Shri Om Prakash Grover And Ors. vs Municipal Corporation Of Delhi

Court
Delhi High Court

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 23.09.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 21.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC014575632017
+ W.P.(C) 9236/2017 & CM APPL. 37765/2017 (Stay)

SHRI OM PRAKASH GROVER AND ORS.
.....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Vipin Singhania and Mr.
Lakshay Jain, Advocates.
versus

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Rishikant Singh, Advocate
for DUSIB.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present Writ Petition, filed under Article 226 read with
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeks to assail the Order
1
dated 27.07.2017 , passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge
2
(HQs)/Rent Control Tribunal, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi , in the
Appeal preferred under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of
3 4
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 , being PPA No. 30139/2016 ,
titled “Om Prakash Grover & Ors. v. MCD & Anr.” .
2. By way of the Impugned Order, the learned Appellate Authority

1
Impugned Order
2
Appellate Authority
3
PP Act
4
Appeal
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:12:07

partly allowed the Appeal preferred by the Petitioners against the
5
Order dated 14.12.2011 , passed by the learned Estate Officer-I,
6
Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board , under sub-sections (2)
and (2-A) of Section 7 of the PP Act. By the Order of the Estate
Officer, the Petitioners had been held liable to pay a sum of Rs.
13,95,400/- as damages for the unauthorised occupation of the
premises bearing Nos. 4622, 4623 and 4624, Ward No. XII, Arya
7
Pura, Subzi Mandi, Delhi-110007 , for the period from 01.04.1995
to 30.11.2011, and damages at the rate of Rs. 6,977/- per month
thereafter, together with simple interest at the rate of 18% per annum.
3. The learned Appellate Authority modified the Order of the
learned Estate Officer to the extent that the Petitioners were held
liable to pay damages only with effect from 05.04.2000, being the
date of cancellation of their licence, at the rate of Rs. 6,978/- per
month till payment, together with simple interest at the rate of 12%
per annum. The Petitioners, by way of the present Petition, seek the
setting aside of the Impugned Order as well as the Order of the
learned Estate Officer.
4. Petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 are the sons, and Petitioner No. 4 is the
grandson, of late Sh. Lekh Raj alias Lekh Ram. They are, for the sake
of convenience, hereinafter collectively referred to as “the
Petitioners” . Respondent No. 1 is the Municipal Corporation of Delhi
(Slum & JJ Wing), whose functions in respect of the Subject Premises
are now discharged by the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement
8
Board , and Respondent No. 2 is the learned Estate Officer. They are,

5
Order of the Estate Officer
6
Estate Officer
7
Subject Premises
8
DUSIB
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:12:07

for the sake of convenience, hereinafter collectively referred to as “the
Respondents” .
BRIEF FACTS:
Subject Premises and the grant of Licence
5. The Subject Premises, forming part of Property No. 4619-26,
Ward No. XII, Katra Meena Beg, Roshanara Road, Delhi, are evacuee
property which is stated to have been transferred by the Ministry of
Rehabilitation, Government of India, to the Slum Department on
21.05.1956, and which has, at different points of time, been under the
management and control of the Slum & JJ Wing of the Delhi
Development Authority, the Slum & JJ Department of the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi and, presently, DUSIB.
6. It is the case of the Petitioners that late Sh. Lekh Raj, a
displaced person, had been in occupation of the Subject Premises as a
licensee since about the year 1948, and had been carrying on business
therefrom. On the other hand, the Respondents contend that, as per the
Evacuee Property Register, only the portion bearing No. 4623,
measuring 8' x 12', had been licensed to late Sh. Lekh Raj, and that
too for residential use, whereas the portions bearing Nos. 4622 and
4624, measuring 12' x 12' and 8' x 12', had been licensed to one Sh.
Mukand Lal and one Sh. Lachman Dass, respectively, and had come
to be occupied by late Sh. Lekh Raj without authority.
7. Late Sh. Lekh Raj passed on in the year 1985. Upon a
representation made by his legal heirs, the Office of the Commissioner
(Slum & JJ), Delhi Development Authority, by a communication
dated 06.02.1992, informed that Sh. Om Prakash, Sh. Sita Ram, Sh.
Charanjit Lal and Sh. Nand Kishore, collectively referred to as
“licensees” , had, vide an Order dated 11.11.1991, been admitted as
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:12:07

joint licensees in respect of the Subject Premises on a licence fee of
Rs. 42.56 per month.
8. A request made by them thereafter, for segregation of the said
joint licence and for issuance of separate demand notices in their
individual names, was declined on 15.09.1992. They, thereupon,
instituted a Suit seeking mandatory injunction, being Suit No.
9
713/1992, subsequently renumbered as Suit No. 630/1999 .
Cancellation of the Licence
9. During the pendency of the First Suit, a Notice dated
28.10.1993 was issued to the said licensees, calling upon them to
show cause as to why the transfer of the licence in their favour be not
withdrawn, to which they submitted a Reply dated 10.11.1993.
10. Thereafter, upon hearing Sh. Nand Kishore, i.e. , Petitioner No.
3 herein and one of the licensees, on 08.03.2000, the Deputy
Commissioner (Slum & JJ), Municipal Corporation of Delhi, by a
10
Cancellation Order dated 05.04.2000 , cancelled the licence in
respect of the Subject Premises. It was held therein that the portion
bearing No. 4623 had been licensed to late Sh. Lekh Raj for
residential use only, a fact admitted by the licensees in their Reply
dated 10.11.1993, and that its user had been changed to commercial. It
was further held that, in respect of the portions bearing Nos. 4622 and
4624, late Sh. Lekh Raj was himself an unauthorised occupant, and
his legal heirs could claim no better right. By the same Order, the
initiation of proceedings under the PP Act was directed.
Proceedings under Section 4 of the PP Act
11
11. Pursuant thereto, a Notice dated 04.07.2000 came to be

9
First Suit
10
Cancellation Order
11
Section 4 Notice
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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issued to the licensees by the then Estate Officer (Slum)-III under
Section 4(1) of the PP Act, stating that they were in unauthorised
occupation of the Subject Premises and calling upon them to show
cause as to why an order of eviction be not made. The licensees filed
their Reply dated 18.08.2000, contending, inter alia , that the Subject
Premises, a) had been allotted to their father, b) had been mutated in
their favour after his demise, and c) had been in commercial use
throughout.
12
12. By an Order dated 20.03.2001 , the then Estate Officer, upon
consideration of the said Reply and the record, found no defect in the
cancellation of the licence. It was held that the licensees had failed to
show that the portions bearing Nos. 4622 and 4624 had ever been
allotted to their father, or that the portion bearing No. 4623 had been
allotted for commercial purposes. The licensees were, accordingly,
directed to approach the O.S.D. (Property) for assessment/calculation
of damages for unauthorised occupation, as per the policy of the
Department, within fifteen days. It is not in dispute that the
licensees/Petitioners did not approach the O.S.D. (Property) in terms
of the said direction.
Civil Proceedings
13. The Cancellation Order and the Order dated 20.03.2001 were
assailed by the Petitioners before this Court in a Writ Petition, being
W.P.(C) 6992/2001, which came to be withdrawn on 19.12.2001, with
liberty to challenge the said Orders in accordance with law.
14. In the meantime, the First Suit came to be dismissed by a
Judgment dated 16.01.2002, wherein the learned Civil Judge held that
the premises had been allotted for residential purposes and could not

12
Order dated 20.03.2001
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:12:07

be used for any other purpose, and that, in view of the cancellation of
the licence vide the Cancellation Order, the very basis of the First Suit
did not survive. An Appeal against the said Judgment, being RCA No.
04/2010, came to be preferred only in the year 2010, and was
dismissed on 31.07.2010, the delay of about 2,894 days in filing the
same not having been condoned.
15. The Petitioners also instituted a second Suit, being Suit No.
13
36/2003, subsequently renumbered as Suit No. 759/2008 , seeking,
inter alia , a declaration that the Cancellation Order and the Order
dated 20.03.2001 were illegal. Their application for interim injunction
was dismissed on 20.03.2003, and the Appeal there-against, being
MCA No. 28/2003, was dismissed on 02.07.2003.
16. Against the order dt. 02.07.2003, the Petition preferred under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, being CM(M) 89/2004, was
dismissed by this Court on 21.01.2004, observing that the finding
returned in the First Suit, that the premises had been let out for
residential purposes but were being used for commercial purposes,
had not been challenged and had attained finality. Civil Appeal No.
4330/2004, preferred there-against, was dismissed by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court on 14.01.2010.
17. In the meantime, the Second Suit came to be dismissed on
12.10.2012. The Appeal preferred against this dismissal by way of
RCA No. 26/2017, was dismissed on 02.08.2018, the delay in filing
the same not having been condoned.
18. For ease of reference, the proceedings instituted by the
Petitioners, and the outcome thereof, are tabulated hereunder:

13
Second Suit
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:12:07

S.
Proceeding Nature of challenge Outcome
No.
First Suit (Suit No.
713/1992, renumbered
as Suit No. 630/1999)
Mandatory injunction
for segregation of the
joint licence
Dismissed on
16.01.2002
1.
Dismissed on
31.07.2010; delay
of about 2,894
days not condoned
Appeal against the
dismissal of the First
Suit
2. RCA No. 04/2010
Challenge to the
Cancellation Order and
the Order dated
20.03.2001
Withdrawn on
19.12.2001, with
liberty
3. W.P.(C) 6992/2001
Declaration that the
Cancellation Order and
the Order dated
20.03.2001 are illegal
Second Suit (Suit No.
36/2003, renumbered as
Suit No. 759/2008)
Dismissed on
12.10.2012
4.
Application for interim
injunction in the Second
Suit
Stay of the Cancellation
Order and the Order
dated 20.03.2001
Dismissed on
20.03.2003
5.
Appeal against the
refusal of interim
injunction
Dismissed on
02.07.2003
6. MCA No. 28/2003
Petition under Article
227 of the Constitution
of India against the
Order in MCA No.
28/2003
Dismissed on
21.01.2004
7. CM(M) 89/2004
Appeal before the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court
against the Order in
CM(M) 89/2004
Civil Appeal No.
8.
4330/2004
Dismissed on
14.01.2010
Appeal against the
dismissal of the Second
Suit
Dismissed on
02.08.2018; delay
not condoned
9. RCA No. 26/2017
Show Cause Notice under Section 7(3) of the PP Act
19. As the Order dated 20.03.2001 had not been complied with, the
matter was referred to the Estate Officer on 04.03.2010 for taking
action under the PP Act. A Notice dated 01.06.2010 was issued to the
Petitioners, affording them a further opportunity to appear and submit
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:12:07

their Reply, pursuant to which they filed their Reply.
14
20. Thereafter, a Notice dated 03.12.2010/06.12.2010 was issued
to the Petitioners under Section 7(3) of the PP Act. It was stated
therein that a sum of Rs. 13,11,695/-, computed at the rate of Rs.
6,978/- per month, “ being arrears of rent from 1.4.1995 to
30.11.2010 ”, was due and payable in respect of the Subject Premises,
and the Petitioners were called upon to show cause as to why an order
requiring them to pay the said amount, together with simple interest,
be not made.
21. The Petitioners submitted their Reply dated 28.12.2010. By a
further Notice dated 28.11.2011, the Estate Officer afforded the
Petitioners a final opportunity to appear on 07.12.2011 and to submit
their Reply along with supporting documents, whereupon a further
reply dated 07.12.2011 came to be filed.
Order of the Estate Officer

22. By the Order of the Estate Officer, it was held that the
Petitioners, upon the cancellation of their licence on 05.04.2000, had
become unauthorised occupants of the Subject Premises. Relying
upon the statement of the Assistant Director (Property), the reports of
the Survey Division, as per which the portion bearing No. 4622,
measuring 40.23 sq. mtrs., was being used as a shop and the portions
bearing Nos. 4623 and 4624, measuring 28.35 sq. mtrs. and 54.41 sq.
mtrs., were being used as godowns, and the policy for assessment of
damages approved by the Corporation vide Resolution No. 413 dated
15.10.2001 and Resolution No. 396 dated 25.10.2004, the Estate
Officer assessed the damages at Rs. 6,977/- per month.
23. The Petitioners were, accordingly, directed, in exercise of the

14
Show Cause Notice
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:12:07

powers under Section 7(2) of the PP Act, to pay a sum of Rs.
13,95,400/- towards damages for the period from 01.04.1995 to
30.11.2011, and damages at the rate of Rs. 6,977/- per month
thereafter, and, under Section 7(2-A) of the PP Act, to pay simple
interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum with effect from
14.01.2012.
Appeal and the Impugned Order
24. Aggrieved thereby, the Petitioners preferred the Appeal under
Section 9 of the PP Act. By an Order dated 08.05.2012, the operation
of the Order of the Estate Officer was stayed, subject to the Petitioners
depositing 40% of the damages assessed, pursuant to which the
Petitioners deposited a sum of Rs. 5,66,712/-.
25. By way of the Impugned Order, the learned Appellate Authority
held that the Petitioners were unauthorised occupants and were liable
to pay damages, and that the mere mention of the expression “arrears
of rent” instead of “damages” in the Show Cause Notice did not
make any difference. The learned Appellate Authority, however, held
that, the licence having been cancelled only on 05.04.2000, damages
could be claimed only with effect from that date, and also reduced the
rate of interest to 12% per annum.
Present Petition
26. Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the Petitioners have
preferred the present Petition, assailing the Impugned Order and the
Order of the Estate Officer. The Notice of the present Petition came to
be issued on 23.10.2017. During the pendency of the present Petition,
the Petitioners have deposited a further sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- with
DUSIB. The parties were also referred to Mediation by an Order dated
13.08.2025; the Mediation, however, did not fructify.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:12:07

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
27. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners would,
at the outset, submit that the very foundation of the Order of the Estate
Officer stands vitiated by an irreconcilable inconsistency in the stand
taken by the Respondents, and that the learned Appellate Authority
failed to rectify the said infirmity, and that both the Impugned Order
and the Order of the Estate Officer, therefore, stand vitiated.
28. It would be submitted that the proceedings under the PP Act
commenced with the Section 4 Notice, whereby the Petitioners were
alleged to be in unauthorised occupation of the Subject Premises and
were called upon to show cause against their eviction. Learned
counsel would submit that the said proceedings were never carried to
their logical conclusion and that no Eviction Order has, till date, been
passed against the Petitioners.
29. Learned counsel would further submit that, after a lapse of
almost a decade, the Respondents issued the Show Cause Notice
under Section 7(3) of the PP Act, wherein the Estate Officer recorded
that a sum of Rs. 13,11,695/- was due and payable by the Petitioners
“ being arrears of rent from 1.4.1995 to 30.11.2010 ”, and even the
interest proposed to be levied was on “ the said arrears ”. It would be
contended that a demand for arrears of rent is referable only to Section
7(1) of the PP Act, which presupposes a subsisting relationship under
which rent is payable, and that the Respondents, by issuing such a
notice, had themselves treated the Petitioners as persons in authorised
occupation and liable to pay rent, and not as unauthorised occupants.
30. Learned counsel for the Petitioners would submit that,
notwithstanding the aforesaid, the Estate Officer proceeded to hold the
Petitioners to be in unauthorised occupation and assessed damages
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:12:07

under Section 7(2) read with Section 7(2-A) of the PP Act. It would
be contended that “arrears of rent” and “damages” operate in
distinct fields, the former presupposing authorised occupation on
payment of rent, and the latter being referable to unauthorised
occupation, and that an order under Section 7(2) of the PP Act can be
passed only after a notice calling upon the person concerned to show
cause against the assessment of damages. According to learned
counsel, the Petitioners were never put to notice of any proposed
assessment of damages, and the Estate Officer could, at best, have
held them liable to pay arrears of rent. The Order of the Estate Officer,
it would be submitted, travels beyond the Show Cause Notice upon
which it is founded. In this regard, attention of this Court would be
drawn to the title of the Show Cause Notice. The same reads as under:
“…
To,
Sh. Om Prakash Gorver, Sh. Charajit Lal Grover & Sh. Nand
Kishore Grover all sons of Late Sh. Lekh Raj, & Legal heirs of late
Sh. Sita Ram Grover S/o Late Sh. Lekh Raj, Property No.4622-
24/XII, Katra Meena Begh, Roshanara
Road, Delhi -110007.

NOTICE UNDER PROVISION OF SUB-SECTION (3) OF
SECTION 7 OF THE PUBLIC PREMISES (EVICTION OF
UNAUTHORIZED OCCUPANTS) ACT, 1971 .
…”
(Emphasis supplied)

31. Learned counsel would further draw the attention of this Court
to the Order of the Estate Officer to submit that the Show Cause
Notice has been described therein as one calling upon the Petitioners
to show cause as to why an order requiring them to pay Rs.
13,11,695/- “ towards damages ” should not be made, whereas the
Show Cause Notice, on its plain terms, raised a demand for “arrears
of rent” . It would be submitted that the Show Cause Notice has thus
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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been recast so as to make it consonant with the order ultimately
passed.
32. Learned counsel for the Petitioners would submit that the
learned Appellate Authority, instead of correcting the aforesaid
illegality, perpetuated it by holding that the mere mention of the
expression “arrears of rent” instead of damages in the Show Cause
Notice does not make any difference. The said finding, it would be
contended, treats rent and damages as interchangeable and runs
contrary to the scheme of Section 7 of the PP Act.
33. Learned counsel for the Petitioners would next submit that the
finding that the Petitioners are in unauthorised occupation of the
Subject Premises is without any foundation. It would be submitted
that the said finding rests upon the report of the Managing Officer
(Evacuee Property Cell) dated 29.10.1991, which itself records that
the relevant property file was not traceable and that the property
“ appears ” to be residential. It would be contended that the licence in
respect of all the three portions was transferred jointly in favour of the
legal heirs of late Sh. Lekh Raj, i.e., in favour of the Petitioners, by
the communication dated 06.02.1992 after due verification, that the
rent receipts issued in respect of all the three portions were placed on
record, none of which describes the premises as residential, and that
the Cancellation Order is, therefore, arbitrary and illegal.
34. In support of the aforesaid submission, learned counsel would
place reliance upon the Judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
15
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia , particularly
Paragraph Nos. 25 and 55 thereof. It would be submitted that the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held therein that the Estate Officer is

15
(2008) 3 SCC 279
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:12:07

obligated to apply his mind so as to form an opinion that the person
concerned is in unauthorised occupation of the public premises, and
that, although the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 do not
apply to such proceedings, the principle underlying Section 101
thereof would apply, such that the burden of proving a fact rests upon
the party who asserts it. The relevant paragraphs of the said Judgment,
as relied upon, read as under:

“Application of the Act and the Rules
25. Where an application is filed for eviction of an unauthorised
occupant it obligates the Estate Officer to apply his mind so as to
enable him to form an opinion that the respondent is a person who
has been in unauthorised occupation of the public premises and that
he should be evicted. When a notice is issued in terms of Section 4
of the Act, the noticee may show cause. Section 5 of the Act
postulates that an order of eviction must be passed only upon
consideration of the show cause and any evidence produced by him
in support of its case also upon giving him a personal hearing, if
any, as provided under Clause ( ii ) of sub-section (2) of Section 4 of
the Act.
*
55. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable,
the underlying principles of Section 101 thereof would apply.
In Sarkar on Law of Evidence , 16th Edn., Vol. 2, at p. 1584 it is
stated as under:
“ Principle and Scope .—This section is based on the
rule, ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat — the
burden of proving a fact rests on the party who
substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue and not
upon the party who denies it; for a negative is usually
incapable of proof. „It is an ancient rule founded on
consideration of good sense and should not be departed
from without strong reasons.‟ [per Lord Maugham
in Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. v. Imperial
Smelting Corpn. Ltd. [1942 AC 154 : (1941) 2 All ER 165
(HL)] ] This rule is derived from the Roman law, and is
supportable not only upon the ground of fairness, but also
upon that of the greater practical difficulty which is
involved in proving a negative than in proving an
affirmative [Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol.
15, Para 488].”

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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
15:12:07

35. Learned counsel would further submit that, in Nusli Neville
Wadia (supra) , particularly in Paragraph Nos. 45 and 46 thereof, the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court has also recognised the right of the noticee to
an effective opportunity to meet the case set up against him, including
the right to cross-examine the witnesses of the authority and to lead
evidence in rebuttal. It would be contended that, in the present case,
the Estate Officer relied upon the statement of Sh. Abdul Dayyan, the
then Assistant Director (Property), and upon the reports of Sh.
Mahender Singh, Surveyor, and Sh. H.C. Bachani, Survey Officer,
none of whom was offered for cross-examination by the Petitioners.
The Respondents, according to learned counsel, thus failed to
discharge the burden which lay upon them, and the finding of
unauthorised occupation, returned in the teeth of the law laid down in
Nusli Neville Wadia (supra) , cannot be sustained. The relevant
portions of the said Judgment, as relied upon, read as under:
“ Natural justice issue
45. If some facts are to be proved by the landlord, indisputably the
occupant should get an opportunity to cross-examine. The witness
who intends to prove the said fact has the right to cross-examine
the witness. This may not be provided by under the statute, but it
being a part of the principle of natural justice should be held to be
indefeasible right. (See K.L. Tripathi v. SBI [(1984) 1 SCC 43 :
1984 SCC (L&S) 62] and Lakshman Exports Ltd. v. CCE [(2005)
10 SCC 634] .)
46. We may also take note of the fact that this Court in Bareilly
Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [(1971) 2 SCC 617 :
(1972) 1 SCR 241] this Court held as under: (SCC p. 629, para 14)
“14. … the application of principle of natural justice does
not imply that what is not evidence can be acted upon. On
the other hand what it means is that no materials can be
relied upon to establish a contested fact which are not
spoken to by persons who are competent to speak about
them and are subjected to cross-examination by the party
against whom they are sought to be used.”


36. It would also be submitted that the proceedings initiated by the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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Section 4 Notice were abandoned midway, which itself leads to the
inference that the Petitioners were not in unauthorised occupation of
the Subject Premises.
37.
On the aspect of limitation, learned counsel would submit that
the demand, even as modified by the learned Appellate Authority so
as to operate from 05.04.2000, is barred by limitation insofar as it
relates to the period beyond three years preceding the Show Cause
Notice. Relying upon the Judgment of a Division Bench of this Court
16
in G.R. Gupta v. Lok Sabha Secretariat , it would be contended that
17
the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to proceedings under Section 7 of
the PP Act, and that the extended period of thirty years under Article
112 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act is available only to the
Central Government or a State Government, and not to a statutory
authority. It would further be submitted that limitation, being a pure
question of law, can be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

38. In light of the foregoing submissions, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the Petitioners would urge that the Impugned Order, as
also the Order of the Estate Officer be set aside.
39. The challenge to the Impugned Order and the Order of the
Estate Officer were confined to these aforementioned grounds. No
other submissions were advanced by learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the Petitioners.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS:
40. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents would
submit that the present Petition is wholly misconceived. It would be
submitted that the licence in respect of the Subject Premises was

16
2013 SCC OnLine Del 4832
17
Limitation Act
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cancelled by the Cancellation Order, on the grounds that the portion
bearing No. 4623, which alone had been licensed to late Sh. Lekh Raj,
and that too for residential use, was being misused for commercial
purposes, and that the portions bearing Nos. 4622 and 4624 were in
his unauthorised occupation. It would be submitted that the Petitioners
themselves admitted, in their Reply dated 10.11.1993, that the
property appeared to be residential, and that the finding of misuser has
attained finality, the Petitioners having unsuccessfully carried the
matter up to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
41. Learned counsel would submit that, pursuant to the Section 4
Notice, the then Estate Officer, vide the Order dated 20.03.2001, after
considering the reply of the Petitioners, found no defect in the
cancellation of the licence, held that the Petitioners had failed to show
that the portions bearing Nos. 4622 and 4624 were ever allotted to
their father or that the portion bearing No. 4623 was allotted for
commercial purposes, and directed them to approach the O.S.D.
(Property) for assessment of damages as per the policy of the
Department. It would be contended that the Petitioners never complied
with the said direction, as a consequence of which the matter was
referred to the Estate Officer on 04.03.2010, culminating in the Order
of the Estate Officer. Learned counsel would submit that the
proceedings for eviction have not been abandoned, and that the
Respondents are taking steps for their revival.
42. Learned counsel would further submit that the mere mention of
the expression “arrears of rent” in the Show Cause Notice does not
alter the status of the Petitioners, who became unauthorised occupants
upon the cancellation of their licence. It would be contended that the
demand or acceptance of any amount towards use and occupation does
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not confer upon an unauthorised occupant any right to remain in
public premises. Reliance in this regard would be placed upon the
Judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Sarup Singh Gupta v. S.
18
Jagdish Singh and Delhi Development Authority v. Anant Raj
19
Agencies (P) Ltd. . It would also be submitted that Resolution No.
396 dated 25.10.2004 merely provides a measure for the calculation of
damages and confers no right upon an unauthorised occupant to
continue in occupation.
43. Adverting to the reliance placed by the Petitioners upon Nusli
Neville Wadia (supra) , learned counsel would submit that the said
decision is clearly distinguishable. It would be submitted that the said
decision arose out of proceedings for the eviction of tenants who had
been lawfully inducted and whose tenancies had been terminated by a
public sector insurance company, and that the question which fell for
consideration was as to which party ought to lead evidence first where
the case of the public authority rests upon grounds which are required
to be established by evidence. It would be contended that the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court, even while placing the initial burden upon the public
authority in such cases, reiterated that the proceedings before the
Estate Officer are summary in nature, that the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 do not
apply thereto, and that any requirement as to the order in which
evidence is to be led can be waived.
44. Learned counsel would submit that, in the present case, the
status of the Petitioners as unauthorised occupants does not depend
upon any disputed question of fact requiring oral evidence, but flows

18
(2006) 4 SCC 205
19
(2016) 11 SCC 406
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from the Cancellation Order, which has never been set aside, and that
the question of unauthorised occupation stood adjudicated by the
Order dated 20.03.2001 after notice to the Petitioners and
consideration of their reply, the challenge whereto was withdrawn by
them. It would further be submitted that the case of the Respondents
rests upon the official record, that the Petitioners never denied the area
or the user of the Subject Premises before the Estate Officer, and that
they never sought to cross-examine any person. No prejudice,
according to learned counsel, has thus been caused to the Petitioners,
and Nusli Neville Wadia (supra) has no application.
45. On the aspect of limitation, learned counsel would submit that
no such plea was raised either before the Estate Officer or before the
learned Appellate Authority, and that the Petitioners are, therefore,
precluded from raising the same for the first time in the present
proceedings, more so when such a plea, if raised at the appropriate
stage, could have been met by the Respondents by leading evidence. It
would further be submitted that DUSIB came into being on
01.07.2010, that the Show Cause Notice was issued within three years
thereof, and that the period prior thereto is governed by Article 112 of
the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Learned counsel would also
submit that, under Section 14 of the PP Act, the amounts due are
recoverable as arrears of land revenue.
46. No other submissions were advanced by learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Respondents.
ANALYSIS:
47. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and, with
their able assistance, perused the material available on record.
48. At the outset, it is necessary to note that, for clarity and
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convenience, the ensuing analysis and discussion are arranged
hereinafter under separate headings corresponding to the principal
issues addressed. The said headings are merely intended to facilitate
the orderly appreciation of the reasoning and are not to be construed
as creating isolated compartments between the issues. The Judgment
is to be read as a whole, and the findings recorded under each heading
shall be understood in the context of, and in conjunction with, the
findings and reasoning contained in the other parts of the Judgment.
Scope of Jurisdiction
49. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioners, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
of the jurisdiction which this Court is called upon to exercise. The PP
Act provides a self-contained mechanism for adjudication. An order
passed by the Estate Officer under Section 7 is appealable, under
Section 9, to the Appellate Authority, and, by virtue of Section 10, the
order made in such appeal is final. No further appeal or revision is
provided.
50. The present Petition, therefore, invokes the jurisdiction of this
Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, which
is supervisory in nature and cannot be equated with a second appeal.
The contours of the said jurisdiction are well settled. The Hon‟ble
Supreme Court, in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar
20
Patil , and, more recently, in Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand
21
Goel , has held that, in exercise of such jurisdiction, the High Court
does not act as a Court of first appeal to re-appreciate or re-weigh the
evidence or the facts upon which the determination under challenge is

20
(2010) 8 SCC 329
21
(2022) 4 SCC 181
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based, nor does it correct every error of fact, or even of law, where the
final finding is justified or can be supported.
51. Interference is warranted where the authority below has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of it, has failed to exercise a
jurisdiction vested in it, has acted in violation of the principles of
natural justice resulting in prejudice, or has returned a finding which
is perverse or suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record,
resulting in manifest injustice. It is within the aforesaid limited
parameters that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioners are
required to be examined.
Grounds of Challenge for Determination
52. At this juncture, this Court deems it apposite to distil the
grounds of challenge urged on behalf of the Petitioners. They may be
enumerated as follows: (i) the effect of the Show Cause Notice having
described the amount claimed as “arrears of rent” , whereas the Order
of the Estate Officer assesses “damages” for unauthorised
occupation; (ii) the challenge to the finding that the Petitioners are in
unauthorised occupation of the Subject Premises, including the
reliance placed upon Nusli Neville Wadia (supra) and the alleged
abandonment of the proceedings under Section 4 of the PP Act; and
(iii) the plea of limitation.
53. The aforesaid grounds, though interrelated in certain respects,
arise from distinct factual and legal considerations. This Court shall,
therefore, examine them in the sequence set out hereinabove.
Show Cause Notice for “arrears of rent” and Order for “damages”
54. The principal ground of challenge proceeds on the premise that
the Show Cause Notice, having demanded “arrears of rent” , could
not have culminated in an order assessing damages for unauthorised
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occupation. In order to appreciate the said contention, it would be
apposite to first advert to the statutory scheme. Section 2(g) of the PP
Act defines “unauthorised occupation” as under:
“ 2. Definitions. —In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires,—
xxx xxx xxx
( g ) “unauthorised occupation”, in relation to any public premises,
means the occupation by any person of the public premises without
authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in
occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority
(whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under
which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has
been determined for any reason whatsoever.”
(Emphasis supplied)

55. Further, this Court deems it appropriate to notice Section 7 of
the PP Act as well. Section 7, as it stood at the relevant time, insofar
as it is relevant for the present purpose, reads as under:
“ 7. Power to require payment of rent or damages in respect of
public premises. —(1) Where any person is in arrears of rent
payable in respect of any public premises, the estate officer may,
by order, require that person to pay the same within such time and
in such instalments as may be specified in the order.
(2) Where any person is, or has at any time been, in unauthorised
occupation of any public premises, the estate officer may, having
regard to such principles of assessment of damages as may be
prescribed, assess the damages on account of the use and
occupation of such premises and may, by order, require that person
to pay the damages within such time and in such instalments as
may be specified in the order.
(2-A) While making an order under sub-section (1) or sub-section
(2), the estate officer may direct that the arrears of rent or, as the
case may be, damages shall be payable together with simple
interest at such rate as may be prescribed, not being a rate
exceeding the current rate of interest within the meaning of the
Interest Act, 1978.
(3) No order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be made
against any person until after the issue of a notice in writing to the
person calling upon him to show cause within such time as may be
specified in the notice, why such order should not be made, and
until his objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in
support of the same, have been considered by the estate officer.”
(Emphasis supplied)

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56. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it manifest
that a person who continues in occupation of public premises after the
authority under which he was allowed to occupy the same has been
determined is in unauthorised occupation thereof, and that the Estate
Officer is empowered, under Section 7(2) of the PP Act, to assess
damages on account of the use and occupation of the premises by such
person. Further, the safeguard engrafted in Section 7(3) of the PP Act
is two-fold, namely , a notice in writing calling upon the person
concerned to show cause as to why such an order should not be made,
and consideration of his objections and of the evidence, if any,
produced by him.
57. The object of the said safeguard is evident. It is to ensure that
the person against whom an order is proposed is made aware of the
case which he is required to meet and is afforded a real opportunity to
meet it. The question which, therefore, falls for consideration is not
whether the Show Cause Notice is felicitously worded, but whether
the Petitioners were, in substance, put to notice of the claim which
was ultimately adjudicated against them, and whether any prejudice
has been occasioned to them by the description of the said claim as
one for “arrears of rent” .
58. The Show Cause Notice cannot, for this purpose, be read in
isolation, divorced from the proceedings of which it formed a part.
Those proceedings commenced with the Cancellation Order and the
Section 4 Notice, and led to the Order dated 20.03.2001, the relevant
portion of which reads as under:
“The licences of the respondents have already been cancelled by
the Competent Authority and seems no defect in it. The
respondents failed to show that the remaining two properties i.e.
property No. 4622/XII and 4624/XII were ever allotted to their
father at any stage. They also failed to show that the property
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No.4623/XII was allotted to their father for commercial purpose.
The submission that the mutation of all the properties was done in
their favour by the authority has no substance as on revelation of
the facts, licences of the respondents were cancelled by the
Competent Authority after affording them opportunity to show
cause.
Keeping in view of the policy of the Department to charge damages
from the unauthorized occupants, respondents are hereby directed
to approach to the O.S.D. (Property) for assessment/calculation of
damages of unauthorized occupation in the property as per policy
of the Department within fifteen days of receipt of this order. He is
also directed to file the copy of application filed before the O.S.D.
(Property) to the undersigned within fifteen days of receipt of
application to the O.S.D. (Property) failing which necessary order
shall be passed in this matter.”
(Emphasis supplied)

59. It is thus evident that, as far back as on 20.03.2001, the
Petitioners had been held, after notice and upon consideration of their
reply, to be in unauthorised occupation of the Subject Premises, and
had been expressly told that damages for such unauthorised
occupation were to be assessed as per the policy of the Department,
and that, upon their failure to approach the O.S.D. (Property),
“necessary order shall be passed” . However, the Petitioners chose
not to comply with the said direction.
60. The Order of the Estate Officer records the circumstances in
which the proceedings were thereafter taken up. The relevant portions
thereof read as under:
“The case of Property No. 4022-24/XII, Katra Meena Begh,
Roshnara Road, Delhi-7 was referred to my predecessor Estate
Officer on 4.3.2010 for taking action under the PP Act,1971, as the
defendants of the suit property had not complied with the order
dated 20.3.2001 of the then Estate Officer(S)-III.
In this case the then Estate Officer has issued notice on 1.6.2010. to
the respondents Sh. Om Prakash, sh. Chiranji Lal, Sh.Sita Ram &
Sh. Nand Kishore all sons of Late Sh. Lekh Raj to appear before
him to submit the reply as in spite of the order dated 20.3.2001
defendants had not approached to the Property section for
assessment of damages.
xxx xxx xxx
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The licence of the Respondents had already been cancelled by the
Competent Authority on 5.4.2000 and thereafter they became
unauthorized occupants in the property and are liable to be evicted
from the premises, however, since, there is policy of the
department, which was approved by the Corporation vide
Resolution NO.413 dated 15.10.2001 and Resolution No.396 dated
25.10.2004, to assess damages for unauthorized occupation from
the unauthorized occupants, therefore, respondents are liable to pay
damages for unauthorized occupation on the rates prescribed by the
Corporation vide resolute No.396 dated 25.10.2004.”
(Emphasis supplied)

61. The Show Cause Notice, which came to be issued in the
aforesaid backdrop, reads as under:
“WHEREAS, I the undersigned, am satisfied that you are in
occupation of the Public Premises described in the Schedule below:
AND WHEREAS, in exercise of the power conferred on me by
sub-section Section(7) of the Public Premises (Eviction of the
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, I consider that a sum of
Rs.13,11,695.00 (Rs. Thirteen lacs, eleven thousand, six hundred
ninety five only) @ Rs. 6,978.00 (Rs. Six thousand, nine hundred,
seventy eight only) being arrears of rent from 1.4.1995 to
30.11.2010 (both days inclusive) in respect of the said premises is
due and payable by you to the Government Statutory Authority.
AND WHEREAS, in exercise of the powers conferred on me by
the sub-section (2-A) of Section of 7 of the Public Premises
(Eviction of the Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, I consider that
you are also liable to pay simple interest of the
Government/Statutory Authority on the said arrears at the rate of
determined by the undersigned till its final payment.
Now, thereof, in the pursuance of sub-section(3) of Section 7 of the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act, 1971, I
hereby call upon you to show cause on or before 15.12.2010 why
an order requiring you to pay the said arrears of rent together with
simple interest should not be made.”
(Emphasis supplied)

62. It is true that the Show Cause Notice describes the amount
claimed as “arrears of rent” , and that the Order of the Estate Officer,
while narrating the background, inaccurately refers to the Show Cause
Notice as one calling upon the Petitioners to show cause as to why an
order requiring them to pay the said amount “towards damages”
should not be made. The said infelicity in the Show Cause Notice, and
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the inaccuracy in the narration, cannot be countenanced as a matter of
good practice. The question, however, is whether they vitiate the
Order of the Estate Officer. In the considered opinion of this Court,
they do not, for the reasons which follow in the ensuing discussion.
63. First , the Show Cause Notice was not the commencement of a
fresh proceeding founded upon a subsisting licence. It was issued in
continuation of proceedings in which the licence already stood
cancelled, the Petitioners already stood held to be unauthorised
occupants, and a direction for assessment of damages for unauthorised
occupation already stood issued and remained uncomplied with by the
Petitioners themselves. The Petitioners were, therefore, at all times
aware that what was being demanded from them were charges for
their continued occupation of the Subject Premises after the
cancellation of their licence.
64. Second , the Show Cause Notice itself left no room for doubt as
to the nature of the demand. The licence fee in respect of the Subject
Premises, as per the communication dated 06.02.1992 relied upon by
the Petitioners themselves, was Rs. 42.56 per month. The Show Cause
Notice, on the other hand, demanded a sum computed at the rate of
Rs. 6,978/- per month. No person in the position of the Petitioners
could have understood a demand at a rate more than one hundred and
sixty times the licence fee to be a demand for the licence fee or the
rent itself.
65. Third , and most significantly, the Petitioners did not, in fact,
understand it as a demand for the licence fee or the rent. In their Reply
dated 28.12.2010 to the Show Cause Notice, the Petitioners stated as
under:
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“- That notice dated 03-12-2010/06-12-2010 (as received on 22-12-
2010) is ex facie illegal and misconceived; the notice fails to
consider that the noticees‟ have not been in arrears of rent qua
subject premises till date;
- That notice dated 03-12-2010/06-12-2010 (as received on 22-12-
2010) would have been valid had the noticees‟ herein been in
unauthorized occupation of subject premises which is yet to be
determined;
- That notice dated 03-12-2010/06-12-2010 (as received on 22-12-
2010) fails to disclose the basis behind assessment of damages in
the sum of Rs.13,11,695.00 (being rupees thirteen lac eleven
thousand six hundred and ninety five only) at the rate of Rs.
6,978.00 (being rupees six thousand nine hundred and seventy
eight only); Sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act makes it
mandatory for the Estate Officer to disclose the principles of
assessment of damages which has not been done; this failure is
apparent on a bare perusal of the notice under reply; yet again, the
period of unauthorized occupation is again vague and ambiguous to
the hilt; the license admittedly has been determined sometime in
the year 2000 whereas assessment undertaken with effect from
1995; the notice hence merits being set aside on this ground alone.
In the above stated facts and circumstances, it is most respectfully
prayed that notice and / or proceedings under reply may most
kindly be quashed and / or recalled by the Learned Estate Officer.
The noticees herein are not liable to pay damages in the sum of
Rs.1311695.00 (being rupees thirteen lac eleven thousand six
hundred and ninety five only) at the rate of Rs. 6,978.00 (being
rupees six thousand nine hundred and seventy eight only).”
(Emphasis supplied)

66. The aforesaid Reply is self-speaking. The Petitioners
understood the Show Cause Notice to be one for “ assessment of
damages ” for a “ period of unauthorized occupation ”, invoked Section
7(2) of the PP Act in terms, objected to the non-disclosure of the
principles of assessment, objected to the period for which the
assessment had been made, and prayed that they be held “ not liable to
pay damages ”. The same prayer was reiterated in their further Reply
dated 07.12.2011, filed after the Estate Officer had afforded them a
final opportunity. Having thus understood the case against them, and
having answered it on that very footing, the Petitioners cannot now be
heard to contend that they were never put to notice of a proposed
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assessment of damages.
67. Fourth , the power of the Estate Officer to assess damages in
respect of the unauthorised occupation of public premises is not in
doubt; it is expressly conferred by Section 7(2) of the PP Act. It is
well settled, as held by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in N. Mani v.
22
Sangeetha Theatre , that where an authority has the power under the
law, the mere fact that the source of the power is not specifically
referred to, or that a reference is made to a wrong provision of law,
does not, by itself, vitiate the exercise of the power, so long as the
power exists and can be traced to a source available in law. The
erroneous description of the demand in the Show Cause Notice as one
for “arrears of rent” , when the Estate Officer was, in substance and
to the knowledge of the Petitioners, proposing to recover charges for
unauthorised use and occupation, falls squarely within the said
principle. The relevant portion of the said Judgment, being Paragraph
No. 9, reads as under:
“ 9. It is well settled that if an authority has a power under the law
merely because while exercising that power the source of power is
not specifically referred to or a reference is made to a wrong
provision of law, that by itself does not vitiate the exercise of
power so long as the power does exist and can be traced to a source
available in law.”

68. Fifth , the requirement of a show cause notice is a facet of the
principles of natural justice, and it is equally well settled that the said
principles are not to be applied as an unbending formula. As held by
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K.
23
Sharma , though in the context of disciplinary proceedings, a
complaint of violation of a procedural safeguard is to be examined on

22
(2004) 12 SCC 278
23
(1996) 3 SCC 364
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the touchstone of prejudice, and an order is not to be set aside for a
procedural infraction which has caused no prejudice to the person
complaining of it. The relevant portions of the said Judgment, being
principles (3), (5) and (6) in Paragraph No. 33, read as under:
“ 33. We may summarise the principles emerging from the above
discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and
are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries
and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the
employee):
*
(3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the
position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for
affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the
delinquent officer/employee. They are, generally speaking,
conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every
procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the
enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under — “no
notice”, “no opportunity” and “no hearing” categories, the
complaint of violation of procedural provision should be
examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether
such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee
in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that
he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made
to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the
enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is
established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no
interference is called for. In this connection, it may be
remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions
which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by
itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of
prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the
judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly
providing that after the evidence of the employer/government
is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead
defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry
officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent
officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident.
No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case.
To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person
has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this
very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of
directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The
principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is only another way of
looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a
different or distinct principle.
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*
(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any
rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is
to observe the principles of natural justice — or, for that
matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the
very nature and impact of the order/action — the Court or the
Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of
natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a
facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment.
In other words, a distinction must be made between “no
opportunity” and no adequate opportunity, i.e., between “no
notice”/“no hearing” and “no fair hearing”. (a) In the case of
former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one
may call it „void‟ or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases,
normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take
proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with
the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the latter case,
the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram
partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice;
in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is
whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent
officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the
orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said
query. [It is made clear that this principle (No. 5) does not
apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf
are laid down elsewhere.]
(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the
primary principle of natural justice) the
Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the
ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz.,
to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of
justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying
the rule to varying situations that arise before them.”
(Emphasis supplied)

69. The present case is not one of “no notice” . The Petitioners had
notice of the demand, of the rate at which it was computed and of the
period to which it related; they filed two replies; and their objections
were considered. The complaint, at its highest, is of a deficiency in the
description of the demand, which is required to be examined from the
standpoint of prejudice. No prejudice whatsoever is shown to have
been caused to them.
70. The manner prescribed by Section 7(3) of the PP Act is the
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issuance of a notice in writing to show cause and the consideration of
the objections and the evidence of the noticee. That is precisely what
was done. The statute does not render the exercise of the power under
Section 7(2) of the PP Act dependent upon the nomenclature
employed in the notice.
71. The related contention, that the demand of “arrears of rent”
amounts to a recognition of the Petitioners as persons in authorised
occupation, also does not merit acceptance. The status of the
Petitioners is determined by the Cancellation Order, by which the
authority under which they occupied the Subject Premises stood
determined, and not by the label attached to the demand raised upon
them a decade later. It is well settled, as held in Sarup Singh Gupta
(supra) , that the mere acceptance of rent, after the determination of
the right to occupy, does not, by itself, evince an intention to treat the
occupation as authorised; such intention is a question of fact to be
gathered from all the circumstances. A mere demand stands on no
higher footing.
72. In Anant Raj Agencies (supra) , the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
held that the mere acceptance of amounts towards rent by a public
authority, after the determination of a lease, cannot be construed as a
renewal thereof. The relevant portion of the said Judgment, being
Paragraph No. 27, reads as under:
“ 27. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is a general law governing
the landlord-and-tenant relationship in general. The specific Rent
Control Acts are advancement over the Transfer of Property Act,
thereby providing more protection to the tenant from arbitrary
increase of rent and ejectment from the rented premises by the
landlord. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid case law, it can be
concluded that the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is not applicable
in respect of the public premises. The property in question is public
premises by virtue of Section 2(e)(3)(ii) of the Public Premises
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(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, which is
reproduced hereunder:
“ 2. (e) “public premises” means—
*
(3) in relation to the National Capital Territory of
Delhi—
*
(ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi
Development Authority, whether such premises are in
the possession of, or leased out by, the said Authority;”

Therefore, in the instant case, as per Clause III(b) of the lease deed
and Sections 21 and 22 of the DD Act read with Rule 43 of the
Nazul Land Rules and in the light of Shanti Prasad Devi [Shanti
Prasad Devi v. Shankar Mahto, (2005) 5 SCC 543] , Sarup Singh
Gupta [Sarup Singh Gupta v. S. Jagdish Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 205]
and Ashoka Mktg. Ltd. [Ashoka Mktg. Ltd. v. Punjab National
Bank, (1990) 4 SCC 406] cases, there cannot be an automatic
renewal of lease in favour of the original lessee once it stands
terminated by efflux of time and also by issuing notice terminating
the lease. Merely accepting the amount towards the rent by the
office of DDA after expiry of the lease period shall not be
construed as renewal of lease of the premises in question, in favour
of the original lessee, for another period of 20 years as contended
by the respondent.”
(Emphasis supplied)

73. The said principle applies with greater force to the present case,
where the Respondents have accepted nothing, and are only alleged to
have mis-described their demand as one for arrears of rent instead of
damages. The Respondents had cancelled the licence, initiated
proceedings under the PP Act, obtained an order directing assessment
of damages and resisted every proceeding instituted by the Petitioners
up to the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. Their conduct evinces no intention
whatsoever to treat the Petitioners as licensees. On the contrary, the
record of the learned Appellate Authority reveals that when the
Petitioners, in the year 2006, sought to tender the licence fee in respect
of the Subject Premises for the period from the year 1992 onwards,
the pay orders sent by them were returned by the Department on the
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specific ground that the licence stood cancelled by the Cancellation
Order. The contention that the Respondents continued to treat the
Petitioners as persons liable to pay rent is, thus, belied by the record.
74. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The only real
consequence which could have flowed from the anomaly in the Show
Cause Notice was in respect of the period prior to 05.04.2000, during
which the licence subsisted and for which no damages for
unauthorised occupation could have been claimed. That anomaly was
noticed by the learned Appellate Authority, which has confined the
liability of the Petitioners to the period commencing from the date of
the cancellation of the licence. The relevant portion of the Impugned
Order reads as under:
“ 6. Record reveals that property no.4623/XII was allotted to Sh.
Lekh Raj, father of the appellants, for residential use and he also
encroached upon property no. 4622/12 and 4624/12 which were not
allotted to him. On 05.04.2000 the Deputy Commissioner had
cancelled the license on the ground that appellants Om Prakash and
others had changed the use of the properties from residential to
commercial. Since the appellants are unauthorized occupants, they
have to pay damages. Notice under Section 7(3) of the P.P. Act was
issued to the appellants on 03.12.2010 wherein arrears of rent to the
tune of Rs.13,11,695/- at the rate of Rs.6,978/- being arrears of rent
from 01.04.1995 to 30.11.2010 were claimed. The appellants are
unauthorized occupants, they have to pay damages and mere
mention of the word “arrears of rent” instead of damages in the
notice under Section 7 of the PP Act does not make any difference.
The contention of the appellants that Estate Officer is the same
person who has cancelled licence of the appellants does not affect
the present case as at the relevant time he was discharging his
duties as Dy. Commissioner and thereafter duty of Estate Officer
was assigned to him. In the impugned order, policy of the
department with regard to rate of damages have been specifically
dealt with. However, the damages have been claimed with effect
from 01.04.1995.
7. It is not in dispute that the license of the appellants had been
cancelled way back on 05.04.2000 and thus the department can
legally claim damages only with effect from the date of
cancellation of license i.e. 05.04.2000 and not prior thereto @
Rs.6,978/- as claimed in the notice dated 03.12.2010. Since the
appellants are unauthorized occupants in respect of the premises in
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question, they are liable to pay the damages only from the date of
cancellation of their license i.e. 05.04.2000 @ Rs.6,978/- per month
till final payment is made. Since interest @ 18% has been awarded,
which in my view is on the higher side. Accordingly, appellants are
also liable to pay simple interest @ 12% per annum on the amount
payable by them.”
(Emphasis supplied)

75. The conclusion of the learned Appellate Authority, that the
mention of the expression “arrears of rent” in the Show Cause Notice
does not make any difference, though briefly stated, is, for the reasons
set out hereinabove, the correct conclusion on the facts of the present
case. The learned Appellate Authority has also granted to the
Petitioners the only relief to which the anomaly in the Show Cause
Notice could legitimately have entitled them.
76. Therefore, the first , and the primary, ground of challenge
sought to be raised on behalf of the Petitioners does not merit
acceptance and is, accordingly, rejected.
Finding of unauthorised occupation and the reliance upon Nusli
Neville Wadia (supra)
77. Adverting to the second ground of challenge, it is contended
that the finding that the Petitioners are in unauthorised occupation of
the Subject Premises is without foundation, inasmuch as it rests upon
the report of the Managing Officer (Evacuee Property Cell) dated
29.10.1991, and that the Cancellation Order is itself arbitrary and
illegal. Considerable emphasis has been laid, in this regard, upon the
decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Nusli Neville Wadia
(supra) .
78. In Nusli Neville Wadia (supra) , the respondent was a tenant in
a building which had been acquired by a public sector insurance
company. The tenancy was terminated, and proceedings were initiated
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before the Estate Officer under the PP Act for eviction as well as for
damages. The Estate Officer called upon the tenant to lead his
evidence first. The High Court held that it was for the insurance
company to lead its evidence first, and the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
declined to interfere with the said view.
79. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that a public authority, though
exempt from the rigours of the rent control legislation, is required to
act fairly and reasonably in seeking the eviction of its tenants; that,
although the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 do not, as such, apply to the proceedings
before the Estate Officer, the principles of natural justice are required
to be complied with; that the noticee is entitled to an effective
opportunity to show cause, to inspect the documents relied upon
against him and to cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of
the authority.

80. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court further held that, where the case of
the authority for eviction rests upon grounds which are required to be
established by it, the principle underlying Section 101 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 would require the authority to adduce its evidence
first. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, at the same time, emphasised that
the proceedings before the Estate Officer are summary in nature and
are required to be concluded expeditiously.
81. There can be no quarrel with the principles so enunciated. This
Court is, however, unable to accept that they advance the case of the
Petitioners in the facts of the present case, for more than one reason.
82. In the first place, Nusli Neville Wadia (supra) was concerned
with the manner in which a contested question, on which the right of
the authority to evict depended, was to be tried before the Estate
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Officer. In the present case, the status of the Petitioners does not
depend upon any such contested question remaining to be tried. In
terms of Section 2(g) of the PP Act, a person who continues in
occupation of public premises after the authority under which he was
allowed to occupy the same “ has been determined for any reason
whatsoever ” is in unauthorised occupation thereof. That the licence of
the Petitioners was determined by the Cancellation Order is not in
dispute; the Petitioners, thus, fall squarely within the said definition.
83. The endeavour of the Petitioners, in substance, is to question
the correctness of the Cancellation Order itself, by contending that the
Subject Premises had been licensed to their father in their entirety and
for commercial use. That question, however, in the considered view of
this Court, is no longer open to the Petitioners.
84. The Cancellation Order was passed by the competent authority
after a notice to show cause and a hearing. The challenge laid to it in
the Writ Petition, being W.P.(C) 6992/2001, was withdrawn. The First
Suit was dismissed with a finding that the premises had been allotted
for residential purposes, and the Appeal there-against was dismissed
as barred by limitation. The Second Suit, in which the Cancellation
Order was directly assailed, has also been dismissed, and the Appeal
preferred there-against was likewise dismissed as barred by limitation.
The Cancellation Order and the Order dated 20.03.2001 have, thus,
not been stayed or set aside in any proceeding.
85. This Court, in the Petition, being CM(M) 89/2004, has already
taken the view, albeit while declining interim relief, that the finding as
to the residential nature of the allotment and its commercial misuser,
not having been challenged, had attained finality, and the Civil Appeal
preferred there-against was dismissed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
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as well.
86. In view of the foregoing facts, this Court is of the considered
view that the Petitioners cannot, now in a challenge to an order
assessing damages, be permitted to reopen a cancellation which they
have unsuccessfully assailed, in one proceeding after another, for over
two decades.
87. In the second place, the question as to whether the Petitioners
were in unauthorised occupation was not decided for the first time by
the Order of the Estate Officer on the basis of the report dated
29.10.1991. It had been decided by the Order dated 20.03.2001, after
the Section 4 Notice, the reply of the Petitioners dated 18.08.2000 and
the reply of the Department had been considered. The Petitioners
were, therefore, heard on the very question on which they now claim
to have been condemned without evidence, and the finding returned
against them has remained undisturbed. The burden which lay upon
the Respondents, on the principle underlying Section 101 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, thus stood discharged by the Cancellation Order
and the Order dated 20.03.2001, and it was thereafter for the
Petitioners to show the authority under which they continued in
occupation.
88. In the third place, the grievance that the Petitioners were denied
an opportunity to cross-examine the Assistant Director (Property) and
the officials of the Survey Division is not borne out by the record.
Nothing has been shown to this Court to indicate that the Petitioners,
at any stage of the proceedings before the Estate Officer, sought to
cross-examine any person or to lead any evidence in rebuttal. The
Replies dated 28.12.2010 and 07.12.2011 contain no such request.
The Order of the Estate Officer, on the other hand, specifically records
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that the Petitioners had not denied the area or the user of the Subject
Premises in any of their Replies.
89. The right to cross-examine, recognised in Nusli Neville Wadia
(supra) , is a right to be afforded such opportunity where it is sought; it
does not cast an obligation upon the Estate Officer to conduct a trial
on matters which are not put in issue by the noticee. The requirement
of cross-examination, as the passage relied upon by the Petitioners
itself indicates, is attracted where material is relied upon to establish a
contested fact; the area and the user of the Subject Premises were not
contested by the Petitioners. The statement of the Assistant Director
(Property), moreover, did no more than place before the Estate Officer
the contents of the official record, including the Cancellation Order
and the Order dated 20.03.2001, with which the Petitioners were fully
conversant. No prejudice, therefore, is shown to have been caused to
the Petitioners on this count either.

90. Further, the contention that the proceedings under Section 4 of
the PP Act were abandoned midway, and that the same leads to an
inference that the Petitioners were not in unauthorised occupation, is
equally devoid of merit.
91. The said proceedings were not abandoned; they resulted in the
Order dated 20.03.2001, by which the Petitioners were held to be
unauthorised occupants and were directed to have the damages
assessed. The fact that no order of eviction has, as yet, been passed
against the Petitioners does not clothe their occupation with any
authority. As held by the Division Bench of this Court in G.R. Gupta
(supra) , the failure of the authority to initiate eviction proceedings
does not confer any right upon the occupant to continue in occupation
of public premises; and the same would apply, a fortiori , where such
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proceedings have been initiated but not carried to a conclusion.
92. In view of the foregoing, the second ground of challenge also
does not inspire the confidence of this Court and is, accordingly,
rejected.
Plea of Limitation
93. Adverting to the third ground of challenge, it is contended that
the claim for damages, insofar as it relates to the period beyond three
years preceding the Show Cause Notice, is barred by limitation.
Reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision of the Division
Bench of this Court in G.R. Gupta (supra) , the relevant portions
whereof read as under:
“ 24. However, we are of the opinion that the law of limitation
applies to proceedings initiated before the Estate Officer under the
PP Act, 1971. The Supreme Court in New Delhi Municipal
Committee v. Kalu Ram (supra) has held as under : -
“………… If the recovery of any amount is barred by the
law of limitation, it is difficult to hold that the Estate
Officer could still insist that the said amount was payable.
When a duty is cast on an authority to determine the
arrears of rent, the determination must be in accordance
with law. Section 7 only provides a special procedure for
the realisation of rent in arrears and does not constitute a
source or foundation of a right to claim a debt otherwise
time-barred. Construing the expression “any money due”
in section 186 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 the
Privy Council held in Hans Raj Gupta v. Official
Liquidators of the Dehradun Mussorie Electric Tramway
Company Ltd. (1) that this meant moneys due and
recoverable in suit by the company, and observed:
It is a section which creates a special procedure for
obtaining payment of moneys; it is not a section which
purports to create a foundation upon which to base a claim
for payment. It creates no new rights.
We are clear that the word “payable” in section 7, in the
context in which its occurs, means “legally recoverable.”
Admittedly a suit to recover the arrears instituted on the
day the order under section 7 was made would have been
barred by limitation. The amount in question was therefore
irrecoverable. This being the position, the appeal fails and
is dismissed with costs.”
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xxx xxx xxx
27. Even though we have held that the Act, 1963 applies to
proceedings under the PP Act, 1971, yet the question that arises for
consideration is whether the right to claim damages under Section
7(2) of the PP Act, 1971, was barred on the date the proceedings
were initiated by the Lok Sabha Secretariat.
xxx xxx xxx
29. It is pertinent to mention that the Act, 1963 grants extended
limitation of 30 years only to Central and State Governments and
not to statutory authorities like NDMC and Calcutta Port Trust. In
any event, in none of the judgments cited before us the import and
significance of Article 112 of the Act, 1963 has been considered. In
fact, in The Union of India v. The District Judge Amritsar , 1985
P.L.J. (67) 120 (Punjab & Haryana High Court) it has been held
that “ The damages are being recovered in the present case by the
Estate Officer on behalf of the Central Government. Therefore,
under Section 7 of the Act damages for a period of 30 years prior
to the initiation of proceedings under the said provision could be
claimed and recovered. ” Consequently, as the proceedings for
recovery of damages for the period 01st January, 1994 to 27th
September, 2001 had been filed in 2001 i.e. within 30 years of
cause of action having arisen, the respondent‟s claim for damages
was within limitation.”
(Emphasis supplied)

94. The proposition that the law of limitation applies to proceedings
under Section 7 of the PP Act is, thus, not in doubt. The plea of the
Petitioners, however, cannot be accepted.
95. The plea of limitation was not raised by the Petitioners in their
Replies before the Estate Officer. It does not find place in the
memorandum of the Appeal preferred before the learned Appellate
Authority, and the Impugned Order does not record any such
submission. It was not raised even in the present Petition as originally
filed, and has been urged for the first time by way of Additional
Written Submissions, several years after the institution of the present
Petition.
96. The contention that a plea of limitation, being a pure question
of law, can be raised at any stage, is too broadly stated. As held by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal
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24
Mehta , a plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle
of law divorced from facts, since, in every case, the starting point of
limitation has to be ascertained, which is entirely a question of fact; a
plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. The relevant
portion of the said Judgment, being Paragraph No. 19, though
rendered in the context of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, reads as under:
“ 19. A plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle
of law divorced from facts as in every case the starting point of
limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact.
A plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. The
question whether the words “barred by law” occurring in Order 7
Rule 11( d ) CPC would also include the ground that it is barred by
law of limitation has been recently considered by a two-Judge
Bench of this Court to which one of us was a member (Ashok
Bhan, J.) in Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. v. Hanuman Seva
Trust [(2006) 5 SCC 658, below] it was held: (SCC p. 661, para 8)
“ 8 . After hearing counsel for the parties, going through the
plaint, application under Order 7 Rule 11( d ) CPC and the
judgments of the trial court and the High Court, we are of
the opinion that the present suit could not be dismissed as
barred by limitation without proper pleadings, framing of
an issue of limitation and taking of evidence. Question of
limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. Ex facie in
the present case on the reading of the plaint it cannot be
held that the suit is barred by time.”
This principle would be equally applicable to a company petition.
Therefore, unless it becomes apparent from the reading of the
company petition that the same is barred by limitation the petition
cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11( d ) CPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)

97. To the same effect is the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme
25
Court in Kamlesh Babu v. Lajpat Rai Sharma . The Hon‟ble
Supreme Court, in that case, did permit the plea of limitation to be
urged, though it had not been taken before the appellate courts, and
noticed that a point of limitation is prima facie admissible even in the

24
(2006) 5 SCC 638
25
(2008) 12 SCC 577
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court of last resort. It did so, however, because the plea had been
raised in the written statement and decided upon by the learned Trial
Court, and the factual foundation for it was, thus, already on record.
The proposition that a plea of limitation which is a mixed question of
law and fact cannot be raised at the appellate stage was, at the same
time, expressly affirmed. The relevant portions of the said Judgment
read as under:
“ 21. It is no doubt true, as was pointed out by this Court in
Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. and also in Narne Rama Murthy
case , that if the plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and
fact, the same cannot be raised at the appellate stage. We have no
problem with the said proposition of law. What we are concerned
with is whether the said proposition is applicable to the facts of this
case. In this case the plea of limitation had been raised in the
written statement and though no specific issue was framed in
respect thereof, a decision was given thereupon by the learned trial
court.
22. Apart from Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, even Order 7
Rule 11( d ) of the Code of Civil Procedure casts a mandate upon the
court to reject a plaint where the suit appears from the statement in
the plaint to be barred by any law, in this case by the law of
limitation. Further, as far back as in 1943, the Privy Council in
Lachhmi Sewak Sahu v. Ram Rup Sahu held that a point of
limitation is prima facie admissible even in the court of last resort,
although it had not been taken in the lower courts.
23. The reasoning behind the said proposition is that certain
questions relating to the jurisdiction of a court, including limitation,
goes to the very root of the court‟s jurisdiction to entertain and
decide a matter, as otherwise, the decision rendered without
jurisdiction will be a nullity. However, we are not required to
elaborate on the said proposition, inasmuch as in the instant case
such a plea had been raised and decided by the trial court but was
not reversed by the first appellate court or the High Court while
reversing the decision of the trial court on the issues framed in the
suit. …”
(Emphasis supplied)

98. This Court is not unmindful of the mandate of Section 3 of the
Limitation Act, sub-section (1) whereof reads as under:
“ 3. Bar of limitation. —(1) Subject to the provisions contained in
sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred,
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and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed,
although limitation has not been set up as a defence.”

99. The nature of the said obligation was explained by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in Kamlesh Babu (supra) in the following terms:
“ 17. It is well settled that Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act casts a
duty upon the court to dismiss a suit or an appeal or an application,
if made after the prescribed period, although, limitation is not set
up as a defence.”
(Emphasis supplied)

100. The said duty, however, operates upon facts which are not in
dispute. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Union of India v. British
26
India Corporation Ltd. , while holding that limitation is a mandate to
the forum, which must be considered and applied irrespective of
whether it was raised or not, was careful to qualify the said
proposition by the words “if there is no dispute on facts” . The
relevant portion of the said Judgment reads as under:
“ 7. As to the first point, the question of limitation is a mandate to
the forum and, irrespective of the fact whether it was raised or not,
the forum must consider and apply it, if there is no dispute on facts.
Section 50 of the 1922 Act, as modified by Rule 4-A, is a provision
of the statute which was required to be applied by the High Court at
the time of considering the relief, if any, to be granted in the writ
petition. The claim being barred by time, the writ petition could not
have been allowed nor could any relief be granted. The first
contention, therefore, fails.”
(Emphasis supplied)

101. The obligation under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, therefore,
does not dispense with the requirement of a factual foundation. Where
the bar is apparent from facts which are admitted, or which appear on
the face of the record, the forum is bound to give effect to it, whether
or not it has been pleaded. Where, however, the applicability of the
bar depends upon facts which are in dispute, or which have never been

26
(2003) 9 SCC 505
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brought on record, the plea partakes of the character of a mixed
question of law and fact, and must be raised at the stage at which such
facts can be pleaded and proved. The question, therefore, is whether,
in the present case, the bar of limitation was apparent on undisputed
facts.
102. Tested on the said touchstone, the plea of the Petitioners does
not rest upon undisputed facts. In the first place, the very starting
point of limitation is not free from doubt. In G.R. Gupta (supra) , the
Division Bench of this Court tested the bar of limitation with
reference to the date on which the proceedings for recovery under
Section 7 of the PP Act were initiated. In the present case, the earlier
proceedings, which commenced with the Section 4 Notice and led to
the Order dated 20.03.2001, were proceedings for eviction, though the
said Order also directed the Petitioners to have the damages for their
unauthorised occupation assessed. The matter was, thereafter, referred
to the Estate Officer on 04.03.2010 for taking action under the PP Act,
the Notice dated 01.06.2010 was issued to the Petitioners, and the
Show Cause Notice under Section 7(3) of the PP Act followed on
03.12.2010/06.12.2010. The Petitioners compute the period of
limitation from the Show Cause Notice. Whether the proceedings for
recovery are to be regarded as having been initiated on the date of the
Show Cause Notice, or on the reference dated 04.03.2010, or on the
Notice dated 01.06.2010, and whether the direction contained in the
Order dated 20.03.2001 has any bearing upon the matter, are questions
which turn upon the record of the proceedings, and none of them was
ever put to the Estate Officer.
103. Be that as it may, each of the said dates falls in the year 2010.
On any of them, the liability to pay damages for use and occupation
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BHATIA
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being one which accrues for so long as the unauthorised occupation
continues, the claim for the period of three years immediately
preceding the initiation of the proceedings under Section 7 of the PP
Act, and for the entire period thereafter, is within time. The plea of the
Petitioners, as urged, is itself confined to the period anterior thereto.
The plea, even if it were to be entertained, would thus not go against
the core of the Order of the Estate Officer or of the Impugned Order,
and could, at the highest, affect a part of the period for which damages
have been awarded.
104. In the second place, insofar as the period from 05.04.2000 up to
the commencement of the said three years is concerned, the answer
would depend upon whether the claim is one to which Article 112 of
the Schedule to the Limitation Act applies. As noticed in G.R. Gupta
(supra) , the extended period of thirty years is available where the
recovery is sought by or on behalf of the Central Government or a
State Government, and not where a statutory authority seeks recovery
in its own right. The Subject Premises are stated to be evacuee
property transferred by the Ministry of Rehabilitation, Government of
India, to the Slum Department in the year 1956, and have since been
managed, successively, by the Delhi Development Authority, the
Municipal Corporation of Delhi and DUSIB. It is the stand of the
Respondents that the period prior to 01.07.2010, on which date
DUSIB came into being, is governed by Article 112 of the Limitation
Act.
105. Whether, during the said period, the Subject Premises continued
to vest in the Government, with the Respondents and their
predecessors managing the same and recovering the dues on its behalf,
or whether they stood vested in the statutory authority itself, is a
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BHATIA
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question of fact, which turns upon the terms of the said transfer and
the records of the Department. Significantly, the pleadings contain no
averment as to the person or authority in whom the Subject Premises
vested during the period from 05.04.2000 till DUSIB came into being
on 01.07.2010, or as to the capacity in which the dues for that period
were being claimed.
106. The Respondents, in their Counter Affidavit, have confined
themselves to the assertion that the said period is governed by Article
112 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, while the Petitioners, in
their Additional Written Submissions, have contended to the contrary
on the strength of G.R. Gupta (supra) . Beyond the bare statement,
found in the Order of the Estate Officer and in the Petition, that the
Subject Premises were transferred by the Ministry of Rehabilitation to
the Slum Department in the year 1956, and the stand of the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi, recorded in the Judgment dated 16.01.2002 in
the First Suit, that the Subject Premises, previously under the control
and management of the Slum and J.J. Department of the Delhi
Development Authority, stood transferred with effect from 01.09.1992
“to the MCD and Union of India” , no material has been placed on
record to show the terms of such transfers, or the capacity in which the
Respondents, or their predecessors, held and managed the Subject
Premises thereafter.
107. In the third place, the effect, if any, upon the computation of
limitation, of the Order dated 20.03.2001, by which the Petitioners
were directed to have the damages for their unauthorised occupation
assessed, and of the stand taken by the Petitioners in the proceedings
which followed, is a matter which could have been gone into only
upon the plea being raised. None of these aspects has been examined
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BHATIA
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by either of the authorities below, for the simple reason that no such
plea was ever urged before them.
108. It is in this backdrop that the obligation under Section 3 of the
Limitation Act is to be viewed. Even proceeding on the footing that a
like obligation rested upon the Estate Officer, in view of the principle,
noticed in G.R. Gupta (supra) , that the amount payable under Section
7 of the PP Act must be one which is legally recoverable, the Estate
Officer, in the discharge of his quasi-judicial function, could have
given effect to the bar of his own accord only if it were apparent from
the record before him. It was not. The Petitioners, in their Replies, did
not dispute the claim on the ground of limitation, and the
Respondents, consequently, had no occasion to place on record the
material bearing upon the date of initiation of the proceedings, the
capacity in which the claim was being made, or the effect of the Order
dated 20.03.2001. In the absence of such material, the Estate Officer
could not have determined, of his own accord, whether the period of
limitation applicable to the claim was three years or thirty years, or the
date from which it was to be reckoned. The position before the learned
Appellate Authority was no different. The bar of limitation was,
therefore, not one which was apparent on undisputed facts, and the
plea, in the present case, is a mixed question of law and fact, and not a
pure question of law which could be raised at any stage.
109. The aforesaid aspects are matters upon which the Respondents
were entitled to an opportunity to place their material before the fact-
finding authorities. A party who did not raise such a plea before either
of the authorities below cannot be permitted to raise it for the first
time in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India, and the Impugned Order cannot be said to suffer from any error
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BHATIA
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for not having dealt with a plea which was never urged. The said
jurisdiction is, moreover, discretionary, and this Court is not inclined
to exercise it in aid of a belated plea raised by parties who, having
been directed as far back as on 20.03.2001 to have the damages
assessed, did not comply with the said direction and have continued in
occupation of the Subject Premises throughout.
110. This Court, accordingly, declines to entertain the plea of
limitation, and expresses no opinion on the applicability of Article 112
of the Schedule to the Limitation Act to the claim of the Respondents.
The third ground of challenge, therefore, fails.
CONCLUSION:
111. On an overall consideration of the matter, this Court finds that
the Petitioners, whose licence in respect of the Subject Premises stood
cancelled on 05.04.2000, have continued in occupation thereof for
over two decades thereafter. The direction issued to them as far back
as on 20.03.2001 to have the damages assessed was not complied
with. The proceedings which followed afforded them due notice and
adequate opportunity, of which they availed.
112. The infirmity in the wording of the Show Cause Notice, upon
which the principal challenge is founded, has caused no prejudice to
the Petitioners, and the only consequence which could legitimately
flow therefrom has already been addressed by the learned Appellate
Authority by confining the liability to the period subsequent to the
cancellation of the licence.
113. The decision in Nusli Neville Wadia (supra) also does not
assist the Petitioners, the question of their status being governed by
the Cancellation Order and the Order dated 20.03.2001, which have
remained undisturbed. The plea of limitation, raised for the first time
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BHATIA
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before this Court and dependent upon facts which were never placed
before the authorities below, cannot be entertained.
114. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no
jurisdictional error, violation of the principles of natural justice,
perversity or error apparent on the face of the record in the Impugned
Order or the Order of the Estate Officer, warranting interference in
exercise of the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution of India.
DECISION:
115. Accordingly, the present Petition, being sans merit, is
dismissed. The Impugned Order, and the Order of the Estate Officer
as modified thereby, are upheld.
116. The amounts deposited by the Petitioners pursuant to the orders
passed by the learned Appellate Authority and by this Court shall be
adjusted towards the amount payable by them in terms of the
Impugned Order, and the Respondents shall be at liberty to recover the
balance amount, if any, in accordance with law.
117. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the aforementioned terms.
118. There shall be no Order as to the Costs.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 21, 2026/DJ
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BHATIA
Signing Date:21.11.2026
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