KRISHNA RAM BARHAI vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010286002022 2026:CGHC:45678
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 3848 of 2022
Reserved on 1.10.2026
Pronounced on 29.10.2026
SHYNA
AJAY
Digitally
signed by
SHYNA AJAY
Date:
2026.10.29
19:13:21
+0530
Krishna Ram Barhai S/o Late Shri Rai Singh, Aged About 57 Years, R/o
Forest Colony, Balodabazar District Balodabazar Bhatapara
Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Secretary, General
Administration Department, Naya Raipur, Atal Nagar, District Raipur
Chhattisgarh
2 - State Information Commission Through Chief Information
Commissioner, Chhattisgarh State Information Commission Naya
Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
3 - The Divisional Forest Officer, Balodabazar, Forest Division
Balodabazar, District Balodabazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh
4 - Anil Agrawal S/o Shri Agrawal, Aged About 50 Years R/o
Bandwapara, Purani Basti, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Akash Pandey, Advocate
For Respondent
1 & 3/State
:
Dr. Arham Siddiqui, Panel Lawyer
For Respondent
:
Dr. Shyam Sunder Lal Tekchandani, Advocate
No.2
For Respondent
:
Mr. Pranjal Agarwal, Advocate
No.4
SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
C A V Order
1.
The present Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India has been preferred challenging the legality, propriety and
validity of the impugned order dated 11.04.2022 passed by the
Chhattisgarh State Information Commission (Respondent No. 2)
in Complaint Case No. C/922/2021. By the impugned order,
Respondent No. 2 recorded a finding of guilt against the petitioner
for wrongful denial of information, issued a show cause notice for
imposing a maximum penalty of Rs. 25,000/- under Section 20(1)
of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as
"the Act of 2005") and directed recommendation of departmental
proceedings under Section 20(2) of the Act of 2005.
2.
Brief facts of the case, as projected by the petitioner, are that
Respondent No. 4 filed an application dated 19.07.2021 under
Section 6(1) of the RTI Act before the petitioner, who was then
functioning as the Public Information Officer-cum-Divisional Forest

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Officer, Forest Division, Baloda Bazar, seeking certified copies of
the official vehicle logbook and the official daily movement diary of
the petitioner for the month of June 2021. The petitioner/PIO
considered the application and filed a detailed response dated
11.08.2021 within the statutory period of thirty days. The petitioner
informed the applicant that the information sought pertained to
routine travel movements and operational deployments of a forest
authority, disclosure of which would compromise official security
and personal safety, thereby falling under the exemptions
provided under Sections 8(1)(j) and 11(1) of the RTI Act, in light of
the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP(C)
No.27734/2012 { Girish Ramchandra Deshpande vs. CIC }. The
petitioner stated in the reply that if aggrieved, Respondent No. 4
may prefer a First Appeal under Section 19(1) of the Act of 2005.
However, instead of exhausting the statutory appellate remedy
provided under Section 19(1) of the Act of 2005 before the First
Appellate Authority, Respondent No. 4 directly approached the
State Information Commission by filing a complaint dated
28.08.2021 under Section 18 of the Act of 2005. Respondent No.
2 registered the complaint as Complaint Case No. C/922/2021
and issued notice to the petitioner. With considering the reply of
the petitioner, Respondent No.2 passed the impugned order
dated 11.04.2022, holding the petitioner guilty of withholding
information and issuing show cause notice(s) under Sections
20(1) and 20(2) of the Act of 2005. Hence, this Petition.

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3. Mr. Akash Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,
submits that the impugned order dated 11.04.2022 is illegal, non-
speaking and passed in violation of the principles of natural
justice. He submits that Respondent No. 2 committed a grave
jurisdictional error by entertaining a direct complaint under Section
18 when a reply/denial had already been furnished by the PIO,
thereby, allowing the information seeker to bypass the mandatory
statutory remedy of a First Appeal under Section 19(1). He further
submits that official movement diaries and vehicle logbooks of a
field officer contain operational and security sensitive details and
are exempt from disclosure under Section 8(1)(j) of the Act of
2005. He also argued that penalty under Section 20 cannot be
imposed without recording a finding of mala fide intent or
deliberate refusal and since the petitioner acted bona fide, no
mala fide intent could be attributed to him. He also submits that
Respondent No. 2 prejudged the issue by recording a conclusive
finding of guilt in the impugned order prior to considering the reply
to the show cause notice, reducing the process to a mere empty
formality. He further submits that under the statutory scheme of
the Act of 2005, the State Information Commission is constituted
comprising the State Chief Information Commissioner and State
Information Commissioners. For the Commission to lawfully
exercise its quasi-judicial powers, any proceeding or order
conducted/passed in the name of the State Information
Commission must be adjudicated by a bench duly constituted by
or including the State Chief Information Commissioner or by a

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division/multi member bench as contemplated under the Act. In
the present case, the hearing was conducted and the impugned
order was passed solely by a single State Information
Commissioner acting as a single-member bench without the
participation or administrative authorization of the Chief
Information Commissioner. Therefore, the proceedings were
conducted coram non judice and in direct violation of the statutory
provisions of the Act of 2005, thereby rendering the impugned
order illegal, void and non est in the eyes of law .
4. Per contra, Mr. Shyam Sunder Lal Tekchandani, learned counsel
appearing for the State Information Commission (Respondent No.
2) submits that the impugned order dated 11.04.2022 only
recorded a prima facie view regarding the improper denial of
information and issued a show cause notice under Sections 20(1)
and 20(2) of the Act of 2005. He submits that the proceedings
have not attained finality and the petitioner was afforded full
opportunity to demonstrate bona fide conduct, meaning thereby
no cause of action has accrued to invoke the writ jurisdiction of
this Court. He also submits that under Section 18 read with
Section 20 of the Act of 2005, the Commission possesses wide
supervisory powers to inquire into cases of illegal withholding of
information and non-filing of a First Appeal does not extinguish
this jurisdiction. He asserted that under Section 2(f) of the Act of
2005, vehicle logbooks and daily diaries fall within the definition of
"information" and refusal under Section 8(1)(j) without
demonstrating how disclosure would cause an unwarranted

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invasion of privacy is legally untenable. He further submits that
regarding the Bench constitution, under Sections 12(4) and 15(4)
of the Act of 2005, the Chief Information Commissioner possesses
administrative authority to constitute Benches, as affirmed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Information Commission Vs.
DDA and another reported in (2024) 8 SCC 812 . Hence, he prays
for dismissal of the petition.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the
documents annexed with the petition with utmost circumspection.
6. Evidently, the impugned order dated 11.04.2022 passed by the
Chhattisgarh State Information Commission reveals that the
authority failed to appreciate an important aspect of the case i.e.
the information seeker had sought details regarding the vehicle
logbook and official travel itineraries of the petitioner, who was
then serving as Divisional Forest Officer, Forest Division, Baloda
Bazar. A perusal of the reply filed by the petitioner/Public
Information Officer shows that disclosure was denied under
Sections 8(1)(j) and 11(1) of the Act of 2005 on the ground that
the information sought constitutes personal information. The
petitioner stated that disclosing routine travel movements could
entail security implications for the official as well as third parties.
7.
It is a vital aspect of the matter that the information seeker
preferred a direct complaint under Section 18 of the Act of 2005
before the State Information Commission without exhausting the
statutory remedy of filing a First Appeal under Section 19(1). The

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law is well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chief
Information Commissioner Vs. State of Manipur and others,

reported in AIR 2012 SC 864 that Section 18 and Section 19 of
the Act of 2005 operate in distinct fields and serve different
purposes. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while entertaining
a complaint under Section 18, the Information Commission
exercises purely inquisitorial and penal jurisdiction and has no
jurisdiction to direct the disclosure of information, which can only
be sought through the appellate procedure prescribed under
Section 19. The following was held in paragraphs 38, 39, 40 &
49 :
38. The procedure for hearing the appeals has been
framed in exercise of power under clauses (e) and (f) of
sub-section (2) of Section 27 of the Act. They are called the
Central Information Commission (Appeal Procedure)
Rules, 2005. The procedure of deciding the appeals is laid
down in Rule 5 of the said Rules. Therefore, the procedure
contemplated under Section 18 and Section 19 of the said
Act is substantially different.
39. The nature of the power under Section 18 is
supervisory in character whereas the procedure under
Section 19 is an appellate procedure and a person who is
aggrieved by refusal in receiving the information which he
has sought for can only seek redress in the manner
provided in the statute, namely, by following the procedure
under Section 19. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion
that Section 7 read with Section 19 provides a complete
statutory mechanism to a person who is aggrieved by
refusal to receive information. Such person has to get the
information by following the aforesaid statutory provisions.
The contention of the appellant that information can be
accessed through Section 18 is contrary to the express
provision of Section 19 of the Act.

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40. It is well known that when a procedure is laid down
statutorily and there is no challenge to the said statutory
procedure the Court should not, in the name of
interpretation, lay down a procedure which is contrary to
the express statutory provision. It is a time-honoured
principle as early as from the decision in Taylor v. Taylor
[(1875) 1 Ch D 426 (CA)] that where a statute provides for
something to be done in a particular manner it can be done
in that manner alone and all other modes of performance
are necessarily forbidden. This principle has been followed
by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Nazir
Ahmad v. Emperor [(1935-36) 63 IA 372 : AIR 1936 PC 253
(2)] and also by this Court in Deep Chand v. State of
Rajasthan [AIR 1961 SC 1527 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 705] , AIR
at para 9 and also in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh [AIR
1964 SC 358 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 263 (2)] reported in AIR at
para 8.
49. There is another aspect also. The procedure under
Section 19 is an appellate procedure. A right of appeal is
always a creature of statute. A right of appeal is a right of
entering a superior forum for invoking its aid and
interposition to correct errors of the inferior forum. It is a
very valuable right. Therefore, when the statute confers
such a right of appeal that must be exercised by a person
who is aggrieved by reason of refusal to be furnished with
the information.
8. Furthermore, in the matter of Shishir Gupta Vs. Central Public
Information Officer, Reserve Bank of India , reported in 2022
SCC OnLine CIC 159 , the Central Information Commission,
reiterating the principle laid down in State of Manipur (supra) ,
held as under in paragraph 11:
11. This Commission further observes that while
examining the complaint under Section 18 of the RTI Act,
2005, the CIC has no jurisdiction to direct disclosure of

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any information. This legal position has been
authoritatively settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India in Chief Information Commissioner v. State of
Manipur in Civil Appeal Nos. 10787-10788 of 2011 dated
12-12-2011. The relevant extract of the said decision is set
down below:
“ 30. It has been contended before us by the
Respondent that under Section 18 of the Act the Central
Information Commission or the State Information
Commission has no power to provide access to the
information which has been requested for by any person
but which has been denied to him. The only order which
can be passed by the Central Information Commission or
the State Information Commission, as the case may be,
under Section 18 is an order of penalty provided under
Section 20. However, before such order is passed the
Commissioner must be satisfied that the conduct of the
Information Officer was not bona fide.
31. We uphold the said contention and do not find
any error in the impugned judgment of the High court
whereby it has been held that the Commissioner
while entertaining a complaint under Section 18 of
the said Act has no jurisdiction to pass an order
providing for access to the information .
37. We are of the view that Sections 18 and 19 of the
Act serve two different purposes and lay down two
different procedures and they provide two different
remedies. One cannot be a Substitute for the other….”
9.
While resorting to a complaint under Section 18 may be
permissible where a Public Information Officer fails to respond or
refuses to accept an application altogether, once a reply/denial
has been furnished by the PIO, the aggrieved party must resort to
the First Appellate Authority under Section 19(1). The statutory

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scheme does not permit converting a grievance against a PIO's
reply into a direct complaint under Section 18 as a substitute for
an appeal. On this ground alone, the order passed by the
Commission is rendered unsustainable and liable to be quashed.
10. Furthermore, the information sought pertaining to the day-to-day
official movements and vehicle logbook of a serving field officer
could not have been disclosed in view of the statutory bar under
Section 8(1)(j) of the Act of 2005. The State Information
Commission did not consider the detailed explanation submitted
by the petitioner and proceeded to hold the petitioner guilty
without recording any finding of mala fide intent or willful
withholding of information.
11.
In view of the settled position of law { Manohar S/o Manikrao
Anchule Vs. State of Maharashtra and another reported in
(2012) 13 SCC 14 )}, proceedings for penalty under Section 20 (1)
and recommendation of departmental action under Section 20 (2)
cannot be sustained in the absence of a deliberate default or
malafide conduct on the part of the Public Information Officer.
Given that the petitioner acted bona fide, no malafide intent can
be inferred or presumed against him. Hence, the impugned order
recording a premature finding of guilt and issuing the show cause
notice under Section 20 is bad in law.
12.
With respect to the petitioner's objection regarding the constitution
of the Bench, the Act of 2005 establishes a tiered mechanism
comprising the Public Information Officer, the First Appellate

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Authority and the Second Appellate Authority depending on the
facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, each member of the
State Information Commission and the Central Information
Commission is fully competent to decide the issue involved on its
own merits. There is therefore no question of an individual
Commissioner usurping the jurisdiction of the Commission or
passing an order in a personal capacity, as argued by counsel for
the petitioner.
13. Furthermore, in the matter of Central Information Commission
v. DDA (supra), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
that absence of an explicit provision for Benches does not negate
the CIC’s authority to constitute them, as such powers are
implicitly included within the scope of the CIC’s general
superintendence and management responsibilities. Further, the
broad language of the RTI Act indicates an intention to grant the
CIC comprehensive authority to ensure the effective and efficient
functioning of the commission. Relevant portion of the said
decision reads as under:-
17. The absence of an explicit provision for
Benches does not negate the CIC’s authority to
constitute them, as such powers are implicitly
included within the scope of the CIC’s general
superintendence and management responsibilities.
The broad language of the RTI Act indicates an
intention to grant the CIC comprehensive authority
to ensure the effective and efficient functioning of
the Commission. The Delhi High Court’s narrow
reading of the provisions overlooked the inherent of

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the CIC to manage the affairs of the Commission.
The RTI Act’s broad language suggests that
legislative intent was to provide the CIC with the
necessary authority to implement measures that
ensure the Commission's effective operation.
18. In the present case, the RTI Act should be
interpreted purposively, taking into account the
broader objectives of the legislation. The purpose of
the RTI Act is to promote transparency and
accountability in the functioning of public
authorities, ensuring citizens’ essential that the
Central Information Commission operates efficiently
and without undue procedural constraints. The
principle of purposive interpretation supports the
view that the CIC’s powers under Section 12(4) of
the RTI Act includes all necessary measures to
manage and direct the Commissioner’s affairs
effectively. This includes the ability to form Benches
to handle the increasing volume of cases. The
formation of Benches allows for the efficient
allocation of work and ensures the timely disposal
of cases, which is crucial for upholding the right to
information.
14. Coming to the facts of the present case, in light of the principles
laid down in the aforesaid judgment {Central Information
Commission Vs. DDA (supra)} , although the petitioner fails on
the ground concerning the constitution and quorum of the Bench,
the impugned order nevertheless suffers from a jurisdictional
defect under Section 18 of the Act of 2005. Furthermore, it is
substantively unsustainable on merits due to the absence of any
finding of malafide intent. Consequently, the impugned order
cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

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15. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 11.04.2022 passed by
Respondent No. 2 is set-aside.
16.
Consequently, the Writ Petition is allowed.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Shyna Ajay