Dr Keshbhan Singh And Another vs State Of U.P. And 7 Others

RESERVED ON 11.05.2026
DELIVERED ON 27.05.2026
A.F.R.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 371 of 2026
Dr Keshbhan Singh and another
…..Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and 7 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Gajendra Pratap Singh (Sr. Adv.)
with Jai Singh Parihar
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Anil Bhushan (Sr. Adv.) with
Manish Kumar Pandey, Rajiv Singh
(S.C.)
Along with
SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 337 of 2026
Committee of Management Arya Kanya Pathshala Samiti and 4 others
…..Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and 5 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Anil Bhushan (Sr. Adv.) with
Manish Kumar Pandey, Devi Prasad
Tripathi
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Gajendra Pratap (Sr. Adv.) with Jai
Singh Parihar, Rajiv Singh (S.C.)

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SPLA No. - 371 of 2026
Chief Justice's Court
HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.
(Per : Kshitij Shailendra, J.)
1. Heard Shri Gajendra Pratap Singh, learned Senior Advocate
assisted by Shri Jai Singh Parihar for the appellants, learned Standing
Counsel for respondents no. 1 to 3 and Shri Anil Bhushan, learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Manish Kumar Pandey for respondents
no. 4 to 8 in Special Appeal No. 371 of 2026. Same learned Senior
Advocates have been heard in the connected Special Appeal Defective
No. 337 of 2026, but from reverse side.
2. These two special appeals raise challenge to the order dated
13.03.2026 whereby the learned Single Judge has disposed of Writ – C
No. 8732 of 2026 (Dr. Keshbhan Singh and another vs. State of U.P. and
7 others) setting aside the order dated 13.02.2026 impugned therein and
remitting the matter to the Commissioner, Jhansi Division, Jhansi
(‘Commissioner’) to decide an appeal only qua order passed under
Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (‘the Act’). The
learned Single Judge has further observed that so far as order passed by
the Commissioner under Section 4-A of the Act is concerned, the private
respondents will have liberty to avail legally available remedy.
3. Since the order passed by the learned Single Judge has been
challenged by both sides to the extent they feel aggrieved of the same,
both the appeals are being decided by a common order.
SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 371 of 2026
4. The memo of present appeal contains solitary ground of challenge
to the order passed by the learned Single Judge to the effect that there
being no provision for appeal against the order dated 13.06.2025 passed
by the Assistant Registrar under Section 25(2) of the Act, the order of
remand to the Commissioner for deciding the appeal could not have been
passed.

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SPLA No. - 371 of 2026
5. The facts of the matter for the purpose of decision in these two
appeals are not in dispute. The Assistant Registrar, Jhansi Division,
Jhansi, passed a composite order dated 13.06.2025 under Section 25(2)
and Section 4-B of the Act. He declared the Society as defunct/time
barred under Section 25(2) and also declared a list of 20 members of the
General Body under Section 4-B as valid.
6. Challenging the said order, an appeal was filed on behalf of
respondents no. 5 to 8 before the Commissioner, which was admitted by
him by order dated 19.07.2025. Later on, the same was allowed on
13.02.2026 setting aside the order dated 13.06.2025 and a list of 10
members, as submitted by the contesting respondents (appellants in
appeal before the Commissioner), was declared as valid. Further, the
Assistant Registrar was directed to ensure further proceedings for the
purposes of holding elections of the Society based upon the
determination made. It is against the said order dated 13.02.2026 passed
by the Commissioner that the writ petition giving rise to these two
special appeals was filed.
Preliminary Objection
7. Shri Anil Bhushan appearing for the private respondents has raised
a preliminary objection as regards maintainability of the present special
appeal on the ground that the writ petition had arisen out of an appellate
order passed by the Commissioner in exercise of powers under Societies
Registration Act, 1860 and, therefore, the present special appeal is not
maintainable and the same is barred as per the provisions of Chapter VIII
Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952.
8. Refuting the submissions made, Shri Gajendra Pratap Singh has
made submissions that special appeal is not barred as the Commissioner
had wrongly entertained the appeal against composite order dated
13.06.2025 passed by the Assistant Registrar exercising his power under
Section 25(2) and Section 4-B of the Act. Submission is that appeal
against the order passed under either of the two provisions does not lie
under the Act itself and, therefore, once the Commissioner had no

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SPLA No. - 371 of 2026
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, the special appeal arising out of order
passed by the learned Single Judge raising a challenge to the order which
was without jurisdiction, is very much maintainable.
9. Elaborating his submissions, it is contended by Shri Singh that an
appeal is always a creation of statute and the language used in Rule 5 of
Chapter VIII makes it clear that the appeal would not be maintainable
only when 'appellate jurisdiction is or purported to be exercised under
any U.P. Act or Central Act with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution'. Submission is that since the U.P. Act, i.e.
Act of 1860, itself does not provide an appeal against an order passed
either under Section 25(2) or Section 4-B, the exercise undertaken by the
Commissioner while passing the order impugned in the writ petition,
could not be said to be ‘in the exercise or purported exercise of
jurisdiction, i.e. the appellate jurisdiction’.
10. In support of his submissions, reliance has been placed by Shri
Singh on Sheet Gupta vs. State of U.P. and others : 2009 (4) ADJ 183,
Kamleshwar Singh vs. District Inspector of Schools and another: 1997
AWC (Supp) 206 and Mahendra Pratap Bhatt 76 (Clmc) 2015 vs. Saroj
Mahana : 2016 (5) ADJ 282.
11. We have considered the submissions made on maintainability of
special appeal and have perused the material available on record.
Maintainability of Special Appeal
12. There being no dispute about the fact that the Assistant Registrar
had passed a composite order under Section 25(2) and 4-B of the Act, it
would be appropriate to reproduce Section 4-B and 25(2) of the Act,
1860. The same are quoted as under:-
“4-B. (1) At the time of registration/renewal of a society, list of
members of General Body of that society shall be filed with the
Registrar mentioning the name, father's name, address and occupation
of the members. The Registrar shall examine the correctness of the list
of members of the General Body of such society on the basis of the
register of members of the General Body and minutes book thereof,

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SPLA No. - 371 of 2026
cash book, receipt book of membership fee and bank pass book of the
society.
2) If there is any change in the list of members of the General Body of
the society referred to in sub-section (1), on account of induction,
removal, resignation or death of any member, a modified list of
members of General Body, shall be filed with the Registrar, within one
month from the date of change.
(3) The list of members of the General Body to be filed with the
Registrar under this section shall be signed by two office-bearers and
two executive members of the society. - Vide U.P. Act No. 23 of 2013,
Section 2 (w.e.f. 9.10.2013).”
Section 25. Disputes regarding election of office-bearers.
(1) ……..
2) Where by an order made under sub-section (1), an election is set
aside or an office-bearer is held no longer entitled to continue in office
or where the Registrar is satisfied that any election of office-bearers of
a Society has not been held within the time specified in the rules of
that Society, (he may call a meeting of the general body of such
Society for electing such office-bearer or office-bearers, and such
meeting shall be presided over and be conducted by the Registrar or
by any officer authorised by him in this behalf, and the provisions in
the rules of the Society relating to meetings and elections shall apply
to such meeting and election with necessary modifications.”
13. There is no provision of appeal in the Act,1860 against the order
passed under any of the aforesaid two provisions, rather an appeal lies
under Section 25(1)(d) against an order passed under sub-Section (1) of
Section 25 of the Act which is reproduced as under:-
“Section 25. Dispute regarding election of office-bearers.-(1) The
prescribed authority may, on a reference made to it by the Registrar or
by at least one-fourth of the members of a society registered in Uttar
Pradesh, hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute
in respect of the election or continuance in office of an office-bearers
of such society, and may pass such orders in respect thereof as it
deems fit:
Provided that the election of an office-bearer shall be set aside where
the prescribed authority is satisfied -
a) that any corrupt practice has been committed by such office-bearer;
or
(b) that the nomination of any candidate has been improperly rejected;
or
(c) that the result of the election in so far as it concerns such office-
bearer has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any
nomination or by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any
vote or the reception of any vote which is void or by any non-
compliance with the provisions of any rules of the society.
After clause (c), the following clause shall be inserted, namely -

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SPLA No. - 371 of 2026
"(d) An appeal against an order made under this sub-section may be
preferred to the Commissioner of the Division in whose jurisdiction
the headquarter of the Society lies, within one month from the date of
communication of such order:
Provided that the appellate authority may admit an appeal after the
expiry of such period if the appellant satisfies the appellate authority
that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such
period.”
14. Although, in the present case, title of the appeal preferred before
the Commissioner, as reflected from his order, indicates Section 25 (d),
mere such indication does not make it a competent appeal under the said
provision keeping in view the nature of order which was assailed before
the Commissioner. Apparently, the order dated 13.06.2025 passed by the
Assistant Registrar was not appealable under Section 25(1)(d) and,
hence, indication made by the Commissioner to that effect cannot be
treated as decisive.
15. As far as Chapter VIII Rule 5 of Allahabad High Court Rules,
1952 is concerned, words ‘in the exercise or purported exercise of
appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any U.P. Act/Central Act with
respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the
Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, any such
Act’ would mean that such appellate or revisional jurisdiction is
available to the concerned authority. Meaning thereby, if, in a given case,
the appeal is not provided by the statute itself, it would not clothe the
appellate authority with power to entertain and decide the appeal on
merits. If the decision on merits, either correct or incorrect, right or
wrong, is passed by the appellate authority in an appeal which is not
provided by the statute, it would not fall within the meaning and import
of ‘exercise or purported exercise of appellate jurisdiction’.
16. Words ‘purported exercise’ appearing in Rule 5 of Chapter VIII
are of quite significance, particularly when contention has been raised
that even if an authority sitting in appellate/revisional jurisdiction, does
not have power/jurisdiction to pass any order, the exercise undertaken by
it would be covered by ‘purported exercise’ of power and, therefore, the
special appeal would not be maintainable.

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SPLA No. - 371 of 2026
17. In this regard, we may refer to a judgment of Co-ordinate Bench
of this Court in Sardar Mohammad Ansar Khan vs. State of U.P. and
others : 1995 All L.J. 317, wherein question of maintainability of special
appeal had arisen from a situation where an order passed by District
Inspector of Schools (D.I.O.S.) as an appellate authority was assailed in
writ petition and order of the writ Court was challenged in special
appeal. The Co-ordinate Bench found that the D.I.O.S. had exercised
power under Regulation 3(1)(b) of Chapter II of Regulations framed
under U.P. Intermediate Education Act and though the said provision
relates to determination of seniority etc. of ‘teachers’, the D.I.O.S.
exercised such power in respect of ‘clerks’. It was held that the order
passed by the D.I.O.S. being without jurisdiction and outside the
purview of the Act and the Regulations, the exercise of power by him
cannot be said to be ‘purported exercise’ of appellate jurisdiction. The
special appeal was thus found maintainable.
18. We may, however, observe that in the case of Sardar Mohammad
Ansar Khan (supra), reference was made to a judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Azimunnisa vs. Deputy Custodian : AIR 1961 SC 365,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had indicated that the word
‘purport’ has many shades of meaning, it means fictitious, what appears
on the face of the instruments; the apparent and not the legal import and,
therefore any act which purports to be done in exercise of a power is to
be deemed to be done within that power notwithstanding that the power
is not exercisable. From reading of the above observations of Hon’ble
Supreme Court, it may, at the first instance, appear that an order without
jurisdiction also falls within the meaning of the words ‘purported
exercise of power’, however, the Co-ordinate Bench in the case of
Sardar Mohammad Ansar Khan (supra), took note of the fact that the
decision in the case of Azimunnisa (supra) was distinguished by the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Municipal Committee/ Council, Balaghat
vs. Meghraj Phojraj Baghrecha and another : AIR 1966 Madh 104,
wherein it was held that imposition of a tax by Municipal Board being

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SPLA No. - 371 of 2026
beyond its jurisdiction and power is not an Act ‘purporting to be done
under the Act’.
19. With reference to the judgment in the case of Azimunnisa (supra),
it was also indicated that the observations were made while considering
the effect of Section 8 (2-A) of the Administration of Evacuee Property
Act, 1950 (in short ‘Evacuee Act’), there was detailed discussion
regarding pre-amendment and post-amendment status of the Evacuee
Act and the Hon’ble Supreme Court had discussed newly inserted sub-
Section (2-A) added to Section 8, which reads as under:-
“2-A) "Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained
in sub-section (2) all property which under any law repealed hereby
purports to have vested as evacuee property in any person exercising
the powers of Custodian in any State shall, notwithstanding any defect
in or the invalidity of, such law or any judgment, decree, order of any
Court, be deemed for all purposes to have validly vested in that person,
as if the provisions of such law had been enacted by Parliament and
such property shall, on the commencement of this Act, be deemed to
have been evacuee property declared as such within the meaning of
this Act and accordingly, any order made or other action taken by the
Custodian or any other authority in relation to such property shall be
deemed to have been validly and lawfully made or taken.”
20. It was in the light of the aforesaid provision that occasion to
interpret word ‘purport’ had arisen before the Hon’ble Supreme Court
however, language incorporated under sub-Section (2-A) of Section 8 of
the Evacuee Act is altogether different from the language incorporated in
Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rule, 1952.
Apparently, in the Evacuee Act, the word ‘purport’ was used as regards
deemed vesting of a property as evacuee property in any person
exercising the powers of custodian, notwithstanding any defect in or the
invalidity of law, judgment, decree or order and the deeming provision
was emphasized so as to validate such vesting as if the provisions of
such law had been enacted by Parliament.
21. Contrarily, in Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the High Court Rules, the
language used is plain and simple and words “ purported to be exercised
under any U.P. Act or Central Act” are not qualified by any further
stipulations or explanatory clarification of any nature so as to make
further interpretation and, therefore, we take the same view that has been

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SPLA No. - 371 of 2026
taken by Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Meghraj Phojraj
Baghrecha (supra), while explaining the judgment in the case of
Azimunnisa (supra) and also fully endorse the view taken by the co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sardar Mohammad Ansar
Khan (supra).
22. In the case of Sheet Gupta (supra), a Full Bench of this Court,
while dealing with the provisions of Chapter VIII Rule 5 and a previous
decision in Vajara Yojna Seed Farm, Kalyanpur (M/s) and others vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court II, U.P., Kanpur and another: 2003 (1)
UPLBEC 496, has laid down that special appeal against an order passed
by the writ Court arising out of an appellate order passed under
paragraph 28 of the Essential Commodities Distribution Order, 2004
would not be maintainable. In the said case, statutory appeal was itself
provided under paragraph 28 of the Distribution Order. The Full Bench
took note of a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Prakash D.
Mehta and Jawahar D. Mehta vs. Collector of Customs (Preventive),
Bombay : AIR 1988 SC 2010 wherein observation was made that right
to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice,
the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi-judicial
adjudications and the right is a statutory right and it can be
circumscribed by the conditions in the grant.
23. In the case of Kamleshwar Singh (supra), writ petition was filed
against an order passed by the D.I.O.S. exercising appellate power. The
learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition setting aside the order and
remanded the matter to the D.I.O.S. for deciding the dispute. On
challenge laid to the order of learned Single Judge, the Division Bench
found that the D.I.O.S. earlier happened to be appellate authority but, by
virtue of a notification dated 22.08.1992, the said power had been taken
away from him and the same was entrusted with Regional Deputy
Director of Education, consequently, the D.I.O.S. had ceased to be an
appellate authority. Under such circumstances, it was held that the
D.I.O.S., not being an appellate authority, his order would not be treated

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SPLA No. - 371 of 2026
as an order passed in an appeal and, therefore, special appeal raising a
challenge to the order passed by the learned Single Judge in writ petition
against the order of the D.I.O.S., would be maintainable.
24. In the case of Mahendra Pratap Bhatt (supra), special appeal had
arisen out of an order passed by the learned Single Judge on an
application under Section 24 C.P.C. and, having found that the learned
Single Judge had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application
and pass order thereon, the special appeal was held maintainable and the
order passed by the learned Single Judge was set aside.
25. In view of above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that
since the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the
appeal against an order passed either under Section 25(2) or Section 4-B
of the Act, 1860, the mere fact that the order had been passed in an
appeal which was otherwise not maintainable and was not provided
under the Act itself, the present special appeal raising a challenge to the
order passed by the learned Single Judge in a writ petition assailing the
validity of the order passed by the Commissioner, is maintainable.
Conclusion on maintainability of special appeal:
26. We, accordingly, hold that a special appeal arising out of judgment
passed by learned Single Judge in a writ petition under Article 226 of
Constitution of India, wherein challenge was laid to an appellate order
passed by the Government or any officer or authority, made or purported
to be made in the exercise of or purported exercise of appellate
jurisdiction under any U.P. Act/Central Act with respect to any of the
matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, would be maintainable if the
appeal itself was not provided under the statute but was entertained or
decided either way and the power exercised by the appellate authority
would not be treated as ‘purported exercise of power’ .

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SPLA No. - 371 of 2026
On Merits:
27. The Court now proceeds to examine the nature of the order passed
by the learned Single Judge wherein, after setting aside the order passed
by the Commissioner, the matter has been remitted back to him to decide
the appeal only qua order passed under Section 25(2) of the Act.
28. Once we have arrived at a conclusion that the appeal against the
order dated 13.06.2025, compositely passed under Section 25(2) and 4-B
of the Act, did not lie before the Commissioner, direction for remand to
the Commissioner to decide the same qua Section 25(2) of the Act, is not
proper. As a matter of fact, learned Single Judge has conferred
jurisdiction upon the Commissioner to examine challenge to the order
passed by the Assistant Registrar under Section 25(2) of the Act,
although the Commissioner otherwise has no jurisdiction under the
statute to entertain the appeal.
29. We may observe here that mainly three kinds of jurisdiction are
recognized under the law; pecuniary, territorial and inherent. If any
Court/authority lacks any of such jurisdictions, the order passed by it
would be a nullity. Further, jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the
Court/authority in any manner even based upon consent or acquiescence.
Reference in this regard can be made to United Commercial Bank
Limited vs. Their Workmen : AIR 1951 SC 230, Kiran Singh vs.
Chaman Paswan : AIR 1954 SC 340, Benarsi Silk Palace vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax : (1964) 52 ITR 220 (All), Kali Das
Wadhwani & Another vs. Jagjiwan Das and another : 1985 (2) ARC 533,
Sardar Hasan Siddique vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal : AIR
1986 Allahabad 132, Karnal Improvement Trust vs. Prakashwati : (1995)
5 SCC 159, U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. vs. Indudre Pvt. Ltd. : AIR
1996 SC 1373, S. Sethuraman vs. R. Venkataraman and others: AIR
2007 SC 2499, Collector, Distt. Gwalior and another vs. Cine Exhibitors
P. Ltd. and another : AIR 2012 SC 1239.
30. In view of above discussion, the Special Appeal No. 371 of 2026
is allowed.

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SPLA No. - 371 of 2026
31. The order dated 13.03.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge to
the extent of remanding the matter to Commissioner is hereby set aside.
32. The order dated 13.02.2026 passed by the Commissioner,
impugned in the writ petition, being without jurisdiction, is also set
aside.
SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 337 of 2026
33. This Special Appeal has been reported to be beyond time by six
days. An application seeking condonation of delay has been filed. For
the reasons stated in the affidavit supporting the application, the same is
allowed. Delay in filing the appeal is hereby condoned.
34. This appeal raises a challenge to the same order passed by the
learned Single Judge to the extent of conclusion drawn and observations
made regarding appellate power of the Commissioner to examine
validity of the order passed by the Assistant Registrar under Section 4-B
of the Act.
35. Submission has been made by Shri Anil Bhushan that by virtue of
amendments made in the Act by the Societies Registration (U.P.
Amendment) Act, 2021, (U.P. Act No. 8 of 2022), appeal against any
order passed under Sections 4, 4-A and 4-B would be maintainable
before the Commissioner. It is contended that appeal lies under Section
4(1-A) against an order made under Section 4 and Section 4-B being part
of Section 4, appeal would be maintainable and, therefore, the learned
Single Judge has wrongly held the appeal to that extent as not
maintainable.
36. Per contra, Shri Gajendra Pratap Singh has made submissions that
provision of appeal was added by way of insertion of sub-Section (1-A)
after Section 4 and there being no insertion/addition/substitution etc. in
other provisions, i.e. Section 4-A or 4-B, appeal against the order passed
under Section 4-B does not lie.

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SPLA No. - 371 of 2026
37. We have considered the submissions made and have perused the
material available on record.
38. It would be appropriate to quote relevant portions of the U.P. Act
No. 8 of 2022, by which amendments were made in the Principal Act,
w.e.f. 18.07.2022. The same reads as under:-
“3. Amendment of Section 4.-In Section 4 of the principal Act, after
sub-section (1), the following sub-section and the proviso shall be
inserted, namely:
(1-A) An appeal against an order made under this section may
be preferred to the Commissioner of the Division in whose
jurisdiction the headquarter of the Society lies, within one month from
the date of communication of such order:
Provided that the appellate authority may admit an appeal after
the expiry of such period if the appellant satisfies the appellate
authority that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal
within such period.
4. Amendment of Section 4-B.-For sub-section (2) of Section 4-B of
the principal Act, the following sub-section shall be substituted,
namely:
(2) If there is any change in the list of members of the General Body
of the society referred to in sub-section (1), on account of induction,
removal, registration or death of any member, a modified list of
members of General Body, shall be filed with the Registrar, within one
month from the date of change. Any change in the list of General
Body shall not be valid unless it is approved by the Managing Body.”
39. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions of the Amendment Act
makes it clear that sub-Section (1-A) was added just after Section 4 and
the place of insertion clearly indicates the legislative intent to provide an
appeal only against an order passed under Section 4 after its
renumbering as Section 4(1) and not against Section 4-B which is
altogether a separate and distinct Section. This Court, in Abhishek
Pandey vs. State of U.P. and others, 2025 : AHC:213663-DB, has
already dealt with the same issue in detail and it has been held as under:
-
“10. Once Section 4(1-A) clearly provides for an appeal against an
order under Section 4, the said appeal is confined to an order passed in
relation to accepting the Committee of Management etc. by the
Registrar under Section 4(1). Section 4-B is totally independent of
Section 4 as the same deals with the list of members of General Body
and has nothing to do with the Committee of Management and once

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SPLA No. - 371 of 2026
the statute does not provide any appeal qua the order passed under
Section 4-B of the Act, the provision as contained under sub-section
(1-A) of Section 4 cannot by any stretch of imagination be used for
the purpose of maintaining the appeal against an order passed under
Section 4-B of the Act.”
40. In view of above discussion, we do no find any force in the
submissions advanced by Shri Anil Bhushan that appeal also lies against
an order under Section 4-B when we find no such provision in the
Statute.
41. Accordingly, the challenge laid to part of the order impugned,
whereby learned Single Judge has held the appeal against order passed
under Section 4-B of the Act as not maintainable, does not call for any
interference.
42. Consequently, the Special Appeal Defective No. 337 of 2026 is
hereby dismissed.
Liberty to the aggrieved parties
43. We, however, leave it open for the parties aggrieved of the order
dated 13.06.2025 passed by the Assistant Registrar to the extent the same
is against them, to avail remedy before appropriate forum.
(Kshitij Shailendra, J) (Arun Bhansali, CJ)
May 27, 2026
Sazia
Digitally signed by :-
SAZIA AQUIL
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad