THE INDIAN PENTECOSTAL CHURCH OF GOD (IPC) vs BINU V. GEORGE

Court: Kerala High Court
Decided on: 10-04-2026

<div> 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANU TH FRIDAY, THE 10 DAY OF APRIL 2026 / 20TH CHAITHRA, 1948 FAO NO. 100 OF 2025 AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 28.07.2025 IN IA 4/2025 IN OP(Society) NO.30 OF 2025 OF DISTRICT COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS 1 & 2: 1 THE INDIAN PENTECOSTAL CHURCH OF GOD (IPC) A SOCIETY HAVING REGISTRATION NO.9/1935-36, ELURU, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH, AND HAVING CENTRAL WORKING OFFICE AT HEBRONPURAM, KUMBANAD, PATHANAMTHITTA, KERALA, PIN – 689547, REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL SECRETARY, PRESENTLY PR.DR.BABY VARGHESE, 2 IPC GENERAL COUNCIL HAVING CENTRAL WORKING OFFICE AT HEBRONPURAM, KUMBANAD, PATHANAMTHITTA, KERALA REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL SECRETARY, PRESENTLY PR. DR. BABY VARGHESE., PIN - 689547 BY ADVS. SRI.JACOB P.ALEX SRI.JOSEPH P.ALEX SRI.MANU SANKAR P. SRI.AMAL AMIR ALI 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 2 RESPONDENTS/PETITIONERS & RESPONDENTS 3 – 5 : 1 BINU V. GEORGE AGED 54 YEARS S/O. LATE V. GEORGE, RESIDING AT AALILYETH HOUSE, TC 14/1308(6), MALANCHIRA POST, ULLOOR VILLAGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM TALUK, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT., PIN - 695015 2 JOBY ABRAHAM AGED 40 YEARS S/O. T.E. ABRAHAM, RESIDING AT THONDATTIL HOUSE, KADAVOOR P.O., MANIPPARA, KADAVOOR VILLAGE, KOTHAMANGALAM TALUK, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT., PIN - 686671 3 DAVID SAM A.M. AGED 49 YEARS S/O. LATE ARTHER SAM,RESIDING AT THENGUVILAKATHU HOUSE, ARAMADA P.O., KONKALAM, THIRUMALA VILLAGE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM TALUK, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT, PIN - 695032 4 JOJI IYPE MATHEWS S/O. LATE IYPE M. ABRAHAM, RESIDING AT MANAKKU PUTHEPURAYIL HOUSE, MEPRAL P.O., PERINGARA VILLAGE, THIRUVALLA TALUK, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT., PIN - 689591 5 INDIAN PENTECOSTAL CHURCH OF GOD, IPC KERALA STATE COUNCIL HEBRONPURAM, KUMBANAD, PATHANAMTHITTA, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, PIN – 689547. 6 STATE BANK OF INDIA KUMBANAD BRANCH, PB NO. 1, THOMSON BUILDINGS, KUMBANAD P.O., PATHANAMTHITTA, REPRESENTED BY ITS BRANCH MANAGER, PIN – 689547. 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 3 7 BANK OF INDIA KUMBANAD BRANCH, BLISS CENTRE, KUMBANAD, PATHANAMTHITTA, REPRESENTED BY ITS BRANCH MANAGER, PIN - 689547 ADDL.R8: DANIEL KONNANILKUNNATHIL JACOB AGED 52 YEARS, SON OF K.C. CHACKO, SECRETARY, INDIAN PENTECOSTAL CHURCH OF GOD, KERALA STATE COUNCIL, HEBRON PURAM, KUMBANAD, PATHANAMTHITTA 689 547, RESIDING AT KONNANILKUNNATHIL, EBENZER GARDENS, KUDAPPANAKUNNE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM- 695043. * ADDL.R8 IS IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 03/12/2025 IN I.A.4/2025 IN FAO NO.100/2025. BY ADVS. SHRI.BHARATH MURALI SHRI.GEORGE VARGHESE(PERUMPALLIKUTTIYIL) SRI.B.ASHOK SHENOY SHRI.MANU NAIR G. SRI.MANU SRINATH SHRI.LIJO JOHN THAMPY SMT.NIVEDITA MUCHILOTE SHRI.RIYAS M.B. SHRI.JINSU M. JAIS SRI.P.S.GIREESH SHRI.UMASANKER U.U. SHRI.ADITYA A. SHENOY OTHER PRESENT: ADV G SREEKUMAR CHELUR- R1 THIS FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDERS HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 24.03.2026, THE COURT ON 10.04.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 4 [CR] S.MANU, J. -------------------------------------------------- F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 ------------------------------------------------- th Dated this the 10 day of April, 2026 JUDGMENT Order dated 28.7.2025 passed by the learned District Judge, Pathanamthitta in I.A.No.4/2025 in O.P. (Society)No.30/2025 is under challenge in this appeal. Appellants are the respondents 1 and 2 in the I.A. Respondents 1 to 4 herein are the petitioners in the I.A. The remaining respondents are the respondents 3 to 5 in the I.A. respectively. 2. The I.A. was filed seeking temporary prohibitory nd injunction restraining the 2 appellant from implementing and establishing the operation of IPC Malabar State, Kerala and also from forming further States by dividing the existing Kerala State Council. By the impugned order, the learned District Judge nd restrained the 2 appellant herein from forming any ‘sub state within the Kerala State Council of Indian Pentecostal Church of 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 5 God and also from proceeding with the functions of the IPC Malabar State Council until further orders. st 3. According to the appellants, the 1 appellant is the largest indigenous Pentecostal Church in India with more than 10,000 churches in India and abroad with several lakhs of st believers. The 1 respondent was registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860. The registered office is situated at Eluru, West Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh. Currently the IPC is governed by the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as “the Andhra Act”). The central working office is situated at Kumbanadu in Pathanamthitta District. 4. The main dispute which led to filing of the O.P. (Society) is the formation of ‘IPC Malabar State’ carving out 513 local churches and 34 District/Centres from IPC Kerala State. Respondents 1 to 4 alleged that the decision to form a separate State was taken without any authority of law and without following the procedures contemplated in the Memorandum of 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 6 Association and constitution of IPC. Invoking Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001, the Original Petition was filed in the District Court, Pathanamthitta. 5. First and foremost contention raised by the appellant in this appeal is regarding the maintainability of the original petition before the District Court, Pathanamthitta. As all counsel appearing for various parties elaborately addressed arguments on this issue, it is appropriate to deal with the said contention before addressing the matter on merits. st 6. The 1 appellant obtained registration initially under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (Central Act 21 of 1860) from Eluru in Andhra Pradesh. In 2001, the legislative assembly of the State of Andhra Pradesh enacted the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001. The object of the Act is to consolidate and amend the law relating to the registration of societies situated in Andhra Pradesh promoting art, fine arts, charity, crafts, religion, sport, literature, culture, science, philosophy, political education or any other public purpose and 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 7 for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 7. Section 23 of the Andhra Act deals with disputes arising among the Committee or the members of the Society, in respect of any matter relating to the affairs of the Society. Two remedies are provided under the provision. The aggrieved can proceed under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or file an application in the District Court concerned. Upon filing of an application in the District Court, the said Court shall, after necessary enquiry, pass such order as it may deem fit. 8. Court has been defined under Section 2(d). The expression shall be understood with respect to cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad as City Civil Courts and elsewhere the same would mean the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The respondents 1 to 4 have approached the District Court, Pathanamthitta in the O.P.(Society) indisputably invoking Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001. The moot question is as to whether a Principal Civil 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 8 Court of original jurisdiction in the State of Kerala can entertain an original petition filed under Section 23 of the Andhra Act. 9. The learned counsel for the appellants Sri.Jacob Alex forcefully contended that the original petition is not maintainable before the District Court, Pathanamthitta. The learned counsel submitted that in view of Article 245 of the Constitution of India, legislature of a State can enact laws applicable only to the State concerned. Such laws cannot have any application beyond the territories of the State. He argued that the Andhra Act has no application beyond the State of Andhra Pradesh. He contended that the definition of ‘Court’ in Section 2(d) cannot be understood to mean that every Principal Civil Courts of original jurisdiction in the country can exercise the jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Andhra Act. He submitted that the expression ‘elsewhere’ employed in Section 2(d) denotes the Principal Civil Courts of original jurisdiction situated within the State of Andhra Pradesh other than in Hyderabad and Secunderabad. He further submitted that no 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 9 Principal Civil Courts of original jurisdiction beyond the State of Andhra Pradesh can exercise the powers under Section 23 of the Andhra Act. He argued that jurisdiction can be conferred on a court only by a law. No court can assume jurisdiction. He submitted that in the instant case, the District Court, Pathanamthitta has erred in entertaining the O.P.(Society) as it inherently lacks jurisdiction to deal with the same. He further contended that the inherent lack of jurisdiction being a question of law can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and therefore the appellants are entitled to contend that the said issue be decided in this appeal. The learned counsel relied on the following judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in support of his contention regarding jurisdiction of the District Court:- 1) Hindustan Zinc Limited (HZL) v. Ajmer Vidyut Virtan Nigam Limited [(2019) 17 SCC 82]. 2) Subhash Mahadevasa Habib v. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas (Dead) by Lrs. and others [(2007) 13 SCC 650]. 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 10 3) Asma Lateef and another v. Shabbir Ahmad and others [(2024) 4 SCC 696]. 10. The learned counsel referred to the following paragraph in Hindustan Zinc Limited (HZL) (Supra):- “ 17. We are of the view that it is settled law that if there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction, the plea can be taken up at any stage and also in collateral proceedings. This was held by this Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [(1955) 1 SCR 117 : AIR 1954 SC 340] as follows : (SCR p. 121 : AIR p. 342, para 6) “ 6 . … It is a fundamental principle well- established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its judgment and decree would be nullities.” 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 11 11. The learned counsel relied on the following paragraphs of the judgment in Subhash Mahadevasa Habib (Supra):- “ 33. What is relevant in this context is the legal effect of the so-called finding in OS No. 4 of 1972 that the decree in OS No. 61 of 1971 was passed by a court which had no pecuniary jurisdiction to pass that decree. The Code of Civil Procedure has made a distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make a decree passed by that court one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void. At best it is voidable in the sense that it could be challenged in appeal therefrom provided the conditions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied. .......................................................................... 35. Though Section 21-A of the Code speaks of a suit not being maintainable for challenging the validity of a prior decree between the same parties on a ground based on an objection as to “the place of suing”, there is no reason to restrict its operation only to an objection based on territorial jurisdiction and excluding from its purview a defect based on pecuniary jurisdiction. In the sense in which the expression “place of suing” has been used in the Code it could be understood as taking within it both territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. 36. Section 15 of the Code deals with pecuniary jurisdiction and, Sections 15 to 20 of the Code deal with “place of suing”. The heading “place of suing” covers Section 15 also. This Court in Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd.v.P.J. Pappu [AIR 1966 SC 634 : 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 12 (1966) 1 SCR 461] made no distinction between Section 15 on the one hand and Sections 16 to 20 on the other, in the context of Section 21 of the Code. Even otherwise, considering the interpretation placed by this Court on Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act and treating it as equivalent in effect to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it existed prior to the amendment in 1976, it is possible to say, especially in the context of the amendment brought about in Section 21 of the Code by Amendment Act 104 of 1976, that Section 21-A was intended to cover a challenge to a prior decree as regards lack of jurisdiction, both territorial and pecuniary, with reference to the place of suing, meaning thereby the court in which the suit was instituted. .......................................................................... 40. The entire question was considered by this Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [AIR 1954 SC 340 : (1955) 1 SCR 117]. Since in the present case, the objection is based on the valuation of the suit or the pecuniary jurisdiction, we think it proper to refer to that part of the judgment dealing with Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. Their Lordships held: (AIR p. 342, para 7) “ 7 . … It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a court based on overvaluation or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional court, unless there was 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 13 a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits.” In Hiralal Patni v. Kali Nath [AIR 1962 SC 199 : (1962) 2 SCR 747] , it was held that: (AIR p. 201, para 4) “ 4 . … It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a court to try a case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” In Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu [AIR 1966 SC 634 : (1966) 1 SCR 461], it was held Section 21 is a statutory recognition of the principle that the defect as to the place of suing under Sections 15 to 20 of the Code may be waived and that even independently of Section 21, a defendant 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 14 may waive the objection and may be subsequently precluded from taking it.” 12. He relied on the following paragraphs of the judgment in Asma Lateef and another (Supra) :- “43. What does “jurisdiction” mean? In the ensuing discussion, we feel inclined to draw guidance from certain decisions of ancient vintage which have stood the test of time. 44. The wisdom of Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee, ACJ, speaking for a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Hriday Nath Roy v. Ram Chandra Barna Sarma [1920 SCC OnLine Cal 85 : ILR (1921) 48 Cal 138], more than a century back, profitably assists us in understanding what is meant by “jurisdiction”, “lack of jurisdiction” and “error in the exercise of jurisdiction”. The relevant passage reads as under : (SCC OnLine Cal) “… An examination of the cases in the books discloses numerous attempts to define the term “jurisdiction”, which has been stated to be “the power to hear and determine issues of law and fact”; “the authority by which judicial officers take cognizance of and decide causes”; “the authority to hear and decide a legal controversy”; “the power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy between parties to a suit and to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them”; “the power to hear, determine and pronounce judgment on the issues before the Court”; “the power or authority which is conferred upon a court by the legislature to bear and determine causes between parties and to carry the judgments into 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 15 effect”; “the power to enquire into the facts, to apply the law, to pronounce the judgment and to carry it into execution.” … This jurisdiction of the Court may be qualified or restricted by a variety of circumstances. Thus, the jurisdiction may have to be considered with reference to place, value, and nature of the subject-matter. … This classification into territorial jurisdiction, pecuniary jurisdiction and jurisdiction of the subject-matter is obviously of a fundamental character. Given such jurisdiction, we must be careful to distinguish exercise of jurisdiction from existence of jurisdiction; for fundamentally different are the consequences of failure to comply with statutory requirements in the assumption and in the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction; and when there is jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. The extent to which the conditions essential for creating and raising the jurisdiction of a court or the restraints attaching to the mode of exercise of that jurisdiction should be included in the conception of jurisdiction itself is sometimes a question of great nicety…But the distinction between existence of jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction has not always been borne in mind and this has sometimes led to confusion. … We must not thus overlook the cardinal position that in order that jurisdiction may be exercised, there must be a case legally before the Court and a hearing as well as a determination. A judgment pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, subject to the well-known reservation that when the jurisdiction of a court is challenged, 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 16 the Court is competent to determine the question of jurisdiction, though the result of the enquiry may be that it has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter brought before it. * … Besides the cases mentioned therein, reference may particularly be made to the judgment of Srinivas Aiyangar, J., in Thuljaram Row v. Gopala Aiyan [1916 SCC OnLine Mad 298], where the true rule was stated to be that if a court has jurisdiction to try a suit and has authority to pass orders of a particular kind, the fact that it has passed an order which it should not have made in the circumstances of that litigation, does not indicate total want or loss of jurisdiction so as to render the order a nullity.” (emphasis supplied) 47. Moving on to decisions of not too distant an origin, we notice that this Court in Rafique Bibi v. Waliuddin [(2004) 1 SCC 287] whilst relying on Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, [(1970) 1 SCC 670] , has made valuable observations as to the circumstances where an order passed could be regarded as a nullity. The relevant observations made in Rafique Bibi v. Waliuddin, [(2004) 1 SCC 287] read thus : “6. What is “void” has to be clearly understood. A decree can be said to be without jurisdiction, and hence a nullity, if the court passing the decree has usurped a jurisdiction which it did not have; a mere wrong exercise of jurisdiction does not result in a nullity. The lack of jurisdiction in the court passing the decree must be patent on its face in order to enable the executing court to take cognizance of such a nullity based on want of jurisdiction, else the normal rule that an executing court cannot go behind the decree must prevail. 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 17 7. Two things must be clearly borne in mind. Firstly, ‘the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be “a nullity” and “void” but these terms have no absolute sense : their meaning is relative, depending upon the court's willingness to grant relief in any particular situation. If this principle of illegal relativity is borne in mind, the law can be made to operate justly and reasonably in cases where the doctrine of ultra vires, rigidly applied, would produce unacceptable results.’ (Administrative Law, Wade and Forsyth, 8th Edn., 2000, p. 308.) … 8. A distinction exists between a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction and consequently being a nullity and not executable and a decree of the court which is merely illegal or not passed in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. A decree suffering from illegality or irregularity of procedure, cannot be termed inexecutable by the executing court; the remedy of a person aggrieved by such a decree is to have it set aside in a duly constituted legal proceedings or by a superior court failing which he must obey the command of the decree. A decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be denuded of its efficacy by any collateral attack or in incidental proceedings.” (emphasis supplied) 13. Sri.Jacob Alex placed reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajendra Diwan v. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala and another [(2019) 20 SCC 143]. In the said 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 18 judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there is no provision in the Constitution which saves State laws with extra territorial operation, similar to Article 245(ii) which expressly saves Union laws with extra territorial operation, enacted by Parliament. He contended that in view of the provisions of Article 245 of the Constitution, the Andhra Act can have no operation beyond the territories of the State of Andhra Pradesh. 14. Advocate Sreekumar Chelur appearing for the respondents 1 to 4 contended that the O.P.(Society) is perfectly maintainable before the District Court, Pathanamthitta. He submitted that the issue is no longer res integra. He relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Terapalli Dyvasahata Kumar v. S.M.Kantha Raju (Dead) through legal representatives and another [(2018) 11 SCC 769]. He submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act in the judgment cited and conclusively held that the expression ‘District Court’ should be understood in the sense 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 19 as it is used in the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore the District Court having jurisdiction in view of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be the proper forum to entertain original petitions under Section 23 of the Andhra Act. The learned counsel submitted that the appellants herein challenged the maintainability of the suit filed before the Principal District Court, West Godavari, in Andhra Pradesh, on the ground that, in view of a specific stipulation in the Memorandum of Association and Constitution of the IPC providing that any proceedings before a court of law against the IPC General Church shall be filed within the local jurisdiction of the courts of Pathanamthitta District, the suit was not maintainable. He referred to the order passed by the Principal District Judge, West Godhavari on 21.6.2024 in I.A.No.315/2024 in SOP No.2/2023. He pointed out that the contention of the appellants was accepted by the learned Principal Judge and the petition was returned for filing before the appropriate forum in accordance with the bylaws of the IPC. He argued that having adopted a contention that only 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 20 the courts in Pathanamthitta District shall have the jurisdiction to entertain disputes regarding administration of IPC, it is not open to the appellants to take a contrary plea in the proceedings on hand. He therefore submitted that the contention regarding maintainability of the O.P.(Society) is without any merits. th 15. Advocate Ashok Shenoy appearing for 8 respondent also submitted that the contention regarding maintainability of the O.P.(Society) is bereft of merits. He submitted that though the general proposition is that a legislation enacted by the legislative assembly of a State can have operation only within the territories of the State concerned, the same is not an absolute rule. He pointed out that though the IPC is registered under the Andhra Act and its registered office is situated in Andhra Pradesh, the Society has operations across India and also abroad. He therefore submitted that the remedy under Section 23 of the Andhra Act can be invoked beyond the territories of the State of Andhra Pradesh as the operations of 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 21 the society is not confined within the State of Andhra Pradesh. The learned counsel also submitted that the jurisdiction of the court can be understood only as provided under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He relied on a judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Rashtriya Chemical & Fertilizers Limited, Mumbai and others v. State of Maharashtra and another [2019 SCC OnLine Bom 765]. He made specific reference to the following paragraph of the judgment:- “38. To decide whether a State law has an extraterritorial operation, the doctrine of territorial nexus is invoked. The doctrine of territorial nexus is applied to find out whether a particular State law has extraterritorial operation. It signifies that the object to which the law applies need not be physically located within the territorial boundaries of the State, but what is necessary is that it should have a sufficient territorial connection with the State. If there is a territorial nexus between the subject matter of the Act and the State making the law, then the statute in question is not regarded as having extraterritorial operation.” 16. He submitted that though the IPC is registered under the Andhra Act and has its registered office in the State of Andhra Pradesh, its head office is situated in Pathanamthitta 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 22 District and the dispute is regarding the bifurcation of the IPC State of Kerala. Hence, he submitted that the District Court, Pathanamthitta is the ‘court concerned’ as provided under Section 23 of the Andhra Act. He also referred to the definition of the ‘court’ in Section 2(d) of the Andhra Act and pointed out that except for Hyderabad and Secunderabad, the expression ‘court’ shall be understood as the Principal Civil Court of original civil jurisdiction of the district. He also pointed out that the constitution of the IPC provides that courts within Pathanamthitta District shall have jurisdiction to entertain litigations pertaining to the IPC. He hence submitted that the contention regarding maintainability is misconceived and hence liable to be rejected. th 17. Adv.George Varghese appearing for the 5 respondent submitted that the contention of the other respondents that the proceedings are maintainable before the District Court, Pathanamthitta is liable to be rejected as the same is inconsistent with the provisions of Article 245 of the 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 23 Constitution of India. He submitted that the O.P.(Society) is not maintainable and if the respondents 1 to 4 had any genuine grievance, their remedy was to file a proper suit for appropriate reliefs before the lowest forum in the hierarchy of civil courts. He submitted that O.P.(Society) is liable to be declared as not maintainable. 18. In reply to the submissions of Advocate Sreekumar Chelur, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that no reliance can be placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied on by him. Adv.Jacob Alex contended that in the judgment cited, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered a case wherein the Division Bench of the High Court held that only the District Court concerned where the Society is registered will have jurisdiction to entertain a dispute under Section 23 of the Andhra Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the conclusion of the High Court was erroneous. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the context of the issue which arose for consideration, held that the provisions applicable to District 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 24 Courts generally would apply and that the expression ‘District Court’ in Section 23 does not refer only to the principal court of original jurisdiction of a particular place. The learned counsel submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not confronted with a case of dispute regarding jurisdiction of a District Court situated outside the territorial limits of the State of Andhra Pradesh. He therefore submitted that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment cited cannot be applied in the instant case. 19. I shall now refer to the relevant provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001. Section 2(d) reads as under:- “ 2(d) - ‘Court’ means in the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad the City Civil Court, and elsewhere the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction.” Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Society Registration Act,2001 reads as under:- “ 23 . Dispute regarding management - In the event of any dispute arising among the Committee or the members of the society, in respect of any matter 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 25 relating to the affairs of the society, any member of the society may proceed with the dispute under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act1996 (Central Act 26 of 1996), or may file an application in the District Court concerned and the said court shall after necessary inquiry pass such order as it may deem fit.” 20. Section 23 is included in Chapter IV of the Andhra Act dealing with disputes, dissolution and winding up. Analytical reading of Section 23 would show that it is a provision intended to provide remedies in case of disputes arising among the Committee or the members of the Society in respect of any matter relating to the affairs of the Society. Two different options are provided under Section 23. It is open to any member of the Society to proceed with the dispute under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Alternative option is to file an application in the District Court concerned. On filing of such an application, the District Court concerned shall, after necessary enquiry, pass such order as it may deem fit. If the member/members having dispute is/are not opting to proceed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 26 a special remedy of filing an application directly in the District Court concerned has been provided. It is to be noted that the said remedy is obviously a special remedy. The same has been provided as another option in addition to the proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Moreover, a special remedy and a designated forum have been provided. If Section 23 was absent in the Andhra Act, the course open to the aggrieved would have been instituting civil suits. In such an event the suit would lie only before the lowest civil court in the hierarchy of civil courts. By incorporating the provision, an opportunity to raise the grievance directly before the District Court has been provided. Thus, Section 23 provides for a special forum for considering the applications of the members of the Societies registered under the Andhra Act in respect of matters relating to the affairs of the Society by conferring a special jurisdiction on an existing court. Thus Section 23 confers a special jurisdiction on the District Courts concerned. 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 27 21. Part XI of the Constitution of India encompasses Articles dealing with the relations between the Union and the States. Provisions under this Part are of paramount importance in the federal system of Government. Article 245 is a highly significant provision as it deals with the extent of the laws made by Parliament and legislatures of State. It reads as under:- “245 . Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State. (2) No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have extra- territorial operation.” The legislature of a State is competent to make laws for the whole or any part of the State. It is pertinent to note that Article 245(2) provides that laws made by the Parliament shall not be deemed to be invalid on the ground that they have extra- territorial operation. No such fortification is offered to the laws 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 28 enacted by the legislatures of States. 22. As provided under Article 246(3), subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule, referred to as the State List. 23. Entry 32 of the State List is extracted hereunder:- “Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporation, other than those specified in List I, and universities; unincorporated trading, literacy, scientific, religious and other societies and associations; co-operative societies.” 24. Hence the State legislature is competent to legislate with regard to societies. The Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act is obviously enacted exercising the authority under Entry 32. There cannot be any quarrel regarding the competence of the legislature and applicability of the Act to the territories of the State of Andhra Pradesh. However, the controversy in this case is as to whether the said Act can confer jurisdiction on a District Court situated beyond the territories of 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 29 the State of Andhra Pradesh to accept a petition filed under Section 23 of the Andhra Act and to pass appropriate orders after conducting necessary enquiry. 25. Sri.Sreekumar Chelur asserted during the arguments that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Terapalli Dyvasahata Kumar [Supra] has held unequivocally regarding the scope of Section 23 of the Andhra Act that for the purpose of determining jurisdiction to exercise the power under Section 23, provisions applicable to District Courts generally would apply and that therefore the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, would apply to determine the Court having jurisdiction. He specifically referred to Paragraph 13 of the judgment in this regard. A careful reading of the judgment shows that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering an appeal arising from a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in which Section 23 was construed as referring only to the Principal District Court of the place where the Society is registered. A preliminary objection was raised before the District Court at 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 30 Vishakapattanam that it had no jurisdiction to consider a petition under Section 23 of the Andhra Act. The objection was rejected by the learned District Judge who held that the expression District Court was not defined in the Andhra Pradesh Society Registration Act and hence the provisions of CPC can be taken into consideration to decide the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court concerned as envisaged under Section 23 of the Andhra Act. Further it was held that as Section 20 of CPC envisages that the proceedings can be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the cause of action wholly or in part arises. The said conclusion of the learned District Judge was reversed by the High Court. It was held by the High Court that only the District Court concerned, where the Society is registered, has jurisdiction to entertain any dispute under Section 23 of the Andhra Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the scope of the provisions in this context. This is clear from a careful reading of the judgment as a whole. In other words, the dispute in the case was as to whether the 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 31 proceeding under Section 23 of the Andhra Act could be entertained by any District Court other than that having jurisdiction over the place where the registered office of the Society was situated. Whether Section 23 of the Andhra Act can have any application beyond the territorial limits of the State of Andhra Pradesh was not a matter arising for decision in the said case. The law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court shall be understood in the factual frame work of the case. It is to be borne in mind that a judgment is an authority for what is actually decided in the case. Precedents cannot be read and understood like statutes. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the factual situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations in a judgment must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. As the question considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision cited being totally different, I am unable to accept the contention that the issue arising for consideration in the instant case is covered 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 32 by the judgment in Terapalli Dyvasahata Kumar (Supra). 26. Under the Constitutional scheme, effect of a law enacted by a State Legislature is confined to the territories of the State concerned as stipulated under Article 245. In this connection it is apposite to refer to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shrikant Bhalchandra Karulkar and Others v. State of Gujarat and others [(1994) 5 SCC 459]. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “7. It is no doubt correct that under Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India the Legislature of a State can make laws for the State or any part thereof. It would be overstepping the limits of its legislative field when it purports to affect men and property outside the State. In other words the State Legislature has no legislative competence to make laws which have extraterritorial operation. Meaning of the words “extraterritorial operation” have been authoritatively laid down by this Court in various judgments. A State Legislature has plenary jurisdiction to enact laws in respect of subjects in Lists II and III, Seventh Schedule, Constitution of India. Such laws may be in respect of persons within the territory, of property — immovable or movable — situated within the State, or of acts and events which occur within its borders. So long as the law made by the State Legislature is applicable to the persons residing within its territory and to all things and acts within its territory, it cannot be considered extraterritorial. 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 33 This Court — over a period of three decades — has evolved a principle called “doctrine of territorial nexus” to find out whether the provisions of a particular State law have extraterritorial operation. The doctrine is well-established and there is no dispute as to its principles. If there is a territorial nexus between the persons/property subject- matter of the Act and the State seeking to comply with the provisions of the Act then the Statute cannot be considered as having extraterritorial operation. Sufficiency of the territorial connection involves consideration of two elements, the connection must be real and not illusory and the liability sought to be imposed under the Act must be relevant to that connection. The Act has to satisfy the principles of territorial nexus which are essentially discernible from the factual application of the provisions of the Act.” [ Emphasis added ] 27. The only ground to justify any extra territorial operation of a State law is territorial nexus. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained the concept of territorial nexus as under in State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala and Another [1957 SCC OnLine SC 12]:- “23. The next point urged by the petitioners is that under Articles 245 and 246 the Legislature of a State can only make a law for the State or any part thereof and consequently the Legislature overstepped the limits of its legislative field when by the impugned Act it purported to affect men residing and carrying on business outside the 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 34 State. It is submitted that there is no sufficient territorial nexus between the State and the activities of the petitioners who are not in the State. The doctrine of territorial nexus is well established and there is no dispute as to the principles. As enunciated by learned counsel for the petitioners, if there is a territorial nexus between the person sought to be charged and the State seeking to tax him the taxing statute may be upheld. Sufficiency of the territorial connection involves a consideration of two elements, namely, (a) the connection must be real and not illusory and (b) the liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that connection. It is conceded that it is of no importance on the question of validity that the liability imposed is or may be altogether disproportionate to the territorial connection. In other words, if the connection is sufficient in the sense mentioned above, the extent of such connection affects merely the policy and not the validity of the legislation. Keeping these principles in mind we have to ascertain if in the case before us there was sufficient territorial nexus to entitle the Bombay Legislature to make the impugned law. The question whether in a given case there is sufficient territorial nexus is essentially one of fact. The trial court took the view that the territorial nexus was not sufficient to uphold the validity of the law under debate. The court of appeal took a different view of the facts and upheld the law. We find ourselves in agreement with the court of appeal. The newspaper “Sporting Star” printed and published in Bangalore is widely circulated in the State of Bombay. The petitioners have set up collection depots within the State to receive entry forms and the fees. They have appointed local collectors. Besides the circulation of the copies of the “Sporting Star”, the petitioners print over 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 35 40,000 extra coupons for distribution which no doubt are available from their local collectors. The most important circumstance in these competitions is the alluring invitation to participate in the competition where very large prizes amounting to thousands of rupees and sometimes running into a lakh of rupees may be won at and for a paltry entrance fee of say 4 annas per entry. These advertisements reach a large number of people resident within the State. The gamblers, euphemistically called the competitors, fill up the entry forms and either leave it along with the entry fees at the collection depots set up in the State of Bombay or send the same by post from Bombay. All the activities that the gambler is ordinarily expected to undertake take place, mostly if not entirely, in the State of Bombay and after sending the entry forms and the fees the gamblers hold their soul in patience in great expectations that fortune may smile on them. In our judgment the standing invitations, the filling up of the forms and the payment of money take place within the State which is seeking to tax only the amount received by the petitioners from the State of Bombay. The tax is on gambling although collected from the promoters. All these, we think, constitute sufficient territorial nexus which entitles the State of Bombay to impose a tax on the gambling that takes place within its boundaries and the law cannot be struck down on the ground of extra territoriality.” 28. In the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Rashtriya Chemical & Fertilizers Limited, Mumbai and Others (Supra), relied on by the respondents, 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 36 the principle of territorial nexus is explained as under:- “ 36. The petitioners' next contention is the extra- territoriality of the impugned Rule. In that context, we may refer to a couple of constitutional provisions. Article 245(1) of the Constitution empowers Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India. But the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of that State alone. No law made by Parliament shall, however, be questioned on the ground that it would have extraterritorial operation. Yet, a State—as a constituent of the Union, with no sovereignty— has no such immunity. 37. In other words, a State Legislature has no legislative competence to make laws having extra-territorial operation; a State can legislate effectively only for its own territory; a State law can affect persons, properties, or things within the State and not outside the State. Thus, a State law is not immune from challenge in a Court on the ground of extra-territorial operation. Put differently, a State law having operation outside the State is not valid. 38. To decide whether a State law has an extra- territorial operation, the doctrine of territorial nexus is invoked. The doctrine of territorial nexus is applied to find out whether a particular State law has extraterritorial operation. It signifies that the object to which the law applies need not be physically located within the territorial boundaries of the State, but what is necessary is that it should have a sufficient territorial connection with the State. If there is a territorial nexus between the subject matter of the Act and the State making the law, then the statute in question is not regarded as having extra-territorial operation. 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 37 39. Durga Das Basu in his magnum opus Constitution of India, has noted that though the jurisdiction of a State Legislature is, prima facie, confined to persons and objects within the territorial limits of its State, this jurisdiction extends, as it were, by the application of nexus. This means, once a State Legislature, competent to legislate regarding a particular subject, has some connection with a person, object, or activity within its territorial limits, the application or operation of the Act may extend to persons, objects or activities (as the case may be) outside the State. If there is a territorial nexus between the person/property, subject matter of the Act and the State seeking to comply with the provisions of the Act, then the state cannot be considered as having extraterritorial operation. Sufficiency of territorial connection involves consideration of two elements: the connection must be real and not illusory, and the liability sought to be imposed under the Act must be relevant to that connection. The Act has to satisfy the principles of territorial nexus which are essentially discernible from the factual application of the provisions of the Act. 40. The learned author has further observed that “whether in a given case there is sufficient territorial nexus is a question of fact and it is for the Courts of decide whether the ‘territorial nexus’ being put forward as the basis of the application of the law is ‘sufficient or not’. It is of no importance on the question of validity that the liability imposed is or may be altogether disproportionate to the territorial connection.” In other words, if the connection is sufficient as satisfying the two elements mentioned above, the extent of such connection affects merely the policy and not the validity of the legislation. 41. As held in Shrikant Bhalchandra Karulkar v. 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 38 State of Gujarat, [(1994) 5 SCC 459] there is no general formula defining what territorial connection or nexus is sufficient or necessary for applying a State law to a particular object. Sufficiency of the territorial connection involves consideration of two elements: (a) the connection must be real and not illusory; and (b) the liability sought to be imposed under the Act must be pertinent or relevant to that connection. 42. In relation to a taxing statute, the Supreme Court, in the early constitutional days, has held the sale or purchase need not take place within the territorial limits of the State. Broadly speaking, local activities of buying or selling carried in the State in relation to local goods would be sufficient basis to sustain the taxing power of the State, provided, of course, such activities ultimately result in concluded sale or purchase to be taxed. 43. In Bengal Immunity v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 a seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has held that the words “extra-territorial operation” are used in two different senses: first, laws regarding acts or events which take place inside the State but have operation outside; second, laws with reference to the nationals of a State in respect of their acts outside. In its former sense, the laws are strictly speaking intra-territorial though loosely termed ‘extraterritorial’. Thus, under article 245(1), it is within the competence of the State Legislatures to enact laws with extra-territorial operation in that sense. The words “laws with extra-territorial operation” in Article 245(2) must be understood. Bengal Immunity holds, in their second and strict sense as having reference to the laws of a State for their nationals in respect of acts done outside the State. Otherwise, the provision would be inconsistent as regards laws enacted by States.” 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 39 29. Learned Counsel Shri Sreekumar Chelur and Shri. Ashok Shenoy have contended that the IPC is having its registered office in the State of Andhra Pradesh and majority of its members are living outside the territories of the said State. The headquarters is situated within Pathanamthitta District of State of Kerala. Subject matter of the dispute between the parties is regarding bifurcation of the IPC State of Kerala and formation of Malabar State. They hence submitted that the dispute is between its members mostly residing within the State of Kerala regarding the management of the affairs of the IPC. They further submitted that the principles of territorial nexus will definitely apply in the instant case and the dispute would be governed by Section 23 of the Andhra Act. Hence, according to them, the District Court, Pathanamthitta is well justified in entertaining the OP filed under Section 23. Moreover, in view of the specific provisions in the Constitution and Bylaws of IPC, which provide that jurisdiction shall lie with the courts in Pathanamthitta District for all disputes pertaining to the IPC 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 40 General Church, they contend that they are perfectly justified in approaching the District Court, Pathanamthitta, with the petition filed under Section 23. 30. Nevertheless, I find that the vital issue that requires addressing in this case is not whether the principles of territorial nexus would apply to the contentious subject matter, but rather whether the District Courts of one State can exercise the special jurisdiction granted by a statute passed by another State. 31. As observed above, Section 23 of the Andhra Act indisputably provides a special remedy of approaching the District Court. However, the operation of the Act is unquestionably controlled by Article 245 of the Constitution. Viewed from such an angle, it can be reckoned only as a provision conferring a special jurisdiction on the District Courts situated within the territories of the State of Andhra Pradesh. The respondents, however, contend that in view of the principles of territorial nexus, read in conjunction with the provisions of the Constitution of the IPC, which provide that jurisdiction in 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 41 case of disputes shall lie with the courts in Pathanamthitta District, the original petition filed under Section 23 is perfectly maintainable before the District Court, Pathanamthitta. However, it is to be noted that the provision in the constitution of IPC does not specify that the disputes are to be adjudicated by the District Court, Pathanamthitta. Moreover, a provision in the bylaws or constitution of a society cannot confer jurisdiction on a particular court of law, that it does not enjoy under law. The same can be conferred only by a statute. Therefore, unless Section 23 of the Andhra Act can be held to operate beyond the territories of the State of Andhra Pradesh in conferring jurisdiction on the District Court, the respondents’ argument cannot be accepted. In my opinion, it is inconceivable under our Constitutional scheme for an Act of a State to confer special jurisdiction on a court located beyond the territories of that State. Principles of territorial nexus, which is related primarily to the subject matter, cannot be raised as a ground to seek extension of operation of a provision of a State Act conferring 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 42 jurisdiction on courts, beyond its territorial limits as it would definitely affront Art.245 of the Constitution. 32. With regard to the federal system, Article 245 of the Constitution is among the most significant provisions. The legislative powers of the Union, as well as those of the States, shall be construed primarily in terms of Article 245. Otherwise, the result would be anarchy. 33. The legislative competence of State Legislatures to enact laws under Article 245 has been noted by acclaimed author Durga Das Basu in his crowning work “Constitution of India” as under:- “A State law is not valid if it purports to affect men and property outside the State. A State law may apply to persons within its territory, to property- movable and immovable-situated within the state or to acts and events which occur within the borders. A State Legislature has no legislative competence to make laws having extra-territorial operation. A State can legislate effectively only for its own territory. A State law can affect persons, properties or things within the State and not outside the State. A State law is not immune from challenge in a Court on the ground of extra-territorial operation. A State law is not immune from challenge in a Court on the ground of extra-territorial operation. A State law having operation outside the State is not valid.” 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 43 34. Even if the contention of the respondents that the actions of the IPC and its members in the State of Kerala have a territorial nexus, on the ground that the registered office of the IPC is situated in the State of Andhra Pradesh and that its registration is under the Andhra Act, is assumed to be correct for the sake of argument, at the risk of repetition, it should be noted that the fundamental issue concerns the invocation of the special jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Andhra Act by a District Court in Kerala. If it is assumed that a State Legislature can enact a law conferring jurisdiction on courts situated within the territories of another State or regulating the functioning of such courts, the state of affairs would be chaotic and violative of the basic principles of the federal structure. Therefore, I am of the view that the proposition canvassed by the respondents that Section 23 of the Andhra Act has extra territorial application if the dispute has territorial nexus and hence the special jurisdiction can be invoked by a District Court in the State of 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 44 Kerala is contradictory to the provisions of Article 245. Such a proposition, if accepted, would violate the basic tenets of the federal structure. 35. In Rajendra Diwan v. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala and another [(2019) 20 SCC 143] cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the validity of Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011 that provided appeal against orders of the Rent Control Tribunal to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Apex Court held as under:- “ 36. Parliament and the State Legislatures derive their power to make laws from Article 245(1) of the Constitution of India and such power is subject to and/or limited by the provisions of the Constitution. While Parliament can make law for the whole or any part of the territory of India, the State Legislature can only make laws for the State or any part thereof, subject to the restrictions in the Constitution of India. 37. Article 246, which distributes legislative powers between the Union Legislature and the State Legislature, confers exclusive power to Parliament to make laws in respect of the matters specified in List I in the Seventh Schedule, that is, the Union List. The Union Parliament also has, subject to clause (3) of Article 246, the power to 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 45 make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule, that is, the Concurrent List. 38. While Parliament has exclusive power under Article 246(1) of the Constitution to make laws with respect to the matters enumerated in the Union List, the State Legislature has exclusive power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the State List, subject to clauses (1) and (2) of Article 246. Along with the Union Legislature, the State Legislature is also competent to enact laws in respect of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, subject to the provisions of Article 246(1). …..................................................................... 49. Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from orders passed by the Rent Control Tribunal, is not ancillary or incidental to the power of the Chhattisgarh State Legislature to enact a Rent Control Act, which provides for appellate adjudication of appeals relating to tenancy and rent by a Tribunal. In enacting Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, the Chhattisgarh State Legislature has overtly transgressed the limits of its legislative power, as reiterated and discussed hereinafter. …..................................................................... 51. As observed above, both the Union legislature and the State Legislature derive their power to legislate from Article 245 of the Constitution of India. It is axiomatic that the legislature of a State may only make laws for the whole or any part of the State, while Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India. There is no provision in the Constitution which saves State laws with extra-territorial operation, similar to Article 245(2) which expressly saves Union laws 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 46 with extra-territorial operation, enacted by Parliament. The Chhattisgar h State Legislature, thus, patently lacks competence to enact any law which affects the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, outside the State of Chhattisgarh.” [ Emphasis added ] 36. The Apex Court finally held that the State Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact Section 13(2), and the provision was declared ultra vires the Constitution of India, null and void, and of no effect. 37. It is interesting to refer to some judgments rendered by various High Courts during the pre-Constitutional era, in the light of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act. In Commissioner of Wakf Bengal v. Narasingh Chandra [1939 SCC OnLine Cal 7] the Calcutta High Court considered the question as to whether Section 70 of the Bengal Wakf Act, 1934 has application outside the province of Bengal. In the said case a wakf was created by a resident of Dacca with respect to properties situated partly in Bengal and partly in Assam. A suit was filed in a Munsiff Court situated in the State of Assam under 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 47 Section 70(5) of the Bengal Wakf Act, 1934. The learned Munsiff dismissed the application holding that the Bengal Wakf Act does not apply to Assam. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court considered the issue in the light of Section 80A of the Government of India Act and held that local legislature is not authorized to make laws regulating subjects lying outside the province. It was contended in the said case that Section 70(2) of the Act refers to a suit or proceeding in respect of any wakf property and therefore if the property is situated outside the province the court having jurisdiction over it can exercise the power under Section 70(2). The said contention was negatived by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court accepting the rival submission that such an interpretation would inevitably lead to conflict of jurisdiction. 38. In M.K.Khanna v. Raja Ram [1953 SCC OnLine Pat 75 ] a Division Bench of the Patna High Court considered a case in which a judgment debtor objected to the execution of the decree passed by Special Judge of Benares appointed under the 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 48 United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act by the Subordinate Judge of Purnea. The objection of the judgment debtor was overruled by the learned Subordinate Judge. The Division Bench held that the general principle is that exercise of civil jurisdiction is conditioned by territorial limits. Further it was held that the principle applies not merely to the jurisdiction of a judicial tribunal but to exercise of legislative jurisdiction. The Division Bench referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court of America in St. Louis v. The Ferry Co. [(1870) 11 Wall. 423, 430]. In the light of the principle laid down therein and also in view of Section 80A of the Government of India Act, 1919 it was held that the Legislature of the United Provinces has no power to make laws which would have extra-territorial application or which would affect person or property outside its jurisdiction. Under the relevant enactment of the United Provinces, the Local Government of the United Provinces was authorised under Section 3 of the Act to appoint any civil judicial officer as a “Special Judge,” who would have jurisdiction within the area 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 49 specified. The Advocate General contended that the decree of the Special Judge had the force of a decree passed by a civil court of competent jurisdiction, and that the same could be validly transferred for execution to the court at Purnea. The Division Bench rejected the contention. It was held that if the Legislature of the United Provinces cannot legislate directly for property outside its territorial limit, the Legislature cannot by a process of fiction treat the decree of the Special Judge as a decree of a civil court of competent jurisdiction and make it executable against immovable property outside its territorial limits by recourse to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. It was held that in view of the provisions of the Act, the decree of the Special Judge will be deemed to be a decree of the civil court only within the territory of the United Provinces. 39. Hence the judicial pronouncements, even of the pre- Constitutional era regarding extra territorial application of state laws pertaining to jurisdiction of courts, support the conclusions given above. 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 50 40. The inevitable conclusion of the above discussion is that the special jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Andhra Act can be exercised only by the District Courts located within the territorial limits of the State of Andhra Pradesh. I therefore hold that O.P.(Society)No.30/2025 pending before the District Court Pathanamthitta filed under Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 is not maintainable. Given this conclusion, it is unnecessary to decide any of the other contentions raised by the parties during the course of hearing. They are left open. 41. In fine I hold that the impugned order is not legally sustainable and it is accordingly set aside. I.A.No.4/2025 shall stand dismissed. The FAO is allowed as above. No costs. Sd/- S.MANU JUDGE skj 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 51 APPENDIX OF FAO NO. 100 OF 2025 APPELLANTS' ANNEXURES Annexure 1 TRUE COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION AND CONSTITUTION OF IPC (REVISED IN 2022) Annexure 2 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 31-01-2023 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI IN WRIT PETITION NO. 1851/2023 Annexure 3 TRUE COPY OF THE APTC FORM - 10 DATED 09-02- 2023 EVIDENCING THE PAYMENT OF REQUISITE FEES FOR AMENDMENT OF BYE-LAWS Annexure 4 TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE BEARING NO. IPCGC/115/2024 DATED 24-01-2025 Annexure 5 TRUE COPY OF THE ADDENDUM BEARING NO. IPCGC/235/2025 DATED 24-02-2025 Annexure 6 TRUE COPY OF THE DIRECTIVE BEARING NO. IPCGC/242/2025 DATED 14-03-2025 Annexure 7 TRUE COPY OF THE COMMUNICATION BEARING NO. IPCGC/245/2025 DATED 20-03-2025 Annexure 8 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER BEARING NO. IPCKL/8487/2025 DATED 06-03-2025 Annexure 9 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER BEARING NO. IPCKL /8874 /2025 DATED 09-04-2025 ISSUED BY THE IPC KERALA TO OFFICE BEARERS OF IPC Annexure 10 TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL PETITION IN OP (SOCIETY) NO. 30 OF 2025 BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA Annexure 11 TRUE COPY OF THE IA NO. 2 OF 2025 IN OP (SOCIETY) NO. 30 OF 2025 BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA Annexure 12 TRUE COPY OF THE PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF OBJECTION FILED IN IA NO. 2 OF 2025 IN OP (SOCIETY) NO. 30 OF 2025 BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA Annexure 13 TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 09-06-2025 IN OPC NO. 1076 OF 2025 OF THIS HON’BLE COURT Annexure 14 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 27-06-2025 IN RP NO. 764 OF 2025 OF THIS HON’BLE COURT Annexure 15 TRUE COPY OF THE IA NO. 4 OF 2025 IN OP (SOCIETY) NO. 30 OF 2025 BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA Annexure 16 TRUE COPY OF THE PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF OBJECTION FILED IN IA NO. 4 OF 2025 IN OP (SOCIETY) NO. 30 OF 2025 BEFORE THE DISTRICT 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 52 COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA Annexure 17 TRUE COPY OF THE IPCGC/50/25-26 DATED 02-07-2025 RESPONDENTS' ANNEXURES Annexure R1(a) THE TRUE COPY OF THE PREVAILING REGISTERED MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION OF THE 1ST RESPONDENT OBTAINED FROM THE REGISTRAR OF ANDHRA PRADESH Annexure R1(b) A TRUE COPY OF THE AFFIDAVIT FILED BY THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR IN IN I.A. NO. 1337 IN O.P. NO. 2 OF 2023, ON THE FILE OF THE HON’BLE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT Annexure R1(c) A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER PASSED BY THE HON’BLE DISTRICT COURT, WEST GODAVARI,ELURU DATED 21/6/2024 IN IA NO.315/2024 IN S.O.P NO.2/2023 Annexure R1(d) A TRUE COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM OF WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE 2NDAPPELLANT AGAINST THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR, ANDHRA PRADESH Annexure R1(e) A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 31.01.2023 PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT ANDHRA PRADESH Annexure R1(f) A TRUE COPY OF THE MEMO DATED 25.02.2023 PASSED BY THE DISTRICT REGISTRAR, IN REFERENCE TO W.P. NO. 1851 OF 2023 Annexure R1(g) THE TRUE COPY OF THE PRESS REPORT BEARING NO.IPCGC/240/2025 DATED 12.03.2025 Annexure R1(h) A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 24.01.2025 STATING AGENDA ISSUED FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL MEETING OF 26.02.2025 Annexure R1(i) A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 24.03.2025 ISSUED BY THE 2ND APPELLANT Annexure R1(j) A TRUE COPY OF THE SAID COMPLAINT DATED 08.07.2025, SUBMITTED BY MULTIPLE MEMBERS OF THE 2NDAPPELLANT Annexure R1(k) A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 14.03.2025 Annexure R1(l) A TRUE COPY OF THE SAID NOTICE DATED 21.04.2025 ISSUED BY THE 2ND APPELLANT Annexure R1(m) A TRUE COPY OF THE I.A NO. 4 OF 2025 FILED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT Annexure R1(n) A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 28.07.2025 IN I.A. NO. 4 OF 2025 IN O.P. (SOCIETY) NO. 30 OF 2025 OF THE DISTRICT COURT, PATHANAMTHITTA Annexure R1(o) A TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 27.08.2025 IN THE ABOVE APPEAL 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 53 Annexure R1(p) A TRUE COPY OF THE RECORD OF THE INAUGURAL FUNCTION OF IPC MALABAR STATE Annexure R1(q) A TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 02.07.2025 Annexure R1(r) ORDER APPOINTING AN INTERIM COMMITTEE IN PLACE AD-HOC COMMITTEE FOR MONITORING THE 5TH RESPONDENT VIDE NOTICE DATED 15.09.2025 PETITIONERS' ANNEXURES Annexure 18 True copy of the IPCKL/7654/2024 dated 09-02-2024 Annexure 19 True copy of the covering letter dated 29-05-2023 (without annexures) submitted by the General President of IPC to the District Registrar, Eluru Annexure 20 True copy of the Order dated 08-05-2023 in IA No. 5 of 2023 in IA No. 16 of 2023 in OS No ….. of 2023 of the District Court, Pathanamthitta Annexure 22 True copy of the Judgment dated 24-05-2023 in FAO No. 42 of 2023 Annexure 23 True copy of the judgment dated12-04-2023 in WPC 12495 of 2023 Annexure 24 True copy of the relevant portion of the newspaper (Malayala Manorama) report dated 23- 10-2025 Annexure 21 True copy of the Order dated 16-05-2023 in IA No. 1 of 2023 in FAO No. 42 of 2023 of this Hon’ble Court RESPONDENTS' ANNEXURES Annexure R7(a) A true copy of order No. IPCGC/93/25-26 dated 20.09.2025 issued by the 1st respondent Annexure R7(b) True copy of the transfer order issued by the Secretary to Pastor Baburaj C.K. as per letter No. IPCKL/9009/2025 dated 09.10.2025 Annexure R7(c) A true copy of order No. IPCKL/9008/2025 dated 22.09.2025 Annexure R7(d) A true copy of Order No. IPCKL/9021/2025 dated 29.10.2025 Annexure R7(e) A true copy of Order No. IPCKL/9015/2025 dated 16.10.2025 Annexure R7(f) A true copy of Order No. IPCKL/9022/2025 dated 29.10.2025 Annexure R7(g) A true copy of the relevant page of the Passbook of the 7th respondent with A/c No. 0384053000007032 in South Indian Bank, Kumbanad Branch 2026:KER:32401 F.A.O.No.100 of 2025 54 Annexure R8(a) True copy of letter No. IPCGC/85/25-56 dated 15.09.2025 issued by 1st respondent Annexure R8(b) True copy of commission report dated 26.9.2025 in O.P (Society) No. 32 of 2025 filed by Advocate Commissioner before the District Court, Pathanamthitta PETITIONERS' ANNEXURES Annexure 25 TRUE COPY OF THE IPCGC/248/2025 DATED 27-03-2025 ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT OF 1ST APPLICANT HEREIN Annexure 26 TRUE COPY OF THE DECISION DATED IPCGC/85/25-26 DATED 15.09.2025 Annexure 27 TRUE PHOTOGRAPHS (6 NUMBERS) OF THE IPC GENERAL HEADQUARTERS CAMPUS Annexure 27 (a) TRUE COPY OF THE LAND TAX RECEIPT DATED 26-11-2025 OF KOIPRUM VILLAGE IN THE NAME OF INDIAN PENTACOSTAL CHURCH Annexure 28 TRUE COPY OF THE FIR NO. 1256 OF 2025 BEFORE THE KOIPURAM POLICE STATION Annexure 29 TRUE COPY OF THE IPCGC/122/25-26 DATED 21.11.2025 Annexure 30 TRUE COPY OF THE PURPORTED ELECTION NOTIFICATION DATED 20.11.2025 Annexure 31 TRUE COPY OF THE NEWS ITEM PUBLISHED IN THE MANGALAM DAILY ON 21.11.2025 Annexure 32 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 25.11.2025 ISSUED TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE Annexure 33 TRUE COPY OF EMAIL DATED 28.11.2025 ALONG WITH LETTER BEARING NO. IPCGC/125/25-26 DATED 28.11.2025 (MISTAKENLY TYPED AS 29.11.2025) Annexure 34 TRUE PHOTOGRAPHS (3 NUMBERS) THAT WAS CAPTURED FROM CCTV FOOTAGE ON 28.11.2025</div>