Department Of Land Resources vs M/S Mukesh And Associates
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
rd
% Reserved on: 23 July, 2026
th
Pronounced on: 15 October, 2026
# CNR No: DLHC010493242024
+ FAO(OS) (COMM) 175/2024, CM APPL. 46184/2024 – STAY
(VOL. 1), CM APPL. 46186/2024 – DELAY OF 58 DAYS IN
FILING (VOL. 1), CM APPL. 46187/2024 – DELAY OF 55
DAYS IN FILING (VOL. 1)
DEPARTMENT OF LAND RESOURCES
THROUGH ITS DEPUTY ADVISER
(WATERSHED MANAGEMENT)
MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT,
2ND FLOOR, RIGHT WING, ANNEXE
BUILDING, SHIVAJI STADIUM,
CONNAUGHT PLACE, NEW DELHI-110001
. ....APPELLANT
Through: Mr. Rajesh Gogna and Ms. Simran,
Advocates.
Versus
M/S MUKESH AND ASSOCIATES
THROUGH ITS COUNSEL
MR. SHIVA SANATANAM SWAMINADHAN,
DIVISION-2/2/6, RANGANATHAR AVENUE
PERUMAL MALAI, MAIN ROAD
NARASOTHIPALLY, SALEM,
TAMIL NADU-604004
.....RESPONDENT
Signature Not Verified
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NEGI
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Through: Mr. Ritin Rai, Sr. Adv. with Mr. S.
Santanam Swaminadhan, Ms.
Abhilasha Shrawat, Mr. Kartik
Malhotra & Ms. Shivani
Choudhary, Advocates.
# CNR No: DLHC010703402024
+ FAO(OS) (COMM) 233/2024, CM APPL. 60551/2024 – DELAY
OF 60 DAYS IN FILING, CM APPL. 60552/2024 – DELAY OF
92 DAYS IN RE-FILING
DEPARTMENT OF LAND RESOURCES
THROUGH ITS DEPUTY ADVISER
(WATERSHED MANAGEMENT)
MINISTRY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT,
2ND FLOOR, RIGHT WING, ANNEXE
BUILDING, SHIVAJI STADIUM,
CONNAUGHT PLACE, NEW DELHI-110001
. ....APPELLANT
Through: Mr. Rajesh Gogna and Ms. Simran,
Advocates.
versus
M/S MUKESH AND ASSOCIATES
THROUGH ITS COUNSEL
MR. SHIVA SANATANAM SWAMINADHAN,
DIVISION-2/2/6, RANGANATHAR AVENUE
PERUMAL MALAI, MAIN ROAD
NARASOTHIPALLY, SALEM,
TAMIL NADU-604004 .....RESPONDENT
Through: Mr. Ritin Rai, Sr. Adv. with Mr. S.
Signature Not Verified
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Santanam Swaminadhan, Ms.
Abhilasha Shrawat, Mr. Kartik
Malhotra & Ms. Shivani
Choudhary, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT SHARMA
JUDGMENT
AMIT SHARMA, J.
1. These appeals i.e. FAO(OS)(COMM) 175/2024 and
FAO(OS)(COMM) 233/2024 under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “ A&C Act ”) seek to
assail the orders dated 12.02.2024 and 30.01.2024 (hereinafter referred to
as “ impugned orders ”) passed by the learned Single Judge in
O.M.P.(Comm) 591/2020 and O.M.P.(Comm) 589/2020 respectively.
Vide the impugned orders, the learned Single Judge has rejected
appellant’s petition under Section 34 of the A&C Act assailing the arbitral
award dated 10.01.2020 (as amended on 13.02.2020) passed by the learned
Sole Arbitrator in ARB.P. 174/2018 and 171/2018 respectively.
2. The brief background of the case is that, on 10.07.2015, parties
entered into a contract wherein, the respondent undertook to monitor and
evaluate the Integrated Watershed Management Portal (hereinafter
referred to as “ IWMP ”). In July 2017, during Consultancy Monitoring
Committee preparations, procedural lapses in awarding the contract to the
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respondent were identified. Subsequently, an inquiry was initiated to
investigate how the respondent, allegedly lacking the necessary
competence, managed to secure the contract. Questions also arose
regarding procedural compliances. Due to disputes, the respondent
invoked arbitration proceedings bearing ARB.P. 174/2018 and 171/2018
in March 2018 and a Sole Arbitrator was appointed.
3. On 10.01.2020, learned Sole Arbitrator awarded a sum of Rs.
11,23,95,709 to the respondent, with future interest as per the Micro, Small
and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 from the date of the
award till the date of actual payment. The said award highlighted
procedural irregularities in the appellant’s actions including bypassing
required approvals and delays in addressing disputes. Aggrieved by the
said award, petitioner challenged the said award by filling two petitions
under Section 34 of A&C Act i.e. O.M.P.(Comm) 591/2020 and
O.M.P.(Comm) 589/2020. However, learned Single Judge dismissed the
said petitions vide impugned orders dated 12.02.2024 and 30.01.2024.
Hence, the present appeals were filed on 11.05.2024. However, defects
were marked on both of the appeals. Thus, the present appeals were refiled.
4. During the course of the proceedings in the present appeals, on
19.03.2026, serious objection on behalf of learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent on the maintainability of present appeals were raised,
according to him present appeals were time barred and the delay is not at
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all explained in light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
1
matter of Government of Maharashtra vs. Borse Brothers . Hence, the
arguments were heard on the Condonation of Delay for filing and refiling.
5. It is the case of the appellant that these appeals could not be filed
within the prescribed limit of time under the Limitation Act, 1963 as the
instructions from the concerned department could not be sent to the office
of the standing counsel, since the office of the concerned department was
not fully functional due to the Lok Sabha Election 2024 and government
offices were not functioning to its full capacity till the election process was
completed. After elections, government offices started functioning and the
present appeals i.e. FAO(OS)(COMM) 175/2024 and FAO(OS)(COMM)
233/2024 were finalized and duly filed on 11.05.2024 and 08.05.2024
respectively.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that objections to the
impugned orders were filed on 11.05.2024 and such objections were raised
on 14.05.2024 by the Registry. On 25.07.2024, appellant removed the
objections and on even date, an objection was raised that applications for
condonation of delay in refiling these appeals are required to be filed. It is
further submitted that the reason for delay in re-filing the present appeals
i.e. on 25.07.2024, is that the office of appellant’s counsel was not
functional during this Court’s Summer Vacation Break and the limitation
1
(2021) 6 SCC 460
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period for refiling these appeals expired during the said break i.e. on
11.06.2024.
7. Per contra , learned Senior Counsel for the respondent in support of
his submissions, (in respect of limitation in filing and refiling) in
FAO(OS)(COMM) 175/2024, has submitted the following list of dates:
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8. Further, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent in support of his
submissions, with respect to FAO(OS)(COMM) 233/2024, has submitted
the following list of dates in respect of limitation in filing and refiling:
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9. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent submits that a perusal of
the E-filing and the limitation report, represents that the appellant
deliberately filed a defective Appeal to stop the clock of limitation. The
defects dated 14.05.2024 in FAO(OS)(COMM) 175/2024 and defects
dated 13.05.2024 in FAO(OS)(COMM) 233/2024 records that at the first
instance only 24 and 26 pages respectively were filed. However, the same
appeals as of now runs into 350 and 686 pages respectively. It is submitted
that the initial filing failed to include the bare minimum required to
maintain an appeal, including the arbitral award and the impugned
judgment, thus such a filing constitute as a non-est filing based on the
principles laid down in Pragati Constructions Consultants v. UOI &
2
Anr. , wherein it is held that:
“97.1. Non-filing of the arbitral award along with an
application under the Section 34 of the Arbitration Act
would make the said application liable to be treated and
declared as non est, and the limitation prescribed under
2
2025 OnLine Del 636
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Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act shall continue to run in
spite of such filing.
97.2. Mere non-filing of the statement of truth or a defect in
statement of truth being filed, that is, including with blanks
or without attestation, would not ipso facto, make the filing
to be non est. However, if accompanied with other defects,
the court may form an opinion, based on a cumulative list of
such defects, that the filing was non est.
97.3. Similarly, non-filing or filing of a defective
vakalatnama; the petition not being signed or properly
verified; changes in the content of petition being made in
form of addition/deletion of facts, grounds, or filing of
additional documents from arbitral record, or filing with
deficient court-fee, each of these defects, individually would
not render to filing of an application under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act to be treated and declared as non est.
However, presence of more than one of such defects may,
in the given set of facts involved in a case, justify the
conclusion of the court that filing of the application was
never intended to be final and therefore, is liable to be
declared non est. ”
10. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that it is trite in law that
merely because government is involved, a different yardstick for
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3
condonation of delay cannot be laid down. In State of MP v. Bherulal ,
4
UOI v. Besco Ltd. and State of Maharashtra v. Borse Bros. Engineers
& Contractors (P) Ltd. ( Supra ) , Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
since the object of A&C Act is speedy resolution of disputes, the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ is not elastic enough to cover a delay beyond
what is contemplated by the provision. Further, in the same judgment it
has been held that condonation of delay is an exception and not a rule, and
the same needs to be exercised sparingly where the delay is bonafide .
5
Moreover, in State of MP v. Ramkumar Chaudhary , Hon’ble Supreme
Court clarified that sufficient cause must be traced to events or
circumstances arising within the period of limitation and the Appellant’s
failure to meet the same undermines the plea for condonation.
11. It is submitted that FAO(OS)(COMM) 175/2024 and
FAO(OS)(COMM) 233/2024 has been filed with a delay of 29 days and
42 days respectively and the only explanation offered is a vague reference
to Lok Sabha Election 2024, that can not constitute a ‘sufficient cause’.
Further, the appellant has offered no explanation as to how the Lok Sabha
Elections, 2024 prevented the appellant from communicating instructions
to its counsel.
3
(2020) 10 SCC 654
4
2024 SCC OnLine Del 8467
5
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612
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12. Learned Senior Counsel submits that FAO(OS)(COMM) 175/2024
and FAO(OS)(COMM) 233/2024 have been re-filed with a delay of 58
days and 120 days respectively and explanation forthcoming for the said
delay is that the office of appellant’s counsel was not functional due to
Court’s Summer Vacation Break. However, as per learned Senior Counsel,
the said statement stands belied by appellant’s own conduct. Since, it is an
admitted fact that the present appeals were refiled on 10.06.2024 i.e.
during the summer break.
13. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that this Court reopened
after summer break on 01.07.2024, however, FAO(OS)(COMM)
175/2024 and FAO(OS)(COMM) 233/2024 were refiled on 25.07.2024
and 03.08.2024 respectively, for which delay there is no explanation
forthcoming from the appellant.
14. It is submitted that the appellant deliberately chose not to file the
present appeals on time in order to delay the execution proceedings in
OMP(Enf)(Comm)/136/2020 and OMP(Enf)(Comm)/137/2020.
Pertinently, the present appeals came to be registered only after an order
of deposit dated 18.07.2024 and 07.10.2024 were passed by this Court
against the appellant in the enforcement proceedings. The appellant was
adopting delaying tactic, not warranting any liberal approach, reliance for
6
the same is placed upon DDA v. Durga Construction Co. .
6
2013 SCC OnLine Del 4451
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15. Refuting the submissions made on behalf of the respondent, learned
counsel for the appellant submits that after announcement of the Lok
Sabha Elections 2024 vide order dated 04.01.2024, some of the officers of
the appellant department were directed to report for duty at the office of
Central District Election officer on 08.01.2024. Further, vide subsequent
communications, officers of the Appellant Department were engaged in
the process of elections (which continued till end of May 2024).
16. Learned Counsel for the appellant further submits that these appeals
were filed in a hurry, without sufficient documents, on 11.05.2024.
However, a large number of defects were raised, whereunder, a fair type
of copy of large number of documents had to be filed and the same
required a lot of time. The delay caused in refiling the appeals were
inevitable since the records were very old. Learned Counsel further
submits that despite the fact that the office of the appellant’s counsel was
not working due to summer vacations for some days, all the defects in
FAO(OS)(COMM) 175/2024 and FAO(OS)(COMM) 233/2024 were
removed on 05.08.2024 and 03.10.2024 respectively.
17. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
18. Both the appeals in hand were filed on 11.05.2024 but the Registry
had returned the said appeals under objections and same were again filed
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on 10.06.2024. Subsequently, after a series of objections and removing
them, these appeals i.e. FAO(OS)(COMM) 175/2024 and
FAO(OS)(COMM) 233/2024 were refiled on 09.08.2024 and 08.10.2024
respectively.
19. During the course of hearing, on the issue of non-est filing, a
specific query was put to the learned counsel for the appellant that whether
these appeals at the very initial stage on 11.05.2024 were filed along with
the impugned orders and arbitration award or not. Learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that he will not be able to answer the said specific
query, since he doesn’t have any records for the same. Accordingly, this
Court inquired from the Registry and it was informed that the initial filing
was without the impugned orders and arbitration award. Thus, in terms of
the Judgment rendered by the full Bench of this Court in Pragati
Constructions Consultants ( Supra ) , this Court doesn’t find any
hesitation in holding that the initial filing of these appeals on 11.05.2024
was a non-est filing, which cannot be treated as a valid filing and therefore,
did not stop the cycle of limitation. Accordingly, 10.06.2024 will be
considered as the date of filing of both the appeals.
20. It is significant to note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Borse
Bros. Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd. ( Supra ) has settled the issue of
limitation period in filing an appeal under Section 37 of the A&C Act. It
has been held that the limitation period for filling an appeal under Section
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37 of the A&C Act, having “specified value” of not less than three lakhs
rupees, is 60 days, as mentioned in Section 13(1A) of the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015.
21. It is noted that FAO(OS)(COMM.) 175/2024 and
FAO(OS)(COMM) 233/2024, have been filed challenging the judgment
dated 12.02.2024 and 30.01.2024 respectively. Thus, in the considered
opinion of this Court, both the appeals, having been filed on 10.06.2024,
have been filed beyond the limitation period of 60 days. Therefore, these
have been filed after a delay of 119 days and 132 days i.e. beyond the
period of 60 days.
22. Even, after filing of these appeals on 10.06.2024, defects were
marked by the registry on 29.06.2024. Subsequently, after a series of
marking of objections and refiling, both the appeals i.e.
FAO(OS)(COMM.) 175/2024 and FAO(OS)(COMM) 233/2024 were
finally refiled, without any objections, on 09.08.2024 and 08.10.2024
respectively. According to Rule 3 Chapter IV of the Delhi High Court
Original Side Rules, 2018, limitation period for refiling is 30 days.
Therefore, in these appeals, limitation period for refiling expired on
28.07.2024, after counting 30 days from the date of marking of objections
i.e. 29.06.2024. In view of the above, there is delay in refiling of both the
appeals (of 11 days and 71 days respectively), when compared with the
defects marked by the Registry on 29.06.2024 in both the appeals.
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23. Admittedly, in the application filed for condonation of delay in
filing both the appeals, the only ground taken by the appellant is that the
government offices were not functioning to its full capacity due to the Lok
Sabha Election 2024. Further, in the application filed for condonation of
delay in re-filing both the appeals, the only ground taken by the appellant
for the said delay is that the office of appellant’s counsel was not
functional during this Court’s Summer Vacation Break. Apart from these
grounds, nothing has been placed on record. As already noted above, the
first filing of both the appeals is a non-est filing and that being the position,
the appeals were actually filed on 10.06.2024. This Court finds merit in
the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent that the
delay in filing both the appeals has not been properly explained and the
same cannot fall under category of ‘sufficient cause’.
24. In Borse Bros. Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd. ( Supra ) ,
Hon’ble Supreme Court while analysing the expression “sufficient cause”
for the purposes of condoning delay under A&C Act and Commercial
Courts Act, 2015, observed and held as under: -
“ 58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the
Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the
speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is
not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period
provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression
“sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of
pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in Basawaraj v.
LAO [Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81] , has held : (SCC
pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)
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“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not
be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient”
is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient”
embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which
when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in
the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined
from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In
this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide
on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it
cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or
“remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of
each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court
concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the
court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any
“sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow
the application for condonation of delay. The court has to
examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device
to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land & Building
Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [Manindra Land & Building Corpn.
v. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan [Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770] ,
Parimal v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011)
2 SCC (Civ) 1] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of
Brihan Mumbai [Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of
Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [Arjun Singh v. Mohindra
Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference
between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed
that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa.
However, if any difference exists it can only be that the
requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of
proof than that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only
[Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in
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original.] so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides
cannot be imputed to the party concerned [Ed. : The matter
between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] , whether
or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the
facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [Madanlal v. Shyamlal, (2002) 1
SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [Ram Nath Sao
v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. ‘A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has
no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court
has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The
legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it
is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks
to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.
According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p.
266: ‘605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence
of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant claims
have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant
might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that
persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with
reasonable diligence.’ An unlimited limitation would lead to a
sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation
prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been
acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may
have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.
(See Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [Popat &
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Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510] ,
Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh,
(1973) 2 SCC 705] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium
Project [Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008)
17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [P.
Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002
SCC (Cri) 830] this Court held that judicially engrafting
principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in
the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation
of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
(emphasis supplied in original)
59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a
different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down.
This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living
Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC
(Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649] [“Postmaster General”], as
follows : (SCC pp. 573-74, paras 27-29)
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well
aware or conversant with the issues involved including the
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prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of
filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation when the Department
was possessed with competent persons familiar with court
proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a
wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has
to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view
that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take
advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of
impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern
technologies being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government
bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was
bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation
that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The
government departments are under a special obligation to ensure
that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as
an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled
for the benefit of a few.”
*
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought
to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration
Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation
Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay
beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be
condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule . In a fit
case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a
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negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the
discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that
the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have
acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the
first party's inaction, negligence or laches.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. Thus, in view of Apex Court’s decision in Borse Bros. Engineers
& Contractors (P) Ltd. ( Supra ) , even if the Government is involved, a
different yardstick cannot be applied for condonation of delay. In the
present case, the very first filing being non-est , as observed hereinabove,
on account of non-filing of the impugned order and arbitration award,
shows the lack of bonafide in filing the present appeals. Further, the only
reason stated for condonation of delay in filing in both the appeals, as
stated hereinabove, that government offices were not functioning to its full
capacity due to the Lok Sabha Election 2024, is completely vague and
cannot in any manner justify the delay in filing both the appeals. The said
reason cannot in any manner be covered under the expression “sufficient
expression” as observed in the aforesaid judgment.
26. There is no explanation for each day’s delay and no plausible reason
is forthcoming as to how Lok Sabha Election 2024 prevented the appellant
for taking necessary steps for filing the present appeals within the
limitation period. Keeping in view the mandate laid down in the aforesaid
judgment that condonation of delay is an exception and not a rule, this
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Court is of considered opinion that the appellant have failed in showing
the “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay.
27. Accordingly, applications for condonation of delay in filing, CM
APPL. 46186/2024 in FAO(OS)(COMM) 175/2024 and CM APPL.
60551/2024 in FAO(OS)(COMM) 233/2024, is dismissed and
consequently, present appeals are dismissed and disposed of.
28. Pending applications, if any, stands disposed of.
29. Order be uploaded on the website of this Court, forthwith.
NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE
(ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE)
AMIT SHARMA
(JUDGE)
OCTOBER 15, 2026 /sg
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