KAILSHBHAI REVAJI PANCHAL(LUHAR) vs STATE OF GUJARAT

R/SCR.A/3157/2017 (GJHC240601102017) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (QUASHING) NO. 3157 of 2017

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL

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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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KAILSHBHAI REVAJI PANCHAL(LUHAR) & ANR.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR P P MAJMUDAR(5284) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2
MR RB THAKOR(6743) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
KANVA ANTANI APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL

Date : 01/09/2026

ORAL JUDGMENT
1. applicants before this Court are original Accused Nos. 1 and
2, invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 226 read with
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, interalia
praying to quash and set aside FIR being CR No. II-43 of 2017,
lodged before the Amirgadh Police Station, District Banaskantha,
for the offences punishable under Section 186, 189, 504, 506(2)
and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
2. Facts as narrated in the FIR in nutshell are to the effect
that:-
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R/SCR.A/3157/2017 (GJHC240601102017) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
2.1 That the Respondent no. 2 has filed the Impugned FIR on
25.04.2017 for the alleged offences committed on 28.03.2017
alleging, inter alia, that Respondent No. 2 is the Taluka District
Officer of Taluka Panchayat, Amirgadh, and allegedly 28.03.2017
at around 3.00 Pm when Respondent No. 2 and his Senior Clerk,
Rohit Prajapati and others were present on their duty at Taluka
Panchayat office, allegedly, the applicants came there and give a
computerized application, wherein, it was stated that if their
houses are demolished by the Village Panchayat then they will
have to commit suicide.
2.2 It is further alleged that when the applicants were asked to
contact the Village Panchayat, Amirgadh office, allegedly the
applicants got excited and gave threat to set on fire all staff
members of the office. Thus, it is alleged that the applicants tried
to create obstacle in performance of public duty by public
servant. Hence the present petition.
3. Learned advocate Mr. P.P Majmudar for the applicants
would submit that:-
3.1 None of the ingredients of either Section 504 or Section
506(2) of the IPC is made out, and inasmuch as the alleged
incident occurred on 28.03.2017, whereas the FIR was lodged on
25.04.2017, i.e., almost 27 days after the alleged incident, it
cannot be said that the threat, if any, given by the present
applicants was with an intent to cause alarm to the informant.
Thus, the same would not attract the provisions of Section 506(2)
of the IPC.
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R/SCR.A/3157/2017 (GJHC240601102017) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
3.2 That the mere fact of the informant having been abused is
not sufficient by itself to attract the provisions of Section 504 of
the IPC, as there is no likelihood that such provocation would
cause a breach of peace or induce the informant to commit any
other offence. Under such circumstances, Section 504 of the IPC
is also not attracted.
3.3 Insofar as the allegation under Section 186 of the IPC is
concerned, the same is squarely covered by the bar contained in
Section 195 of the CrPC. Even if the investigation is permitted to
continue and culminates in the filing of a charge-sheet, the
competent Court will not be able to take cognizance unless there
is a complaint in writing as contemplated under Section 2(d) of
the CrPC. Cognizance cannot be taken on the basis of the final
report (charge-sheet) submitted by the investigating agency. He
has, therefore, argued that the present petition be allowed.
3.4 Lastly, it is submitted that, though Section 189 of the IPC is
not covered under the provisions of Section 195 of the CrPC, the
act of threatening to cause injury to a public servant is
inseparable from the act of obstructing the public servant from
discharging his duties, as alleged in the FIR. Therefore, the FIR, to
that extent, is also required to be quashed and set aside and
thus argued to allow the present petition.
4. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, along
with learned Advocate Mr. R. B. Thakor appearing for the original
complainant, jointly submits that merely because threats had
also been given earlier and no complaint was lodged, it cannot be
said that the threats allegedly administered by the present
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R/SCR.A/3157/2017 (GJHC240601102017) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
applicants would not fall within the four corners of Section 504 or
Section 506(2) of the IPC. It is further submitted that, even if the
offence under Section 186 of the IPC is barred under Section 195
of the CrPC, the investigation can still proceed qua Section 189 of
the IPC and thus argued to reject the present petition.
5. Heard learned advocate for the respective parties. This
court has gone through the FIR.
5.1 At the outset, law governing the exception under Section
195 is required to be taken into consideration. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Devendra KumarVersus State
(NCT of Delhi) and Another reported in 2025 SCC Online
SC 1753 more particularly paragraph 59, has held as follows:
“E. CONCLUSION
59. We may summarize our final conclusion as under:
(i) Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. bars the court from taking
cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188
respectively of the I.P.C., unless there is a written complaint by
the public servant concerned or his administrative superior, for
voluntarily obstructing the public servant from discharge of his
public functions. Without a complaint from the said persons, the
court would lack competence to take cognizance in certain types
of offences enumerated therein.
(ii) If in truth and substance, an offence falls in the category of
Section 195(1)(a)(i), it is not open to the court to undertake the
exercise of splitting them up and proceeding further against the
accused for the other distinct offences disclosed in the same set
of facts. However, it also cannot be laid down as a straitjacket
formula that the Court, under all circumstances, cannot
undertake the exercise of splitting up. It would depend upon the
facts of each case, the nature of allegations and the materials on
record.
(iii) Severance of distinct offences is not permissible when it
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R/SCR.A/3157/2017 (GJHC240601102017) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
would effectively circumvent the protection afforded by Section
195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C., which requires a complaint by a public
servant for certain offences against public justice. This means
that if the core of the offence falls under the purview of Section
195(1)(a)(i), it cannot be prosecuted by simply filing a general
complaint for a different, but related, offence. The focus should
be on whether the facts, in substance, constitute an offence
requiring a public servant’s complaint.
(iv) In the aforesaid context, the courts must apply twin tests.
First, the courts must ascertain having regard to the nature of
the allegations made in the complaint/FIR and other materials on
record whether the other distinct offences not covered by Section
195(1)(a)(i) have been invoked only with a view to evade the
mandatory bar of Section 195 of the I.P.C. and secondly, whether
the facts primarily and essentially disclose an offence for which a
complaint of the court or a public servant is required.
(v) Where an accused is alleged to have committed some
offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in
Section 195, Section 195 will affect only the offences mentioned
therein. However, the courts should ascertain whether such
offences form an integral part and are so intrinsically connected
so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same
transaction, in which case the other offences also would fall
within the ambit of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. This would all
depend on the facts of each case.
(vi) Sections 195(1)(b)(i)(ii) & (iii) and 340 of the Cr.P.C.
respectively do not control or circumscribe the power of the
police to investigate, under the Criminal Procedure Code. Once
investigation is completed then the embargo in Section 195
would come into play and the Court would not be competent to
take cognizance. However, that Court could then file a complaint
for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected
during investigation, provided the procedure laid down in Section
340 of the Cr.P.C. is followed.”
5.2 Thus, unless there is a written complaint by the public
servant concerned or by his administrative superior in respect of
the offence of voluntarily obstructing the public servant from the
discharge of his public functions, the Court would lack the
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R/SCR.A/3157/2017 (GJHC240601102017) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
competence to take cognizance. Under such circumstances,
permitting the investigation to continue pursuant to the
impugned FIR would be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the
bar contained in Section 195(1)(a) of the CrPC would bar the
Court from taking cognizance on the basis of the final report
submitted under Section 173 of the CrPC.
5.3 As far as rest of the sections, more particular Section 504
and 506(2) and 189 of the IPC are concerned, in truth and
substance, the offences fall within the purview of Section 195(1)
(a)(i) of CRPC. The exercise of splitting up the offences would also
be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the said offences also fall
within the category of offences contemplated under Section
195(1)(a)(i), as held by the Supreme Court in State v. Kathi
Unad, reported in AIR 1955 Saurashtra 10, that t he very act
of obstructing, assaulting and hurting to the informant and that
the offence primarily seems to be committed under Section 186
of the IPC and to convict the accused for offence under Section
332 of the IPC would tantamount to holding the accused guilty
under Section 186 of the IPC and then convicting them for
offence under Section 332 of the IPC. Under such circumstances,
it was held that the prosecution could not circumvent the
provisions of Section 195 by a dubious method.
5.4 Under the circumstances, the present case squarely falls
under Clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph 59 of the aforesaid
judgment of Devendrakumar.
6. In view of the above, the captioned petition stands allowed.
The impugned FIR being CR No. II-43 of 2017, lodged before the
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R/SCR.A/3157/2017 (GJHC240601102017) JUDGMENT DATED: 01/09/2026
Amirgadh Police Station, District Banaskantha, for the offences
punishable under Section 186, 189, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860, along with all consequential
proceedings arising therefrom qua the present applicants, stands
quashed and set aside. However, it is always open to the State to
initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law.
7. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.
(P. M. RAVAL, J)
MMP
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