M/S Anu Enterprises Thru.Proprietor Anu Singh vs State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Prin. Secy. Secondary Edu. Lko. And 6 Others

A.F.R.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - C No. - 7398 of 2026
M/S Anu Enterprises Thru.Proprietor Anu Singh
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Prin. Secy. Secondary Edu.
Lko. And 6 Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Hemant Kumar Mishra, Abhishek Mishra,
Arti Ganguly
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., I.M. Pandey Ist, Naresh Chandra
Mehrotra
Court No. - 3
HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
HON'BLE ABDHESH KUMAR CHAUDHARY, J.
1. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well
as Shri Pankaj Khare and Ms. Isha Mittal, learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel for the State-respondent(s) and perused the
materials available on record.
This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for the following
2.
main relief(s):
"(a) To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of Certiorari
quashing the impugned order dated 29.04.2026 issued by the
Opposite Party No. 1, contained as Annexure no. 1 to this Writ
Petition.

(b) To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of Certiorari
quashing the impugned Short Term e-tender notice no. 20/ GM-3/
UPPCL/ 2026-27 dated 30.06.2026 and tender no. 21/ GM-
3/UPPCL/2026-27 dated 30.06.2026 issued by the Opposite Party
No. 7, contained as Annexure No. 2 and 3 to this Writ Petition
respectively.
(c) To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS
commanding the Opposite Party No. 1 to allow the Petitioner to
complete its work in terms of the Letter of Intent dated 21.04.2026
in respect of Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyay Rajkiya Model Inter

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2
College, Khajuri, Ambedkarnagar and letter of Intent dated
22.04.2026 in respect of Rajkiya Inter College, Akbarpur,
Ambedkarnagar."
3. The factual matrix indicates that respondent no.3, namely, the
Uttar Pradesh State Construction and Infrastructure Development
Corporation, had been entrusted by the State of Uttar Pradesh with
the execution of certain projects. For carrying out the said projects,
respondent no. 3 invited several tenders, and the petitioner was
declared successful in respect of two projects, namely, (i) the
construction of a Mini Indoor Stadium at Pandit Deen Dayal
Upadhyay Rajkiya Model Inter College, Khajuri, Ambedkar Nagar,
and (ii) the construction of a Mini Indoor Stadium at Rajkiya Inter
College, Akbarpur, District Ambedkar Nagar.
4. Letters of Intent in respect of the aforesaid projects were issued to
the petitioner on 21.04.2026 and 22.04.2026 by respondent no. 3.
However, by order dated 29.04.2026, the Special Secretary,
Government of Uttar Pradesh, addressed a communication to the
Director, Secondary Education, directing that the U.P. Projects
Corporation Limited (respondent no. 7), instead of respondent no. 3,
would act as the nodal agency for execution of the said two projects
in respect of which the petitioner had already been awarded the
tenders. Pursuant to the said communication, the petitioner was
restrained from executing the works allotted to him by respondent no.
3. Furthermore, respondent no. 7 issued short-term tenders for both
the projects and proceeded to open the technical bids in respect
thereof.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, once the petitioner
had been declared successful in the tender process and Letters of
Intent had been issued in his favour by respondent no. 3, the
communication dated 29.04.2026 issued by the Special Secretary,
Government of Uttar Pradesh, indirectly takes away the valuable
rights that had accrued to the petitioner under the tender process. It is
contended that the petitioner could not have been deprived of the
contract in the aforesaid manner after the issuance of the Letters of
Intent.
Learned counsel has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Hon'ble

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Supreme Court in Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour vs. Chief
Executive Officer and others reported in 2024(7) SCR 532 : 2024
AIR (SC) 3784.
6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State submits that
the present writ petition is not maintainable, as the petitioner has no
locus standi to invoke the writ jurisdiction in the facts of the present
case. It is further submitted that any grievance arising out of the
tender or the Letters of Intent issued by respondent no. 3 is
contractual in nature and is liable to be resolved in terms of the
arbitration clause contained therein. Learned counsel further submits
that the State, in its wisdom, transferred the projects to another nodal
agency, namely, respondent no. 7, as the works were not being
executed satisfactorily by respondent no. 3.
7. The question that arises for consideration in the present writ
petition is whether the rights that accrued to the petitioner pursuant to
the issuance of the Letters of Intent and the award of the tenders can
be enforced in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, or whether the petitioner is required to seek redress before the
appropriate forum, such as the Arbitral Tribunal or the competent Civil
Court, in accordance with law.
8. In our considered view, if the petitioner is of the opinion that
respondent no. 3 has committed a breach of the contractual
obligations arising out of the Letters of Intent, it is open to the
petitioner to initiate appropriate proceedings against respondent no. 3
for recovery of damages or any other relief available in law. The
action of the Government vide letter dated 29.04.2026 is upon the
respondent no.3 and the said action cannot be indirectly challenged
by the petitioner by way of filing a writ petition. If at all, the grievance
arising from the transfer of the projects is one which respondent no.3
may choose to agitate. It is upto the respondent no.3 to initiate
appropriate proceedings against the State. The respondent no.3
cannot be permitted to indulge in proxy litigation through the
petitioner. In any case, the petitioner shall remain at liberty to seek
compensation for loss of profit or any other consequential relief by
invoking the arbitration clause or by instituting appropriate civil
proceedings, against the respondent no.3, in accordance with law.

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9. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner lay
down general principles of law. However, the same are
distinguishable on facts and do not advance the case of the petitioner
in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case.
Consequently, the said decisions are of no assistance to the
petitioner.
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bareilly Development
Authority vs. Ajai Pal Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1076; has held that, if a
person is aggrieved in respect of non-statutory and purely contractual
rights flowing from a contract, remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution is not available. Similarly, in Kerala State Electricity
Board and another Vs. Kurian E. Kalathil and others, 2000(6)
SCC 293, the Apex Court held that, if a term of contract is violated,
ordinarily remedy is not the writ petition under Article 226. Disputes
arising out of terms of such contract or alleged breaches have to be
settled by ordinary principles of law of contract.
11. In State of U.P. and others vs. Bridge & Roof Co.; AIR 1996
SC 3515 ; the Apex Court, when called upon to examine the
entertainability of a Writ Petition in contractual matter, held as follows:
"Firstly, the contract between the parties is a contract in the realm
of private law. It is not a statutory contract. It is governed by the
provisions of the Contract Act or, may be, also by certain
provisions of the Sale of Goods Act. Any dispute relating to
interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a Contract
cannot be agitated, and could not have been agitated, in a writ
petition. That is a matter either for arbitration as provided by the
contract or for Civil Court, as the case may be."
12. It has to be understood that the present writ petition requires
interpretation of several terms of the conditions of contract executed
between the petitioner and the Respondent No.3, to arrive at any
decision. In Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India vs. Devi Ispat
Ltd. and Ors., 2010(11) SCC 186; the Apex Court said:
"It is settled law that the disputes relating to interpretation of terms
and conditions of a contract could not be examined/challenged or
agitated in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is
a matter for adjudication by a civil court or in arbitration, if provided

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for in the contract or before the DRT or under the Securitization
Act."
Further, it has to be understood that the grounds canvassed by the
learned Counsel for the petitioner is in the nature of breach of
contract and this court is clear in its mind that no writ or order can be
issued under Article 226 so as to compel the authorities to remedy a
breach of contract, pure and simple. However, that does not mean
that the petitioner is remediless, as the petitioner can very well
approach the competent court for adjudication by a Civil Court or by
the mechanism of arbitration, if provided for in the contract.
The Supreme Court referring the judgment of
13. Bareilly
Development Authority vs. Ajai Pal Singh (supra), and Bridge &
Roof Co. (India) Ltd., (supra) , in the case of Rajasthan State
Industrial Development and Investment Corporation and Anr. vs.
Diamond and Gem Development Corporation Ltd. and Anr.;
2013(5) SCC 470 has observed as under:
"There can be no dispute to the settled legal proposition that
matters/disputes relating to contract cannot be agitated nor terms
of the contract can be enforced through writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, writ court cannot be a forum
to seek any relief based on terms and conditions incorporated in
the agreement by the parties."
14. Recently, the Supreme Court in Rikhab Chand Jain vs. Union
of India reported in (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2510), while holding the
concept of entertainability and maintainability of writ petition held,
relevant to the context:
"9. While deciding whether to entertain a petition under
Article 226 bearing in mind the precedents in the field, a
writ court ought to additionally notice the forum designated
by the statute for the litigant to approach. This is necessary
because the alternative forum that is provided by the
statute has to be one which can dispense speedy and
efficacious relief. However, as in the present case, if the
statutorily designated alternative forum happens to be the
high court itself whose jurisdiction under Article 226 is

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invoked and not any ordinary statutory functionary/tribunal,
refusal to entertain the petition should be the rule and
entertaining it an exception."
10. We may profitably refer, in this context, to the
Constitution Bench decision in
Thansingh Nathmal v. A.
Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419. In
Thansingh Nathmal (supra), this Court had the occasion to
lay down a principle of law which is salutary and not to be
found in any other previous decision rendered by it. The
principle, plainly, is that, if a remedy is available to a party
before the high court in another jurisdiction, the writ
jurisdiction should not normally be exercised on a petition
under Article 226, for, that would allow the machinery set
up by the concerned statute to be bye-passed. The relevant
passage from the decision reads as follows:
"The jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of
the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the
exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except
the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided
in the article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is
discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is
lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction
demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to
certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that
jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for
relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode
prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the court will not
entertain a petition for a writ under article 226,
where the petitioner has an alternative remedy,
which, without being unduly onerous, provides an
equally efficacious remedy. Again, the High Court
does not generally enter upon a determination of
questions which demand an elaborate examination
of evidence to establish the right to enforce which
the writ is claimed. The High Court does not therefore
act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court
or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by
assuming jurisdiction under article 226 trench upon an
alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining

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relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to
move another tribunal, or even itself in another
jurisdiction for
obtaining redress in the manner
provided by a statute, the High Court normally will
not permit, by entertaining a petition under article
226 of the Constitution, the machinery created
under the statute to be by-passed, and will leave
the party applying to it to seek resort to the
machinery so set up."
(emphasis ours)
11. Since the appellant had a remedy by way of a reference
before the High Court against the order dated 23rd June,
2000 of the CEGAT, we do not consider refusal to exercise
discretion in favour of the appellant to be so fundamentally
incorrect that interference is warranted."
15. In view of above exposition of law and for all the aforesaid
reasons, petitioner as having remedy in common law regarding
alleged breach of contract, we hold that the same cannot be enforced
by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed.
July 28, 2026
Praveen
(Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary,J.) (Shekhar B. Saraf,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
PRAVEEN KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench