MAHESH CHAND S/O SHRI MAN BAHADUR CHAND vs THE KERALA STATE COOPERATIVE COIR MARKETING FEDERATION LTD.

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15890/2025
CNR: RJHC020897352025 | URN: CW / 36149U / 2025
Mahesh Chand S/o Shri Man Bahadur Chand, Aged About 31
Years, R/o Plot No. 19, Shreenath Residency, Raipura, Kota,
(Rajasthan)
----Petitioner
Versus
The Kerala State Cooperative Coir Marketing Federation Ltd.,
through Managing Director, (Coirfed) Head Office, Alappuzha,
Kerla.
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Prem Krishan Sharma,
Mr. Arun Sharma and
Ms. Sang Mitra Mehta
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Pradeep Rajpurohit
JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND
Order
05/11/2026
Reportable
1. The instant writ petition has been preferred against the
impugned order dated 29.08.2025, passed by the respondent, by
which the petitioner has been transferred from Kota Showroom to
Head Office at Alappuzha, Kerala. The petitioner was directed to
hand over the charge of the aforesaid showroom to one - Smt.
Babitha K. and report at Head Office, Alappuzha, Kerala. When the
aforesaid order was not complied with by the petitioner, a show-
cause notice dated 06.10.2025 was issued to the petitioner by the
respondent calling upon his explanation as to why disciplinary
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proceedings should not be initiated against him for non-
compliance of the order dated 29.08.2025.
2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the aforesaid order
dated 29.08.2025 and show cause notice dated 06.10.2025, the
petitioner has approached this Court by way of filing the instant
writ petition.
3. This Court, vide order dated 30.10.2026, directed the
counsel for the petitioner to satisfy this Court as to “Whether the
orders passed by the respondent at Kerala can be assailed before
this Court and whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction to
hear and decide the order passed by the respondent at Kerala”.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the
provisions mentioned in Clause 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution
of India and submitted that a petition can be filed before the High
Court where part of the cause of action has arisen. Counsel
submits that in the instant case, the impugned order and the
show-cause notice passed by the respondent have been
communicated to the petitioner at Kota, which falls within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Counsel submits that part
cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court and therefore, the petitioner has approached this Court by
way of filing the instant writ petition.
5. In support of his contention, counsel has placed reliance
upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Nawal Kishore Sharma versus Union of India and Others ,
reported in 2014 (9) SCC 329 .
6. Per contra, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents
opposed the prayer and submitted that neither wholly nor in part
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cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court. Simply by virtue of the order impugned being
communicated to the petitioner at Kota does not arise any cause
of action in favour of the petitioner to file the instant writ petition
before this Court. Counsel submits that even as per the bye-laws
of the Kerala State Co-Operative Coir Marketing Federation Ltd.
(COIRFED), all disputes in relation to the COIRFED shall be heard
by the Courts having territorial jurisdiction at Alappuzha,
irrespective of the State/place where the dispute has arisen.
Counsel submits that under these circumstances, the instant writ
petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be rejected on the
ground of territorial jurisdiction alone.
7. Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and
perused the material available on the record.
8. The issue which has arisen for consideration of this Court is
whether mere service or communication of the order impugned
upon the petitioner within the territorial limits of this Court, would
confer any right upon the petitioner to file a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India before this Court.
9. The aforesaid issue is required to be decided at the
threshold.
10. The provisions contained under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India are relevant for adjudication upon the issue.
For ready reference, the same are reproduced as under:
“ 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain
writs.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32 every High
Court shall have power, throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any
person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any
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Government, within those territories directions, orders
or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus ,
mandamus , prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari , or
any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue
directions, orders or writs to any Government,
authority or person may also be exercised by any High
Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding
that the seat of such Government or authority or the
residence of such person is not within those territories
(3) Where any party against whom an interim order,
whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other
manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to,
a petition under clause (1), without-
(a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition
and all documents in support of the plea for such
interim order; and
(b) giving such party an opportunity of being
heard,
makes an application to the High Court for the vacation
of such order and furnishes a copy of such application
to the party in whose favour such order has been made
or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall
dispose of the application within a period of two weeks
from the date on which it is received or from the date
on which the copy of such application is so furnished,
whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on
the last day of that period, before the expiry of the
next day afterwards on which the High Court is open;
and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim
order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case
may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.
(4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article
shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on
the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.”
11. Perusal of the Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of
India deals with the term “Cause of Action”, and the territorial
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jurisdiction of the High Court. The crucial words are “only”, and
“may also”. The object behind the Clause (2) of Article 226 was
not to take away jurisdiction of the High Court, which they had
prior to the introduction of the amendment to this Clause, but to
enable the other High Courts to exercise their jurisdiction in the
cases where part cause of action arises within their territorial
jurisdiction.
12. The scope of territorial jurisdiction has been examined by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of judgments:
12.1. The scope of territorial jurisdiction came to be examined by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v.
Swaika Properties, (1985) 3 SCC 217 , wherein, M/s Swaika
Properties, a company based at Calcutta, had challenged a notice
issued by the Special Town Planning Officer, Jaipur, regarding
acquisition of its land situated in Jaipur, by filing a writ petition
before the Calcutta High Court. The issue before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court was whether the Calcutta High Court possessed
territorial jurisdiction merely because the petitioner carried on
business at Calcutta, when the land in question and the authority
issuing the notice were situated in Rajasthan. The Apex Court set
aside the order of the Calcutta High Court and held as under:-
“ 7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied that the
cause of action neither wholly nor in part arose
within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High
Court and therefore the learned Single Judge had
no jurisdiction to issue a rule nisi on the petition
filed by the respondents under Article 226 of the
Constitution or to make the ad interim ex parte
prohibitory order restraining the appellants from
taking any steps to take possession of the land
acquired. Under sub-section (5) of Section 52 of the
Act the appellants were entitled to require the
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respondents to surrender or deliver possession of the
lands acquired forthwith and upon their failure to do so,
take immediate steps to secure such possession under
sub-section (6) thereof.
8. ...In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken
with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a
right to relief against the defendant. The mere service
of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the
respondents at their registered office at 18-B,
Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial
limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give
rise to a cause of action within that territory
unless the service of such notice was an integral
part of the cause of action …”
12.2. Moreso, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while examining the
issue of territorial jurisdiction in the matter of ONGC v. Utpal
Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 , held as under:-
“ 12. Pointing out that after the issuance of the
notification by the State Government under Section
52(1) of the Act, the notified land became vested in the
State Government free from all encumbrances and
hence it was not necessary for the respondents to plead
the service of notice under Section 52(2) for the grant
of an appropriate direction or order under Article 226
for quashing the notification acquiring the land. This
Court, therefore, held that no part of the cause of
action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta
High Court. This Court deeply regretted and
deprecated the practice prevalent in the High
Court of exercising jurisdiction and passing
interlocutory orders in matters where it lacked
territorial jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the strong
observations made by this Court in the aforesaid
decision and in the earlier decisions referred to therein,
we are distressed that the High Court of Calcutta
persists in exercising jurisdiction even in cases where no
part of the cause of action arose within its territorial
jurisdiction. It is indeed a great pity that one of the
premier High Courts of the country should appear
to have developed a tendency to assume
jurisdiction on the sole ground that the petitioner
before it resides in or carries on business from a
registered office in the State of West Bengal. We
feel all the more pained that notwithstanding the
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observations of this Court made time and again,
some of the learned Judges continue to betray
that tendency. Only recently while disposing of
appeals arising out of SLP Nos. 10065-66 of 1993,
Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering
Enterprises(P) Ltd. [(1994) 4 SCC 710] , this Court
observed:
“We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court
of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a
case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction.”
In that case, the contract in question was executed at
Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at
Aligarh, the contracts provided that in the event of
dispute the Aligarh court alone will have jurisdiction, the
arbitrator was appointed at Aligarh and was to function
at Aligarh and yet merely because the respondent was a
Calcutta-based firm, it instituted proceedings in the
Calcutta High Court and the High Court exercised
jurisdiction where it had none whatsoever. It must be
remembered that the image and prestige of a court
depends on how the members of that institution
conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground
that even in cases which fall outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, certain members of the
court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on
the plea that some event, however trivial and
unconnected with the cause of action had
occurred within the jurisdiction of the said court,
litigants would seek to abuse the process by
carrying the cause before such members giving
rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the
dignity of the institution and put the entire system to
ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do
not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we
are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and
the system of administration of justice. We do hope that
we will not have another occasion to deal with such a
situation.”
12.3. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CBI Anti-
Corruption Branch v. Narayan Diwakar, (1999) 4 SCC 656 ,
observed as under:-
“ 5. An objection was raised on behalf of the
respondents in the writ petition against the
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maintainability of the case. A Single Judge of the
High Court allowed the writ petition holding that the
Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and
that the case is a fit one for quashing of the first
information reports. On the question of jurisdiction,
the learned Single Judge held that the
communication of the wireless message to the
respondent at Itanagar, Arunachal Pradesh was
apart of the cause of action for filing the writ
petition and, therefore, the writ petition filed in
the Guwahati High Court was maintainable under
Article 226(2) of the Constitution . On the merits of
the case, the learned Single Judge relied on the
averments in the writ petition. As noted earlier, the writ
petition was allowed. The appeal filed by the appellant
before the Division Bench was dismissed at the motion
stage. Therefore, the present appeal by the CBI.
8. In view of what has been fairly stated by the learned
counsel for the respondent, it is not necessary for us to
enter into the merits of the case, suffice it to say that
on the facts and circumstances of the case and the
material on record, we have no hesitation to hold
that the Guwahati High Court was clearly in error
in deciding the question of jurisdiction in favour
of the respondent. In our considered view, the
writ petition filed by the respondent in the
Guwahati High Court was not maintainable. ”
12.4. In the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Adani Exports
Ltd. & Anr., (2002) 1 SCC 567 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that for a High Court to assume jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, the writ petition must disclose that the
material and integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of
action constitute a cause enabling the Court to adjudicate the
dispute and that such cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen
within its territorial limits and observed as under:-
“17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer
jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition
or a special civil application as in this case, the High
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Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in
support of the cause of action that those facts do
constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide
a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its
jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that
each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their
application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion
that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the
court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded
are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis
that is involved in the case. Facts which have no
bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case,
do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer
territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we
apply this principle then we see that none of the facts
pleaded in para16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls
into the category of bundle of facts which would
constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute
which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the courts
at Ahmedabad.”
12.5. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India,
(2004) 6 SCC 254 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court authoritatively
held that the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India is determined by the place where
the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, and not merely by
the situs of the Union of India or Parliament. In the said case, the
petitioner-company, registered in Mumbai and having obtained
financial assistance from the Bhopal branch of the State Bank of
India, challenged the constitutional validity of the SARFAESI Act,
2002 before the Delhi High Court. The Delhi High Court declined to
entertain the petition on the ground of lack of territorial
jurisdiction. Affirming the principle, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed that the expression “cause of action” signifies the bundle
of material facts which the petitioner must plead and prove in
order to obtain relief, and that in the absence of such material
facts arising within the territorial limits of a High Court, the writ
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petition would not be maintainable. It was further emphasized
that existence of a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the
High Court is a foundational requirement, and in its absence, the
petition is liable to be rejected at the threshold.
12.6. On similar line, the Delhi High Court in the case of Ex.
Rect/GD Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, 135 (2006) DLT
414 (DB) , held as follows:-
“We may notice that impugned order was passed by the
Deputy Director General of Police, CRPF Gauhati-23 on
th
29 April, 1999 and by the Commandant 6th Battalion
CRPF Chimukedima Dimapur (Nagaland) in March,
1998. Revisional order dated 14th December, 1999
dismissing the revision petition filed by the petitioner
was passed by Director General, North-Eastern Sector,
CRPF Guwahati. The petitioner had filed appeal/revision
against the order of dismissal before the authorities at
Guwahati. Even the second appeal/representation filed
by the petitioner in July,1999 was addressed to the
Inspector General of Police at Shillong, who was the
competent authority to take decision upon the
representation. The disciplinary proceedings and all
other proceedings against the petitioner were
taken place at Gauhati or Shillong i.e. beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. No cause of
action or part thereof has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. ”
12.7. In the case of Gurdial Singh v. Food Corporation
ofIndia, 2006 SCC OnLine P&H 435 , the Punjab & Haryana
High Court, held as under:
“ 13. Thus, it is well settled that the expression ‘cause
of action’ means that bundle of facts which the
petitioner must prove if travensed to entitle him
to a judgment in his favour. In Oil and Natural
Gas Commission's case (supra), the Supreme
Court had given a word of caution to the High
Courts against transgressing into the jurisdiction
of other High Courts merely on the ground of
some insignificant event connected with the
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cause of action taking place within the territorial
limits of the High Court to which the litigant
approaches at his own choice or convenience.
14. In a recent decision in the case of Musaraf
HossainKhan v. Bhageeratha Engineering Limited
[J.T. 2006(3) S.C. 80] , the Supreme Court has held
that “cause of action within the meaning of clause (2)
of Article 226 shall have the same meaning as is
ordinarily understood. The expression ‘cause of action’
has a definite connection. It means a bundle of facts
which would be required to be proved.
17. Similar controversy arose before a Full Bench of
Kerala High Court in Nakul Deo Singh v. Deputy
Commandant [1999 (3) KLT 629] , wherein the
court was considering the question as to whether the
receipt of an order passed by an Appellate Court in
disciplinary proceedings would constitute ‘cause of
action’. After noticing the definition of the ‘cause of
action’, as stated in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure,
15th Edn. Vol. 1 at page251 and a decision of the Court
of Appeal in Paragaon Finance v. D.B. Thakerar & Co.
[(1999) 1 ALLER 400], the Full Bench has held as
follows :—
“The fact that a person who was dismissed
from service while he was in service outside
the State would have to suffer the
consequence of that dismissal when he is in
his native place by being rendered jobless, is
not a fact which constitutes the bundle of
facts giving rise to a cause of action in his
favour to challenge his dismissal. That right
accrued to him earlier when he was dismissed from
service outside the State and he lost his
employment. Similarly, when an appeal is filed by
him to an appellate authority who is outside the
jurisdiction of this High Court and that appeal is
dismissed by the appellate authority, the merger in
the decision of the appellate authority takes place
when the appeal is dismissed and not when the
appellant receives the order. What a writ
petition needs to plead as a part of his cause
of action is the fact that his appeal was
dismissed wholly or in part and not the fact
that the order was communicated to him.
That plea is relevant only to show when the
right of action arose in his favour. The receipt
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of the order only gives him a right of action
on the already accrued cause of action and
enables him to meet a plea of laches or
limitation raised in opposition. That the
consequences of a proceeding in the larger
sense are suffered by a person in his native
place is not a ground to hold that the High
Court within the jurisdiction of which the
native place is situate is also competent to
entertain a writ petition under Article 226of
the Constitution. When a person is dismissed
or reduced in rank, he suffers the
consequences where he was employed at the
relevant time and not in his native place to
which he might have retired on his
dismissal.”
18. This Full Bench judgment has been referred with
approval by the Supreme Court in Musaraf Hossain
Khan's case (supra). ”
13. In the instant case, the order impugned dated 29.08.2025
has not been passed by the respondents within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court and the same has been passed at the
Head Office of the respondents, which is situated and located at
Alappuzha, a city in the State of Kerala.
14. Mere communication of the order impugned to the petitioner
at Kota does not amount to arising of any part cause of action in
his favour. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the judgment
relied by the counsel for the petitioner in the case of Nawal
Kishore Sharma (supra) is not applicable in the facts and
circumstances of the case.
15. Upon considering the various judgments delivered by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts, the
legal position which emerges is that the invocation of territorial
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India depends
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upon where the cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen and
not merely upon the location of the parties or the place where the
order has been communicated.
16. In the present case, the order impugned and the show cause
notice have been passed by the respondents within the territorial
jurisdiction of the State of Kerala. Hence, this Court finds it
difficult to entertain the instant writ petition, as no cause of
action, wholly or in part, is shown to have arisen within its
territorial jurisdiction.
17. On this count alone, the instant writ petition is liable to be
and is hereby dismissed. Stay application and all pending
applications, if any, also stand dismissed.
18. However, the petitioner would be at liberty to approach the
jurisdictional appropriate forum of law for assailing the order
impugned, where the cause of action, wholly or in part, has
arisen.
(ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J
Crt_5/D-A/143/KuD
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