SRI SANJAY VARMA vs STATE OF KARNATAKA

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CRL.P No. 7906 of 2020


IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

TH
DATED THIS THE 30 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026
R


BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH

CRIMINAL PETITION NO.7906 OF 2020


BETWEEN:

1. SRI. SANJAY VARMA,
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,
S/O SURESH CHANDRA VARMA,
THE OCCUPIER AND FACTORY MANAGER,
M/S. MANGALORE REFINERY AND
PETROCHEMICALS LTD.,
P.O. KUTHETOOR VIA KATIPALLA,
DAKSHINA KANNADA,
MANGALURU-575030.
…PETITIONER

(BY SRI. ASHOK HARANAHALLI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. SRINIVASA RAO S.S., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF FACTORIES,
DIVISION -I, MANGALURU.
REPRESENTED BY SPP,
HIGH COURT BUILDING,
BENGALURU-560001.
…RESPONDENT

(BY SRI. SUHAS GOWDA M., HCGP)

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482
OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS
AND ALL FURTHER INVESTIGATION IN C.C.NO.1615/2020 VIDE
ANNEXURE-A REGISTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER FOR
OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 92 OF FACTORIES











Digitally signed
by DEVIKA M
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA

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ACT, PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE
FIRST CLASS (II COURT) MANGALURU, DAKSHINA KANNADA.

THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 13.10.2026, THIS DAY, THE COURT
PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH

CAV ORDER
Heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner and the learned High Court Government Pleader
appearing for the respondent/State.
2. The prayer sought in this petition is to quash the
initiation of criminal proceedings in C.C.No.1615/2020
registered against the petitioner for the offence punishable
under Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948, on the file of the
Judicial Magistrate First Class (II Court), Mangalore, D.K., and
grant such other relief as deemed fit in the circumstances of
the case.
3. The factual matrix of the case of the complainant is
that the petitioner M/s. Mangalore Refineries and
Petrochemicals Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as MRPL) entered
into a contract with M/s. Bridge and Roof Company India Ltd.
for the purpose of carrying out the project of revamp work for
upgradation of MRPL SWS units. The allegation made against

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the MRPL is that violated and contravened with Section 38(1) of
the Factories Act, which pertains to prevention of fire outbreak
and also the petitioner did not take safety measures. Hence, it
attracts Section 92 of the Factories Act.
4. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner had
issued letter to M/s. Bridge and Roof Company India Ltd.
stating that the contractor would be fully responsible for
ensuring strict compliance with relevant statutory provisions
and also to ensure that no accidents are caused due to the
ignorance or negligence of contractors or his sub-contractors
personnel. It is contended that on 01.07.2020 Sri Kamalesh
Kumar and Sri Ram Sevak Mahto suffered burn injuries while
undertaking maintenance work near the refinery sour water line
at the MRPL. It is stated that in spite of all resuscitative
measures, they could not be revived and was declared dead
and spot inspection by the respondent was also conducted and
show cause notice was issued on 15.09.2020 to the petitioner
and detailed reply to the show cause notice was also submitted
by the petitioner on 25.09.2020. The order by the respondent
stating that reply is not satisfactory dated 28.09.2020 is
challenged before the appellate authority under Section 107 of

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the Factories Act, 1948 before the Department of Factories,
Boilers and Industrial Safety and Health, Bangalore and the
said appeal was also dismissed on 22.10.2020. But the
respondent preferred a private complaint and the same is
numbered as C.C.No.1615/2020 and the very taking of
cognizance against the petitioner is erroneous and the learned
Magistrate has committed an error in taking the cognizance and
the very complaint is not maintainable and the order of taking
cognizance is also without application of mind. The learned
counsel would contend that the petitioner being the occupier
and the factory manager of MRPL, which is a public sector
undertaking, is a public servant and there is a bar
contemplated under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. and without any
sanction there cannot be prosecution.
5. The learned Senior Counsel would vehemently
contend that there is no negligence on the part of the
petitioner, which has resulted in untoward incident. The
learned counsel would contend that the project of revamp work
for upgradation of MRPL SWS units were awarded to M/s.
Bridge and Roof Company (I) Ltd. under the supervision of
Engineers India Ltd. (EIL) and for the execution of these
project revamp jobs, M/s. Bridge and Roof Company (I) Ltd.

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had sub-contracted a portion of the work/manpower supply to a
company named M/s. Northern Construction Company. MRPL
do not have any contract with M/s. Northern Construction
Company. Prior to the commencement of work, the petitioner
had issued a letter dated 24.09.2018 to M/s. Bridge and Roof
Company India Ltd clearly stating that the contractor would be
fully responsible for ensuring strict compliance with relevant
statutory provisions and the agreed terms of the contract and
also to ensure that no accidents are caused due to the
ignorance or negligence of contractor or his sub-contractor
personnel. The contractors shall adhere to permit work system
at refinery which is a hazardous industry and even safety
measurement training was also given to the workmen before
their deployment from the job clearly making them aware of
the hazards associated in working in a refinery as well as the
various safety precautions to be adopted while carrying out
jobs. The learned counsel also vehemently contend that when
the show cause notice was given, reply was given and the same
is not properly considered and erroneously held that the
petitioner has contravened Section 7A(2)(c) of the Factories Act
1948, which pertains to providing such information, instruction,
training and supervision as are necessary to ensure the health

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and safety of all workers. The learned counsel also contend that
the conclusion of the respondent that the petitioner has
contravened with Section 38(1) of the Factories Act, 1948,
which pertains to prevention of fire outbreak is erroneous. The
learned counsel would vehemently contend that it is not on the
part of the petitioner and they are also not the worker within
the meaning of the factory and also it is not in dispute that the
incident was taken place in manufacturing process. The learned
counsel would vehemently contend that if any untoward
incident is taken place, this petitioner is not responsible. The
injured persons are not the employees of the factory and they
are the employees of sub-contractor. Hence, Section 92 of the
Factories Act will not attract against the petitioner. The learned
counsel would vehemently contend that definition attracts only
in respect of, if it is any manufacturing process, if any untoward
accident is taken place. The contract is also not given to the
sub-contractor and also not permitted to give any sub-contract
to M/s. Northern Construction Company.
6. The learned counsel in support of his arguments
relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
SHRI CHINTAMAN RAO AND ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF
MADHYA PRADESH reported in AIR 1958 SC 388 and

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brought to the notice of this Court the discussion made in
paragraph No.14, wherein it is held that Section 92 constitutes
the contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or any
rules made thereunder an offence punishable with
imprisonment or fine or with both. The scheme of the aforesaid
provisions indicates that the workmen in the factory are under
the direct supervision and control of the management. The
conditions of service are statutorily regulated and the
management is to conform to the rules laid down at the risk of
being penalised for dereliction of any of the statutory duties.
The management obviously cannot fix the working hours,
weekly holidays, arrange for night shifts and comply with other
statutory requirements, if the persons like the Sattedars,
working in their factories and getting their work done by others
or through coolies, are workers within the meaning of the Act.
It is well nigh impossible for the management of the factory to
regulate their work or to comply with the mandatory provisions
of the Act. The said provisions, therefore, give a clear indication
that a worker under the definition of the Act is a person who
enters into a contract of service under the management and
does not include an independent contractor or his coolies or

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servants who are not under the control and supervision of the
employer.
7. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of
this Court the discussion made in paragraph No.15 with regard
to the definition of worker. It is observed that the only question
raised and decided was whether the persons employed in
repairing the machinery or putting up new machinery were
persons engaged in any manufacturing process or any work
incidental to or connected with it. The learned counsel also
brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.18, wherein it
is held that neither the Sattedars nor the coolies found by the
Inspector to be working in the factory were workers, as they
were not employed by the factory. In paragraph No.19 it is held
that as they were not workers, the non-inclusion of their names
in the register of adult workers or the absence of any entries in
regard to them in the said register would not constitute an
offence under Section 92 of the Act.
8. The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment
of the Apex Court in the case of LANCO ANPARA POWER
LIMITED v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS
reported in 2016 (10) SCC 329 and brought to the notice of

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this Court the discussion made in paragraph No.26, wherein it
is held that insofar as the Factories Act is concerned, its
preamble mentions that it is an Act to consolidate and amend
the law regulating labour in factories. It is enacted primarily
with the object of protecting workers employed in factories
against industrial and occupational hazards. For that purpose,
it seeks to impose upon the owners or occupiers certain
obligations to protect workers unwary as well as negligent and
to secure for them employment in conditions conducive to their
health and safety. This Act also requires that the workers
should work in healthy and sanitary conditions and for that
purpose it provides that precautions should be taken for the
safety of workers and prevention of accidents. Detailed
provisions are, therefore, made in diverse chapters of the Act
imposing obligations upon the owners of the factories to
maintain inspecting staff and for maintenance or health,
cleanliness, prevention of overcrowding and provisions for
amenities such as lighting, drinking water, etc. Provisions are
also made for safety of workers and their welfare, such as
restrictions on working hours and on the employment of young
persons and females, and grant of annual leave with wages.
The learned counsel referring this judgment would vehemently

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contend that in paragraph No.34, the Apex Court discussed
with regard to the worker is concerned and the same is in
respect of the employees of the factory and not in respect of
the employees of sub-contractor.
9. The learned counsel also relied upon the order
passed by this Court in Crl.P.No.7340/2019 dated
15.07.2026 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph
No.15, wherein it is held that injured was not an employee of
MRPL, but was employee of contractor. In Chintaman Rao’s
case, Hon'ble Supreme Court was examining whether
employees of Sattedars would fall within definition of ‘worker’
under Section 2(l) of the Act. Observing that contractor would
mean one who makes an agreement to carryout certain work
was distinct from meaning of worker, who essentially subjects
himself to control of employer, held contract worker would not
fall within meaning of definition of ‘worker’ under Section 2(l) of
the Act. Similar view is expressed in the case of General
Manager, U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Achchey Lal and
Another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2096 and quashed
the proceedings.

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10. The learned counsel also relies upon the judgment
of this Court in the case of S. SURESH AND ANOTHER v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in 2025 SCC OnLine KAR
25603 , wherein the coordinate bench of this Court considered
the issue that primarily the work entrusted to an external
agency was not in respect of the normal manufacturing process
of the petitioner factory. It was a civil work entrusted for
replacing the sugar bin feeding conveyor belt and therefore,
invocation of the provisions of the Factories Act and/or the
rules thereunder, would become suspect and allowed the
petition and quashed the proceedings.
11. Per contra, the learned High Court Government
Pleader appearing for the respondent/State would vehemently
contend that the petitioner cannot take the defence that they
were the employees of sub-contractor and taken note of
Section 7A(2)(a) to (c) while considering the reply of the
petitioner and passed an order. The learned counsel would
contend that in the untoward incident, lives were lost and
hence, the petitioner is liable to pay the compensation. The
petitioner cannot wash the hands in contending that they are
the sub-contractor employees and there was no any contract
between the petitioner and the sub-contractor and admittedly,

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the contract was entrusted to the main contractor and these
are all the matters to be considered during the course of trial
and not at the stage of initiation of the proceedings against the
petitioner for contravention of the provisions and penal
provision under Section 92 of the Factories Act is invoked and
hence, there cannot be quashing of the proceedings.
12. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner and the learned High Court Government Pleader
appearing for the respondent/State and also considering the
principles laid down in the judgments referred supra relied
upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the
points that would arise for the consideration of this Court are:

(i) Whether the petitioner has made out the
ground to quash the proceedings initiated
against him that there cannot be any
prosecution against the petitioner in view of the
contentions which have been raised?


(ii) What order?

Point No.(i):
13. Having heard the respective counsel, the prayer
sought before this Court is quashment of proceedings in
C.C.No.1615/2020 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for the

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proceedings initiated against the petitioner for the offence
punishable under Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948. It is
not in dispute that petition is filed by Occupier and Factory
Managers of M/s. Mangalore Refineries and Petrochemicals Ltd.
(for short ‘M/s.MRPL’) and it is also not in dispute that
M/s.MRPL had entered into EPCM (Engineering, Procurement
and Construction Management) contract with M/s. Engineers
India Limited (for short ‘M/s. EIL’) for implementation of BS-VI
Project at Mangalore. Under the said arrangement, M/s. EIL
was entrusted with the responsibility of procuring services,
supervising and managing the construction activities as the
Project Management Consultant. In furtherance of the project,
M/s. EIL engaged M/s. Bridge & Roof Company India Ltd. (B &
R) to undertake mechanical construction work relating to
revamp and upgradation of M/s. MRPL Sour Water Stripping
(SWS) Units.
14. But, the main contention of learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the petitioner is that sub-contract was given by
M/s.EIL in respect of certain portions of the work to M/s.
Northern Construction Company for execution of the project. It
is the contention of the petitioner that, M/s. EIL and B & R were
primarily responsible for supervision and implementation of the

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work in accordance with the prescribed safety protocols and
M/s. MRPL had no direct contractual relationship with
M/s.Northern Construction Company, that means there was no
contract between M/s. MRPL and M/s. Northern Construction
Company.
15. It is also not in dispute that Sri Kamalesh Kumar
and Sri Ram Sevak Mahto have sustained burn injuries while
undertaking maintenance work near the refinery’s Sour Water
line within the premises of M/s. MRPL on 01.07.2020. The
incident occurred during execution of the work relating to
revamp and upgradation of SWS Units. The injured workmen
were subsequently provided medical treatment. However,
despite the resuscitative measures undertaken, Sri Ram Sevak
Mahto, one of the injured could not be revived and was
declared dead on 05.08.2020, after a month of the incident.
Consequent upon the same, Deputy Director of Factories,
Division-I, Mangalore visited the spot on 02.07.2020 and an
inspection was conducted in connection with the accident and
report was prepared in July, 2020. Thereafter, a show-cause
notice dated 15.09.2020 was issued to the petitioner in relation
to the alleged contravention of the provisions of the Factories
Act, 1948 and the applicable rules. The petitioner submitted his

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detailed reply on 25.09.2020 explaining his position and
circumstances surrounding the incident. The said explanation
was rejected by the respondent vide order dated 28.09.2020.
16. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner
preferred an appeal under Section 107 of the Factories Act,
1948 before the Appellate Authority and the same was also
rejected vide order dated 22.10.2020. But, in the meanwhile, a
complaint was filed before the learned Magistrate on
20.10.2020 and cognizance was taken by registering a case in
C.C.No.1615/2020. The very initiation of proceedings is
challenged before this Court invoking Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
17. It is not in dispute that allegation against the
petitioner is that work was being undertaken as part of revamp
and upgradation of SWS Units. The only contention of the
petitioner is that workmen were deployed by M/s. Northern
Construction Company which had been engaged as a sub-
contractor by M/s.Bridge & Roof Company India Limited and
that M/s. MRPL had no direct contractual relationship with the
sub-contractor. Hence, there cannot be any prosecution against
the petitioner under Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1948. It is
also not in dispute that when the work was undertaken,

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applicable statutory provisions, safety procedures and permit-
to-work requirements, and to ensure that accidents did not
occur due to the negligence or non-compliance of the
contractor or its sub-contractor also to be taken note of. But, it
is the contention of petitioner that the contractor was also
required to provide necessary safety training to the personnel
deployed by it which was the condition prevailing when the
contract was given and no dispute with regard to the said fact.
It is also not in dispute that incident has taken place, as a
result, two of them have sustained injuries and subsequently,
medical aid was given.
18. It is the contention of the petitioner that the very
case of the complainant that there was contravention of Section
38(1) of the Factories Act, 1948 and Rule 84 of the Karnataka
Factories Rules 1969, are unsustainable. It has to be noted that
Court has taken cognizance vide order dated 22.10.2020, but
Factories Act is a Welfare and Social Protection Statute and its
safety provisions are to be construed in favour of the worker.
19. It is relevant to note definition of Section 2(n) of
the Factories Act, 1948 which defines ‘occupier’ and so also,
Section 2(l) which defines ‘worker’ to include a person

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employed, directly or through any agency (including a
contractor), in any manufacturing process or in any kind of
work incidental to or connected with it. But, the main
contention of learned Senior counsel for the petitioner is that if
any act is done by a person relating to manufacturing process,
then a person would be considered as a ‘worker’ and it is the
responsibility of the petitioner and the said argument of learned
Senior counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted and the
Court has to take note of definition of Section 2(l) of Factories
Act, 1948 which defines a ‘worker’. So also, the Court has to
take note of definition of Section 7A(1) of Factories Act, 1948
requires every occupier to ensure health, safety and welfare of
all workers while at work in the factory and so also, Section
7A(2)(c) of Factories Act, 1948 requires the provision of such
information, instruction, training and supervision as are
necessary to ensure that health and safety. Section 38(1) of
Factories Act, 1948 requires all practicable measures to prevent
outbreak of fire and its spread, with safe means of escape and
equipment for extinguishing it. But, provision under Section 92
of Factories Act, 1948 punishes contravention of the Act or
Rules.

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20. In keeping these relevant provisions, this Court has
to take note of very contention of learned Senior counsel for
the petitioner that petitioner-company is not in manufacturing
process. But, the very definition under Section 2(l) of Factories
Act, 1948 not only includes manufacturing process or any kind
of incidental work connected to it. But, in the case on hand, it
has to be noted that M/s. MRPL had started its functioning long
back, but contract was given to the contractor relating to the
revamp and upgradation of SWS units which is also an
incidental work. Hence, the contention that it has not taken
place during the course of manufacturing process cannot be
accepted.
21. The question before this Court is with regard to
order taking cognizance which is questioned and it is held in the
judgment in MEHMOOD UI REHMAN vs. KHAZIR
MOHAMMAD TUNDA reported in (2015) 12 SCC 420,
wherein the Apex Court held that the order must reflect
application of mind. It also held that a detailed reasoned order
at that stage is neither necessary nor desirable. So also, in the
case of PEPSI FOODS LTD. vs. SPECIAL JUDICIAL
MAGISTRATE reported in (1998) 5 SCC 749 , emphasized
that summoning an accused is a serious matter, no dispute to

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this aspect is concerned and while taking cognizance, the Court
has to take note of material available on record and the same
was taken note of by the Trial Court while passing an order
taking cognizance.
22. The other contention urged by learned Senior
counsel for the petitioner is that work was undertaken by M/s.
Northern Construction Company and there is no previty of
contract between M/s. MRPL and the sub-contractor and there
was contract only between M/s. Bridge & Roof Company India
Limited. The Court has to take note of material on record that
there was a contract between M/s. EIL and B & R, who were
primarily responsible and through letter dated 24.09.2018,
M/s.MRPL shifted all liability to the contractor. This Court
cannot accept the said argument at the threshold for the
reason that duties under Section 7(A) and 38 and the Rules
thereunder imposed on the Occupier, that means contract
workers inside the factory are ‘workers’ under Section 2(l). The
occupier's statutory responsibility is not discharged by contract.
The parties cannot agree among themselves to avoid duties
imposed for the protection of workers.

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23. The Apex Court in J. K. INDUSTRIES LTD. vs.
CHIEF INSPECTOR OF FACTORIES AND BOILERS reported
in (1996) 6 SCC 665 , wherein the Apex Court dealt with the
structure of occupier liability in a company. It also held that
liability under the Act attaches to the occupier as defined, and
that the Act itself identifies the person made answerable. The
documents which have been produced by M/s. MRPL is clear
that the company kept control of the safety-critical functions.
The operator of M/s. MRPL checked the system, closed the
isolation valve, supervised draining and de-pressurization, and
explained the job to the contractor’s supervisor. The letter
dated 24.09.2018 is clear with regard to allocation of
responsibility between M/s. MRPL and its contractor. When such
being the case, the very contention of learned Senior counsel
for the petitioner cannot be accepted.
24. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner relied
upon judgment of the Apex Court in SHRI CHINTAMAN RAO
AND ANOTHER vs. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH reported
in AIR 1958 SC 388, it is relevant to note that the said
decision was rendered prior to amendment to Section 2(l) of
the Factories Act, 1948, brought about by the Factories
(Amendment) Act, 1976, with effect from 26.10.1976. By the

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said amendment, the definition of “worker” was expressly
enlarged to include a person employed directly or through any
agency, including a contractor, with or without the knowledge
of the principal employer. Therefore, the said decision, which
considered the definition as it stood prior to the amendment,
cannot be applied without reference to the amended statutory
provision. In the present case, the mere fact that the deceased
was engaged through a contractor or subcontractor would not,
by itself, exclude him from the definition of “worker”. It would
nevertheless be necessary to examine whether the work
undertaken by him was in a manufacturing process or was
incidental to or connected with the manufacturing process, as
contemplated under Section 2(l) of the Act. The said judgment
will not come to the aid of the petitioner, since the said
judgment is prior to amendment to Section 2(l) of the Factories
Act, 1948 and the said amendment was brought in the year
1976, subsequent to the judgment of the Apex Court.

25. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has also
relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in LANCO ANPARA
POWER LTD. vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH reported in
(2016) 10 SCC 329 . The said decision is distinguishable on
the factual context in which the question arose, namely,

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construction activity undertaken before commencement of
manufacturing operations in the facility concerned. In the
present case, the work in question relates to revamp and
upgradation of SWS Units forming part of an existing refinery.
The material question is whether such work was incidental to or
connected with the manufacturing process carried on in the
factory. The mere fact that the concerned unit was undergoing
revamp or that its operations were temporarily suspended for
such purpose would not, by itself, be determinative of the

applicability of the Act.

26. It is relevant to take into consideration that this
Court distinguished the said judgment in
CRL.P.NO.5671/2021 vide order dated 01.10.2018,
particularly in paragraph No.12, this Court discussed the factual
aspects of the said case and in the said case, the deceased was
engaged in construction of STP-Sewerage lines which was
purely a civil work unconnected with the manufacturing
activity. The deceased was also not engaged in the
manufacturing process. The deceased was working under the
sub-contractor M/s.Tunga Bhadra Services. The work of the
deceased was not related or incidental to or proximate to the
manufacturing process. In paragraph No.13, this Court

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discussed with regard to applicability of the said judgment,
wherein in the said judgment, distinguished that at the relevant
time no manufacturing operation had commenced by the
appellants therein. The appellants were in the process of
construction of civil works/factory buildings etc., wherein they
had planned to set up their factories. As the process of
construction of civil works was undertaken by the appellants
wherein construction workers were engaged, the respondent
authorities took the view that the provisions of the aforesaid
Acts which were meant for construction workers became
applicable. In the said backdrop, considering the legislative
intent of BOCW Act and the Factories Act, extracted paragraph
No.34. In paragraph No.14, even extracted definition of Section
2(l) and in paragraph No.16, held that as per the said
definition, even a person who is employed through an agency
including a contractor either in any manufacturing process or in
cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a
manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental
to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, would bring
the said person within the said definition. The workers who
actually work on the machines, no doubt are employed in the
manufacturing process, but the definition includes, workers

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employed “in any other kind of work incidental to or connected
with the manufacturing process”. The same is also explained by
the Bombay High Court in UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER
vs. ARUN VITHAL BONDE reported in 2010 (3) Mh.L.J.
447, wherein it is held that “the ambit of these words is very
wide and must necessarily include those who are not employed
in the manufacturing process. The work may be entirely
different. It must, however, be incidental to or connected with
it. Hence, the Court has to take note of definition of Section
2(l) which is amended and the judgment of this Court referred
supra goes against the petitioner.

27. This Court would like to rely upon judgment of
Jammu and Kashmir High Court in JUTHI DEVI vs. PINE
CHEMICALS LTD. AND ANOTHER reported in (1991) 2 LLJ
386, wherein the Court also held that the applicability of the
beneficial legislation could not be denied merely because actual
manufacturing had not commenced. The Court observed that
nature, intention and purpose of the industrial activity were
relevant, and that workers would not lose statutory production
merely because production had not started or had temporarily
stopped. The Court emphasized that the process could
commence with effective steps towards the contemplated

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manufacturing activity and need not depend upon the
successful production of the finished product.

28. The Court has to take note of factual aspects of the
present case. The work was entrusted to contractor relating to
revamp and upgradation of SWS Units to M/s. MRPL which
forms part of the refinery’s and industrial operations. The work
was intended to modify and improve the facilities associated
with the refining process. It is also to be taken note of that
relevant unit was temporarily shut down to facilitate revamp
work and that would not, by itself, severe the connection
between work undertaken and the refinery’s manufacturing
activities. The contention that Factories Act, 1948 ceased to
apply merely because manufacturing operations had
temporarily stopped cannot, therefore, be accepted without
examining the nature and purpose of the work. Hence, the
contention of learned Senior counsel for the petitioner cannot
be accepted that the said work is not in connection with
manufacturing process and the definition is wider than the very
contention raised by learned Senior counsel for the petitioner.

29. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner also relied
upon judgment of this Court in S. SURESH AND ANOTHER

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CRL.P No. 7906 of 2020


vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY THE SPECIAL PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR reported in 2025 SCC ONLINE KAR 25603
and the said judgment also will not come to the aid of
petitioner and the Court has to consider in the context of
nature of work and the allegations in the case on hand. In the
present case, the work concerned is relating to revamp and
upgradation of existing SWS Units at an operating refinery. If
the material on record establishes a connection between the
work and the refineries manufacturing process, the mere fact
that work was entrusted to a contractor would not, by itself,
warrant quashing of the proceedings.

30. So also, in the case in SRI M. VENKATESH AND
ANOTHER vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA passed in
CRL.P.NO.7340/2019 dated 15.07.2026 which was relied
upon by learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, the
applicability of the said decision to the present case depends
upon whether the complaint herein specifies the statutory
obligations allegedly breached and the factual basis for such
violations. The decision must also be considered in light of its
interpretation of Section 2(l) of the Factories Act and the
definition under Section 2(l) is very wide. The defences on
contractor responsibility, foreseeability and causation are

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CRL.P No. 7906 of 2020


defences to be proved at trial, where the burden under Section
104A will govern. The limitation question under Section 106 is
also left to the Trial Court as an issue to be considered since
the limitation involves mixed question of fact and law and the
same to be considered only after considering the matter on
merits.

31. Having considered the material available on record
in toto, the very contention of learned Senior counsel for the
petitioner that there cannot be any proceedings under Section
92 of the Factories Act, 1948 against the petitioner cannot be
accepted considering the discussion made above elaborately
that the victims are not the employees of M/s. MRPL and they
are the employees of sub-contractor in view of work
undertaken by the occupier. The other contention that it was
not at the time of manufacturing process also cannot be
accepted in view of detailed discussion made, including other
incidental work.

32. The other contention that there was no contract
between the sub-contractor and M/s. MRPL also cannot be
accepted and so also, the Court has to look into the provisions
of Section 7A 2(c) as well as Section 38 and the contention that

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CRL.P No. 7906 of 2020


they were not in the manufacturing process also cannot be
accepted and already the explanation given by the petitioner
was rejected by the Appellate Authority when the appeal was
filed and the grounds which have been urged before this Court
is kept open to be raised during the course of trial and not at
the stage of taking cognizance in respect of the offence under
Section 92 of the Factories Act, 1958. Accordingly, I answer
point No.(i) as ‘negative’.

Point No.(ii)

33. In view of the elaborate discussion made above, I
pass the following:
ORDER
The criminal petition is dismissed.



Sd/-
(H.P.SANDESH)
JUDGE


MD/ST