Prashant Kishor Mehta vs Rajesh Kishor Mehta And Ors

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 3250 OF 2026
Prashant Kishor Mehta
Age 54 Years, Indian Inhabitant
Residing at Diamond House, Vaccha
Gandhi Road, Gamdevi
…Petitioner
Mumbai – 400 007
Versus
Rajesh Kishor Mehta,
Age about 59 years. Occp : Business,
Resident of Usha Kiran,
Carmichael Road, Mumbai – 400 026;
and at Eglantierlaan 7, Bus 3,
Antwerpen – 2020, Belgium ...(Original
Accused No. 2)
2 Central Bureau of Investigation
Bank Securities & Fraud Cell,
Mumbai, through the
Superintendent of Police,
...(Original
Complainant)
Mumbai.
3. The State of Maharashtra
(through the Office of the Public
Prosecutor, High Court of Bombay),
...Respondents
Arjun 1

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

-------
Mr. Rizwan Merchant a/w Aditya Mithe, Abhay Dadhiwal, Ms.
Minal Chandani, Monish Bhatia, Vidhi K., Esha Joshi, i/b Jaykar &
Partners, for the Petitioner.
Mr. V. B. Konde-deshmukh, APP for the Respondent – State.
Mr. Devadatt Kamat, Senior Advocate a/w Aditya Raut, for the
Respondent No. 1.
-------
CORAM : ASHWIN D. BHOBE, J.
th
DATE : 7 July, 2026.
Oral Judgment:
1. Heard, Mr. Rizwan Merchant, learned Advocate for the
Petitioner, Mr. Devadatt Kamat, learned Senior Advocate for the
Respondent No. 1 and Mr. V. B. Konde-deshmukh, learned APP for
the Respondent – State.
2. By this Petition, the Petitioner has sought the following relief
in prayer clauses (a) to (e), which are reproduced verbatim:
a. issue a writ of certiorari or any other
appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature thereof,
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read with
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
calling for the records and proceedings of Criminal
Revision Application No. 106 of 2016 and C.C. No.
662/PW/2009, and after examining the legality. propriety
and correctness thereof, quash and set aside the impugned
judgment and order dated 8th August 2018 passed by the
Ld. Special Judge for C.B.I., Greater Bombay in Criminal
Arjun 2

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

Revision Application No. 106 of 2016 (Exhibit 'C');
b. consequently, restore the order dated 3
November 2015 (Exhibit A) passed by the Ld. Additional
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 3rd Court, Esplanade.
Mumbai rejecting the application for discharge of
Respondent No. 1, and direct that Respondent No. 1
(original accused no. 2) be put up for trial in C.C. No.
662/PW/2009 along with the co-accused for the offences
punishable under Sections 120-B read with 420, 467, 468
and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and the substantive
offences thereof;
c. pending the hearing and final disposal of the
present petition, stay the operation, execution and
implementation of the impugned judgment and order
dated 8 August 2018 (Exhibit 'C');
d. Costs; and
e. pass such other and further order(s) as this
Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case and in the interests of justice.
3. Mr. Devadatt Kamat, learned Senior Advocate for
Respondent No. 1, raises a preliminary objection to the
maintainability and entertainability of this Petition. The objections
raised by Mr. Kamat are threefold: First , that this Petition, which
seeks to challenge the Judgment and Order dated 08.08.2018
(“impugned order”) passed by the Special Judge for CBI, City Civil
and Sessions Court, Greater Bombay (“Sessions Court”), in
Criminal Revision Application No. 106 of 2016 (Exhibit – C), is
Arjun 3

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

hopelessly barred by delay and latches; Second , that the Petitioner
is neither a party nor a Complainant in the proceedings bearing
C.C. No. 662/PW/2009 before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
3rd Court, Esplanade, Mumbai (“Magistrate”), as such lacks locus;
and Third , that this Petition, apart from being frivolous, is
mischievous and has been filed with mala fide intent. To elucidate,
Mr. Kamat submits that, owing to a personal dispute between the
Petitioner and Respondent No. 1, the Petitioner has been
instrumental in initiating or filing at least 150 cases against
Respondent No. 1 in the preceding 3 months, the sole intent being
to harass and humiliate Respondent No. 1. Mr. Kamat submits that
the Petitioner does not fall within the definition of a “victim”
under Section 2(y) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023. For all the said reasons, Mr. Kamat seeks dismissal of this
Petition with exemplary costs.
4. In response to the preliminary objections raised by Mr.
Devadatt Kamat, learned Senior Advocate for Respondent No. 1,
Mr. Rizwan Merchant, learned Advocate for the Petitioner, submits
that the impugned order is perverse and therefore requires
Arjun 4

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

interference by this Court. He refers to paragraph No. 5 (page No.
27 of the Petition memo) to contend that the Petitioner has
explained the delay in filing this Petition. To clarify, he submits
that the Petitioner approached this Court with this Petition only
after acquiring knowledge of the impugned order. He further
submits that no limitation is prescribed for filing a Writ Petition,
therefore the Petitioner is entitled to maintain this Petition before
this Court against the impugned order, which is dated 08.08.2018.
5. In respect of the objection to the locus of the Petitioner, Mr.
Rizwan Merchant fairly submits that the Petitioner is neither a
complainant nor a party to the proceedings bearing CC No.
662/PW/2009 before the Magistrate. However, he submits that the
Petitioner, who is the brother of Respondent No. 1 and the son of
Kishor Mehta (Accused No. 1), is interested in removing the stigma
attached to Accused No. 1 in respect of the acts of omission and
commission of an offence committed by Respondent No. 1.
6. Mr. Rizwan Merchant disputes the contentions of Mr.
Devadatt Kamat regarding the Petitioner filing of 150 cases against
the Respondent No. 1.
Arjun 5

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

7. Perused the records with the assistance of the learned
Advocates.
8. Para 1.3 of the memo of Petition reads as follows:-
“1.3) The Petitioner has no personal interest adverse
to the administration of criminal justice and
approaches this Hon'ble Court as a whistle-blower
solely to ensure that a serious fraud upon public-
sector banks is brought to trial on its merits and is not
stifled at the threshold by an order which is contrary
to law and perverse on facts.”
9. Indisputably, the Petitioner is neither a Complainant nor a
party to the proceedings bearing CC No. 662/PW/2009 before the
Magistrate, nor to the Criminal Revision Application No. 106 of
2016. From the case set out in this Petition, the Petitioner is
neither a victim nor an aggrieved person. The Petitioner has not
suffered any prejudice in relation to the impugned order. Further,
the Petitioner has not demonstrated that his legal rights are
impaired or that any harm or injury has been caused to him by any
act or omission for which the Petitioner was charged. Thus, the
question is whether the Petitioner has locus standi to challenge the
impugned order.
Arjun 6

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Harsh Mandar v.
1
Amit Anilchandra Shah , in paragraph Nos. 36 to 46, has held as
under:-
36. The present case does not involve the issue of
locus standi of a third party/stranger for setting the
criminal law in motion. The issue in the present case is
whether the applicant, who is a total stranger to the
proceedings can invoke the powers under Section 482 CrPC
to challenge the discharge order. Hence, the decision in
Antulay [A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2
SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277] is not strictly applicable to
the facts of the present case.
37. The observations in Sheonandan Paswan
[Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 288 :
1987 SCC (Cri) 82] on the question of locus standi were
restricted to the interpretation and scope of Section 321
CrPC. The judgment does not lay down that a stranger to
the proceeding can invoke the inherent powers of the court
under Section 482 CrPC for challenging the order of
discharge particularly when the order of discharge is
revisable.
38. At this stage it would be advantageous to
refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Subramanian
Swamy [Subramanian Swamy v. Raju, (2013) 10 SCC 465 :
(2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 785] wherein the petitioner, in a public
interest litigation had sought an authoritative
pronouncement of the true purport and effect of the
different provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act so as to take
a juvenile out of the purview of the said Act. The High
Court had declined to answer the question raised on the
1 (2017) 13 SCC 420
Arjun 7

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

ground that the petitioners had an alternative remedy
under the Juvenile Justice Act against the order as may
have been passed by the Board. In the SLP filed before the
Apex Court, an objection was raised as regards its
maintainability on the ground that it suffers from the vice
of absence of locus on the part of the petitioner. While
considering this objection the Apex Court has observed
thus: (SCC p. 469, para 8)
“8. The administration of criminal justice in India
can be divided into two broad stages at which the
machinery operates. The first is the investigation of an
alleged offence leading to prosecution and the second is the
actual prosecution of the offender in a court of law. The
jurisprudence that has evolved over the decades has
assigned the primary role and responsibility at both stages
to the State though we must hasten to add that in certain
exceptional situations there is a recognition of a limited
right in a victim or his family members to take part in the
process, particularly, at the stage of the trial. The law,
however, frowns upon and prohibits any abdication by the
State of its role in the matter at each of the stages and, in
fact, does not recognise the right of a third party/stranger
to participate or even to come to the aid of the State at any
of the stages.”
39. On merits the SLP was held to be
maintainable as the adjudication that the petitioner was
seeking had implications beyond the case/proceedings. It
was held that the interpretations of the provisions of the
Juvenile Justice Act would have effect on all juveniles, who
may come in conflict with law—both in the immediate and
near future.
40. In Simranjit Singh Mann [Simranjit Singh
Mann v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 653 : 1993 SCC (Cri)
22] and Karamjeet Singh [Karamjeet Singh v. Union of
India, (1992) 4 SCC 666 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 17] while
considering the question whether a third party who is a
Arjun 8

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

total stranger to the prosecution culminating in the
conviction of the accused has any locus standi to challenge
the conviction and sentence awarded to them, by invoking
Article 32 of the Constitution, the Apex Court has
reiterated that neither the provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 nor any other statute permits a
third party/stranger to question the correctness of
conviction and sentence imposed by the court after the
regular trial.
41. In Sulochana Devi [Sulochana Devi v. District
Magistrate, 1993 Ori LR 47] the petitioner who was not a
party to the proceedings had invoked the powers of the
High Court under Section 482 CrPC to challenge the order
of issuance of proclamation under Section 82 of the Code
and attachment of the property. Raising the issue of locus
standi, preliminary objection was raised to the
maintainability of the application at the behest of the
petitioner. The Orissa High Court after considering the
scope of Section 482 CrPC as well as the decisions of the
Apex Court in Madhu Limaye [Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] ,
Simranjit Singh [Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India,
(1992) 4 SCC 653 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 22] and in Janata Dal
v. H.S. Chowdhary [Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4
SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : 1993 Cri LJ 600] held that:
“… Even if there are million questions of law to be
deeply gone into and examined in a criminal case
registered against specified accused persons, it is for
him/them to raise all such questions and challenge the
proceedings initiated at appropriate time before the proper
forum and not for third parties either individually or under
the garb of public interest litigation. Ordinarily, the
aggrieved party, which is affected by any order has the
right to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or
correctness of the order unless such party is a minor and
insane person or is suffering from any other disability
which law recognises as sufficient to permit another person
e.g. next friend, to move the court in his behalf.”
Arjun 9

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

42. Reverting to the case in hand, it is not in
dispute that the applicant is neither a victim nor an
aggrieved person. He is not in any manner connected with
the proceedings pending before the learned Sessions Court,
Greater Bombay. The applicant has not suffered any
prejudice and has not demonstrated that his legal rights are
impaired or any harm/injury is caused to him or is likely to
be caused. The applicant has thus not been able to
demonstrate that his legal right has been invaded so as to
give him locus standi to challenge the order.
43. The applicant who claims to be a socially
responsible citizen has allegedly filed this application for
preventing abuse of process of court. It is pertinent to note
that though the alleged incident had occurred in the year
2005, and no case was registered against Respondent 1 and
the other police officers, the applicant herein had not
shown any interest to set the criminal law in motion. The
said crime was registered only pursuant to the directions
given by the Honourable Supreme Court in view of the
letter of grievance made by Rubabbuddin, the brother of
the deceased.
44. It is also pertinent to note that Respondent 1
was discharged by the order dated 30-12-2014. CBI had
not challenged the said order. The aggrieved person,
Rubabbuddin had also not filed any revision application
within the period of limitation. Despite which the
applicant, who claims to be a socially responsible citizen,
had not taken any steps to challenge the said order. It is to
be noted that one Shri Rajesh Kamble, who was also not a
party to the proceedings, had opposed the withdrawal
application filed by Rubabbuddin Shaikh in his capacity of
being “an alert citizen”. The said application was dismissed
vide order dated 21-10-2015. The applicant has shown
interest in this matter only after the dismissal of the
application filed by Rajesh Kamble.
45. It is also pertinent to note that several other
Arjun 10

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

accused in the said crime have also been discharged, but
the applicant has not challenged the said orders, but has
sought to challenge only the order whereby the present
Respondent 1 has been discharged. The social interest and
responsibility proclaimed by the applicant is thus restricted
only to the relief sought against Respondent 1 and does not
even extend to other accused in the said case much less
having larger implications beyond the case. This is a
predominant distinguishing feature in the relief sought in
the present case vis-à-vis a relief in Subramanian Swamy
[Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC
64 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1041 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666] .
The above facts coupled with the fact that the applicant has
shown sudden interest in the matter after a period of over
10 years gives an indication of lack of bona fides. Needless
to state that the criminal law cannot be permitted to be
used as an instrument to wreak vengeance due to personal
or political grudge or to spite the accused for any other
oblique purpose.
46. In the instant case, the State had not
challenged the order of discharge. Nonetheless the
aggrieved person, Rubabbuddin Shaikh, the brother of the
deceased Sohrabuddin had challenged the said order in
Revision Application (St.) No. 413 of 2015 which was filed
along with the application for condonation of delay being
Application No. 355 of 2015. As stated earlier this Court
has allowed the aggrieved person to withdraw the said
application after being satisfied that the request for
withdrawal was voluntary and that the same was not made
under threat, pressure, inducement or promise. Hence, this
is not one of those rare cases which brings about a situation
which is an abuse of the process of the court which
necessitates exercise of inherent jurisdiction.”
11. Petitioner would not be entitled to maintain this Petition on
Arjun 11

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

the broad plea that the Petitioner is interested in removing the
stigma attached to the deceased Accused No. 1, as submitted by
Mr. Rizwan Merchant. Petitioner lacks locus to maintain this
Petition, as rightly submitted by Mr. Devadatt Kamat, learned
Senior Advocate for Respondent No. 1.
12. Criminal proceedings bearing CC No. 662/PW/2009 before
the Magistrate date back to 2009 and involved not only
Respondent No.1 but also Kishor Kirtilal Mehta (now deceased),
father of the Petitioner and Respondent No.1, who was Accused
No.1 in CC No. 662/PW/2009. The impugned order is dated
08.08.2018.
13. Paragraph No. 5 of the Petition memo reads as follows:-
5. As regards limitation, it is respectfully
submitted that there is no period of limitation prescribed
for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Hon'ble
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India read
with Section 482 of the Code. The Petitioner, not being a
party to Criminal Revision Application No. 106 of 2016,
had no notice or knowledge of the impugned order dated
08.08.2018. In the course of the proceedings before the
Hon'ble High Court, the Ld. Advocate for Respondent No.
1, on 22.05.2026, submitted that Respondent. No. 1 had
been discharged in the present proceedings, and the same
was conveyed by the Petitioner's Advocate who was also
Arjun 12

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

present before the Hon'ble High Court in regard to some
other matter, to the Petitioner. On coming to learn thereof,
the Petitioner conducted an online search and was able to
locate the impugned order, and thereupon instructed his
Advocate to apply for a certified copy of the papers and
proceedings of the said Criminal Revision Application. The
Petitioner received the certified copy of the papers and
proceedings on 25.06.2026. The present petition has been
filed promptly thereafter. Any delay in approaching this
Hon'ble Court is therefore neither wilful nor deliberate, but
is occasioned solely by the Petitioner's want of knowledge
of the impugned order until the aforesaid date.
14. Mr. Rizwan Merchant submits that no limitation period is
prescribed for filing a Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India or under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023.
15. Though no period of limitation is prescribed under the
Limitation Act, 1963, for the exercise of powers under Articles 226
or 227 of the Constitution of India, there must be no inordinate
delay, laches or negligence on the part of the litigant in
approaching the Court.
16. Although styled as a Petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, read with Section 528 of the BNSS, this
Arjun 13

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

Petition essentially invokes the supervisory jurisdiction of this
Court by way of a writ of Certiorari, as evident from the reliefs
sought. Accordingly, the Petitioner ought to have approached this
Court within a reasonable period. The question before this Court is
whether a delay of 7 years and 10 months in filing this Petition is
reasonable?
17.
The limitation period for a Criminal Revision Application
under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (now BNSS 2023) is
90 days, as per Article 131 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act
1963. Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act 1963
provides a limitation period of three years for any Application for
which no period of limitation is specified elsewhere in the
Schedule (Period of Limitation) of the Limitation Act 1963.
18.
Petitioner, having approached this Court after a period of 7
years and 10 months to challenge the impugned order (dated
08.08.2018), is subject to the principles of delay and latches.
19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in State of M.P. vs. Nandlal
2
Jaiswal & ors., in paragraph No. 24, has held as follows :-
2 (1986) 4 SCC 566
Arjun 14

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

24. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High
Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the
exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy
and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If
there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in
filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily
explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and
grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The
evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a
number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under
the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion
and public inconvenience and bring in its train new
injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if
the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed
after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting
not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on
third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court
is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of
third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor
which always weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not
think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference
to various decisions of this Court where it has been
emphasised time and again that where there is inordinate
and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in
the intervening period, the High Court would decline to
interfere, even if the State action complained of is
unconstitutional or illegal. We may only mention in the
passing two decisions of this Court one in Ramana
Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India
[(1979) 3 SCC 489: AIR 1979 SC 1628: (1979) 3 SCR
1014] and the other in Ashok Kumar Mishra v. Collector
[(1980) 1 SCC 180: AIR 1980 SC 112: (1980) 1 SCR 491].
We may point out that in R.D. Shetty case, even though the
State action was held to be unconstitutional as being
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court
refused to grant relief to the petitioner on the ground that
the writ petition had been filed by the petitioner more than
Arjun 15

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

five months after the acceptance of the tender of the fourth
respondent and during that period, the fourth respondent
had incurred considerable expenditure, aggregating to
about Rs 1.25 lakhs, in making arrangements for putting
up the restaurant and the snack bar. Of course, this rule of
laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a
strait jacket formula, for there may be cases where despite
delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may
still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant
relief to the petitioner. But, such cases where the demand
of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be
inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third
party rights would by their very nature be few and far
between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the
discretion of the court; ex hypothesi every discretion must
be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and
not to defeat it.
20. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board
3
and Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in
paragraph No. 16 has held as under :-
16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be
lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the
explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The
court should bear in mind that it is exercising an
extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a
constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of
the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to
the primary principle that when an aggrieved person,
without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own
leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage
should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in
the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and
3 (2014) 4 SCC 108
Arjun 16

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances
inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant
who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects
inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant
who has forgotten the basic norms, namely,
"procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second,
law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix.
Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.
4
21. In Popat Bahiru Govardhane vs. Land Acquisition Officer in
paragraph No. 16, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as
follows :-
16. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation
may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.
The court has no power to extend the period of limitation
on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause
hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the
court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to
the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means
"the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such
a situation. It has consistently been held that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered
while interpreting a statute. "A result flowing from a
statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power
to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation."(See Martin Burn Ltd.
v. Corpn. of Calcutta [AIR 1966 SC 529], AIR p. 535, para
14 and Rohitash Kumar v. Om Prakash Sharma [(2012) 13
SCC 792: AIR 2013 SC 30].) Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co.
Ltd. v. State of Bombay 1957 SCC OnLine SC 7.
4 (2013) 10 SCC 765
Arjun 17

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in N. Balakrishnan v. M.
5
Krishnamurthy in paragraph No. 11, has observed as follow s :-
"11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights
of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort
to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The
object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage
caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes
a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal
injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would
never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes
would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal
remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be
fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the
remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and
consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus
founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim
interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general
welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the
parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to
dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is
that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a
legislatively fixed period of time.
23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Londhe Prakash
6
Bhagwan v. Dattatraya Eknath Mane has in paragraph No. 9 held
as follows :-
9. Even if we assume that no limitation is prescribed in
any statute to file an application before the court in that
case, can an aggrieved person come before the court at his
5 (1998) 7 SCC 123
6 (2013) 10 SCC 627
Arjun 18

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

sweet will at any point of time? The answer must be in the
negative. If no time-limit has been prescribed in a statute to
apply before the appropriate forum, in that case, he has to
come before the court within a reasonable time. This Court
on a number of occasions, while dealing with the matter of
similar nature held that where even no limitation has been
prescribed, the petition must be filed within a reasonable
time. In our considered opinion, the period of 9 years and
11 months, is nothing but an inordinate delay to pursue the
remedy of a person and without submitting any cogent
reason therefor. The court has no power to condone the
same in such case. (See Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory
[(2012) 8 SCC 524 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 540] , State of
Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty [(2011) 3 SCC 436 : (2011) 2
SCC (L&S) 83] and K.R. Mudgal v. R.P. Singh [(1986) 4
SCC 531 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 6] .) In these cases, it has been
held that the application should be rejected on the ground
of inordinate delay. Furthermore, it is to be noted that
appointment of the appellant was within the knowledge of
Respondent 1 from day one but he did not take any step for
such a long time.
24. The justification sought to be put forth by the Petitioner in
paragraph No. 5 does not make out any cause, let alone “sufficient
cause”, to condone the delay of 7 years and 10 months on the
touchstone of the guidelines enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Raghunathpur Nafar
7
Academy
7 (2013) 12 SCC 649
Arjun 19

22-WP-3250-2026.doc

25. In the present case, Respondent No. 2 - CBI, has not
challenged the impugned order allowing the discharge of
Respondent No. 1 from the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
662/PW/2009.
26. In the wake of the above, I uphold the preliminary objection
raised by Mr. Devadatt Kamat, learned Senior Advocate for the
Respondent No. 1 and dismiss this Petition on the ground that the
Petitioner lacks locus, as well as on the ground that this Petition is
barred by inordinate delay and laches.
27. In view of the above, the Petition is dismissed.
28.
There shall be no orders as to costs.
(ASHWIN D. BHOBE, J.)
Digitally
signed by
ARJUN
KRISHNA
RODGE
Date:
2026.07.11
18:37:18
+0530
ARJUN
KRISHNA
RODGE
Arjun 20