Vinodkumar Chellappan Pillai vs The State Of Maharashtra And Ors.

2026:BHC-KOL:3781-DB
2-WP-280-2026.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 280 OF 2026
Vinodkumar Chellappan Pillai, ]
Age 51 years, Occ : Nil, Prisoner No. 9337, ]
Presently conined at Kolhapur (Kalamba), ]
Central Prison, Kolhapur. ]
Permanent R/o : House No. 594, Sharnam, ]
Vijaynagar, Deolali Camp, Nashik, 422401. ] ...Petitioner.
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra ]
2. The Deputy Inspector General of ]
Prisons (West), Yerwada, Pune. ]
3. The Superintendent, Kolhapur (Kalamba), ]
Central Prison, Kolhapur. ] ...Respondents.
——————
Mr. Muralidhar P. Kharat for the Petitioner.
Mr. Rupesh Jaiswal, amicus curiae.
Mr. A. A. Naik, APP for the Respondent-State.
——————
Coram : Madhav J. Jamdar &
Pravin S. Patil, JJ.
Date : May 4, 2026.
Judgment [Per Madhav J. Jamdar, J.] :
1. Heard Mr. Kharat, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner,
Mr. Naik, learned APP for the Respondent-State and Mr. Rupesh Jaiswal,
learned advocate appointed as amicus to assist the Court.
2. By the present writ petition iled under Article 226 of the
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Constitution of India, the Petitioner has sought following substantive
reliefs :
“(a) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to Issue a Writ of
Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction, in
the nature of Mandamus directing the Respondent authorities
to forthwith consider and decide the parole application
submitted by the Petitioner in a time-bound manner, preferably
within one week;
(b) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to Issue a Writ of
Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction, in
the nature of Mandamus directing the Respondents to release
the Petitioner on parole for a period of 30 days, on such terms
and conditions as this Hon’ble Court may deem it and proper.”
3. It is the submission of Mr. Naik, learned APP that the Maharashtra
Prisons (Furlough and Parole) Rules, 2024 [for short “the Rules of
2024” ], and in particular Rule 14 of the same, provides that all prisoners
(subject to certain exceptions) shall be eligible for regular parole on
completion of one year of actual imprisonment. Learned APP submitted
that as far as the Petitioner is concerned, the Petitioner has been
convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
and has been sentenced to sufer simple imprisonment for 1 year and
further directed to pay compensation of Rs.24 lakh to the complainant
and in default of payment of compensation to sufer simple
imprisonment for 6 months. Learned APP submitted that the Petitioner
rd
surrendered to the prison authority on 3 May 2025 and sought to
rd
submit an application seeking parole leave on 23 March 2026, however,
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in view of the provisions of Rule 14 of the Rules of 2024, the Petitioner
was asked to withdraw the said application.
4. Mr. Rupesh Jaiswal, learned amicus pointed out the Delhi High
1
Court judgment in the case of Nadeem v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) ,
Larger Bench judgment of this Court (at Nagpur Bench) in the case of
2
Kantilal Nadlal Jaiswal v. Divisional Commissioner , the Supreme
3
Court judgment in the case of Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan and also on
the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Balaji
4
Abhaji Puyad v. State of Maharashtra .
5. Mr. Kharat, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner has also
relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of
Balaji Abhaji Puyad (supra).
6. It is the submission of Mr. Jaiwal, learned amicus and Mr. Kharat,
learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner that Rule 14 of the Rules
of 2024 is unconstitutional which prohibits that the prisoners (barring
certain exceptions) shall be eligible for regular parole on completion of
one year of actual imprisonment.
7. Before considering the rival contentions, it would be apt to note
that the grounds on which parole may be granted are speciied in Rule
12 of the Rules of 2024. Rule 13 of the Rules of 2024 provides for types
1
WP (Crl.) 3627 of 2025 dtd 6.11.2025.
2
(2020) 4 RCR (Cri) 426.
3
(2017) 15 SCC 55.
4
Crim WP (st) No. 21606 of 2024 decided on 25.10.2024.
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of parole, namely, regular parole and emergency parole. Rule 14 of the
Rules of 2024 speaks about the eligibility of prisoner for parole. All
these rules are set out hereinbelow for ready reference :
“ Rule 12.Grounds for grant of parole.
(1) To deal with serious illness of his spouse, blood relatives,
birth of his child, or attend to the aftermath of natural
calamities like loods, ire, earthquake resulting in damage
tohis house and property.
(2) To attend to the inal rituals on the death of his blood
relatives or spouse.
(3) To attend to the marriage of his children and siblings.”
“Rule 13.Types of parole.
The parole is of following two types, namely.
(1) Regular Parole- Regular parole may be granted to prisoner
to attend serious illness of his spouse or blood relatives, birth
of his child, marriage of his children or siblings or the aftermath
of natural calamities like loods, ire, earthquake resulting in
damage to his house and property.
(2) Emergency Parole- Emergency parole may be granted to
prisoner to attend the inal rituals on the death of his spouse or
blood relatives.”
“Rule 14.Eligibility for parole.
(1) All prisoners except foreign prisoners, prisoners
sentenced to death and prisoners sentenced to imprisonment
for life till death, shall be eligible for regular parole, “on
completion of one year of actual imprisonment.”
(2) All prisoners except foreign prisoners are eligible for
emergency parole.”
(Emphasis added)
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8. Before analysing the above rules, it is required to be noted that
“prisoner” is deined under Rule 2(f) of the Rules of 2024 means the
convicted prisoner.
9. Thus, parole is granted to deal with serious illness of prisoner’s
spouse or blood relatives or birth of prisoner’s child, or to attend to the
aftermath of natural calamities like loods, ire, earthquake resulting in
damage to the house or property of prisoner. So also, the parole is
granted to attend to the inal rituals on the death of prisoner’s blood
relatives or spouse. Parole is also granted to the prisoner to attend the
marriage of his children and siblings. Emergency parole as per Rule 13
of the Rule 2024 may be granted to the prisoner to attend the inal
rituals on the death of his spouse or blood relatives. Rule 14 provides
that for being eligible for regular parole, the prisoner shall complete
one year of actual imprisonment.
10. For considering the constitutional validity of Rule 14 by which it is
provided that prisoner inter alia has to complete one year of actual
imprisonment before seeking parole leave, it is necessary to discuss the
decision of the Larger Bench of this Court in the case of Kantilal Nadlal
Jaiswal (supra).
11. The questions referred to the Larger Bench of this Court in the
case of Kantilal Nadlal Jaiswal (supra) are set out in paragraph 2 of the
said decision, which read thus :
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“(i) Whether parole is a right or a concession oﬀered by the
State or a mere administrative decision of the State dictated by its
administrative policy or a special right of a prisoner in special
circumstances or something else ?
(ii) Whether proviso to Rule 19(2) introduced in terms of
th
notiﬁcation dated 16 April, 2019 is violative of Article 14 and
Article 21 of the Constitution of India and if yes, what treatment
must it be given ?”
Question No.(i) has been answered by the Larger Bench in paragraph
no.23 as follows :
“Therefore, question (i) referred to this Bench is answered by
holding that parole is not a mere administrative decision dictated
only by the administrative policy of the State but it is a limited
legal right available to the convict or prisoner subject to
satisfaction of the requirements speciﬁed in the Rules of 1959
for grant of parole, with the avowed objectives to be achieved as
speciﬁed in Rule 1(A) of the said Rules.”
Thus, what has been held by the Larger Bench is that parole is a limited
legal right available to the prisoner subject to satisfaction of the
requirements speciied in the Rules for grant of parole for the purpose
of achieving the objectives as speciied in Rule 1(A) of the Prisons
(Bombay Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1959.
12. As far as question no.(ii) referred to the Larger Bench is
concerned, it is relevant to note that Rule 19(2) of the Prisons (Bombay
Furlough and Parole) Rules, 1959 reads as under :
“19. When a prisoner may be released on emergency
parole:-
(1)………….
(2) All the prisoners eligible for furlough shall be eligible
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for regular parole for following reasons:—
a. Serious illness of father/mother/spouse/son/daughter.
b. Delivery of wife (except high security risk prisoners).
c. In case of natural calamities such as house collapse;
ﬂood, ﬁre, earthquake, etc.
Provided that, a prisoner shall not be released on
emergency or regular parole for the period of one year after
the expiry of his last emergency or regular parole except in
case of death of his nearest relatives mentioned. Above.”
(Emphasis added)
The relevant observations of the Larger Bench are in paragraph No.33
to 42, which reads thus :
“33. A perusal of Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1959 quoted
above, shows that such a basis for creating an exception
certainly had no nexus with the objectives for grant of
parole leaves speciﬁed in Rule 1(A) of the Rules of 1959. If
the objectives for grant of parole leave included under Rule
1(A)(a) to enable the inmate to maintain continuity with
family life and under Rule 1(A)(d) to enable him/her to
develop active interest in life, it is diﬃcult to understand
why the prisoner in whose case period of one year from
grant of last emergency or regular parole has expired,
cannot be released even when he has a genuine case to
show that either his father or mother or spouse or son or
daughter is suﬀering from serious illness or that a natural
calamity has occurred such as house collapse, ﬂood, ﬁre or
earthquake. It appears to be highly insensitive and even cruel
that a prisoner is to be told that since period of one year from the
last emergency or regular parole has expired, he cannot be
granted parole even if there is serious illness of close relatives or
that a natural calamity has occurred, because such events are
uncertain and he can be granted parole only if there is death,
which is a certainty. In other words, a prisoner, just because the
aforesaid period of one year is to expire, will not be able to see
his/her close relatives during serious illness, even facing death,
and also when a natural calamity occurs, but he would have to
wait for death to occur for grant of parole. This runs absolutely
counter to the said avowed objectives of the Rules of 1959,
pertaining to grant of parole as speciﬁcally stated in Rules
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1(A)(a) and (d) of the Rules of 1959. This indicates that apart
from the classiﬁcation test, the aforesaid proviso to Rule
19(2) of the Rules of 1959, is manifestly arbitrary on the face
of it.
34. In this context, the position of law enunciated in a recent
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Navtej
Singh Johar v. Union of India , reported in (2018) 10 SCC 1,
assumes signiﬁcance. It is stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the context of the content of the right to equality under Article
14 of the Constitution of India, as follows:—
“409. Equating the content of equality with the
reasonableness of a classiﬁcation on which a law is based
advances the cause of legal formalism. The problem with
the classiﬁcation test is that what constitutes a reasonable
classiﬁcation is reduced to a mere formula : the quest for an
intelligible diﬀerentia and the rational nexus to the object
sought to be achieved. In doing so, the test of classiﬁcation
risks elevating form over substance. The danger inherent in
legal formalism lies in its inability to lay threadbare the values
which guide the process of judging constitutional rights. Legal
formalism buries the life-giving forces of the Constitution
under a mere mantra. What it ignores is that Article 14
contains a powerful statement of values - of the substance
of equality before the law and the equal protection of laws.
To reduce it to a formal exercise of classiﬁcation may miss
the true value of equality as a safeguard against
arbitrariness in State action. As our constitutional
jurisprudence has evolved towards recognizing the
substantive content of liberty and equality, the core of
Article 14 has emerged out of the shadows of
classiﬁcation. Article 14 has a substantive content on
which, together with liberty and dignity, the ediﬁce of the
Constitution is built. Simply put, in that avatar, it reﬂects
the quest for ensuring fair treatment of the individual in
every aspect of human endeavour and in every facet of
human existence.”
35. Applying the said test to the said proviso to Rule 19(2)
of the Rules of 1959, would show that it can be termed to be
nothing but manifestly arbitrary.
36 . The contentions raised on behalf of the respondents go
against the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
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speciﬁcally in the context of parole leaves, in the case of Asfaq v.
State of Rajasthan (supra). The respondents are not ustiﬁed in
contending that Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of
India in their restricted form are available to prisoners only
within four walls of the jail and they are available only in the
context of quality of food and such other facilities inside jail. The
objectives speciﬁed in Rule 1(A) of the Rules of 1959, as
also the evolution of law pertaining to parole, noted by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan
(supra) shows that the prisoner does have a right to be
treated with dignity and in a non-arbitrary manner even
when his/her application for parole leave to come out of the
four walls of the jail, is to be considered within the rigours
of the mechanism laid down in the Rules of 1959.
Introduction of the said proviso to Rule 19(2) of the Rules of
1959 goes against the grain of the said evolution of law, as
also the very objectives encapsulated in Rule 1(A), thereby
rendering it whimsical, arbitrary and hence unsustainable.
37. The respondents-State Authorities cannot be
permitted to raise the bogey of misuse of the facility of
parole to introduce such a proviso, which runs counter not
only to the aforesaid objectives speciﬁed in Rule 1(A) of the
said Rules, but it violates the rights available to convicts
and prisoners under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the
Constitution of India, in the context of consideration of their
applications for grant of parole. It is relevant to note that even
in the judgment of Amit Gajanan Gandhi v. State of
Maharashtra (supra) when the Division Bench of this Court
referred to gross misuse and misutilisation of the provision of
parole, it was speciﬁcally noted in paragraph 12 as follows:—
“12………. This is a case of sheer casual approach and gross
negligence on the part of authorities in dealing with the
provision of parole.”
38. Thus, viewed from any angle, the arbitrariness of the
said proviso is evident and in that context reference made by
the learned senior counsel for the petitioner to judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh
v. Nandlal Jaiswal reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566 becomes
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relevant. In the said judgment, while acknowledging the fact no
one could claim as against the State, a right to carry out a trade
or business in liquor and the State could not be compelled to
part with its exclusive right to do so, it was held that when the
State decides to grant such right or privilege to others, the
State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. Thus, even if facility of parole could
be a policy of the State whereby it had conceded a limited
right to the convict or prisoner within the four corners of the
Rules of 1959, once such a limited right was conceded, the
State was bound to operate such a procedure under the
said Rules, in a non-arbitrary manner. The moment it is
found that the insertion of proviso to Rule 19(2) of the Rules
of 1959 is arbitrary and it violates Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, it deserves to be struck down as
being invalid and unconstitutional. The right of a convict or
prisoner under Article 21 of the Constitution of India to
be treated with dignity would also require the State to treat
such prisoners and convicts in a non-arbitrary manner and
not at its whims and fancies. Therefore, on the touchstone
of both Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of
India, the aforesaid proviso to Rule 19(2) of the Rules of
1959 is found to be ultra vires, unconstitutional and liable to
be struck down.
39. This aspect was never brought to the notice of the Division
Bench of this Court in the case of Gajanan Babulal Bathulwar v.
State of Maharashtra (supra). At this juncture, it is relevant to
observe that the repeated introduction and deletion of the
said proviso to Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1959, on the part
of the State shows that even the State is not clear about its
own policy. Such repeated somersaults in the State policy
show the arbitrary manner in which the State has been
treating prisoners and convicts in the State of Maharashtra.
The dates noted above show that between 28.11.1989 and
06.02.2007, the proviso operated while between 07.02.2007
and 22.02.2012, it stood deleted, during which period the
said limitation of period of one year did not apply to
applications made by the convicts or prisoners for grant of
parole. The proviso again stood added and operated when
applications were considered for grant of parole between
23.02.2012 and 25.08.2016, where after again it stood
deleted and between the period 26.08.2016 and 15.04.2018,
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it did not apply. Thereafter, on 16.04.2018 the said proviso
was again brought back in the Rules. The arbitrary
approach of the State is manifested in the manner in which
it has chosen to treat convicts and prisoners in the State of
Maharashtra, in the context of grant or refusal of parole, at
its own whims and fancies.
40. In view of the above, it is found that the proviso to
Article 19(2) of the Rules of 1959 introduced in terms of
Notiﬁcation dated 16.04.2018 violates Article 14 and 21 of
the Constitution of India and thereby question (ii) is
answered against the State.
41. Accordingly, the said proviso to Rule 19(2) of the
Rules of 1959 introduced in terms of Notiﬁcation dated
16.04.2018 is struck down as violative of Articles 14 and 21
of the Constitution of India and it is found to be ultra vires
even to the objectives stated in Rule 1(A) of the Rules of
1959.”
(Emphasis added)
13. Thus, the Larger Bench of this Court in Kantilal Nandlal Jaiswal
(supra), in the context of challenge to the constitutional validity of
proviso to Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1959 has inter alia held as follows:
(i) Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1959, shows that a basis for creating
an exception certainly had no nexus with the objectives for grant of
parole leaves speciied in Rule 1(A) of the Rules of 1959. If the
objectives for grant of parole leave included under Rule 1(A)(a) to
enable the inmate to maintain continuity with family life and under
Rule 1(A)(d) to enable him/her to develop active interest in life, it is
diicult to understand why the prisoner in whose case period of
one year from grant of last emergency or regular parole has
expired, cannot be released even when he has a genuine case to
show that either his father or mother or spouse or son or daughter
is sufering from serious illness or that a natural calamity has
occurred such as house collapse, lood, ire or earthquake. This runs
absolutely counter to the said avowed objectives of the Rules of
1959, pertaining to grant of parole as speciically stated in Rules
1(A)(a) and (d) of the Rules of 1959. This indicates that apart from
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the classiication test, the aforesaid proviso to Rule 19(2) of the
Rules of 1959, is manifestly arbitrary on the face of it.
(ii) The Larger Bench relied on the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Navtej Singh Johar (supra) where the test of
classiication has been laid down. While applying the said
classiication test the larger bench held that the proviso to Rule
19(2) of the Rules of 1959, would show that it can be termed to be
nothing but manifestly arbitrary.
(iii) The objectives speciied in Rule 1(A) of the Rules of 1959, as
also the evolution of law pertaining to parole, noted by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Asfaq v. State of Rajasthan (supra) shows that
the prisoner does have a right to be treated with dignity and in a
non-arbitrary manner even when his/her application for parole
leave to come out of the four walls of the jail, is to be considered
within the rigours of the mechanism laid down in the Rules of 1959.
Introduction of the said proviso to Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1959
goes against the grain of the said evolution of law, as also the very
objectives encapsulated in Rule 1(A), thereby rendering it
whimsical, arbitrary and hence unsustainable.
(iv) The State Authorities cannot be permitted to raise the bogey
of misuse of the facility of parole to introduce such a proviso, which
runs counter not only to the aforesaid objectives speciied in Rule
1(A) of the said Rules, but it violates the rights available to convicts
and prisoners under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of
India, in the context of consideration of their applications for grant
of parole.
(v) Even if facility of parole could be a policy of the State whereby
it had conceded a limited right to the convict or prisoner within the
four corners of the Rules of 1959, once such a limited right was
conceded, the State was bound to operate such a procedure under
the said Rules, in a non-arbitrary manner. The moment it is found
that the insertion of proviso to Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1959 is
arbitrary and it violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it
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deserves to be struck down as being invalid and unconstitutional.
(vi) The right of a convict or prisoner under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India to be treated with dignity would also require
the State to treat such prisoners and convicts in a non-arbitrary
manner and not at its whims and fancies. Thus, it was held that on
the touchstone of both Article 14 and Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, the aforesaid proviso to Rule 19(2) of the
Rules of 1959 is found to be ultra vires , unconstitutional and is
liable to be struck down.
(vii) Accordingly, the said proviso to Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1959
introduced in terms of Notiication dated 16.04.2018 was struck
down by the larger bench as violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of India and it was found to be ultra vires even to the
objectives stated in Rule 1(A) of the Rules of 1959.
14. The above observations of the Larger Bench are squarely
applicable to Rule 14 of the Rules of 2024.
15. A perusal of Rule 14 of the Rules of 2024 shows that the cap of
completion of actual imprisonment of one year placed for consideration
of parole has no basis or nexus with the grounds for grant of parole.
The parole i.e. regular parole leave is to be granted for the following
reasons :
(i) To deal with serious illness of prisoner’s spouse or blood
relatives or birth of prisoner’s child,
(ii) To attend to the aftermath of natural calamities like loods,
ire, earthquake resulting in damage to the house and property
of prisoner.
(iii) To attend to the marriage of children or siblings of the prisoner,
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etc.
16. Thus, if the prohibition in Rule 14 of the Rules of 2024 is
considered from the point of view of reasons for which parole is to be
granted, it is very clear that the cap of one year of actual imprisonment
has nothing to do with the grounds speciied for grant of parole leave.
17. It is required to be noted that the Rules of 2024 will apply only to
the convicted prisoners. Till that time, when the trial is pending, the
prisoner can apply for temporary bail, if necessary, on the grounds
speciied in Rule 12 of the Rules of 2024. After the conviction, prisoner
has a only remedy of parole leave (except the bail application for
temporary bail in criminal appeals, if pending). It is also relevant to note
that as per Rule 19 of the Rules of 2024, the period spent on parole
shall not be counted towards the period of sentence.
18. It is clear that the parole and furlough rules are enacted for the
speciic purposes. The furlough leave is to enable the prisoner to deal
with his family matters, to develop active interest in life, to save him
from the evil efects of continuous prison life, to enable him to maintain
and develop his self-conidence and enable the prisoner to develop
constructive hope and active interest in life. As far as objectives for
grant of parole leave are concerned, the same are that the prisoner
should be available to family to deal with serious illness of spouse or
blood relatives, to help the family to overcome the aftermath of natural
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calamities resulting in damage to the house or property of the prisoner.
Also parole is to be granted if there is birth of prisoner’s child or to
enable the prisoner to attend the marriage of children and siblings.
Thus, if objectives or grounds for which the parole leave is to be granted
are considered, then, it is very clear that the cap of one year provided by
Rule 14 of the Rules of 2024 has no nexus with the objectives speciied
for grant of parole leave. The observations in paragraph 33 of the
Larger Bench judgment in the case of Kantilal Nadlal Jaiswal (supra)
with respect to proviso to Rule 19(2) of the Prisons (Bombay Furlough
and Parole) Rules, 1959 are also squarely applicable to Rule 14 of the
Rules of 2024.
19. It is very clear that providing the cap of one year of actual
imprisonment as speciied in Rule 14 of the Rules of 2024 is manifestly
arbitrary and violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
20. The Supreme Court in Asfaq (supra) has held as follows in
paragraph 18 :
“18. The provisions of parole and furlough, thus,
provide for a humanistic approach towards those lodged in
jails. Main purpose of such provisions is to aﬀord to them an
opportunity to solve their personal and family problems and
to enable them to maintain their links with society. Even
citizens of this country have a vested interest in preparing
oﬀenders for successful re-entry into society. Those who
leave prison without strong networks of support, without
employment prospects, without a fundamental knowledge of
the communities to which they will return, and without
resources, stand a signiﬁcantly higher chance of failure.
When oﬀenders revert to criminal activity upon release, they
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frequently do so because they lack hope of merging into
society as accepted citizens. Furloughs or parole can help
prepare oﬀenders for success. ”
(Emphasis added)
Thus, what has been held by the Supreme Court is that the provisions of
parole and furlough provide for a humanstic approach to aford the
prisoners an opportunity to solve their personal and family problems
and to enable them to maintain their links with society.
21. The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 18 above are
squarely applicable to the present case and clearly show that the said
prohibition as provided in Rule 14 of the Rules 2024 is manifestly
arbitrary and violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
22. Accordingly, we hold that the prohibition of one year of actual
imprisonment provided in Rule 14 of the Rules of 2024 is violative of
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and is ultra vires the
grounds / objectives stated in Rule 14 of the Rules of 2024. Accordingly,
following portion of Rule 14(1) of the Rules of 2024, is held as violative
of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and is ultra vires and
thus struck down.
“ on completion of one year of actual imprisonment ”
23. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the Deputy
Inspector General of Prisons (West), Yerwada, Pune to decide in
rd th
accordance with law the said application dated 23 March 2026 / 11
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2-WP-280-2026.doc
nd th
April 2026 / 22 April 2026 of the Petitioner on or before 15 May 2026.
24. As the transcribing of detailed judgment will take some time, this
operative order / direction given to the Prison authority to be uploaded
immediately.
25. This Court places on record the appreciation for the able
assistance rendered by Advocate Mr. Rupesh Jaiswal, amicus appointed
by this Court.
26. Writ petition stands disposed of.
[Pravin S. Patil, J.] [Madhav J. Jamdar, J.]
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