangements for her travel in India
and abroad, without any restrictions. However, the
passport of the child shall remain with the Registry of this
Court. The interim direction issued by this Court
restraining the removal of the child from the country
without the leave of the Court and other incidental
directions issued earlier shall also remain in force,
subject to what has been ordered today.
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21. A copy of this order be furnished to Ms. Aishwarya
Bhati, learned ASG, with a request that the authorities at
NIMHANS be duly intimated and also for engagement of
an interpreter.

22. We place on record our appreciation for the assistance
rendered by Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, assisted by Mr.
Sachin Sharma and Ms. Madhulika Upadhyay, learned
counsels, on behalf of the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare, who have appeared at the request of this Court
since the matter involves the participation of NIMHANS.

23. Counsels may apprise this Court on 14.08.2026 of
the steps taken and developments in this regard in terms
of the directions issued today. The parties may not be
required to be present on 14.08.2026 in person unless
they so desire.

24. The guardianship proceedings shall commence
immediately without any loss of time by the concerned
Court in Delhi on receipt of the records at the Court, and
the Court is requested to proceed with the matter on a
day-to-day basis, subject to other judicial commitments,
and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible. It
is also made clear that the concerned Court shall proceed
with the matter without being influenced by the
proceedings and orders that have been passed by this
Court in the present proceedings.

25. List the matter on 14.08.2026 at 2:00 p.m.”

30. The NIMHANS report was received on 21.09.2026 and
copies were furnished to the parties.
31. The pending Guardianship Petition bearing ‘Act VIII
Case No. 69 of 2026 (R-69)’ before the Court of the District
Judge, South 24-Parganas, at Alipore, has now been transferred
to the Family Court, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, upon the
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mother and father agreeing to the same. The case is now at the
initial stage, and the parents are participating in the same.
32. We will now consider the arguments put forth on behalf
of the parents seeking interim custody of the child.
33. Learned Senior Advocate for the mother, Ms. Geetha
Luthra, submits that per the Tender Years Doctrine as
1
enunciated in Queen v. Maria Clarke , Section 1626(b) of the
German Civil Code, and per Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956, the mother is the natural guardian of
a very young child. Additionally, where the child is born out of
wedlock, the mother is the child’s natural guardian. Further, it
is submitted that, under the doctrine of nurture, a child so
young is best cared for by the mother. The learned Senior
Counsel also relied on paragraph 18 of ABC v. State (NCT of
2
Delhi), which held that where the parents are not married, the
mother should have custody of the child. Similarly, per Gohar
3
Begum v. Suggi alias Nazma Begam and Ors . , an unwed
mother has the best claim over the minor child.

1
1857 SCC OnLine EWHC 1: 119 ER 1217.
2
(2015) 10 SCC 1.
3
1959 SCC OnLine SC 8: (1960) 1 SCR 597.
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34. It is thus submitted that it is in the best interest of the
child to allow the mother to have custody of the child in
Singapore, as this will not amount to dislocating the child if the
parent is compelled to move the child because of their profession
or employment. The mother also avers that, to ensure the
father’s access to the child in Singapore is not disrupted, access
will be maintained through telephone/video calling or physical
access, as may be agreed.

35. Ms. Luthra also submits that the child is very attached
to the mother and becomes very distressed upon separation from
the mother during many custody exchanges between the father
and mother. It is also submitted that the father’s proposal
involves moving the child to Kolkata, a city the child has never
spent any significant time, where the child has no familiar
environment and where the father has no work-related reason to
be present.
36. On the other hand, learned Senior Advocate for the
father, Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, submits that this Court’s
jurisdiction was invoked fraudulently, that the habeas corpus
writ petition has become infructuous now that the mother’s
continuous contact with the child has been restored, and that
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the matter is being heard and argued in a custody petition before
a jurisdictional court.
37. It is also submitted that since the child's birth, the
mother has been ‘absent’ for nearly half the time, and the father
has been the child's primary caregiver. It is further submitted
that the father has built a ‘well-drawn’ cocoon for the child, and
that introducing the child to the ‘alien’ city of Singapore during
the pendency of the Family Court proceedings would be against
the child's interests.
38. Mr Sankaranarayanan also submits that the Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 will not apply, as the
father claims to be a Christian and the mother is also not a
Hindu. Therefore, the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 will apply,
and Section 17 of that Act provides only that the guardianship
of a minor child is to be determined according to what appears
to be in the welfare of the minor. It is vehemently submitted that
allowing the mother to take the child to Singapore would
dislocate the child and would not be in his best interests.
39. We have heard the arguments of the parties and
perused all the materials placed before us.

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HABEAS CORPUS JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT:
40.
The father and the mother seek conflicting custody
arrangements that are incompatible with each other. The mother
wishes to have the child educated in Singapore, where she works
and resides, while the father wishes to raise the child in Kolkata.
In either case, one parent will have less contact with the child
than the other, as the parents' occupations necessitate their
long-term presence in different locations/countries. This issue
will also need to be addressed by the jurisdictional court when
determining the child’s final guardianship/custody
arrangement, because of the complete lack of overlap between
the interim custody and final custody arrangements sought by
each party.
41. Mr. Sankaranarayanan argued vehemently that the
matter should be remitted to the jurisdictional court handling
the guardianship proceedings, in which the mother is already
participating. He contended that her participation renders the
reliefs she seeks from this Court infructuous, and that the
present Special Leave Petition should therefore be disposed of as
infructuous in light of Guardianship Petition No. 37 of 2026,
Page - 21 - of 81

pending before the Family Court at the Patiala House Courts,
New Delhi.
42. It may be noted that while the habeas corpus petition
was filed in February 2026, the father instituted the
guardianship proceedings in Alipore, West Bengal, only in April
2026, after participating in the Bombay High Court proceedings.
The Family Court, now seized of the guardianship petition, will
continue to have jurisdiction despite the habeas corpus
proceedings, as it will deal with the final determination of the
child's guardianship. Similarly, the subsequent filing of the
guardianship petition cannot render the habeas corpus petition
infructuous.
43. A relief sought becomes infructuous when it either
becomes not necessary or impossible for such relief to be
4
granted. This Court in M. Sudakar v. V. Manoharan held that:
“15. …..In our opinion a writ petition broadly speaking is
held infructuous when the relief sought for by the
petitioner is already granted or because of certain events,
there may not be necessity to decide the issue involved in
the writ petition….”

5
44. Further, in Nirmala v. Kulwant Singh & Ors , it was
held as follows:

4
(2011) 1 SCC 484.
5
2024 INSC 370.
Page - 22 - of 81

“16. It can thus be seen that no hard and fast rule can be
laid down insofar as the maintainability of a habeas
corpus petition in the matters of custody of a minor child
is concerned. As to whether the writ court should exercise
its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India or not will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case.”

45.
Based on a conjoint reading of M. Sudakar (supra) and
Nirmala (supra), the pertinent question is whether, in light of
the specific facts and circumstances, it is no longer necessary
for this Court to decide the question of interim custody now that
a petition for guardianship has been instituted by the father.
46. In this regard, we may recall the observations In
6
Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh v. State of T.N ., wherein
this Court held that the parens patriae jurisdiction being
exercised by this Court is foremost for the protection of the minor
and is independent of the statutory framework. The relevant
paragraphs are reproduced below:
“99. Thus, it is well established that in issuing the writ
of habeas corpus in the case of minors, the jurisdiction
which the Court exercises is an inherent jurisdiction as
distinct from a statutory jurisdiction conferred by any
particular provision in any special statute. In other
words, the employment of the writ of habeas corpus in
child custody cases is not pursuant to, but independent
of any statute. The jurisdiction exercised by the court
rests in such cases on its inherent equitable powers and
exerts the force of the State, as parens patriae, for the
protection of its minor ward, and the very nature and
scope of the inquiry and the result sought to be
accomplished call for the exercise of the jurisdiction of a

6
(2023) 12 SCC 472.
Page - 23 - of 81

court of equity. The primary object of a habeas corpus
petition, as applied to minor children, is to determine in
whose custody the best interests of the child will
probably be advanced. In a habeas corpus proceeding
brought by one parent against the other for the custody
of their child, the Court has before it the question of the
rights of the parties as between themselves, and also has
before it, if presented by the pleadings and the evidence,
the question of the interest which the State, as parens
patriae, has in promoting the best interests of the child.”
(emphasis added)

47. There is a distinction between a guardianship petition
and a habeas corpus petition for custody. From a perusal of the
record and pleadings, it is clear that what is now being sought
from this Court is not final adjudication of the guardianship of
the child, but, in the peculiar facts of the case, consideration of
the plea for interim custody of the child.
48. It is also apposite to reproduce the reliefs sought by the
father in the petition now pending before the Principal Judge of
the Family Court, Patiala House Courts, being Guardianship
Petition No. 37 of 2026, as follows:
“It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this
Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:

a) Appoint the Petitioner as the permanent
guardian of the minor son Marcus Johannes
Mukerji,

b) Grant permanent custody of the minor son
Marcus Johannes Mukerji to the Petitioner father,

c) Pass an order of permanent injunction
restraining the Respondent from disturbing the
Page - 24 - of 81

peaceful enjoyment of the minor at his ordinary
place of residence while staying with the Petitioner.

Pass any other orders that this Court may deem fit in
the interest of justice.”

49. These prayers clearly distinguish the guardianship
petition from the habeas corpus proceedings. In the former, the
father seeks a final adjudication on the permanent guardianship
of the child, whereas in the latter, the remaining relief sought by
the mother is purely interim, namely, to take the child to
Singapore for the child's education.

50. It could also be argued that under Section 12 of the
Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, the Family Court is also
equipped to decide interim custody of the child. However, we are
of the opinion that for a court of equity to subject a minor child
of the tender age of four years to multiple proceedings and to
delay a decision on interim custody, while being fully aware of
the absolute lack of cooperation between the parents, would be
to neglect the duty of this Court towards the child under the
parens patriae jurisdiction.
51.
We are also of the opinion that, irrespective of the nature
of the proceeding before a court, when the custody right over a
child is involved, the child’s best interests must be the
Page - 25 - of 81

preeminent consideration; it must prevail over all other
considerations. Hence, once the child’s best interests become the
core issue, all other interests and considerations must be
subservient to it, and such collateral interests, however
important they may appear to the contesting parents, must be
moulded accordingly. Their interests must not be allowed to
override the best interests of the child. A fortiori , procedural law,
including jurisdictional issues, must yield if it stands in the way
of the child’s best interests. Even international jurisdictional
issues cannot come in the way of the best interests of the child.
52.
In that regard, we may refer to the observations in
7
Sheetal Vasant Thakur v. Chirag Arora ,
“51. Through a series of judgments, this Court has laid
down firmly that welfare of the child is the overarching
and the determining factor even in matters relating to
custodial and visitation rights of the parents. All other
factors are subservient to the welfare of the child.
This Court in Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha
8
Nagpal , after a survey of law in this country as well as
in foreign jurisdictions, affirmed that child welfare is the
paramount consideration and also highlighted the legal
proposition of parens patriae jurisdiction of the court for
the welfare of the child. This Court even went to the extent
of ignoring orders of foreign courts by keeping the welfare
of the child as the paramount consideration.

7
2026 SCC OnLine SC 1110.
8
(2009) 1 SCC 42 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 1.
Page - 26 - of 81

9
In Yashita Sahu v. State of Rajasthan , and
Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh v. State of Tamil
10
Nadu
this Court held that though this Court will accord
substantial weight to foreign custody orders, it will be like
other factors which will be subordinate to the prime
consideration of the welfare of the child. Comity or first
strike consideration will be subordinate to the welfare of
child, affirming the supremacy of the child welfare
principle. We may not burden ourselves any further with
the numerous decisions in this regard in reiterating the
dominant principle of the welfare of the child.
52. In Gaurav Nagpal (supra) this Court emphasised that
welfare must be understood in the widest sense, from
moral and ethical perspectives keeping in mind physical,
emotional and educational needs of the child. In other
words, all those factors which are conducive to the
physical, moral and intellectual development of the child,
and not merely confined to material aspects, must be
taken into consideration by the court. In the aforesaid
case, this Court also considered the conduct of the
parents, psychological impact on the child which may
result because of tutoring by either of the parents etc. in
seeking to ascertain what would be in the best interest of
the child.
This Court observed in Gaurav Nagpal (supra) as
follows:—
“ 50. When the court is confronted with
conflicting demands made by the parents, each
time it has to justify the demands. The court has
not only to look at the issue on legalistic basis,
in such matters human angles are relevant for
deciding those issues. The court then does not
give emphasis on what the parties say, it has to
exercise a jurisdiction which is aimed at the
welfare of the minor. As observed recently in

9
(2020) 3 SCC 67 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 39.
10
(2023) 12 SCC 472.
Page - 27 - of 81

11
Mausami Moitra Ganguli case, the court has to
give due weightage to the child's ordinary
contentment, health, education, intellectual
development and favourable surroundings but
over and above physical comforts, the moral and
ethical values have also to be noted. They are
equal if not more important than the others.
51. The words “welfare” used in Section 13 of the
Act has to be construed literally and must be
taken in its widest sense. The moral and ethical
welfare of the child must also weigh with the
court as well as its physical well-being. Though
the provisions of the special statutes which
govern the rights of the parents or guardians
may be taken into consideration, there is nothing
which can stand in the way of the court
exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction arising
in such cases.”
53. In the light of the above position we can say that
emotional stability, psychological security, dignity and
mental health constitute vital components of the concept
of the welfare of the child. Consequently, any such factors
which may impede and seen to be disruptive to the
welfare of the child must be abjured while considering the
welfare of the child. Any process which leads to the
detriment of the welfare of the child must be avoided by
the court while passing orders relating to the
custody/visitation rights claimed by any of the parents.
The court is required to remain responsive not merely to
the legal consequences but also the impact which the
judicially ordained process may have upon the welfare of
the child.”


11
(2008) 7 SCC 673.
Page - 28 - of 81

53. In the aforesaid case of Gaurav Nagpal ( supra ), it was
also observed as follows:
“ 43. The principles in relation to the custody of a minor
child are well settled. In determining the question as to
who should be given custody of a minor child, the
paramount consideration is the “welfare of the child” and
not rights of the parents under a statute for the time being
in force.
xxx
45. In Saraswatibai Shripad Ved v. Shripad Vasanji Ved
[AIR 1941 Bom 103 : ILR 1941 Bom 455] , the High Court
of Bombay stated : (AIR p. 105)
“… It is not the welfare of the father, nor the welfare of
the mother, that is the paramount consideration for the
court. It is the welfare of the minor and of the minor alone
which is the paramount consideration….” (emphasis
supplied)
xxx
47. Again, in Thrity Hoshie Dolikuka v. Hoshiam
Shavaksha Dolikuka [(1982) 2 SCC 544 : 1982 SCC (Cri)
505] , this Court reiterated that the only consideration of
the court in deciding the question of custody of minor
should be the welfare and interest of the minor. And it is
the special duty and responsibility of the court. Mature
thinking is indeed necessary in such a situation to decide
what will ensure to the benefit and welfare of the child.”

54. Thus, the primacy of consideration of the best interests
of the child by the court has been the consistent judicial norm
adopted in this country. Reference to a few more decisions in
that regard would suffice.
12
(i)
Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu,
“ Principles governing custody of minor children
52. In our judgment, the law relating to custody of a child
is fairly well settled and it is this: in deciding a difficult
and complex question as to the custody of a minor, a court
of law should keep in mind the relevant statutes and the
rights flowing therefrom. But such cases cannot be

12
(2008) 9 SCC 413.
Page - 29 - of 81

decided solely by interpreting legal provisions. It is a
human problem and is required to be solved with human
touch. A court while dealing with custody cases, is
neither bound by statutes nor by strict rules of evidence
or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting proper
guardian of a minor, the paramount consideration should
be the welfare and well-being of the child. In selecting a
guardian, the court is exercising parens patriae
jurisdiction and is expected, nay bound, to give due
weight to a child's ordinary comfort, contentment, health,
education, intellectual development and favourable
surroundings. But over and above physical comforts,
moral and ethical values cannot be ignored. They are
equally, or we may say, even more important, essential
and indispensable considerations. If the minor is old
enough to form an intelligent preference or judgment, the
court must consider such preference as well, though the
final decision should rest with the court as to what is
conducive to the welfare of the minor.”

(ii) Tejaswini Gaud v. Shekhar Jagdish
13
Prasad Tewari,

“ Welfare of the minor child is the paramount
consideration
26. The court while deciding the child custody cases is
not bound by the mere legal right of the parent or
guardian. Though the provisions of the special statutes
govern the rights of the parents or guardians, but the
welfare of the minor is the supreme consideration in
cases concerning custody of the minor child. The
paramount consideration for the court ought to be child
interest and welfare of the child.”

(iii)
Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh v. State
of T.N. ( supra )

“ 127.
We would therefore hold that in the case at Bar, the
dominant consideration to which all other considerations
must remain subordinate must be the welfare of the child.
This is not to say that the question of custody will be
determined by weighing the economic circumstances of
the contending parties. The matter will not be determined

13
(2019) 7 SCC 42.
Page - 30 - of 81

solely on the basis of the physical comfort and material
advantages that may be available in the home of one
contender or the other. The welfare of the child must be
decided on a consideration of these and all other relevant
factors, including the general psychological, spiritual and
emotional welfare of the child. It must be the aim of the
court, when resolving disputes between the rival
claimants for the custody of a child, to choose the course
which will best provide for the healthy growth,
development and education of the child so that he or she
will be equipped to face the problems of life as a mature
adult.

14
(iv) Vasudha Sethi v. Kiran V. Bhaskar ,
“32. The decision of this Court in Kanika [Kanika Goel v.
State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 9 SCC 578 : (2018) 4 SCC
(Civ) 411] reiterates the well-settled law that the issue
regarding custody of a minor child and the issue of the
repatriation of the child to the native country has to be
addressed on the sole criteria of the welfare of the minor
and not on consideration of the legal rights of the parents.
The principle that the welfare of the minor shall be the
predominant consideration and that the rights of the
parties to a custody dispute are irrelevant has been
consistently followed by this Court.”

55. At the same time, this Court also observed in the
aforesaid case of Vasudha Sethi (supra) that each case has to
be decided on its own facts and circumstances and no hard and
fast rule can be laid down, and the factual aspects are required
to be tested on the touchstone of the principle of the welfare of
the minor child.
56. In light of the above well-settled principles, this Court
must approach the dispute only from the lens of the best

14
(2023) 17 SCC 478.
Page - 31 - of 81

interests of the child. Given the lack of cooperation of the parents
with each other as to an interim arrangement during the
pendency of the guardianship petition, this Court proposes to
exercise its parens patriea jurisdiction to decide an interim
arrangement to ensure the child is not exposed to multiple
proceedings and the harms that thus follow.
57. We are conscious that this Court has to address the
fundamental question posed by Mr. Sankaranarayanan and Ms.
Malavika Rajkotia, that if any order is passed at this stage
allowing the mother to take the child to Singapore, it would
amount to passing a final order and practically render the
pending guardianship proceeding in Family Court, Patiala House
Courts infructuous.
58. This is an aspect which, in our opinion, can be answered
in due course when we consider the core issue of the best
interests of the child in the light of the expert opinion before us.
In our view, the expert opinion which has given by NIMHANS
after a comprehensive clinical examination of the parents and
child for a fairly well-extended period of time, provides a reliable,
relevant and material basis for evaluating the contesting claims
of the parents, even in a parallel proceeding arising out of the
Page - 32 - of 81

habeas corpus petition. It highlights to us that there is sufficient
reason for this Court to intervene at this stage.
59. Further, we are mindful of the fact that when
considering the best interests of a child in any proceeding, any
determination made by a court is essentially temporary in
nature, in as much we are dealing with an ever-growing child
whose needs and aspirations also keep on evolving and
changing. What is in the best interests of a child who is four
years old will not be the same once the child is ten or fifteen
years old. Similarly, the parents' circumstances, be it
psychological, financial, or social, may also fluctuate,
necessitating a revision of the custody arrangements. Further,
as warring parents move on from the heat of a dispute, it may
even be possible for them to become more agreeable to changing
the custody arrangement based on what may be required or
needed, based on the evolving needs of the child.
60. In this regard, we may refer to the observations of this
15
Court in Neethu v. Rajesh Kumar , which are pertinent in
understanding/guiding the nature of relief that grants custody
to a parent/guardian:

15
(2025) 10 SCC 436.
Page - 33 - of 81

“15. Further, since the case at hand is a custody matter,
it becomes imperative for us to lay down the universally
accepted tenets that such matters are to be dealt
sensitively with due consideration to the emotional,
intellectual, physical, financial, social and cultural needs
of a growing child. Therefore, custody orders are always
considered interlocutory orders and by the nature of such
proceedings, custody orders cannot be made rigid and
final. Rather, the courts are entitled to alter and mould
the custody orders in view of the best interest of the
minor.
16. The core and inalienable standard is the paramount
consideration of the child's welfare, which is affected by
an array of factors, is ever evolving and cannot be
confined in a straitjacket. Therefore, each case has to be
dealt with on the basis of its unique facts and take into
account any change in circumstances which have an
impact on the quality of a child's upbringing.
17 . In light of the aforesaid legal principles surrounding
review jurisdiction of this Court and the role of courts in
custody matters, it is a natural corollary that judicial
discretion has to be properly balanced between the
statutory provisions that advocate for limited exercise of
review powers and the peculiar care that needs to be
extended by the courts in matters of child custody. We
sincerely believe that undertaking a far too hyper
technical approach in such cases shall indeed amount to
abandoning the doctrine of parens patriae and will cause
travesty of justice.”

61. We are conscious of the fact that the jurisdictional
Family Court, Patiala House Courts will finally decide the issue
of permanent guardianship of the child. Accordingly, what we
propose to do in the present proceeding is to examine the
advisability of passing certain interim arrangements, which will
not come in the way of the jurisdictional court in deciding the
final custody arrangement of the child.
Page - 34 - of 81

62. With this caveat in mind, we proceed to examine the
competing reliefs sought from us as to which interim relief can
be granted to either parent.
TRIPLE TEST:
63. It is well settled that interim relief is evaluated through
the triple test, viz.,
(a) prima facie case; and
(b) balance of convenience; and
(c) irreparable harm.
64. The test must be applied in this proceeding in view of
the interim nature of the child’s custody being sought from this
Court. We must make it clear that this Court would not have
had to engage in this analysis at all had the child been old
enough to express his own desires and wishes as to which parent
he would like to stay with, or which country he would want to
stay in. However, this child has only just turned four years old
on 15.07.2022 and in our interactions with him in chambers, it
has become clear to us he is too young to be able to express an
opinion or wish or desire one way or another and is oblivious of
his surroundings so long as he is with his parents. In light of
Page - 35 - of 81

this, we must then engage in balancing the claims of the parents
against each other and consider the best interests of the child.
PRIMA FACIE CASE
65.
The first prong of which party has a prima facie case
may be evaluated as which parent may have a better legal claim
over the child on the face of it. Ms. Luthra contends that under
Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956,
the custody of a child under the age of five years vests with the
mother. Further, where the parents are unwed, the mother is the
natural guardian of the child. She relied upon ABC v. State (NCT
of Delhi ) (supra) and Queen v. Clarke (supra) to establish the
right of an unwed mother to the custody of a young child. On the
other hand, Mr. Sankaranarayanan contends that the Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 does not apply as neither
the mother nor the father are Hindus and the applicable law is
the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, wherein Section 17
provides that the custody of a child shall only be determined
based on the best interests of the child.
16
66. X1 v. State (NCT of Delhi) provides a broad survey of
the various laws across many jurisdictions as to an unwed

16
(2015) 10 SCC 1.
Page - 36 - of 81

mother’s claim of guardianship as opposed to the unwed father’s
claim.
“10. Section 6(b) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship
Act, 1956 makes specific provisions with respect to
natural guardians of illegitimate children, and in this
regard gives primacy to the mother over the father.
Mohammedan Law accords the custody of illegitimate
children to the mother and her relatives. The law follows
the principle that the maternity of a child is established
in the woman who gives birth to it, irrespective of the
lawfulness of her connection with the begetter. However,
paternity is inherently nebulous especially where the
child is not an offspring of marriage. Furthermore, as per
Section 8 of the Succession Act, 1925, which applies to
the Christians in India, the domicile of origin of an
illegitimate child is in the country in which at the time of
his birth his mother is domiciled. This indicates that
priority, preference and pre-eminence is given to the
mother over the father of the child concerned.
11. In the United Kingdom, the Children Act, 1989
allocates parental responsibility, which includes all
rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority of a
parent over the child and his/her property. According to
Section 2(2) of that Act, parental custody of a child born
of unwed parents is with the mother in all cases, and
additionally with the father provided he has acquired
responsibility in accordance with the provisions of the
Act. To acquire responsibility, he would have to register
as the child's father, execute a parental responsibility
agreement with the mother or obtain a court order giving
him parental responsibility over the child.
12. In USA, each State has different child custody laws
but predominantly the mother has full legal and physical
custody from the time the child is born. Unless an
unmarried father establishes his paternity over the child
it is generally difficult for him to defeat or overwhelm the
preferential claims of the mother to the custody. However,
some States assume that both the parents who sign the
child's birth certificate have joint custody, regardless of
whether they are married.
13. In Ireland, Section 6(4) of the Guardianship of Infants
Act, 1964 ordains — “The mother of an illegitimate infant
shall be guardian of the infant”. Unless the mother agrees
to sign a statutory declaration, an unmarried father must
apply to the court in order to become a legal guardian of
his child.
Page - 37 - of 81

14. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines
explicitly provides that “illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code”. This position obtains
regardless of whether the father admits paternity. In
2004, the Supreme Court of the Philippines in Joey D.
2
Briones v. Maricel P. Miguel held that an illegitimate
child is under the sole parental authority of the mother.
15. The law in New Zealand, as laid out in Section 17 of
the Care of Children Act, 2004, is that the mother of a
child is the sole guardian if she is not married to, or in
civil union with, or living as a de facto partner with the
father of the child at any time during the period beginning
with the conception of the child and ending with the birth
of the child.
16.
In South Africa, according to the Children's Act 38 of
2005, parental responsibility includes the responsibility
and the right : (a) to care for the child; (b) to maintain
contact with the child; (c) to act as guardian of the child;
and (d) to contribute to the maintenance of the child. The
biological mother of a child, whether married or
unmarried, has full parental responsibilities and rights in
respect of the child. The father has full parental
responsibility if he is married to the mother, or if he was
married to her at the time of the child's conception, or at
the time of the child's birth or any time in between, or if
at the time of the child's birth he was living with the
mother in a permanent life partnership, or if he (i)
consents to be identified or successfully applies in terms
of Section 26 to be identified as the child's father or pays
damages in terms of customary law; (ii) contributes or has
attempted in good faith to contribute to the child's
upbringing for a reasonable period; and (iii) contributes or
has attempted in good faith to contribute towards
expenses in connection with the maintenance of the child
for a reasonable period.
17. This conspectus indicates the preponderant position
that it is the unwed mother who possesses primary
custodial and guardianship rights with regard to her
children and that the father is not conferred with an equal
position merely by virtue of his having fathered the child.
This analysis should assist us in a meaningful, dynamic
and enduring interpretation of the law as it exists in
India.
(Emphasis added)

Page - 38 - of 81

67. Thus, it becomes clear that across several jurisdictions,
the mother has primary custody of a child born outside of
wedlock. This right of the mother does not come at the exclusion
of the father’s claim of custody. In many jurisdictions, the father
acquires custody upon proper application to the proper forum.
Paragraph 17 of X1 v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra) also notes
that the custodial and guardianship rights are not merely
conferred upon a person because he has fathered the child, but
when he meets some greater threshold than mere biological
connection. In the instant facts, we are not seeking to determine
if the father has met a greater threshold than that identified in
X1 v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra) but only seeking to evaluate
which of the unwed parents has a better prima facie claim of
custody over a very young child.
68. It is recognised across legal jurisdictions that, unless
otherwise proved, preference in the law is to give custody of the
child to the mother when there is a dispute between the parents.
Further, under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, there is no
legal provision that disables the mother from having a prima
facie claim of custody of a child of a tender age of four years.
Thus, jurisprudentially, the mother has a preferential custody
Page - 39 - of 81

right over the child. There is no reason to depart from this well-
settled legal position. The recognized international
jurisprudence is an additional reason that establishes the prima
facie case in favour of granting custody to the mother. Therefore,
in the case of a child born to unwed parents, the mother has a
better prima facie claim of custody.
BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE
69. The next prong of the triple test is the balance of
convenience. The mother has been relentlessly pursuing
litigation in India to continue to maintain her relationship with
the child, which was never ruptured at her instance at any stage
except for necessary visits to Singapore to pursue her career.
Even prior to the litigation, while she was shuttling between
Singapore and India, she remained in constant touch with the
child. According to the mother, her communication and access
to the child was disrupted by the father without any reason
sometime in February 2026 when she came to India to meet the
child. This led to the filing of the habeas corpus petition before
the Bombay High Court. Despite facing serious hardships and
difficulties in being involuntarily away from her place of work in
Singapore, she has remained in India most of the time and has
Page - 40 - of 81

been in consistent contact with the child since the beginning of
the litigation.
70. The mother has informed this Court that her continuous
presence in India due to the litigation is hampering her ability to
work. Further prolonged presence in India may also affect her
ability to maintain her employment status. This Court is
cognizant of the fact that if the possibility of her having to stay
in India for a prolonged period to maintain her parental
relationship with the child results in her losing her employment
relationship, the resulting harm is that it will prevent her from
being able to provide the lush standard of living the child
currently enjoys, including access to the world-class education
that the mother has shown that she has consistently paid for.
The consequential disturbance to both mother and child, if she
were to lose her job, is also a factor this Court must consider
when evaluating the balance of convenience of the parents and
child. The court must be conscious not to allow fortuitous
circumstances to improve or diminish any rightful claim.
71. Comparatively, the father lives and works in New Delhi
as a founding partner of a successful law firm. Travelling to
Singapore to meet the child may be inconvenient. Pursuing any
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necessary litigation in Singapore may be additionally
inconvenient, but it cannot be said to be unfamiliar or
impossible for him, with access to both the financial and legal
resources to handle it, and the legal knowledge to understand
the processes, as he himself practices in the Supreme Court of
this country. The mother has been greatly inconvenienced in
having to approach this Court to even maintain proper
telephonic and physical access to her own child, while putting in
peril her employment status. The father, running his own law
firm, would face comparatively less inconvenience as regards his
employment if he were to travel often to Singapore to maintain
contact with the child.
72. The continued presence of the mother in India, if
temporary custody of the child is given to the father, can happen
only if the mother gives up her employment and remains at the
tender mercy of the father, which we consider utterly unfair and
iniquitous to the mother. The issue is whether it would be fair to
compel the mother to give up her job when the parents are not
living together and are hardly on speaking terms except because
of the child, if a viable alternative is available without her having
to give up her job.
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73. Certainly, neither parent has offered to give up their
respective careers and move for the sake of the child. Hence, we
do not consider an arrangement which would significantly
hinder either parent’s professional commitments. One of the
parents has to forgo a substantial period of companionship with
the child, which is the unfortunate fallout of this bitter dispute
between the parents. We are not, in any manner, seeking to find
the reasons for it or identify who is responsible for this
unfortunate situation. We are trying to determine in whose
custody the child’s best interests will be better served. We
conclude by finding that it cannot be said that the father would
be more inconvenienced than the mother in having to travel to
another country to maintain contact with the child, given that
the mother has been diligently doing the same since the birth of
the child in this country, though she is neither a citizen nor a
resident here, but ordinarily working and based out of
Singapore.
IRREPARABLE HARM
74. The most important prong of the triple test for interim
relief in the facts and circumstances before us is the issue of
irreparable harm. Irreparable harm in the context of habeas
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corpus petitions filed for child custody should be viewed from
the lens of the most vulnerable party and the subject of the
parens patriae jurisdiction, i.e., the child. As discussed above, it
is also settled law that courts of equity, in the exercise of their
parens patriae jurisdiction, always assess custody claims
through the lens of the best interests of the child.
75. Irreparable harm should thus be seen not from the
perspective of the parents or guardians of the child, but from the
view of irreparable harm which may be caused to the child by
granting/not granting a particular proposed arrangement by a
parent.
76. In evaluating the best interests of a child, there are
several factors that tip the scales one way or another. Love,
affection and warmth; formal schooling and opportunities for
growth; and the child's established roots are some of the major
factors.
77. In Rajeswari Chandrasekar Ganesh v. State of T.N.
( supra ) , this Court held that the factors through which the best
interests of a child are to be considered have to do with stability,
love, care and affection essential for the holistic development of
the child:
Page - 44 - of 81

“95. The question as to how the court would determine
what is best in the interest of the child was considered
McGrath (Infants), In re , and it was observed by Lindley,
L.J., as follows : (Ch p. 148)
“… The dominant matter for the consideration of the
Court is the welfare of the child. But the welfare of a
child is not to be measured by money only, nor by
physical comfort only. The word welfare must be
taken in its widest sense. The moral and religious
welfare of the child must be considered as well as
its physical well-being. Nor can the ties of affection
be disregarded.”
xxx
97. The question as to what would be the dominating
factors while examining the welfare of a child was
considered in Walker v. Walker & Harrison [Walker v.
Walker & Harrison, 1981 New Ze Recent Law 257] and it
was observed that while the material considerations
have their place, they are secondary matters. More
important are stability and security, loving and
understanding care and guidance, and warm and
compassionate relationships which are essential for the
development of the child's character, personality and
talents. It was stated as follows:
“Welfare is an all-encompassing word. It includes
material welfare; both in the sense of adequacy of
resources to provide a pleasant home and a
comfortable standard of living and in the sense of an
adequacy of care to ensure that good health and due
personal pride are maintained. However, while
material considerations have their place they are
secondary matters. More important are the stability
and the security, the loving and understanding care
and guidance, the warm and compassionate
relationships that are essential for the full
development of the child's own character,
personality and talents.”

78. The best interest of a child is a highly complex
consideration requiring assessment of all the relevant
considerations. Only after a comprehensive examination of the
relevant factors, the court may arrive at the most practical and
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desirable conclusion. It must be remembered that determining a
child’s best interests will always be a complex exercise as the
relevant factors themselves are always in a state of flux.
17
79. Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay ,
In this Court
observed as follows:
“32. To consider the interests of the child, the Court must
take into account all attending circumstances and the
totality of the situation. The Court must consider the
welfare and happiness of the child as the paramount
consideration and go into all relevant aspects of welfare
including stability and security, loving and
understanding care and guidance, and full development
of the child's character, personality, and talents. The
Court has to give due weightage to the child's ordinary
contentment, health, education, intellectual development,
favourable surroundings, and future prospects. Further,
over and above physical comforts, moral and ethical
values also have to be taken note of, as they constitute
equal if not more important factors than the others.”

80. Keeping the best interests of the child in mind, this
Court had been continually nudging the parents to arrive at an
amicable solution which would factor in their own constraints.
However, over the course of the proceedings before this Court, it
has become clear that the parents are unable to agree on any
custody arrangement without the Court’s intervention, which
has only resulted in detriment to the child, who has now been

17
2025 SCC OnLine SC 482.
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out of formal schooling for several months, depriving him of the
structure and benefits of the same.
81. The inevitable consequence of the lack of agreement
between the parents is that the child must remain with only one
parent for a substantial period while undergoing schooling, while
the other parent would be with the child only intermittently,
since the parents are staying separately in different countries
pursuing their professions. It was in that context that this Court,
in exercise of its parens patriae jurisdiction, sought the opinion
of the National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences
(NIMHANS), a premier national institution of worldwide repute,
to give an opinion as to how to promote the best interests of the
child, keeping in mind the inability of the parents to come to a
mutually agreed arrangement, and the capacity of the parents in
all relevant parameters to look after the child.
82. NIMHANS has undertaken a detailed examination of the
parents and child and submitted a comprehensive report on
17.09.2026, of which references will be made to the relevant
portions.
83. Interestingly, the Report mentions that both parents are
capable of looking after the child’s welfare, despite the fact that
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there may be incompatibility between the parents per se, which
the Report also notes.
84. The Assessment Report of the mother by NIMHANS
states that,
“Ms Helena Anna Maria does not have a diagnosable
psychiatric disorder lifetime/currently. She has the
capacity to fulfil her parental responsibilities. She has
adequate access to financial, family, educational, and
healthcare resources.”

85. Interestingly, the Assessment Report of the father is also
along the same lines, which says that,
“Mr Suhaan Mukerji does not have a diagnosable
psychiatric disorder lifetime/currently. He has the
capacity to fulfil his parental responsibilities. He has
adequate access to financial, find family, educational,
and healthcare resources.”

86. At the same time, it is important to note the Family
Assessment Report of NIMHANS, with regard to parenting
capacity states as follows:
“Both parents presented as emotionally invested in
Marcus and described themselves as attentive and caring
parents despite their strained relationship with each
other.

The sessions suggest strengths in emotional investment
and commitment to Marcus in both parents, alongside
areas requiring attention in cooperative parenting,
communication, conflict management, and shared
decision-making.

Each parent appears to attribute the conflict primarily to
the other while viewing their own actions as motivated by
Marcus’s welfare.”

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87. The Family Assessment Report then concludes in the
following words:
“ Both parents presented as strongly emotionally invested
in Marcus, with a strong emotional bond with him, and
described themselves as caring and committed parents.
The sessions indicate a high-conflict and significantly
strained couple relationship, with differing perceptions
regarding past events, safety, caregiving, residence, and
future parenting arrangements. The primary concern is
the ongoing inter-couple conflict and its potential impact
on Marcus, rather than a lack of parental attachment.
Couples therapy was recommended; however, it could
not be initiated as both parents were unable to arrive at
a mutually agreed decision regarding reconciliation.”


88. Since the proceedings revolve around the focal point of
the welfare of the child, we are of the opinion that the “Child
Clinical Psychologist Observation Report” of the child by
NIMHANS would be of great importance in deciding the issues
before us, including the issue of jurisdiction of this Court, and
hence, the same Report in totality is reproduced as below:
“ Child Clinical Psychologist Observation Report

Marcus was seen across several sessions (about 12
hours) with both parents together and individually. Most
sessions were play-based sessions. The child had
consistently showed interests towards construction play,
especially in the sandpit where he built and then rebuilt
a “forest” scene using his construction toys. He also
enjoyed playing the keyboard and drums, singing, and
drawing.

Marcus is a bright, creative and verbally expressive child
who could clearly communicate his ideas, preferences
and needs. He spoke both fluently in English and German
and could understand and to some extent manage to
communicate in Hindi as well. He demonstrated a good
vocabulary beyond what is expected of his
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developmental level. His overall communication and
development appeared to be age-appropriate. It was
noted that he engaged well in imaginative play and he
could sustain his attention on activities he was interested
in. Additionally, it was seen that he had a strong need to
direct how the play went and how others took part in it,
and he resisted most attempts to redirect him.

Formal assessment including the Children’s
Apperception Test (CAT), Children’s Sentence Completion
Test (C-SCT) and drawing-based activities were
attempted during the course of the sessions. However,
the child’s responses were brief, limited and inconsistent
and therefore meaningful interpretation of these
assessments could not be made. During the CAT, he
primarily named the animals shown in the cards and
reported difficulty in creating stories. During the C-SCT,
he provided responses not related to the sentence stems
despite attempts to explain the task. His participation in
drawing activities was also limited to scribbling or
colouring. These responses may be understood in the
context of his age and developmental abilities, his
preoccupation with his preferred play activities, and his
difficulty engaging with structured tasks and limits.
Therefore, no clinical conclusions are drawn from these
formal assessments.

Both parents were involved and interactive with the child,
and he was observed to be comfortable with each of them
individually. Tantrums and resistance came up with both
parents on different occasions, mostly when his play was
interrupted, or when he was asked to follow an
instruction or when a parent tried to leave. Across
sessions, both parents were observed to have a
permissive stance in how they handled his behaviour.
Limit-setting was inconsistent, especially once he became
distressed or showed resistance. His demands were
often accommodated just to calm him down or avoid more
distress. This pattern showed up with both parents at
different points. It has been reported there is an increase
in his behavioural difficulties recently, and this was
observed during the play sessions too. It was observed
that heightened distress was present around situations
like separations, transitions, and changes to his expected
routine. Given the recent difficulties between the parents
and the changes happening in the family, this context is
relevant to understanding his current presentation.

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Both parents clearly demonstrate care about his welfare,
future, needs and interests, and both stay involved in his
activities. There were differences in how each parent
interacted with him, which can likely be attributed to their
respective and different cultures with its influence on
their individual parenting styles, which cannot be
considered as inherently good or bad.

It is suggested that the child should not be exposed to any
conversations, disagreements or comments about
custody, living arrangements, parental disputes, or either
parent’s relationship with him. These matters should be
discussed privately, away from him.

Given the observed difficulties in the child such as
tantrums, refusal, rigidity or non-cooperation, when his
demands are not met and alleged few reports of him
having behavioural issues/complaints from school;
which might be the result of a few things, such as
parental separation, probable heated
discussion/arguments/quarrel in his presence; it is
strongly recommended that both parents need to
mandatorily attend structured parenting training with a
qualified mental health professional over a few sessions,
focusing on managing the wellbeing of the child during
the current court proceedings, aiding in the adjustment of
the child post the decision regarding custody, explaining
the decision to the child in a developmentally appropriate
and consistent manner, developing an authoritative
parenting style (non-permissive parenting), age
appropriate limit-setting, handling tantrums and refusal,
managing transitions and building consistent responses
to difficult behaviour.

It is also strongly advised that the child resume formal
schooling at the earliest, in the light that the child has
been away from school for about four months, further
contributing to the above-mentioned difficulties.

Overall, based on what was observed, the child engaged
well with both parents individually and both parents
showed genuine concern for his wellbeing. His current
difficulties can be better explained by his individual
temperament, his developmental stage, the parenting
approaches observed, and the recent changes within the
family.”

Page - 51 - of 81

89. For the same reasons, we also reproduced the Child
Psychiatric Assessment Report as follows:

“ Findings
The child presented as a bright, cheerful and well-
engaged four-year-old, with age-appropriate interaction,
communication and play. Both parents demonstrated an
adequate understanding of the child’s developmental
and emotional needs. Both were sensitive and responsive
to the child’s cues and described parenting as a positive
and enjoyable experience. Neither parent reported
significant parenting-related stress on the Parental Stress
Scale. Their responses on the PRFQ were broadly
indicative of an ability to consider the child’s internal
experiences and psychological needs.

During the parent and child interaction observations, both
parents engaged warmly and reciprocally with the child.
With each parent, the child approached readily,
participated spontaneously in child-appropriate play,
demonstrated positive affect and appeared relaxed,
comfortable. Both parents responded appropriately to the
child’s cues and were able to sustain enjoyable,
developmentally appropriate interaction. Both have
demonstrated an ability to appropriately soothe and
support the child during periods of distress.

Collateral information from the child’s regular caregivers
was consistent with the above findings. The child was
described as happy and comfortable with both parents
and as enjoying interaction with each. It was also
reported that the child likes having both parents together.

Opinion

Child demonstrates positive and comfortable
relationships with both parents. At present, child doesn’t
have a diagnosable mental health condition. However,
given the ongoing circumstances, there remains the
possibility of evolving stress-related symptoms, and
continued monitoring of the child’s wellbeing is
recommended.

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On the basis of the assessment, both parents
demonstrate adequate parenting capacities. Both appear
emotionally available and responsive to the child and are
capable of providing warm, developmentally appropriate
interaction.

In view of the child’s positive relationship with each
parent, the child’s psychological and developmental
interests would be best served by preserving meaningful
involvement of both parents in his caregiving and
upbringing.”

90. As quoted above, the Child Clinical Psychologist
Observation Report clearly holds that:
(i) Both parents clearly demonstrate care about his
welfare, future needs and interests, and both stay
involved in all these activities;
(ii) There were differences in how each parent
interacted with him, which can likely be attributed to
their respective and different cultural influences on
their individual parenting styles, which cannot be
considered as “ inherently good or bad”;
(iii) It then suggested that the child should not be
exposed to any conversations, disagreements or
comments about custody, leaving arrangements,
parental disputes, or either parent's relationship with
him and that these matters should be discussed
privately away from him;
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(iv) It was also strongly advised that the child resume
formal schooling at the earliest, as the child has been
away from school for about 4 (four) months, further
contributing to the above-mentioned difficulties.
91. As regards the Child Psychiatric Assessment Report, it
says that:
(i) The child demonstrates a positive and
comfortable relationship with both parents;
(ii) The child does not have a diagnosable mental
health condition;

(iii) In light of the ongoing circumstances, there
remains the possibility of evolving stress-related
symptoms, and continued monitoring of the child’s well-
being is recommended;
(iv) Based on the assessment, both the parents
demonstrate adequate parenting capacities;
(v) Both appear emotionally available and
responsive to the child and are capable of providing
warm and developmentally appropriate interaction;
(vi) In view of the child's positive relationship with
each parent, the child's psychological and
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developmental interests would be best served by
preserving meaningful involvement of both parents in
his caregiving and upbringing.
92.
The Report has revealed equal psychological capacity of
both parents in looking after the child’s welfare, ruling out any
disability of either parent in doing so. The Report has only
strongly urged that the child resume formal schooling at the
earliest to prevent any deterioration of the child’s well-being due
to the separation of the parents.
93. From our observations during interactions with the
parents and child, as well as from the NIMHANS Report, both
parents are equally invested in the child's well-being. There is
nothing to show that either parent cannot provide the warmth,
compassion, care and guidance such a tender-aged child
requires.

94. However, the Report also mentions that the child is
fluent in English and German, which indicates a close bond with
the mother in her mother tongue/native language. In that
circumstance, if interim custody is granted to the father, it is not
only that the mother will be deprived of the company of the child,
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but that the child will be deprived of her love and company
during a critical developmental period of his life.
95. Child psychology acknowledges that the company of the
mother, and maternal care and attention, is most desirable for a
very young child if the bonding between mother and child has
remained intact. We find reliance on research on child
psychology that demonstrates that separation of a young child
from a loving and close maternal bond has been linked to
increased behavioural difficulties, emotional distress and
adverse developmental outcomes. Though there is much
diversity in the context in which the psychological effects of
maternal separation have been studied, the common theme that
has come to the fore is that where the mother is the primary
caregiver of the child, prolonged separation from her risks the
child’s psychological well-being and development in the long
18
run.

18
T.N. Srinivasan and K.J. Raman, ‘Early Child Parent Separation and
Risk for Childhood Psychopathology’ (1988) 30(3) Indian Journal of
Psychiatry 283–289; Kimberly Howard, Anne Martin, Lisa J. Berlin and
Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, ‘Early Mother–Child Separation, Parenting, and
Child Well-Being in Early Head Start Families’ (2011) 13(1) Attachment &
Human Development 5–26. DOI: 10.1080/14616734.2010.488119),
Danielle Horvath Dallaire & Marsha Weinraub (2005) Predicting children's
separation anxiety at age 6: The contributions of infant–mother
attachment security, maternal sensitivity, and maternal separation
Page - 56 - of 81

96. The NIMHANS Report clearly shows that the mother and
child have a very good and strong bond, that the child is very
comfortable with the mother, and that the mother does not have
diagnosable issues that would prevent her from being less caring
towards the child than the father. Though there is nothing
adverse against the father, in such a situation we are of the
opinion that it would not be beneficial for the child to be kept
away from the mother for a prolonged period.

97. The NIMHANS Report has placed the parents on equal
footing regarding their psychological and financial capacities,
and their commitment to the child. This Court had directed both
parents to provide parenting proposals, to see if there may be
any other factor that may tilt the balance in favour of either
parent.
98. The parenting proposals can broadly be summarised as
follows.
99. The mother wishes to take the child to Singapore, and
has identified the following possible schools wherein the child
can be admitted:

anxiety, Attachment & Human Development, 7:4, 393-408, DOI:
10.1080/14616730500365894.
Page - 57 - of 81

a. UWCSEA Dover Campus, Singapore (Admission
process pending either a No Objection Certificate from
the father, or an order of this Court, based on
communication from the school to the mother); or
b. Superland Pre-School, River Valley Campus
(Admission process is pending, but positive
communication from the school has been received as to
availability of a seat for the child).

100. She has specifically proposed visitation schedules to
India around the school academic calendar in Singapore, so that
the child may continue to visit India and keep in touch with the
father, as well as his roots, friends, and family. This would be in
addition to any visits the father may desire to make to Singapore
in exercise of his right of access to the child.
101. In terms of childcare, the mother plans to employ an
Indian, Hindi-speaking nanny such that the child continues to
learn Hindi. Additionally, the mother undertakes to keep the
child connected to his Indian roots through food, language and
social company.
102. The mother, having lived and worked out of Singapore
for the last several years, also has a comfortable and close social
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circle there to ensure the child has a loving and close community
of people to spend time with.
103. Per the father’s proposed parenting plan, the father
wishes to take the child to Kolkata, and proposes a Montessori
school, alongside certain co-curricular and extra-curricular
activities that the child shall have access to, including horse-
riding, swimming and music classes.
104. He has also proposed that the mother may visit
whenever convenient for her. His proposal stipulates that the
mother may either stay over in the ordinary household of the
child or that she may reside in a suitable residence nearby, but
the child shall continue to live in the house of the father when
the mother visits.
105. He has also mentioned several relatives and some
friends of the child with whom the child is familiar who will be
available to create a friendly and homely environment in Kolkata.
106. The father has also repeatedly stated throughout his
pleadings and even in his parenting proposals that the mother
has significant mental health issues that put the child’s well-
being in jeopardy and that this makes her unsuitable to be the
primary caregiver of the child.
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107. We now delve into comparing both parents’ proposals on
three fundamental points – location, the mother’s mental health,
and education.
LOCATION
108. Mr. Sankaranaryanan has argued that uprooting the
child from his familiar environment in Kolkata will be greatly
distressing and may cause irreparable harm to the mental state
of the child. It has been argued that the established roots of the
child are in India and allowing the mother to take the child to
Singapore would amount to dislocation of the child.
109.
Whether the child has already been rooted in the Indian
environment is a matter of fact to be established. We have noted
that the child is four years old now and during babyhood, the
child shuttled from place to place along with the parents. The
parents seemed conscious of the child’s educational needs and
made arrangements for the child’s schooling in more than one
location in Delhi and Goa, and even Germany, as revealed in the
pleadings. In such a short span of time, it would be reading too
much into any one fact to state that the child has developed a
particular attachment or roots in any place.
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110. The child, being all of four years now, is in a very
malleable stage. Children this young often have the capability to
adapt to any environment to which the parents may introduce
the child, so long as the child is in the comfortable company of
the parent(s). Therefore, the supposed cultural rooting of the
child at a very tender age should not be amplified. As long as the
child is with the parents, or either parent with whom the child
is comfortable, the child would adjust.

111. The NIMHANS Report clearly indicates that the child is
comfortable with both/either of the parents. Accordingly, the
father’s concern that the child would be uprooted from familiar
surroundings in India if the child is relocated to Singapore
appears to be an overstatement.
112. The father has also submitted, both before this Court
and before the Family Court when the guardianship petition was
pending in Alipore, West Bengal, that the child’s ordinary
residence is Kolkata and the child is rooted there. We find that
merely because the child has stayed with the father in Kolkata
for a few months, it cannot be said with certainty or
definitiveness that the child has established roots there, and
that relocating from Kolkata to Singapore would amount to
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uprooting the child. The materials show that the child is not
totally a stranger to Singapore or foreign soil. No one can say
that merely because the child is four years of age and has lived
largely in India, the child is rooted here. In fact, even within
India, the child had been living with the parents in different cities
across the country, each with a different cultural milieu and
environment. Delhi is culturally and socially very distinct from
Goa, and the same is true of Kolkata vis-a-vis the other cities. In
such circumstances, can the father claim a better right than the
mother on the factor of rootedness in Kolkata or even India? We
doubt.
113. The observational description of the child in the Child
Clinical Psychologist Observation Report of NIMHANS noted that
the child spoke fluently in both English and German and could
understand and, to some extent, communicate in Hindi as well.
This clearly indicates the child is linguistically quite close to the
mother, which is natural and demonstrates the child’s strong
bond with the mother, alongside the strong multicultural
comfort of the child. How can the father thus claim that the child
has established roots in India, which would be disrupted if he is
relocated to Singapore? The child’s familiarity with his
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surroundings can always be developed as the child grows more
mature, and it will always be available to the child to choose to
reconnect with India. Thus, the apparent loss of the child’s roots
if relocated from India cannot be said to be irreparable or
detrimental.
114. We are also of the opinion that familiar environment
cannot be decided merely on geographical location. The child is
four years old, has regularly shuttled between Delhi and Goa,
two very different socio-cultural environments and is still well-
adjusted. The child has also stayed in Kolkata, albeit for only
some months, which is again different from Delhi and Goa in
almost all respects. During the proceedings before this Court,
the child has practically remained in Delhi. He is at a very
malleable, tender age and will adjust anywhere he has the
attention, love, and care of his parents. Therefore, the
geographical or physical location will not make much difference.
Stability comes from the persons around the child - the parents,
siblings, friend circles, and the routines they provide. At all of
four years, a child develops fondness for anybody who is
constantly with them and is affectionate towards them. Under
the circumstances as revealed in the pleadings, we are of the
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view that this issue of stability or cultural rootedness does not
prevent the relocation of the child to Singapore.
MENTAL HEALTH CONCERNS:
115.
We must also deal with another concern repeatedly
expressed by the father in his pleadings, that the mother has
mental health concerns which are detrimental to the well-being
of the child, and thus disqualifies her from being granted interim
custody of the child. We are mindful of the observation of this
19
Court in Rohith Thammana Gowda v. State of Karnataka , ,
“ 12. When couples are at loggerheads and wanted to
part their ways, as Parthian shot they may level extreme
allegations against each other so as to depict the other
unworthy to have the custody of the child. In the
circumstances, we are of the view that for considering the
claim for custody of a minor child, unless very serious,
proven conduct which should make one of them unworthy
to claim for custody of the child concerned, the question
can and shall be decided solely looking into the question
as to, “what would be the best interest.”

116. We have noted that the pleadings of the father are
replete with allegations and insinuations against the mother that
she is not in the best mental disposition to look after the well-
being of the child, which appears to be totally negated by the
NIMHANS Report. As seen therein, the mother has been found
to not have a diagnosable mental health condition currently or

19
(2022) 20 SCC 550.
Page - 64 - of 81

in her lifetime, and neither displays any behaviour that might
otherwise be detrimental to the child. Therefore, we cannot give
any weight to the father’s contentions that the mother has
mental health issues that will impact the child negatively.
EDUCATION:
117. Based on the above discussion, we conclude that the
irreparable harm to the child that must be duly addressed is the
current lack of formal schooling, which the NIMHANS Report
indicates is detrimental to the child. The uncertainty of the
child’s schedule, coupled with a lack of a structured
environment, seems to be presenting as certain symptomatic
behaviours in the child.
118. There are two proposed options, one where the child is
allowed to remain in Kolkata where the father desires to educate
him, and the other is to allow the child to go with the mother to
Singapore, where she proposes an international school for his
education.
119.
Both in the records and during the proceedings, the
father has said he does not consent to the child going to school
in Singapore. Realistically, we do not expect the mother to give
consent to schooling in Kolkata either. This Court, in the
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circumstances, cannot be expected to evaluate the aspect of
schooling from the perspective of either parent's consent to the
school. Additionally, no meaningful purpose will be served by
deciding on the suitability of schools either in Kolkata or in
Singapore for the child’s admission, as schools in both locations
may be of comparable standards. We also do not wish to engage
in any analysis as to whether one city is more suitable than the
other. Thus, the focus will be on who will be the better person to
ensure a better education for the child and provide better
intimate personal attention and a comfortable environment to
the child.
120. The mother has initiated the process for the child's
admission to UWCSEA in Singapore and has identified backup
schools as well. She has also demonstrated her very proactive
commitment to the child’s education and, from the record,
appears to be the primary parent financing the child’s education.
121. On the other hand, there is nothing too concrete to show
what the father did for the child’s schooling in Kolkata after he
took the child there in February. The father has only averred to
a Montessori school in Kolkata but has shown no documents of
admission/enrolment, etc. His pleadings are unspecific and not
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backed by any admission documents, conversations with the
schools, or any admission fees paid/payable by him. No concrete
plan for the child’s education is discernible on the part of the
father. In direct contrast, the mother has provided her
communications with the schools as well as the fees
payable/paid by her. The mother has shown two different
schools which are willing to admit the child in Singapore upon
either an NOC from the father or an order of this Court. We
therefore draw positive inferences from the mother’s pleadings.
We find that the mother has provided more compelling material
showing that she has been proactive and will immediately enrol
the child in formal schooling to provide a stable environment as
soon as she receives a green signal from this Court, in the
absence of any consent from the father.
122. The father has argued that the mother’s professional
commitments have limited her parenting time in the past and
will continue to leave her with insufficient time for the child. We
find that although she is working in a senior role at a large
company, we cannot hold her professional commitments against
her, as she has provided us with her employer's Work-from-
Home policy and their endorsement of the same, which clearly
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supports her ability to adjust her working hours to be present
for the child when he is not in school.
123. Let us now consider the situation where custody is
given to the father for the child’s education in Kolkata. We believe
that the father is also capable of providing a high quality of life
and education for the child. Yet, we are concerned with certain
other aspects which appear to be against the father. The father
is admittedly a successful lawyer running a busy law firm in
Delhi, employing about 53 associates. The father has a wide
professional network, practising law not only in Delhi but also
in other places such as Goa, Mumbai, and Bengaluru. We are
well aware of the limited time a busy lawyer can spare for family
members. In the present case, the family member is not an adult,
but a small child of four years who is very energetic, as the
NIMHANS Report also shows, who will require much more
personal attention. The demands of a small child of this age can
be very unpredictable, and we are not very confident that the
father would be in a position to spare sufficient and adequate
time for the child during the most crucial period for his
development, which will include preparing the child for school,
helping with homework, as well as keeping up with the demands
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of various hobbies and extracurricular activities. Even after
ascribing only the best intentions to the father and although he
has averred to having a flexible schedule, we are sceptical that
he would be able to provide the child with quality time
comparable to what the mother has arranged for, because of his
professional commitments. In most likelihood, he will have to
rely on the assistance, help and cooperation of his relatives and
nannies. Because of the demands of work, he would be
delegating a significant portion of parental responsibilities to
others. We are concerned about this prospect, which, in our
opinion, is not in the best interests of the child, who is already
struggling due to the current lack of stability.
124. On the other hand, the mother’s proposal appears
realistic and more beneficial to the child, with a significant focus
on direct parenting time by the mother. Thus, the proposal of
the mother inspires more confidence in us.
CONCLUSION
125.
Accordingly, we conclude as follows:
Firstly , as regards the competency of this Court and
jurisdictional issue raised by Mr. Sankaranarayanan, we hold
that this Court has the jurisdiction to decide interim custody in
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exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction in this habeas corpus
proceeding;
Secondly , the mother has a better prima facie claim of
custody over the child;
Thirdly , the balance of convenience lies in favour of the
mother;
Fourthly, it is most likely that the child may suffer
irreparable injury in the event the interim custody is not given
to the mother, as the mother has a better/more concrete plan
for his education and well-being in the interim, which is in the
child’s best interests.
126. Therefore, we will issue appropriate directions below.
127. However, before we issue directions, we want to address
the very genuine apprehensions of the father that once the
mother is allowed to take the child to Singapore, there is a
distinct possibility that once she is out of Indian territory, she
may not co-operate with the jurisdiction of the Family Court in
Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, or for that matter, even this
Court.
128. In this regard, it may be noted that as international
custody disputes become more prevalent, the issue of protecting
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the minor and the parent who is losing significant access to the
child has become necessary to address. This Court, in Smriti
20
Madan Kansagra v. Perry Kansagra , held that :
“24.2. Given the large number of cases arising from
transnational parental abduction in inter-country
marriages, the English courts have issued protective
measures which take the form of undertakings, mirror
orders, and safe harbour orders, since there is no
accepted international mechanism to achieve protective
measures. Such orders are passed to safeguard the
interest of the child who is in transit from one jurisdiction
to another. The courts have found mirror orders to be the
most effective way of achieving protective measures.
24.3. The primary jurisdiction is exercised by the court
where the child has been ordinarily residing for a
substantial period of time, and has conducted an
elaborate enquiry on the issue of custody. The court may
direct the parties to obtain a “mirror order” from the court
where the custody of the child is being shifted. Such an
order is ancillary or auxiliary in character, and supportive
of the order passed by the court which has exercised
primary jurisdiction over the custody of the child. In
international family law, it is necessary that jurisdiction
is exercised by only one court at a time. It would avoid a
situation where conflicting orders may be passed by
courts in two different jurisdictions on the same issue of
custody of the minor child. These orders are passed
keeping in mind the principle of comity of courts and
public policy. The object of a mirror order is to safeguard
the interest of the minor child in transit from one
jurisdiction to another, and to ensure that both parents
are equally bound in each State. The mirror order is
passed to ensure that the courts of the country where the
child is being shifted are aware of the arrangements
which were made in the country where he had ordinarily
been residing. Such an order would also safeguard the
interest of the parent who is losing custody, so that the
rights of visitation and temporary custody are not
impaired. The judgment of the court which had exercised
primary jurisdiction of the custody of the minor child is
however not a matter of binding obligation to be followed
by the court where the child is being transferred, which

20
(2021) 12 SCC 289.
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has passed the mirror order. The judgment of the court
exercising primary jurisdiction would however have great
persuasive value.”

129. In the specific circumstances of this case, we are thus
of the view that the mother can only be allowed to remove the
child from India during the pendency of the Guardianship
Petition No. 37 of 2026, pending before the Patiala House Courts,
after there are protections put in place for the father’s right of
smooth visitation, and to prevent the possibility, however
extreme or unlikely, that the mother may stop cooperating with
the proceedings before the courts in India.
130. In this regard, we have also noted that the mother has
voluntarily undertaken to submit herself to the jurisdiction of
the Singaporean Courts and avail a mirror order of this interim
order, so that the Singaporean Courts may also be aware of the
dispute regarding the child’s custody between the parents and
ensure full compliance with the interim orders of this Court in
Singapore.
131. We are conscious of the fact that by allowing the mother
and the child to leave India and in granting them permission to
go to Singapore, they would ordinarily remain out of the reach of
Indian courts. However, we have given due consideration to the
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fact that Singapore has a very robust and efficacious judicial
system with international recognition for the same. Even in the
field of arbitration, many parties prefer to specifically choose
Singapore as the seat, thus exhibiting the confidence that
litigants often repose in the robustness and reliability of the
Singaporean judicial system. Based on the principles of comity
of courts and the reputation of the Singaporean legal system, we
are confident in allowing the mother and child to stay in
Singapore as an interim custody arrangement for the welfare of
the child. The father himself is a well-established lawyer in India,
and we are sure he will not be in the woods if he has to seek
redressal for any grievance that may arise while his child is in
Singapore with the mother in terms of the orders of this Court,
for the Singaporean legal system, like India, is also based on
common law. The apprehension of the father, in our view, will be
secured by a mirror order to be obtained by the mother.
132. In light of the undertaking given by the mother, we
therefore direct the mother to obtain a mirror order within a
period of 3 weeks from the date of this order from an appropriate
court in Singapore to reflect the directions in this order, such
that it may be appropriately enforced in Singapore.
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133. Further, after the mirror order from a Singapore court is
filed before this Court, the mother shall deposit a sum of Rupees
One Crore (Rs. 1,00,00,000/-) in the Registry of this Court,
which shall be kept in an interest-bearing fixed deposit account
(on auto-renewal basis), for a period of two years or until
Guardianship Petition No. 37 of 2026, Patiala House Courts,
New Delhi is finally disposed of (any appeals, reviews, revisions
etc. included), to ensure compliance with the directions
contained in this order until final disposal of the aforesaid
Guardianship Petition. Once this Court is satisfied that the
mother has discharged all her obligations in accordance with the
aforesaid directions, the mother shall be entitled to withdraw the
aforesaid amount, together with accrued interest.
DIRECTIONS OF THIS COURT:
A. The mother is granted three weeks to file for, and
obtain, a mirror order from the court of appropriate
jurisdiction in Singapore reflecting the directions of this
Court and the parenting plan approved herein.
B. In the meantime, the child shall remain in Delhi and
the schedule for interim custody between the parents till
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the production of said mirror order before this Court shall
be as per the following pattern every week:
Monday Father hands over the
child to Mother at
12.00pm.
Tuesday Mother
Wednesday Mother
Thursday Mother
Friday Mother to hand over the
child to Father at
12.00pm.
Saturday Father
Sunday Father

C. Further, so long as the mother is not in Delhi
during this period, the child shall remain with the father.
D. After the mother has filed the mirror order, the
Registry shall return the passport and the OCI card of the
minor child to the mother and allow the mother to take
the child to Singapore. Further, the mother is directed to
be present with the child before this Court and the Family
Court at Patiala House as and when directed to do so.
PARENTING PLAN:
E. The mother shall enrol the child in UWCSEA,
Singapore. If that is not possible, then the child may be
enrolled in one of the other schools mentioned in her
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parenting plan as a back-up or any such appropriate
school in Singapore.
F. The father shall provide full cooperation and provide
the necessary documents of the child to enable the mother
to secure admission for the child in any of the schools in
Singapore within the specified time frame, failing which it
shall be deemed that he has consented to the admission
in terms of this order.
G. When the child is in Singapore, the mother shall
have primary responsibility for the health and physical
well-being of the child. If the child falls ill, the mother shall
be the primary decision-maker regarding the child’s
healthcare, for which the father shall provide full
cooperation.
H. While the child is in Singapore, the mother shall
ensure the father has access to the child via video-
conferencing every day for a minimum of 20 minutes or
any such longer period as agreed between the parties,
between 2.00 pm and 10.00 pm Singaporean time, as is
convenient to the child and his school schedule, and any
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other convenient times as may be agreed between the
parents, or as the child may desire.
I. The father shall also be permitted to have access
and visitation rights with the child in Singapore as and
when he visits, after due intimation to the mother. He shall
have custody of the child for at least a day, as long as it
does not disrupt the child’s school schedule.
J. Further, if the father stays in Singapore for a period
longer than two days, he may have custody of the child
from Friday afternoon, when school/extra-curricular
activities end, until Sunday evening, 6.00 PM Singaporean
time. The father shall return custody of the child in a
timely manner so as not to disrupt the child’s participation
in school, based on the academic calendar. However, the
mother shall be constantly apprised of the location of the
child when the child is in the custody of the father in
Singapore.
K. The father will not be entitled to take the child out
of Singapore during the applicability of this interim
arrangement during the pendency of the Guardianship
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Petition No. 37 of 2026 in Family Court, Patiala House
Courts.
L. The child shall be brought to India by the mother
during school vacations of more than 7 days, so that the
child may spend time in India with the father, paternal
family, and friends, amongst others. This shall be in
addition to any other mutually agreed periods as decided
by the parents or as decided by the Family Court in Patiala
House Courts for the purpose of deciding the guardianship
petition pending before it.

M. During the period that the child is brought to India,
the father shall have custody in India in the manner laid
out below:
Monday Mother
Tuesday Mother
Wednesday Mother to hand over the
child to Father at 10.00
AM.
Thursday Father
Friday Father
Saturday Father
Sunday Father hands over the
child to Mother at 6.00
PM.

During these visits, the father cannot remove the child
from India, and the father shall keep the mother apprised
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of the child’s location at all times. The mother shall have
access to the child over the phone and/or on video call
from 10.00 AM to 8.00 PM, and also as the child otherwise
desires.
N. When the child is in India, the father shall have
primary responsibility for the child’s health and physical
well-being. If the child falls ill, the father shall be the
primary decision-maker regarding the child’s healthcare,
for which the mother shall provide full cooperation.
O. The mother shall not be entitled to remove the child
from Singapore to any other country, except to India as
mentioned above. However, if she desires to take the child
to any other country other than India, she has to take
specific permission of the concerned Family Court dealing
with Guardianship Petition No. 37 of 2026 in New Delhi.
P. The child will be entrusted to the safe custody of the
mother, but the child must not be exposed to any
influence that may foster the development of parental
alienation syndrome against the father. Per paragraph 97
of Sheetal Vasant Thakur (supra), we find that the
complex nature of facts and circumstances and the
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international nature of the dispute necessitate that the
child be evaluated for the same. Thus, the mother is
directed to obtain a report from an appropriate child
psychologist/psychological institution in either Singapore
or from NIMHANS in India every six months to ensure the
child does not develop parental alienation syndrome. A
copy of this report shall be submitted both to this Court
as well as the concerned jurisdictional Family Court in
Patiala House.
Q. We direct both parents to file undertakings before
this Court, stating that they will abide by and comply with
the directions passed by this Court within one week from
the date of this judgment.
134. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of this
case, we invoke the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution
to transfer the habeas corpus petition titled “Helena Anna Maria
Lersch vs. State of Goa and Anr.” in Writ Petition No.478 of 2026
(F) from the High Court of Bombay at Goa, to this Court to avoid
any duplication of proceedings.
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135. In order to ensure that our orders are duly complied
th
with by the parties, list the matter on 7 December, 2026 at 2.00
pm.
136.
We also make it clear that though we have passed this
order for interim custody of the child in favour of the mother in
light of the materials brought before this Court, this order will
not come in the way of the jurisdictional court dealing with
Guardianship Petition No. 37 of 2026, Patiala House Courts,
New Delhi to decide the said petition finally in accordance with
the law, uninfluenced by the observations and directions made
by this Court in this order.
137. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of in
terms of the above order.

…………………………………………………J.
[NONGMEIPAKAM KOTISWAR SINGH]


………………………..…..J.
[N.V. ANJARIA]

NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 19, 2026

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