Dakshinanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd vs M/S. Creative Entrepreneurs Llp

Court
Delhi High Court

$~52 & 53
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Date of decision: 03.11.2026

# CNR No. DLHC010530782026
+ FAO (COMM) 323/2026, CM APPL. 76328/2026, CM APPL.
76329/2026 & CM APPL. 76330/2026

DAKSHINANCHAL VIDYUT VITRAN NIGAM
LTD .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Rakesh U. Upadhyay, Ms.
Aarti U. Mishra & Mr. Harsh
Som, Advs.
versus

M/S. CREATIVE ENTREPRENEURS LLP .....Respondent
Through:

# CNR No. DLHC010530792026
+ FAO (COMM) 324/2026, CM APPL. 76331/2026, CM APPL.
76332/2026 & CM APPL. 76333/2026
DAKSHINANCHAL VIDYUT VITRAN NIGAM
LTD .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Rakesh U. Upadhyay, Ms.
Aarti U. Mishra & Mr. Harsh
Som, Advs.
versus

M/S CREATIVE ENTREPRENEURS LLP THROUGH ITS
DESIGNATED PARTNERS MR GAGAN
AGARWAL .....Respondent
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

Signature Not Verified
Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:06.11.2026
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FAO (COMM) 323/2026 & 324/2026 Page 1 of 10

AVNEESH JHINGAN, J. (ORAL)
1. These appeals are filed against the order dated 24.08.2026
(hereinafter ‘impugned order’) dismissing the objection petition filed
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as
time-barred.
2. For convenience sake, the facts are being taken from FAO
(COMM) 323/2026. The brief facts are that the appellant floated a
tender for the construction of 33/11 KV sub-station with associated 33
KV and 11 KV lines at Kasganj, U.P. on turnkey-basis. The
respondent was the successful bidder and was awarded work vide
Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 01.06.2015. Pursuant to the LOI, three
work orders were issued on 03.02.2016.
2.1 Dispute arose between parties to the lis and the respondent filed
a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council
under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act, 2006 (for short ‘MSMED Act’). On failure of the
conciliation proceedings, the dispute was referred to the Delhi
Arbitration Centre and arbitrator was appointed. The arbitral
proceedings culminated in award dated 01.04.2024 and was served
upon the appellant on 06.05.2024.
2.2 On 21.05.2024, the appellant filed objection petition under
Section 34 of the Act. The objections were dismissed by the
Commercial Court, Agra vide order dated 15.05.2025 for want of
territorial jurisdiction. Thereafter the objection petition was filed
before the Commercial Court, North-West, Rohini Courts, Delhi on
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Signing Date:06.11.2026
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10.06.2026 and was dismissed by the impugned order. Hence, the
present appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the Commercial
Court should have applied Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963
(hereinafter ‘Limitation Act’) while considering the delay in filing the
objection petition under Section 34 of the Act. Reliance is placed on
the decision of the Supreme Court State of Maharashtra & Ors. v.
M/s. Ark Builders Pvt. Ltd. (2011) 4 SCC 616 and M/s Motilal
Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr. 2025 INSC 1062 to buttress
the argument that the delay in filing the objections should have been
condoned.
3.1 It is contended that the MSME Board had no jurisdiction as
turnkey projects are not covered under the MSMED Act. The decision
of the Bombay High Court in Sterling and Wilson Private Limited
and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 6829 is
pressed into service to fortify the contention that the MSMED Act
does not apply to composite works contracts.
3.2 It is submitted that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised for the
first time in an appeal under Section 37 of the Act. Reliance is placed
on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Zinc Limited
(H.Z.L.) v. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (2019) 17 SCC 82.
3.3 The submission is that the grant of interest at exorbitant rate
calls for interference.
4. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to reproduce
Section 34(3) of the Act:-
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Signing Date:06.11.2026
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“ 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after
three months have elapsed from the date on which the party
making that application had received the arbitral award or, if
a request had been made under section 33, from the date on
which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral
tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application
within the said period of three months it may entertain the
application within a further period of thirty days, but not
thereafter.”
5. Section 34(3) of the Act provides that the limitation for filing
the objection petition under Section 34 of the Act is three months from
the date of receipt of the award. The proviso provides the power to
condone delay of thirty days beyond the prescribed limitation period
of three months. The language of Section 34(3) is unambiguous and
consequence is that by Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act the
applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is ousted. This court
has the power to condone the delay only for a period of thirty days
beyond the prescribed limitation period of three months.
6. The issue is no longer res integra in view of the settled position
of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the following judgments:
6.1 In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises Vs. Principal
Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others , (2008) 7 SCC 169 held
as under:
“20. When any special statute prescribes certain period of
limitation as well as provision for extension upto specified
time limit, on sufficient cause being shown, then the period
of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail
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and to that extent the provisions of the Limitation Act shall
stand excluded. As the intention of the legislature in
enacting sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act is that the
application for setting aside the award should be made
within three months and the period can be further extended
on sufficient cause being shown by another period of 30
days but not thereafter, provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act would not be applicable because the
applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands
excluded because of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act.”
6.2 In Singh Enterprises vs. CCE , (2008) 3 SCC 70 held as under:
“8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also
the tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with
jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible
period provided under the statute. The period up to which
the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily
provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (in short ‘the Limitation Act') can be
availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to
Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be
preferred within three months from the date of
communication to him of the decision or order. However, if
the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal
within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be
presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words,
this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60
days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days' time can be
granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal.
The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the
position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no
power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period
of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that
the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain
the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the
expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring
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appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5
of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High
Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no
power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days'
period.”
6.3 In Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo
India (P) Ltd. and Anr., (2009) 5 SCC 791 held as under:
“32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in
Sections35, 35- B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the
position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court
should be made within 180 days only from the date of
communication of the decision or order. In other words, the
language used in other provisions makes the position clear
that the legislature intended the appellate authority to
entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30
days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary
limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of
any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause
after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was,
therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to
condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of
180 days.”
6.4 In Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity
Regulatory Commission (2010) 5 SCC 23 held as under:
“25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by
any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to
this Court within 60 days from the date of communication
of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section
125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within
a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was
sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period
of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation
prescribed for filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125
is substantially different from the period prescribed under
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the Limitation Act for filing suits, etc. The use of the
expression ‘within a further period of not exceeding 60
days’ in the proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the
outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no
provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an
appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal
after more than 120 days.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. In the case in hand, the initial objection petition filed before the
Commercial Court, Agra was within ninety days and was dismissed
for want of territorial jurisdiction vide order dated 15.01.2025.
Thereafter, the objection petition was filed before the Commercial
Court, North-West, Rohini Courts, Delhi on 10.06.2026 after a delay
of approximately one and a half years. Section 14 of the Limitation
Act is applicable despite the language of Section 34(3) of the Act.
Even if the period from May, 2024 to January, 2025 during which the
appellant was pursuing the objection petition before the Commercial
Court, Agra is excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the
objection petition filed before the Commercial Court, Delhi was
beyond the prescribed period of hundred and twenty days under
Section 34(3) of the Act. The Commercial Court rightly dismissed the
objection petition as time barred. Section 14 of the Limitation Act
excludes the period in pursuing proceedings before a Court that lacked
jurisdiction. The delay in filing the objection petition before the
competent court after excluding the period under Section 14 of the
Limitation Act has to be dealt as per the proviso to Section 34(3) of
the Act.
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Signing Date:06.11.2026
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8. The decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Motilal Agarwala
(supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant is not
applicable to the facts of the present case. The issue therein was
whether service of the award on the Assistant Engineer who was
neither a party to the arbitration nor was in a decision-making capacity
to take further recourses would be a valid service of the award or not.
In the present case, there is no dispute with regard to the service of the
award. Further reliance on State of Maharashtra & Ors. V. M/s Ark
Builders Pvt. Ltd. (supra) does not enhance the case of the appellant.
It was held that the limitation for filing objection petition under
Section 34 of the Act commences from the date of receipt of the
signed copy of the award. In the present case, the date of receipt of
award is not in dispute.
9. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant on the
decision of Sterling and Wilson Private Limited and Ors. (supra)
does not enhance the case of the appellant for challenging the
dismissal of the objection petition as time-barred or in seeking
condonation of delay beyond thirty days after excluding the period
under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
10. The authorities relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant
are not on the proposition that where the objection petition under
Section 34 of the Act has been dismissed as time-barred, the Court in
appeal under Section 37 of the Act can go into the merits of the case.
11. The objection petition under Section 34 of the Act was
dismissed as time-barred and the merits were not gone into. The
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contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellant on merits need
no adjudication. In appeal it is to be considered that the objection
petition was decided within the four corners of Section 34 of the Act.
The dismissal of the objection petition as time-barred is upheld and
this court cannot go into the merits.
12. It is a settled law that in appeal under Section 37 of the Act, it is
to be considered that the exercise of powers under Section 34 of the
Act was within the four corners of the provisions. Reference in this
regard be made to the following decisions of the Supreme Court:-
12.1 In AC Chokshi Share Broker (P) Ltd. v. Jatin Pratap Desai ,
(2025) 5 SCC 321 it was held:
“29. The limited supervisory role of courts while reviewing
an arbitral award is stipulated in Section 34 of the Act,
beyond whose grounds courts cannot intervene and cannot
correct errors in the arbitral award. [McDermott
International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC
181, para 52] The appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 is
also limited, as it is constrained by the grounds specified in
Section 34 and the court cannot undertake an independent
assessment of the merits of the award by reappreciating
evidence or interfering with a reasonable interpretation of
contractual terms by the Arbitral Tribunal. [MMTC Ltd. v.
Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163, para 14 : (2019) 2 SCC
(Civ) 293; Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge
Project, (2023) 9 SCC 85, para 25 : (2023) 4 SCC (Civ)
458.] The court under Section 37 must only determine
whether the Section 34 court has exercised its jurisdiction
properly and rightly, without exceeding its scope. [MMTC
Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163, para 14 : (2019) 2
SCC (Civ) 293; Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corpn. (P)
Ltd. v. Samir Narain Bhojwani, (2024) 7 SCC 218, para
26.]”
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12.2 In SEPCO Electric Power Construction Corpn. v. GMR
Kamalanga Energy Ltd., (2026) 2 SCC 542 it was held:
“72. The decision in MMTC [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.,
(2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293] , as referenced
recently by a coordinate Bench of this Court in Reliance
Infrastructure Ltd. [Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v. State of
Goa, (2024) 1 SCC 479 : (2024) 1 SCC (Civ) 412] , unfolds
in an involute manner that a court under Section 37 of the
1996 Act can only determine as to whether the court
concerned under Section 34 has not travelled beyond the
parameters of the scope therein. No independent evaluation
is permitted on the merits of the award.”
(emphasis supplied)

13. There is no factual or legal error calling for interference in the
impugned order. The appeals are dismissed.
14. All pending applications are disposed of.


AVNEESH JHINGAN, J

SHAIL JAIN, J
NOVEMBER 3, 2026
Ch

Reportable: Yes
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:06.11.2026
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