Mohd Taqi Through Spa Holder Mr. Mohd Saleem vs Shujauddin

Court
Delhi High Court

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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% Reserved on: 08 September, 2026
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Pronounced on: 17 November, 2026
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Uploaded on: 17 November, 2026
# CNR No. DLHC010422862026
+ RFA 969/2026, CM APPL. 60640/2026
MOHD. TAQI
S/o Late Mohd. Suleman
R/o 404, Gali Matiamahal,
Jama Masjid, Delhi-110006.
Through SPA holder Mr. Mohd. Saleem
S/o Mohd. Taqi
R/o 404, Gali Matiamahal,
Jama Masjid, Delhi-110006.
....Appellant
Through: Appellant with Counsel.
versus
SHUJAUDDIN
S/o Late Mohd. Farooq
R/o 404-B, Gali Matiamahal,
Jama Masjid, Delhi-110006.
....Respondent
Through: Mr. Rishu Singh, Advocate
along with Respondent in
person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
J U D G M E N T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.

1. The present Regular First Appeal under Section 96 read with Section
151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as
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“CPC ”), has been preferred by the Defendant/Appellant against the
Judgment and Decree dated 30.04.2026, whereby the learned District Judge
decreed the Suit of the Plaintiff/Respondent for recovery of possession of
the suit property and awarded mesne profits at the rate of ₹8,000/- per
month with effect from 01.11.2021 till the handing over of possession, with
an enhancement of 10% after six weeks from the date of the Decree and a
further enhancement of 10% every three years thereafter, till the vacation of
the Suit Property.
2. The Plaintiff/Respondent had instituted Civil Suit bearing CS DJ
No. 165/2022, seeking recovery of possession, damages and mesne profits,
in respect of portions of the second and third floors of property bearing No.
404, Gali Matia Mahal, Jama Masjid, Delhi, more particularly shown in red
in the Site Plan annexed with the Plaint (hereinafter referred to as the "suit
property").
3. The facts in brief, as stated in the plaint are that the Plaintiff was the
owner of the suit property, by virtue of a registered Sale Deed dated
08.06.1989. It was asserted that Defendant, Mohd. Taqi, being the paternal
uncle of the Plaintiff, had been permitted to reside in the suit property, along
with his family members out of love and affection , without payment of any
license fee. The Plaintiff claimed that the occupation of the Defendant was
merely permissive and that neither the Defendant nor his family members
had any independent right, title or interest in the suit property.
4. However, owing to certain acts and conduct of the Defendant and his
family members, the Plaintiff was no longer willing to permit their
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continued occupation, and he also required the suit property for his own use,
and that of his family members.
5. Accordingly, the Plaintiff terminated the license of the Defendant
with effect from 31.10.2021, vide Legal Notice dated 16.09.2021. Despite
termination of the license, the Defendant failed to vacate and hand over
possession of the suit property.
6. Consequently, the Plaintiff instituted the present Suit seeking
recovery of possession, along with ₹30,000/- towards use and occupation
charges for the period November 2021 to January 2022, along with
pendente lite and future damages/ mesne profits at the rate of ₹10,000/- per
month from the Defendant until the handing over of vacant possession of the
suit property.
7. The Defendant, in his Written Statement , denied the claim of the
Plaintiff, and asserted that he was never a licensee under the Plaintiff , but
was occupying the suit property in his own right, as its owner.
8. The Preliminary objections were taken that the Suit was barred under
Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance ) Act, 1956, as
the suit property was situated in a notified Slum Area and no prior
permission of the Competent Authority, had been obtained. It was further
asserted that the Suit was barred by limitation , and was bad for non-joinder
of necessary parties, as all the legal heirs of Late Mohd. Sulaiman had not
been impleaded.
9. On merits, the Defendant explained that Late Mohd. Sulaiman , his
father and the grandfather of the Plaintiff, had acquired the plot of land from
its erstwhile owner in or around 1947 and had raised construction thereon,
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from his own funds. Mohd. Sulaiman expired in the 1980s, leaving behind
four sons, namely Mohd. Rafiq, Mohd. Islam, Mohd. Farooq and Mohd.
Taqi (the defendant) , of whom the first three had since expired. The
Plaintiff, being the son of Late Mohd. Farooq , was the nephew of the
Defendant.
10. It was asserted that the Plaintiff had no superior right or title over the
suit property, which originally belonged to their common predecessor,
Mohd. Sulaiman.
11. The Defendant further claimed that during his lifetime, Mohd.
Sulaiman had executed a Hibanama/Gift Deed, whereby the property had
been divided amongst his sons in the following manner:
(a) First Floor: Mohd. Farooq and Mohd. Rafiq.
(b) Second Floor: Mohd. Taqi and Mohd. Islam. (The roof
rights were kept common.)
12. Furthermore, it was averred that the aforesaid Family Arrangement
had been acted upon since the 1980s and had remained undisturbed for more
than 40 years. Neither the Gift Deed nor the arrangement had ever been
challenged by any family member. The Defendant, therefore, claimed that
he had been occupying the portion falling to his share as its owner and not
as a licensee under the Plaintiff.
13. The Defendant disputed the ownership claimed by the Plaintiff on the
basis of the registered Sale Deed dated 08.06.1989, alleging that the same
was forged and fabricated. The alleged vendor, Smt. Mehmood Jahan
Begum, or her predecessors, had never been the owners of the suit property
and, therefore, could not have conveyed any title to the Plaintiff.
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14. It was further contended that despite the Sale Deed having been
registered in 1989, the Plaintiff had taken no action to assert his alleged
ownership, for nearly 33 years. The Suit was, therefore, claimed to be
barred by limitation.
15. In the alternative, the Defendant claimed to have perfected his title by
way of adverse possession , asserting that his possession had been open,
continuous and hostile to the Plaintiff for several decades. He also disputed
the correctness of the Site Plan filed by the Plaintiff. He also denied having
received the Legal Notice dated 16.09.2021, terminating the alleged licence.
16. Denying the remaining averments in the Plaint, he sought dismissal of
the Suit with costs.
17. The Issues on the pleadings were framed on 25.11.2022, as under:
“ (i)Whether the defendant is in permissive possession of
the suit property i.e. portions at second and third floor of
property bearing no. 404, Gali Matia Mahal, Jama
Masjid, Delhi as shown in red colour in the site plan as a
licensee under the plaintiff ? OPP
(ii) Whether the aforesaid licence of the defendant has
been terminated by the plaintiff w.e.f 31.10.2021 vide
legal notice dated 16.09.2021? OPP
(iii) Whether the suit of plaintiff is barred under Section
19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act
1956 ? OPD
(iv) Whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred by
limitation ? OPD
(v) Whether the defendant is in possession of the suit
property as an owner thereof in terms of gift deed of Late
Mohd. Suleman? OPD
(vi) Whether the defendant has become the owner of the
suit property by way of adverse possession? OPD
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(vii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree for
recovery of possession of the suit property in his favour?
OPP
(viii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the user charges
in respect of the suit property to the extent of Rs. 30,000/-
for the period November 2021 to January 2022 ? OPP
(ix) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to pendente lite and
future damages/mesne profits, if so, at what rate and for
what period? OPP
(x) Relief ? ”

18. The Plaintiff, Sh. Shujauddin , in support of his case, examined
himself as PW-1 and proved the following documents:
Sr. No. Name of the Document Exhibit/Mark
1. Site Plan Ex.PW1/1
2. Sale Deed dated 08.06.1989 Ex.PW1/2
3. Legal Notice dated 16.09.2021, postal receipt
Ex.PW1/3
and delivery/tracking report.
(Colly.)

19. The Defendant, Mohd. Taqi, examined himself as DW-1 and proved
the following documents:
Sr. No. Name of Document Exhibit/Mark
1. Hibanama / Gift Deed dated 03.01.1974 Ex.DW1/1
2. Copy of Passport of Smt. Hanida Begum Ex.DW1/2
3. Copy of Passport of Mohd. Waseem Ex.DW1/3
4. Copy of Passport of Mohd. Nadeem Ex.DW1/4
5. Copy of Birth Certificate of Mohd. Saleem Ex.DW1/5
6. Copy of Birth Certificate of Mohd. Nadeem Ex.DW1/6
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7. Copy of Birth Certificate of Mohd. Rehan Ex.DW1/7
8. Copy of Birth Certificate of Kamran Ex.DW1/8
9. Copy of cement receipt Ex.DW1/9

20. The learned Trial Court , on appreciation of the evidence, held that
the Plaintiff had established his ownership over the suit property, by virtue
of the registered Sale Deed dated 08.06.1989 Ex. PW1/2, executed by Smt.
Mehmood Jahan Begum in his favour. It was observed that a registered Sale
Deed carries a presumption of valid execution, which the Defendant had
failed to rebut. Though the title of the vendor was disputed, the Defendant,
in his cross-examination, was unable to admit or deny whether Smt.
Mehmood Jahan Begum was the owner of the suit property.
21. In regard to the claim of ownership of the Defendant under the
Hibanama /Gift Deed dated 03.01.1974 Ex. DW1/1, the learned Trial Court
observed that the Defendant had failed to establish that his father, Late
Mohd. Sulaiman, was ever the owner of the suit property. In his cross-
examination, the Defendant admitted that he had no document to establish
his father's ownership and that his knowledge was based upon what his
father had told him. In the absence of proof of title in favour of Mohd.
Sulaiman , the Defendant could not claim ownership on the basis of the
alleged Gift Deed executed by him. Accordingly, the ownership of the
Plaintiff, was held to be established.
22. The learned Trial Court also rejected the Defendant's objection
regarding the identity of the suit property. While the Sale Deed mentioned
property No. 404-B, the Suit had been filed in respect of property No. 404.
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The Plaintiff clarified in his cross-examination that property No. 404
comprised two portions, Part A and Part B, and that the suit property formed
part of 404-B. The Defendant had not filed any contrary Site Plan, and his
description of the portions in his occupation, was substantially consistent
with the Site Plan Ex. PW1/1 filed by the Plaintiff. The learned Trial Court,
therefore, rejected the objection regarding the identity of the suit property.
23. The plea of adverse possession was likewise, rejected. It was held that
mere long and continuous occupation, without any clear and unequivocal
assertion of hostile title to the knowledge of the true owner, could not
constitute adverse possession. The Defendant's possession was, therefore,
held to be permissive in nature.
24. The objection under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1956 was also rejected. Relying upon the decisions of this
Court in Punnu Ram v. Chiranji Lal Gupta and Satender Jain v. Satya
Narain Sanjiv Gupta HUF , the learned Trial Court held that the protection
under Section 19 was available to tenants in law and not to occupants
generally. Since the Defendant had never claimed to be a tenant under the
Plaintiff, but had asserted independent ownership on the basis of the Gift
Deed and adverse possession, the bar under Section 19 was held to be
inapplicable.
25. It was further held that the license stood validly terminated with effect
from 31.10.2021, vide Legal Notice dated 16.09.2021 Ex. PW 1/3. The
postal receipt and tracking report Ex. PW1/3 established that the Notice had
been delivered to the Defendant on 20.09.2021. Consequently, the
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Defendant's continued occupation was held to be unauthorized, entitling the
Plaintiff to a decree for recovery of possession.
26. The learned Trial Court further observed that while the Plaintiff had
claimed mesne profits at the rate of ₹10,000/- per month, no documentary
evidence had been produced to establish the prevailing rental value of the
suit property. However, considering its location, residential use and
accommodation, the reasonable mesne profits were assessed at ₹8,000/- per
month.
27. Accordingly, the Suit was decreed for possession and mesne profits at
the rate of ₹8,000/- per month with effect from 01.11.2021 till the handing
over of possession, with an enhancement of 10% after six weeks from the
date of the Decree and a further enhancement of 10% every three years
thereafter.
28. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment and Decree dated 30.04.2026,
the Defendant/Appellant has preferred the present Appeal.
29. The ground of challenges, raised by the Defendant/Appellant are that
the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence in its correct
perspective, particularly regarding the identity of the suit property.
30. It is contended that while the Plaintiff claimed ownership of property
bearing No. 404-B, Gali Matia Mahal, Jama Masjid, Delhi, by virtue of the
Sale Deed dated 08.06.1989, the Suit was filed for possession of property
bearing No. 404. According to the Appellant, the Plaintiff was himself in
possession of property No. 404-B , whereas the Appellant was occupying
property No. 404. It is asserted that these were distinct portions and that the
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Plaintiff had failed to establish that the property covered by the Sale Deed,
was the same as the suit property.
31. It is further contended that the Plaintiff deliberately withheld the site
plan referred to in the registered Sale Deed, which formed an integral part
thereof, and was necessary to establish the identity and extent of the
property purchased. Instead, the Plaintiff relied upon a separate Site Plan Ex.
PW1/1, which did not correctly depict the suit property.
32. Another objection raised is that the Sale Deed Ex. PW1/2 pertained to
the first and second floors of the property, whereas the Suit sought
possession of portions of the second and third floors. It is contended that
even if the Sale Deed were accepted as genuine, it did not establish the
Plaintiff's ownership over the portion on the third floor, and consequently, a
Decree for possession of that portion could not have been granted.
33. The Appellant has also questioned the title of the Plaintiff on the
ground that the Sale Deed did not disclose the complete chain of ownership
or establish the title of the vendor, Smt. Mehmood Jahan Begum . It is further
contended that the recitals in the Sale Deed referred to common staircases
and owners of other portions of the property, while the description of the
boundaries also indicated the existence of adjoining portions belonging to
other owners. These recitals, according to the Appellant, raised doubts
regarding the extent of the vendor's ownership and did not rule out the
possibility of Late Mohd. Sulaiman being owner of another portion of the
property. These aspects were contended to have been not properly
considered by the learned Trial Court.
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34. The Appellant has further challenged the finding that he was
occupying the suit property as a licensee, under the Plaintiff. It is submitted
that the Plaintiff himself admitted in his cross-examination that the
Appellant and other family members had been residing in the property for
more than 60 years, much before the Plaintiff acquired the alleged
ownership in 1989. The Plaintiff had also deposed that his father was earlier
a tenant in the property and that the Appellant had been brought there by his
father and grandfather. It is, therefore, contended that the Appellant could
not have been inducted as a licensee, by the Plaintiff.
35. Moreover, the Plaintiff had neither specified the date on which the
alleged license was created, nor produced any evidence to establish that he
had ever asserted his ownership against the Appellant, or demanded
possession prior to the issuance of the Legal Notice dated 16.09.2021. It is
further asserted that no notice intimating the Appellant of the change in
ownership, had been issued. The learned Trial Court, therefore, erred in
treating the Appellant's long-standing occupation as permissive possession
under the Plaintiff.
36. It is further contended that, notwithstanding the ownership asserted by
the Plaintiff, the Appellant had perfected his title by adverse possession on
account of his open and continuous occupation of the suit property, for more
than 60 years.
37. The Appellant has also disputed the service of the Legal Notice dated
16.09.2021, allegedly terminating the license. It is contended that the
Appellant had categorically denied receiving the Notice and that the Plaintiff
was required to establish its service upon him. Since both parties resided at
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the same address, it was possible that the Notice had been received by the
Plaintiff himself. It is submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to
consider this aspect, while holding that the license had been validly
terminated.
38. It is further contended that the Suit was barred under Section 19 of the
Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, as the suit property
was situated in a notified Slum Area and the Plaintiff had not obtained prior
permission from the Competent Authority. According to the Appellant, the
protection under Section 19 was not confined to tenants but extended to
other occupants, including licensees and trespassers. The learned Trial
Court, therefore, erred in holding that the said provision was inapplicable.
39. The learned counsel for the Plaintiff/Respondent , who had appeared
on advance Notice, on the other hand, has supported the impugned Judgment
and submitted that the Appellant had been occupying the suit property along
with other family members, under a permissive family arrangement. The
Appellant had failed to establish any ownership under the alleged Gift
Deed/ Hibanam a executed by Late Mohd. Sulaiman. The Plaintiff, having
acquired ownership under the registered Sale Deed dated 08.06.1989, was
entitled to recover possession and mesne profits, as rightly held by the
learned Trial Court.
40. It is further submitted that, despite the Decree in his favour, the
Plaintiff has not initiated Execution proceedings in view of the close
relationship between the parties. Accordingly, dismissal of the Appeal has
been sought.

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Submissions heard and record perused .
41. The Plaintiff/Respondent has sought recovery of possession of the suit
property on the basis of his ownership acquired vide registered Sale Deed
dated 08.06.1989 Ex. PW1/2. The Defendant/Appellant has challenged the
said Sale Deed, alleging that it is forged and fabricated and that the vendor
had no title to convey the suit property.
42. A perusal of the Sale Deed Ex. PW1/2 shows that it was executed by
Smt. Mehmood Jahan Begum , wife of Abdul Khaliq, in favour of the
Plaintiff, Shujauddin . It specifically records that the vendor had acquired
ownership of the first and second floors, along with roof rights, of property
bearing Municipal No. XI/404, Gali Matia Mahal , Jama Masjid, Delhi, by
virtue of a registered Partition Deed dated 13.01.1978. She sold the
aforesaid portion, together with the existing construction, to the Plaintiff,
which was described in the Sale Deed as property bearing No. 404-B.
43. Thus, the source of the vendor's title was clearly disclosed as the
registered Partition Deed dated 13.01.1978, in the Sale Deed. The contention
of the Defendant/Appellant that the Sale Deed did not disclose any previous
ownership is, therefore, factually incorrect. Merely because the complete
chain of earlier ownership was not set out in the Sale Deed would not, by
itself, render the document invalid.
44. Secondly , even if it was accepted that the names of erstwhile owners
was not mentioned in the Sale Deed, that in itself would not render the Sale
Deed invalid, especially when the Defendant/Appellant has not been able to
produce any evidence to show that the property was owned by any person
other than Smt. Mehmood Jahan Begum.
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45. Furthermore, the Sale Deed Ex. PW1/2 is a registered document,
which carries a rebuttable presumption of valid execution under the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872. In Prem Singh v. Birbal , (2006) 5 SCC 353, the Apex
Court held that a registered document is presumed to have been validly
executed and that the onus of rebutting this presumption lies upon the person
challenging it.
46. In the present case, though the Defendant alleged that the Sale Deed
was forged and fabricated, no evidence was produced to substantiate the
said allegation.
47. Significantly, the Defendant, in his cross-examination, could neither
admit nor deny whether Smt. Mehmood Jahan Begum was the owner of the
suit property. Despite alleging that the Sale Deed was forged and fabricated,
the Defendant failed to produce any cogent evidence, to substantiate this
allegation. In these circumstances, there is no ground to disbelieve the
registered Sale Deed Ex. PW1/2 relied upon by the Plaintiff .

48. The next ground of challenge raised by the Appellant is that the Sale
Deed pertains to property bearing No. 404-B, whereas the suit property
bears No. 404, thereby suggesting that there was another portion bearing No.
404-A.
49. This contention is based purely on conjectures and is not supported
by the evidence on record . In fact, a perusal of the Sale Deed clearly shows
that the erstwhile owner had sold the entire first and second floors, along
with roof rights and the existing construction thereon, and it also specifically
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recorded that the property had been renumbered as No. 404-B. Not only this,
even the address of the Plaintiff was mentioned in the Sale Deed, as 404-B.
50. It is evident from the contents of the Sale Deed and the evidence of
the parties that there were shops on the ground floor, and only the first and
second floors, along with roof rights, were sold to the Plaintiff, which was
re-numbered as 404-B, of which the suit property forms a part. While the
Defendant/Appellant has sought to create confusion regarding the identity of
the suit property, he has failed to produce any cogent evidence to establish
that the Sale Deed did not pertain to the suit property or that the Site Plan
Ex. PW1/1 proved by the Plaintiff, was incorrect.

51. Though the Site Plan annexed to the Sale Deed has not been
separately proved, the identity of the Suit Property stands established from
the recitals in the Sale Deed itself, the Site Plan Ex. PW1/1, and the
Defendant’s own description of the portions in his occupation, which
substantially corresponds with Ex. PW1/1. The Defendant also did not file
any contrary Site Plan. The non-production of the Site Plan annexed to the
Sale Deed is, therefore, of no consequence.
52. During the cross-examination of the Plaintiff, various documents were
put to him, namely, passports of Smt. Hanida Begum, Mohd. Waseem and
Mohd. Nadeem Mark PW1/D2 to PW1/D4; birth certificates of Mohd.
Saleem, Mohd. Nadeem, Mohd. Rehan and Kamran Mark PW1/D5 to
PW1/D8; a cement receipt Mark PW1/D9; an electricity bill in the name of
Mohd. Islam Mark PW1/D10; and a Loan Application made by Mohd. Salim
Mark PW1/D11, to establish that the address mentioned in these documents
was property No. 404 and not 404-B.
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53. However, it has emerged from the Plaintiff's testimony that the
Defendant and his family members had been residing in the suit property
along with the Plaintiff's father and grandfather, for several decades. The
Plaintiff also clarified in his cross-examination that his father was initially a
tenant in the property and had brought the other family members to reside
with him. There is no cogent rebuttal to this evidence, which establishes that
even prior to the purchase of the property by the Plaintiff in 1989, the
Defendant and other family members were residing therein along with the
Plaintiff's father, who was a tenant.
54. It is also not disputed that the property was originally numbered 404,
which referred to the entire property. However, upon the sale of the first and
second floors along with roof rights, the portion purchased by the Plaintiff
was identified as property No. 404-B, in the Sale Deed.
55. The Appellant has also contended that the Sale Deed Ex. PW1/2
pertained to the first and second floors, whereas the Suit has been filed in
respect of portions of the second and third floors. However, the Sale Deed
conveyed the first and second floors along with the roof rights. Significantly,
even the Hibanama Ex. DW1/1 relied upon by the Defendant, records the
construction as comprising only the ground, first and second floors. Any
construction raised over the second floor is, therefore, referable to the roof
rights conveyed to the Plaintiff, and the portion on the third-floor, forms part
of the property purchased by him.
56. The Defendant has also vaguely claimed that his father, Late Mohd.
Sulaiman , may have been the owner of another portion of the property.
However, such a speculative assertion, without any cogent evidence, cannot
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confer ownership rights upon the Defendant/Appellant. The learned District
Judge has rightly appreciated the contents of the Sale Deed, the Site Plan
and the evidence of the parties, to conclude that the suit property was the
very property covered by the Sale Deed and that the Defendant, along with
his family members, was occupying the same with the permission of the
Plaintiff.
57. Though the Plaintiff and his family members may initially have
occupied the property as tenants or occupants, the Plaintiff subsequently
acquired ownership rights by virtue of the registered Sale Deed dated
08.06.1989 Ex. PW1/2. Thereafter, the continued occupation of the
Defendant, who had no independent right, title or interest; was only with the
leave of the Plaintiff, who allowed his paternal uncle to continue residing
therein. A licence in favour of a family member arising in such
circumstances, need neither be reduced to writing nor be traced to a specific
date. The Plaintiff has, therefore, been rightly held entitled to recover
possession of the suit property from the Defendant/Appellant.

58. The Defendant/Appellant has claimed ownership of the suit property
by virtue of the Hibanama /Gift Deed dated 03.01.1974 Ex. DW1/1,
allegedly executed by his father, Late Mohd. Sulaiman . Though the
execution of a Gift Deed was pleaded in the Written Statement, its date was
not disclosed, nor was the document filed along with the Written Statement.
The Hibanama was brought on record for the first time during the cross-
examination of PW-1, when it was marked as Mark PW1/D1, and was
subsequently exhibited as Ex. DW1/1, during the evidence of the Defendant.
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59. Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, provides that a gift
of immovable property must be effected through a registered instrument
signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested by at least two witnesses.
However, Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act expressly saves the
rules of Mohammedan Law relating to gifts from the application of the said
provisions. Consequently, a gift under Mohammedan Law, commonly
known as a Hiba, is governed by the principles of Mohammedan Law and is
not necessarily required to be executed through a registered instrument.
60. The Supreme Court, in Hafeeza Bibi & Ors. v. Shaikh Farid (Dead)
by LRs. & Ors., (2011) 5 SCC 654, while examining the interplay between
Sections 123 and 129 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 17 of the
Registration Act, 1908, reiterated that the three essential requirements of a
valid Hiba are: (i) declaration of the gift by the donor; (ii) acceptance of the
gift by the donee, expressly or impliedly; and (iii) delivery of possession of
the subject matter of the gift, either actually or constructively.
61. The Supreme Court further clarified that merely because a gift under
Mohammedan Law has been reduced to writing, it does not become
compulsorily registrable. It was observed that "What is important for a valid
gift under Mohammadan Law is that three essential requisites must be
fulfilled. The form is immaterial."
62. Thus, the validity of a Hiba depends upon fulfilment of its substantive
requirements and not merely upon the existence or registration of a written
instrument.

63. A perusal of the Hibanama Ex. DW1/1 shows that Late Mohd.
Sulaiman, the grandfather of the Plaintiff and father of the Defendant, had
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allegedly acquired the property on Patta in 1947 and had raised construction
comprising the ground, first and second floors. It was further recorded that
the shops constructed on the ground floor had already been sold by him
during his lifetime, while the first floor was given to his sons, Mohd. Farooq
and Mohd. Rafiq, and the second floor to Mohd. Taqi (Defendant) and
Mohd. Islam, with the roof rights remaining common.
64. However, even if the Hibanama is accepted as recording the handing
over of possession of the first and second floors to the respective sons, there
is no evidence to establish that Late Mohd. Sulaiman himself had any
ownership rights in the suit property. The Defendant, in his cross-
examination, admitted that he had no document establishing his father's
ownership and that his knowledge in this regard, was based merely upon
what his father had told him.
65. Consequently, the Hibanama , at best, reflects the arrangement
regarding possession amongst the sons, but cannot confer ownership rights
upon them, in the absence of any title in favour of Mohd. Sulaiman . It is
indeed the Plaintiff who subsequently acquired ownership rights by virtue of
the registered Sale Deed dated 08.06.1989 Ex. PW1/2, and the Defendant
cannot claim any independent ownership rights, on the basis of the alleged
Hibanama.

66. The next contention raised by the Defendant/Appellant is that he was
never served with the Legal Notice dated 16.09.2021 Ex. PW1/3,
terminating his license, w.e.f. 31.10.2021. It was asserted that since the
Plaintiff was residing in the same premises, he could have manipulated the
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service of the Notice. However, the learned Trial Court has rightly observed
that the postal receipt and tracking report establish service of the Legal
Notice upon the Defendant, on 20.09.2021.
67. Even otherwise, the Supreme Court in Nopany Investments (P) Ltd. v.
Santokh Singh (HUF) , (2008) 2 SCC 728, has held that the institution of a
Suit for eviction itself constitutes a notice to quit. Similarly, this Court in
Chhidi Ram v. Ramjas Foundation , RSA No. 12/2007, decided on
06.04.2011, has held that the filing of a Suit for possession by the licensor
itself amounts to an express revocation of the license, even in the absence of
service of a prior notice.

68. Therefore, even if the contention of the Defendant regarding non-
service of the Legal Notice is accepted, his license would, in any event,
stand terminated upon institution of the Suit, and he would have no right to
continue occupying the suit property. The said contention is, therefore,
without merit.

69. The Defendant/Appellant has also claimed that he had acquired
ownership rights by way of adverse possession on account of his long,
continuous and uninterrupted occupation of the suit property for several
decades. However, mere length of possession, howsoever prolonged, does
not confer ownership by adverse possession.
70. The Supreme Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. v. Manjit Kaur
& Ors., (2019) 8 SCC 729, has reiterated that a person claiming adverse
possession must establish that his possession was nec vi, nec clam, nec
precario, i.e., peaceful, open, continuous and hostile to the title of the true
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owner, with the requisite animus possidendi , for the statutory period of
twelve years. Furthermore, in Narasamma v. A. Krishnappa (Dead) through
LRs., AIR 2020 SC 4178, it was held that a person claiming ownership
under an independent title cannot simultaneously claim adverse possession
from the same date. Upon failure of the asserted title, it is necessary to
establish when the possession became hostile to the true owner.
71. The aforesaid position has recently been reiterated by the Supreme
Court in Bhag Singh (D) through Mahant Kashmir Singh v. Basant Kaur (D)
through LRs., 2026 INSC 983. It was observed that where possession is
referrable to a lawful or permissive origin, mere lapse of time does not
render it adverse; there must be clear and unequivocal evidence of the point
at which such possession became hostile to the true owner. Significantly, the
Apex Court further held that the absence of pleadings identifying the
commencement of hostile possession is not a mere technical defect, since
unless such commencement is pleaded and proved, the statutory period for
adverse possession cannot even begin to run.
72. In the present case, the Defendant/Appellant has claimed ownership
on the basis of the Hibanama dated 03.01.1974 and, alternatively, by
adverse possession. However, there is no evidence to establish when his
possession became hostile to the Plaintiff or that he ever openly asserted any
title adverse to that of the true owner. The Defendant also admitted in his
cross-examination that he had never paid property tax, in respect of the suit
property.

73. Mere continuous occupation for several decades, without any clear
assertion of hostile ownership to the knowledge of the true owner, cannot
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mature into adverse possession as reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bhag
Singh (D) through Mahant Kashmir Singh (supra). The Defendant has failed
to discharge this burden. The learned District Judge has, therefore, rightly
rejected the plea of adverse possession.

74. The last objection raised by the Defendant/Appellant is that the suit
property is situated in a notified Slum Area and, therefore, the Suit for
Possession was not maintainable without obtaining prior permission of the
Competent Authority under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1956. The question which, therefore, arises for
consideration is whether the protection contemplated under Section 19(1)
extends to every person in occupation of property situated in a notified slum
area, irrespective of the legal character of such occupation, or is confined to
persons who qualify as tenants in law.
75. Section 19(1) of the Act reads as under:
“19. Proceedings for eviction of tenants not to be taken
without permission of the competent authority .(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
time being in force, no person shall, except with the
previous permission in writing of the competent authority,
(a) institute, after the commencement of the Slum Areas
(Improvement and Clearance) Amendment Act, 1964, any
suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the
eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum
area; or
(b) where any decree or order is obtained in any suit or
proceeding instituted before such commencement for the
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eviction of a tenant from any building or land in such area,
execute such decree or order.”

76. Pertinently, Section 19 itself clearly provides that proceedings for
eviction of tenants cannot be taken without permission of the Competent
Authority. It is, therefore, evident that the bar of Section 19 of the Act is
applicable only in the case of tenants and not the other occupiers.
77. This distinction was considered by the Full Bench of this Court in
Punnu Ram & Ors. v. Chiranji Lal Gupta & Ors., AIR 1982 Delhi 431.
While examining the scheme of the enactment, the Full Bench also
considered the meaning of the expression "tenant", which, unlike
"occupier", has not been separately defined under the Act. Rejecting the
contention that every person in occupation of property situated in a slum
area was entitled to the protection of Section 19, the Full Bench expressly
held:
"The protection contemplated is for a tenant as recognised
by law. A mere occupier cannot be equated to a tenant. An
occupier may be a trespasser or a licensee or a tenant. The
concept of welfare State cannot extend to giving protection
to trespasser or persons who have no right of occupation.
Therefore, when the Legislature used the term 'tenant' in
Section 19 as well as in the Preamble of the Act it meant
tenant-in-law."

78. The Full Bench, therefore, drew a clear distinction between a tenant
recognized in law and a person who is merely in occupation of the premises.
The expression "occupier" under Section 2(f), is wider in its scope and may
include a licensee, trespasser or tenant. However, the Legislature
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consciously employed the expression "tenant" in Section 19, thereby
restricting the statutory protection to persons possessing the requisite legal
status. The mere fact that a person continues in physical possession of
premises situated in a notified Slum Area does not, by itself, bring such
person within the protective ambit of Section 19(1).
79. The said principle was reiterated in Giri Raj (Since Deceased)
Through LRs. v. Deepak Gupta & Ors., RSA 151/2012, decided on
12.09.2013, and Satender Jain v. Satya Narain Sanjiv Gupta HUF , RSA
139/2019, decided on 09.09.2021.
80. The legal position emerging from the aforesaid decisions is that the
applicability of Section 19(1) depends upon the legal character of the
Defendant's occupation and not merely upon the location of the suit property
within a notified slum area.
81. In the present case, the Defendant has not established any relationship
of landlord and tenant with the Plaintiff or the Plaintiff's predecessor-in-
interest. On the contrary, the Defendant claims an independent title to the
suit property on the strength of a Hibanama dated 03.01.1974 and
alternatively, on the basis of adverse possession.
82. Having failed to establish any tenancy rights, the Defendant cannot
claim the protection under Section 19 merely on account of his occupation
of the suit property. The objection has, therefore, been rightly rejected by
the learned District Judge.

Conclusion:
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83. From the aforesaid discussion, it emerges that the learned District
Judge has appreciated the evidence in its correct perspective and has rightly
decreed the Suit for Possession and Mesne Profits in favour of the
Plaintiff/Respondent and against the Defendant/Appellant. The findings
recorded in the impugned Judgment, do not warrant any interference.
84. There is no merit in the present Appeal, which is dismissed.
85. The pending Applications, if any, also stand disposed of.



(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
NOVEMBER 17, 2026
va
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