Gagandeep Singh vs STATE BANK OF INDIA
- Court
- High Court of Himachal Pradesh
( 2026:HHC:36901 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
High Court of H.P.
CWP No. 3515 of 2026.
Reserved on: 12.08.2026.
st
Decided on: 31 August, 2026.
Gagandeep Singh ...Petitioner.
Versus
State Bank of India & Ors. ... .Respondents.
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge.
1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
For the Petitioner: Mr. Ankush Dass Sood, Senior
Advocate with M/s Satish Sharma,
Aman Parth Sharma and Rishabh
Negi, Advocates.
For the respondents: Mr. Arvind Sharma, Senior Advocate
with M/s Kiran Sharma and Digvijay
Singh Thakur, Advocates.
Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge (Oral).
By way of present petition, the petitioner has, inter alia,
prayed for following reliefs:-
i) That writ of certiorari may kindly be granted and impugned
termination order dated 22.01.2026 and 10.01.2026 may kindly
be quashed and set aside in the interest of justice and fair play.
ii) That respondents may kindly be directed to continue the
services of the petitioner and confirm the same without taking
1
Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
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into account pendency of the criminal case, with all
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consequential benefits including back wages.”
2. Facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are
that in terms of appointment letter Annexure P-2 dated 23.07.2025,
the petitioner was appointed against the post of Junior Associate (CS
& S) in the clerical cadre in the respondent bank in the pay scale of
Rs. 24,050 – 64,480/-. The services of the petitioner were to be
governed by the provisions contained in the Sastry and Desai
Awards, as amended from time to time, by industry or bank-level
settlements etc. The petitioner, pursuant to the said appointment,
joined as such at Hamirpur.
3. An FIR was registered against the petitioner under
Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act
( “NDPS Act”) in Police Station Sadar, Hamipur, i.e. FIR No. 331 of
2025 on 06.12.2025. At the relevant time, the petitioner was in the
service of the respondent bank. He was arrested in the said FIR and
released on bail vide order dated 20.01.2026 passed by learned
Special Judge, Hamirpur, copy whereof is appended with the petition
as Annexure P-3.
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4. Another FIR was lodged against the petitioner, again
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under the provisions of the NDPS Act in Police Station Sadar,
Hamirpur, i.e. FIR No. 329 of 2025 dated 05.12.2025, in which, he
was released on bail by the learned Special Judge, Hamirpur on
23.01.2026.
5. The grievance of the petitioner originates from
Annexure P-4, order dated 22.01.2026, in terms whereof, the
services of the petitioner have been terminated by assigning the
following reasons:-
“As per the terms and conditions of appointment,
confirmation of service was subject to:
a. Receipt of satisfactory report about your character
and antecedents from police authorities.
b. Overall suitability for the position to the satisfaction
of bank.
c. Satisfactory completion of mandatory e-lession.
In this regard, the Character and Antecedent
Verification Report received from the Superintendent of
Police, Hamirpur has been found unsatisfactory. As per the
report of SHO, Police Station Hamirpur, the following FIRs
have been registered against the employee and are
presently under investigation:
I. FIR No. 329/2025 dated 05.12.2025, registered
under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act; and
II. FIR No. 331/2025 dated 06.12.2025, registered
under Section 21 of the NDPS Act.
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Further, the Probationary employee was arrested by the
police and remained in custody for 43 days. The above
circumstance has led to the loss of trust & integrity of the
employee which is paramount in banking services.
The report on work and conduct of the employee submitted
by the Branch Manager has also been found unsatisfactory.”
6. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this
Court.
7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner argued that
the impugned order, in terms whereof, the services of the petitioner
stand terminated, is not sustainable in law. He submitted that in
terms of the impugned order, the services of the petitioner have
been terminated by mentioning therein that the confirmation of the
petitioner in the bank was subject to the receipt of a satisfactory
report about his character and antecedents from police authorities
and overall suitability for the position to the satisfaction of the bank
and as in this regard, the character and antecedent verification
report received from the Superintendent of Police demonstrated
that there were two FIRs registered against the petitioner in the
Police Station at Hamirpur. Therefore, as the petitioner failed to
meet the laid-down benchmark for confirmation as Junior Associate,
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his services could not be confirmed and stood terminated as he was
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on probation. He submitted that though an employer has the
discretion to do away with the services of an incumbent on
probation if the services of said incumbent are not found
satisfactory, however, it is settled law that the services of an
incumbent cannot be done away with during the period of probation
by passing a stigmatic order.
8. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the
impugned order is not a simplicitor order of termination of services
on the ground that the services of the petitioner were not found
satisfactory. He submitted that in the impugned order, it is expressly
and explicitly mentioned that it was the lodging of the two FIRs
against the petitioner, which led to the termination of the services of
the petitioner during the period of probation. He submitted that as
this demonstrated that the termination of the petitioner was
stigmatic, his services could not have been terminated without
holding an inquiry and without associating the petitioner with the
same. Learned Senior Counsel referred to the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarita Chaudhary vs. High Court of
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Madhya Pradesh and another, (2025) 9 SCC 297 , to substantiate his
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contentions.
9. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent bank argued that there is no merit in the petition. He
submitted that after appointment of the petitioner, he was on
probation for a period of six months and his confirmation was
subject to the satisfaction of the bank regarding his character and
antecedents. He submitted that it came to the notice of the
Competent Authority that two FIRs were registered against the
petitioner under the provisions of the NDPS Act. The petitioner was
also arrested in the said FIRs and he remained in custody and,
therefore, his services were terminated in accordance with Clause (l)
of the letter of appointment, copy whereof is appended with the
reply as Annexure R-1. He submitted that the order of termination
was neither stigmatic nor punitive and there was no violation of the
principles of natural justice, as the services of the petitioner were
terminated in terms of the conditions of the letter of appointment
during the period of probation and there was no requirement of
issuance of any show cause notice or holding an inquiry in the said
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circumstances. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-Bank has
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relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
Kamal Nayan Mishra vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors, (2010) 2
SCC 169 and Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Others vs. Ram Ratan
Yadav, (2003) 3 SCC 437 in support of his contentions.
10. I have heard learned Senior Counsel for the parties and
have also carefully gone through the pleadings as also the
judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel.
11. Before the Court proceeds any further, this Court would
like to refer to the terms and conditions of the appointment letter,
copy whereof is appended with the reply as Annexure R-1. In terms
of Annexure R-1, the petitioner was appointed as a Junior Associate
(CS & S).
12. Clause (c) of the letter of appointment dated 23.07.2025
reads as under:
“(c) You will be on probation for a period of six months with
effect from the effective date of joining. Prescribed number of
e-lessions are required to be successfully completed by you
during the probation period. Failing which, your probation
period will be extended and/or your service can be terminated.”
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In terms of Clause (c) of the letter of appointment, the petitioner was
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on probation for a period of six months with effect from the date of
effective joining. Clause (d) of the appointment letter mentioned that
during the period of probation, the performance of the petitioner
would be evaluated and the bank will be entitled to extend the
period of probation, if his work was not found satisfactory during
the said period. It was also mentioned in this clause that the
confirmation was also subject to receipt of satisfactory report about
the character and antecedents from the police authorities and from
the referees named by the petitioner. Clause (f) of the appointment
letter provided that the bank was entitled to terminate the services
of the petitioner during the period of probation by giving one
month's notice or on payment of one month's pay and allowances in
lieu of the notice.
13. Clause (l) of the appointment letter is quoted
hereinbelow:-
“(l) Should you be considered by the Bank at the end of the
probationary period as suitable for the position and you have to
the satisfaction of the Bank, complied with all the terms and
conditions stipulated in this letter, and if the reports of the
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concerned, References/Police/District Authorities regarding your
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character and antecedents are found satisfactory, your
appointment may then be confirmed by the Bank. Otherwise it
will be terminated without assigning any reasons whatsoever.
On confirmation you will be entitled to draw salary and
allowances as applicable to you and subject to the provisions of
various Awards as amended by Bipartite Agreements between
the Bank and the Employee's Union/Federation from time to
time.”
Thus, in terms of this clause, the bank was to consider the petitioner
at the end of the probationary period, subject to the conditions
mentioned therein, for confirmation.
14. In the present case, the petitioner was appointed vide
letter dated 23.07.2025 and his services have been terminated vide
Annexure P-4, i.e. letter dated 22.01.2026. Therefore, it is evident
that the termination of the services of the petitioner is of course
during the period of probation.
15. At this stage, I would refer to the judgments relied upon
by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective
contentions.
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16. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has relied
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upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarita
Chaudhary vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh and another (supra). In
the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the issue of
termination of a probationer, has been pleased to hold as under by
referring to the earlier pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court on the issue:
“50. The services of a probationer could result either in a
confirmation in the post or ended by way of termination
simpliciter. However, if a probationer is terminated from service
owing to a misconduct as a punishment, the termination would
cause a stigma on him. If a probationer is unsuitable for a job
and has been terminated then such a case is non-stigmatic as it
is a termination simpliciter. Thus, the performance of a
probationer has to be considered in order to ascertain whether
it has been satisfactory or unsatisfactory. If the performance of
a probationer has been unsatisfactory, he is liable to be
terminated by the employer without conducting any inquiry. No
right of hearing is also reserved with the probationer and
hence, there would be no violation of principles of natural
justice in such a case.
51. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra (1957 SCC OnLine SC 5), this
Court held that the protection of Article 311 also covers a
probationer if the termination was by way of a punishment and
“it puts delible stigma on the officer affecting his future career”.
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To a similar effect is the ruling of this Court in the case of State
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of Bihar vs. Gopi Kishore Prasad , AIR 1960 SC 689. In the said
case, it was observed that if the employer simply terminates the
services of a probationer without holding an inquiry and
without giving him a reasonable chance of showing cause
against his removal from service, the probationary civil servant
has no cause of action even though the real motive behind the
removal from service may have been that the employer thought
him to be unsuitable for the post he was temporarily holding,
on account of his misconduct, or efficiency or some such cause.
Thus, the test is, whether, in a given case the termination is
simpliciter or by way of punishment. When termination is by
way of punishment, the concept of stigma would arise. If a
punishment casts a stigma on the competence of an employee,
it can affect his future career. However, the dilemma is, even
when the probationer, who has no right to hold the post in the
first instance, could argue that a cessation of service owing to
non-suitability, inefficiency or any other similar reason was
stigmatic.
52. As noted, if a termination from service is not visited with
any stigma and neither are there any civil consequences and
nor is founded on misconduct, then, it would be a case of
termination simpliciter. On the other hand, an assessment of
remarks pertaining to the discharge of duties during the
probationary period even without a finding of misconduct and
termination on the basis of such remarks or assessment will be
by way of punishment because such remarks or assessment
would be stigmatic. According to the dictionary meaning,
stigma is indicative of a blemish, disgrace indicating a deviation
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from a norm. Stigma might be inferred from the references
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quoted in the termination order although the order itself might
not contain anything offensive. Where there is a discharge from
service after prescribed probation period was completed and
the discharge order contain allegations against a probationer
and surrounding circumstances also showed that discharge
was not based solely on the assessment of the employee’s work
and conduct during probation, the termination was held to be
stigmatic and punitive vide Jaswantsingh Pratapsingh Jadeja vs.
Rajkot Municipal Corporation , (2007) 10 SCC 71.
53. Even though a probationer has no right to hold a post, it
would not imply that the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution could be violated inasmuch as there cannot be any
arbitrary or discriminatory discharge or an absence of
application of mind in the matter of assessment of performance
and consideration of relevant materials. Thus, in deciding
whether, in a given case, a termination was by way of
punishment or not, the courts have to look into the substance of
the matter and not the form.
54. In Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192, a
seven-Judge Bench of this Court held that if a probationer was
discharged on the ground of misconduct or inefficiency or for
similar reasons without a proper inquiry it might, in a given
case, amount to inflicting the punishment of removal from
services within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
In the very same case, it was also observed as a test for
determining whether, the termination was by way of
punishment, namely, whether, the termination was sought to be
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founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other
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disqualification. Thus, if a termination is founded on
misconduct, it would be a punishment but de hors this, if the
right to terminate existed, the motive operating in the mind of
the employer would be wholly irrelevant. However, all that is
stated above would ultimately boil down to the question,
whether, the termination would prejudicially affect the future
employment of the employee. It is this delicate line which has to
be discerned in every case where a challenge to a termination is
made by a probationer. In other words, if the termination is
simply owing to unsuitability having regard to the nature of the
job and such other factors, it is not stigmatic. Before any
probationer is considered for confirmation, the satisfactory
nature of the work and suitability of the probationer have to be
considered for which some inquiry would have to be made and
if it is found that he is unsuitable for the job then, he could be
discharged and the same would be non-stigmatic and this
would also not call for opportunity for hearing being given to a
probationer.
55. The relevant case law could be discussed at this stage:
56. In Anoop Jaiswal v. Union of India, (1984)2 SCC 369), the
facts were that the impugned order of discharge was passed in
the middle of the probation period after seeking an explanation
regarding the alleged act of indiscipline. Similar explanations
were called from persons other than the appellant therein, but
in the end only the case of the appellant was dealt with severely.
This Court observed that even though the order of discharge
was non-committal, it could not stand alone. It was observed
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that though the noting in the file of the Government may have
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been irrelevant, the cause of the order of discharge could not
have been ignored. That the recommendation, which was the
basis or the foundation for the order of discharge should have
been read with the order for the purpose of determining its true
character. If on reading the two together the court reached the
conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of
the order and but for that allegation it could not have been
passed, then it was inevitable that the order of discharge should
fall to the ground. This was because the appellant therein had
not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself
as provided in Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
56.1 While holding so, this Court held in paragraph 12
as under: (Anup Jaswal, SCC p. 379)
“12. It is, therefore, now well settled that where the form
of the order is merely a camouflage for an order of
dismissal for misconduct it is always open to the court
before which the order is challenged to go behind the
form and ascertain the true character of the order. If the
court holds that the order though in the form is merely a
determination of employment is in reality a cloak for an
order of punishment, the court would not be debarred,
merely because of the form of the order, in giving effect to
the rights conferred by law upon the employee.”
56.2. Consequently, in the aforesaid case, after discussing the
facts of the case in detail, this Court set aside the order of
discharge/termination of service on the ground that an inquiry
ought to have been held against the appellant therein prior to
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termination of service. As a result, the appellant therein was
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reinstated in service at the same rank and seniority in which he
was entitled to before the order the discharge was passed, as if
it had not been passed at all, with all consequential benefits.
57. In Dipti Prakash Banerjee (1999)3 SCC 60, this Court inter
alia, considered the following points:
“18…...(1) In what circumstances, termination of a
probationer’s services can be said to be founded on
misconduct and in what circumstances could it be said
that allegations were only a motive?
2) When can an order of termination of a probationer be
said to contain an express stigma?
(3) Can stigma be gathered by referring back to
proceedings referred to in termination order?”
57.1 Each of the aforesaid points were answered which can
summarised as under:
“Point 1: If findings were arrived at in an enquiry as to
misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular
departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be
treated as “founded” on the allegations and will be bad. But if
the enquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at and the
employer was not inclined to conduct an enquiry but, at the
same time, he did not want to continue the employee against
whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive
and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the
employer did not want to enquire into the truth of the
allegations because of delay in regular departmental
proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate
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evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a
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motive and not the foundation and the simple order of
termination would be valid.
*
Point 2: There is considerable difficulty in finding out whether in
a given case where the order of termination is not a simple
order of termination, the words used in the order can be said to
contain a 'stigma'. It depends on facts and circumstances of
each case and language or words used to ascertain whether
termination order contains stigma.
*
Point 3: Material which amounts to stigma need not be
contained in termination order of a probationer but might be
contained in documents referred to in the termination order or
in its annexures. Such documents can be asked for, or called
for, by any future employer of the probationer. In such a case,
employee's interests would be harmed and therefore
termination order would stand vitiated on the ground that no
regular enquiry was conducted.
*
It is true that the Supreme Court in some of the cases has
held that termination order is not punitive where employee has
been given suitable warnings or has been advised to improve
himself or where he has been given a long rope by way of
extension of probation. However, in all such cases, there were
simple orders of termination which did not contain any words
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amounting to stigma. On the other hand, there is a stigma in
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the impugned order which cannot be ignored because it will
have effect on the appellant's future. Stigma need not be
contained in termination order but may also be contained in an
order or proceeding referred to in termination order or in an
annexure thereto and would vitiate the termination order.”
57.2 Referring to Indra Pal Gupta vs. Managing Committee,
Model Inter College (1984) 3 SCC 384, it was observed in para
35 that the said decision is a clear authority for the proposition
that the material which amounts to stigma need not be
contained in the order of termination of the probationer but
might be contained in any document referred to in the
termination order or in its annexures. Obviously, such a
document could be asked for or called for by any future
employer of the probationer. In such a case, the order of
termination would stand vitiated on the ground that no regular
enquiry was conducted.
57.3 In that case, the employer had given ample
opportunity to the employee by giving him warnings, asking
him to improve and even extended his probation twice. It was
observed that in such circumstances where he was given a long
rope by way of extension of probation, this Court had said that
the termination order could not be held to be punitive as held in
Hindustan Paper Corpn. vs. Purnedu Chakrobarty & Ors,
(1996)11 SCC 404, ONGC v. Mohd. S. Iskender Ali, (1980) 3 SCC
428, Principal, Institute of Post Graduate Medical Education &
Research, Pondicherry vs. S. Andel & Ors., 1995 Supp (4) SCC
609 and a labour case being Oswal Pressure Die Casting
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Industry, Faridabad vs. Presiding Officer , (1998) 3 SCC 225. This
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Court further observed that in the above noted cases, the order
were simple orders of termination which did not contain any
word amounting to stigma. That in case it was concluded that
there was stigma in the impugned order of termination or
discharge it would have an effect on the future irrespective of
whatever had been the earlier opportunities granted by the
employer to the employee to improve.
57.4. Thus, the approach of the Court must be firstly, to
ascertain whether the impugned order is founded on any
conclusions arrived at by the employer as to his misconduct or
whether the termination was passed because the employer did
not want to continue an employee against whom there were
some complaints. The second aspect is whether there is any
stigma in the order of termination or in the documents referred
to in the termination order. In the aforesaid case, the impugned
order of termination was quashed and the appeal was allowed.
The appellant therein was directed to be reinstated with back
wages till the date of reinstatement and continuity of service
reserving liberty to the respondents therein to take such action
as they deem fit in accordance with law against the appellant
therein.
58. Recently in Swati Priyadarshini (2024) 19 SCC 128,
this Court, placing reliance on the earlier judgment in
Parshotam Lal Dhingram 1857 SCC Online SC 5, granted relief
to the appellant therein. The relevant portion of Parshotam Lal
Dhingra could be recapitulated as under:
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“28. …. Any and every termination of service is not a
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dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of
service brought about by the exercise of a contractual
right is not per se dismissal or removal. … In short, if the
termination of service is founded on the right flowing
from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the
termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil
consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even
if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the
right to terminate the employment without going through
the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of
dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the
Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the
servant and if the termination of service is sought to be
founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other
disqualification, then it is a punishment and the
requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As
already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in
the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the
rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be
terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence,
inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A
termination of the service of such a servant on such
grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a
dismissal or removal within Article 311 , for it operates as
a forfeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil
consequences of loss of pay and allowances.
It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his
future career.”
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59. Jayshree Chamanlal Buddhbhatti, (2013)16 SCC 59 is a case
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pertaining to a Civil Judge, Junior Division who was placed on
probation for the period of two years. The respondent in the
aforesaid case initially received certain adverse remarks to
which she sent her replies and the same were followed by her
termination from service on the premise that her performance
was not good and satisfactory and that she was not suitable for
the post she held. Therefore, it was recommended for
termination of her probation immediately and that she should
not be allowed to continue to officiate in service for a long term.
Being unsuccessful in her representation, she assailed the same
before the High Court which held that it was not a case of
termination simpliciter of a probationary officer and therefore
set aside the termination of her service and directed
reinstatement with back wages. The High Court of Gujarat had
preferred an appeal before this Court. Going through the
original records, this Court summarised as under: (Jayshree
Chaman Lal Buddhbhatti Case, SSC P. 61)
“The question is whether this is a case of termination
simpliciter of the services of a probationer on account of
her unsuitability for the post that she was holding, or
whether it is a termination of her services after holding an
inquiry behind her back, and without giving her an
opportunity to defend herself. Having gone through the
salient judgments on the issue in hand, one thing which
emerges very clearly is that, if it is a case of deciding the
suitability of a probationer, and for that limited purpose
any inquiry is conducted, the same cannot be faulted as
such. However, if during the course of such an inquiry any
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allegations are made against the person concerned,
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which result into a stigma, he must be afforded the
minimum protection which is contemplated under Article
311(2) of the Constitution even though he may be a
probationer. The protection is very limited viz. to inform
the person concerned about the charges against him, and
to give him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.”
Consequently, this Court affirmed relief granted to the
respondent therein by granting reinstatement of her service
with continuity and all consequential benefits. However, the
back wages payable to her were restricted to the period
subsequent to the decision of the High Court as the respondent
therein confined her prayer to that extent as she was interested
in mitigating her position.”
17. In Kamal Narayan Mishra vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
and others (supra), that is the judgment relied upon by the learned
Senior Counsel for the respondents, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
been pleased to hold as under:
“13. This Court in Ram Ratan Yadav, also pointed out that
neither the gravity of the criminal offence nor the ultimate
acquittal therein was relevant when considering whether a
probationer who suppresses a material fact (of his being
involved in a criminal case, in the personal information
furnished to the employer), is fit to be continued as a
probationer.
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14. Therefore, the ratio decidendi of Ram Ratan Yadav is,
High Court of H.P.
where an employee (probationer) is required to give his
personal data in an attestation form in connection with his
appointment (either at the time of or thereafter), if it is found
that the employee had suppressed or given false information in
regard to matters which had a bearing on his fitness or
suitability to the post, he could be terminated from service
during the period of probation without holding any inquiry. The
decision dealt with a probationer and not a holder of a civil
post, and nowhere laid down a proposition that a confirmed
employee holding a civil post under the State, could be
terminated from service for furnishing false inform”
18. Similarly, in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and others
vs. Ram Ratan Yadav ( supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been
pleased to hold as under:
12. The object of requiring information in columns 12
“
and 13 of the attestation form and certification thereafter by
the candidate was to ascertain and verify the character and
antecedents to judge his suitability to continue in service. A
candidate having suppressed material information and/or
giving false information cannot claim right to continue in
service. The employer having regard to the nature of the
employment and all other aspects had discretion to terminate
his services, which is made expressly clear in para 9 of the offer
of appointment. The purpose of seeking information as per
columns 12 and 13 was not to find out either the nature or
gravity of the offence or the result of a criminal case ultimately.
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The information in the said columns was sought with a view to
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judge the character and antecedents of the respondent to
continue in service or not. The High Court, in our view, has
failed to see this aspect of the matter. It went wrong in saying
that the criminal case had been subsequently withdrawn and
that the offences, in which the respondent was alleged to have
been involved, were also not of serious nature. In the present
case the respondent was to serve as a Physical Education
Teacher in Kendriya Vidyalaya. The character, conduct and
antecedent of a teacher will have some impact on the minds of
the students of impressionable age. The appellants having
considered all the aspects passed the order of dismissal of the
respondent from service. The Tribunal after due consideration
rightly recorded a finding of fact in upholding the order of
dismissal passed by the appellants. The High Court was clearly
in error in upsetting the order of the Tribunal. The High Court
was again not right in taking note of the withdrawal of the case
by the State Government and that the case was not of a serious
nature to set aside the order of the Tribunal on that ground as
well. The respondent accepted the offer of appointment subject
to the terms and conditions mentioned therein with his eyes
wide open. Para 9 of the said memorandum extracted above in
clear terms kept the respondent informed that the suppression
of any information may lead to dismissal from service. In the
attestation form, the respondent has certified that the
information given by him is correct and complete to the best of
his knowledge and belief; if he could not understand the
contents of column nos. 12 and 13, he could not certify so.
Having certified that the information given by him is correct
and complete, his version cannot be accepted. The order of
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termination of services clearly shows that there has been due
High Court of H.P.
consideration of various aspects. In this view, the argument of
the learned counsel for the respondent that as per para 9 of the
memorandum, the termination of service was not automatic,
cannot be accepted.”
19. Coming back to the facts of this case, the petitioner was
appointed as a Junior Associate vide appointment letter dated
23.07.2025 on probation for a period of six months. Thereafter, he
joined his duty after he was posted at Hamirpur. The FIRs were
lodged against the petitioner on 05.12.2025 and 06.12.2025,
respectively.
20. Thus, the above demonstrates that the FIRs which were
lodged against the petitioner were not lodged before the petitioner
had joined the service of the respondent bank, but this is an event
which took place during the service of the petitioner with the
respondent bank as a probationer.
21. Now, in this backdrop, if we have a look at the
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned
Senior Counsel for the respondent-Bank, one finds that what the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has been pleased to lay down in the
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said judgments is that if a person conceals certain material facts,
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including criminal antecedents, at the time of applying for the job,
and if subsequently these facts are revealed to the employer during
the period of probation, then the services of such an incumbent can
be terminated during the period of probation itself and there is no
requirement of providing an opportunity to such an incumbent to
meet the charges against him.
22. Thus, these two judgments refer to a situation where the
incident which culminates into the termination of the services of a
probationer had happened before the joining of the petitioner with
the employer and such incident was concealed by the employee
from the employer.
23. As observed hereinabove, in the present case, the
lodging of the two FIRs which have led to the termination of the
petitioner took place after the joining of the petitioner with the
respondent bank, though during the period of probation, which
obviously means that there was no occasion for the petitioner to
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have had disclosed these facts at the time when he applied for the
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post or when he joined the post.
24. Therefore, in this backdrop, this Court has to now
examine as to whether the termination order in the present case is a
simple order of termination during the period of probation or a
stigmatic order.
25. The issue that the services of a probationer cannot be
terminated by passing a stigmatic order with holding an inquiry is
no more res integra , as is evident from the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Sarita Chaudhary vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh
and another , relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, which reiterates this law settled by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in umpteen number of judgments.
26. It is evident from the said judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court and other judgments referred therein, which stand
quoted hereinabove earlier that if the services of a probationer are
terminated during probation on the ground that the probationer is
unsuitable for a job, then such a case is non-stigmatic as it is a
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termination simpliciter. Herein, the performance of the probationer
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has to be considered in order to ascertain whether it has been
satisfactory or unsatisfactory. If the performance of a probationer
has been unsatisfactory, he is liable to be terminated by the
employer without conducting an inquiry. No right of hearing is
reserved with the probationer and there would be no violation of the
principles of natural justice in such a case. However, if the
probationer was discharged on the ground of misconduct during
probation without holding an inquiry, then the termination would
amount to punishment as the termination in such a case is founded
on misconduct.
27. Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that termination
simply owing to unsuitability, having regard to the nature of the job,
is not stigmatic before any probationer is considered for
confirmation. But if the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of
the order and, but for the allegation, it would not have been passed,
then it is inevitable that the order of termination would be a
stigmatic order.
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28. When we apply the adjudications of the Hon'ble
High Court of H.P.
Supreme Court on the facts of this case, one finds that herein the
termination of the petitioner during the period of probation is not
on the ground that his work was found unsatisfactory. In fact, that is
neither the foundation nor the edifice of the order. The foundation
of the order is the lodging of the two FIRs against the petitioner,
which led to the passing of the order of termination.
29. Now, incidentally, herein the FIRs were not lodged
before the petitioner had joined the service of the respondent-Bank,
but was a subsequent development which took place while the
petitioner was in service. Therefore, as observed hereinabove also,
these FIRs cannot be taken shelter of by the respondent-Bank for
justifying its decision by stating that because the antecedents of the
petitioner were not found to be worthy, therefore, his services were
terminated.
30. This Court again repeats and reiterates that the lodging
of the two FIRs was a subsequent event. Thus, in these
circumstances, as the services of the petitioner stand terminated
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during the period of probation on account of the lodging of the said
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two FIRs and his termination during the period of probation was not
attributable to the unsatisfactory service on the part of the
petitioner, the impugned order without holding an inquiry indeed is
stigmatic in terms of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
of India, which already stands referred to hereinabove and which is
not being repeated for the sake of brevity.
31. Thus, in the light of above discussion, this writ petition is
allowed and Annexure P-4 and Annexure P-6, dated 22.01.2026 and
10.03.2026 are ordered to be quashed and set aside with
consequences to ensue, but with the observation that the setting
aside of the impugned order shall not come in the way of the
respondent-Bank to proceed against the petitioner in the matter
afresh, in accordance with law.
32. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Ajay Mohan Goel)
Judge
st
31 August, 2026.
(jai)
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