STATE OF KERALA vs SAMATHA M M

Court
Kerala High Court

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​IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM​
​PRESENT​
​THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V​
​&​
​THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. V. JAYAKUMAR​
​TH​
​TUESDAY, THE 27​ ​DAY OF OCTOBER 2026 / 5TH KARTHIKA,​​1948​
​WA NO. 2222 OF 2026​
​AGAINST​​THE​​JUDGMENT​​DATED​​23.10.2026​​IN​​WP(C)​​NO.28587​​OF​​2026​
​OF THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA​
​APPELLANT/RESPONDENTS 2 to 4 & RESPONDENTS 6 & 7 IN WP(C):​
​1​ ​STATE OF KERALA​
​REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY,​
​THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, KERALA, PIN - 695001​
​2​ ​SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT​
​BACKWARD CLASSES DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT​
​SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, KERALA, PIN - 695001​
​3​ ​SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT​
​REVENUE DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,​
​THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, KERALA, PIN - 695001​
​4​ ​REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER​
​THRISSUR, CIVIL STATION, AYYANTHOLE, THRISSUR,​
​KERALA, PIN - 680003​
​5​ ​TAHSILDAR​
​KUNNAMKULAM TALUK, KUNNAMKULAM TALUK OFFICE​
​KUNNAMKULAM P.O. THRISSUR, KERALA, PIN - 680503​

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​BY ADV GOVERNMENT PLEADER​
​RESPONDENTS/PETITIONER & 1ST & 5TH RESPONDENT IN WP(C):​
​1​ ​SAMATHA M M​
​AGED 17 YEARS​
​D/O. MOHAMMED RAFEEQUE M H, REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER,​
​'MALAYIL HOUSE', NEAR POLYTECHNIC KIZHOOR, KUNNAMKULAM,​
​THRISSUR, PIN - 680523​
​2​ ​UNION OF INDIA​
​REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL,​
​PUBLIC GRIEVANCES AND PENSIONS, DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL​
​AND TRAINING, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, NORTH BLOCK,​
​NEW DELHI, PIN - 110001​
​3​ ​CONSORTIUM OF NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITIES​
​A SOCIETY REGISTERED UNDER THE KARNATAKA CO-OPERATIVE​
​SOCIETIES ACT REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY-TREASURER,​
​CLAT PERMANENT SECRETARIAT, NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF​
​INDIA UNIVERSITY, NAGARBHAVI, BENGALURU, KARNATAKA,​
​PIN - 560072​
​ADDL.AG-SRI.P.A. MOHAMMED SHAH ;​
​SMT. PARVATHY KOTTOL- FOR R1​
​THIS​​WRIT​​APPEAL​​HAVING​​COME​​UP​​FOR​​ADMISSION​​ON​​27.10.2026,​​THE​
​COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:​

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​"CR"​
​J U D G M E N T​
​Raja Vijayaraghavan V, J.​
​The​​State​​has​​preferred​​this​​intra-court​​appeal​​challenging​​the​​judgment​​dated​
​23.10.2026​​passed​​by​​the​​learned​​Single​​Judge​​of​​this​​Court​​in​​W.P.(C)​​No.28587​​of​
​2026.​
​2.​ ​The​ ​aforesaid​ ​writ​ ​petition​ ​was​ ​filed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​minor​ ​child,​ ​the​ ​1st​
​respondent​​herein,​​represented​​by​​her​​father.​​The​​1st​​respondent​​intended​​to​​appear​
​for​ ​the​ ​Common​ ​Law​ ​Admission​ ​Test​ ​(CLAT)​ ​2027,​ ​the​ ​entrance​ ​examination​ ​for​
​admission​ ​to​ ​the​ ​much​ ​sought​ ​after​ ​undergraduate​ ​law​ ​programmes.​ ​The​ ​principal​
​prayer​​in​​the​​writ​​petition​​was​​to​​quash​​Ext.​​P8​​rejection​​order,​​whereby​​her​​request​
​for​ ​inclusion​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Non-Creamy​ ​Layer​ ​category​ ​and​ ​for​ ​issuance​ ​of​ ​a​ ​Non-Creamy​
​Layer​​Certificate​​was​​rejected.​​The​​petitioner​​also​​sought​​a​​declaration​​that​​her​​creamy​
​layer​​status​​could​​not​​be​​determined​​solely​​on​​the​​ground​​that​​her​​mother​​presently​
​holds​​a​​Class​​I/Group​​A​​post,​​without​​considering​​the​​applicable​​criteria​​prescribed​​in​
​Office​ ​Memorandum​ ​No.​ ​36012/22/93​ ​Estt.​ ​(SCT)​ ​dated​ ​08.09.1993,​ ​issued​ ​by​ ​the​
​Ministry​ ​of​ ​Personnel,​ ​Public​​Grievances​​and​​Pensions,​​Department​​of​​Personnel​​and​
​Training, Government of India.​
​3.​ ​Since​​the​​last​​date​​for​​submitting​​applications​​to​​appear​​for​​the​​entrance​
​examination​​scheduled​​to​​be​​held​​on​​06.12.2026​​was​​31.10.2026,​​and​​in​​view​​of​​the​

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​urgency​ ​expressed,​ ​with​ ​the​ ​consent​ ​of​ ​both​ ​sides,​​we​​took​​up​​the​​matter​​for​​final​
​disposal on the date of admission itself.​
​4.​ ​We​​have​​heard​​the​​submissions​​of​​Sri​​P.A.​​Mohammed​​Shah,​​the​​learned​
​Additional​ ​Advocate​ ​General​​appearing​​for​​the​​appellants​​and​​Smt.​​Parvathy​​Kottool,​
​the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, who is the 1st respondent herein.​
​5.​ ​Before​​adverting​​to​​the​​contentions​​advanced​​by​​the​​parties,​​it​​would​​be​
​apposite to set out the brief facts that led to the filing of the writ petition:​
​a.​ ​The​​1st​​respondent​​is​​a​​minor.​​She​​is​​a​​Muslim​​and​​belongs​​to​​the​​Mappila​
​community,​​which​​is​​included​​under​​the​​category​​of​​“Muslims”​​in​​the​​list​​of​
​Socially​ ​and​ ​Educationally​ ​Backward​ ​Classes​ ​(SEBC)​ ​notified​ ​by​ ​the​
​Government​​of​​Kerala​​vide​​G.O.(P)​​No.​​208/66/Edn.​​dated​​02.05.1966,​​as​
​subsequently amended.​
​b.​ ​The​​1st​​respondent​​states​​that​​her​​father​​was​​appointed​​as​​Assistant​​Public​
​Prosecutor​ ​Grade​ ​II​ ​at​ ​Gram​ ​Nyayalaya,​ ​Azhutha,​ ​Peerumedu,​ ​on​
​31.07.2018,​​in​​the​​pay​​scale​​of​​₹40,500​​to​​₹85,000.​​He​​was​​subsequently​
​promoted​​as​​Assistant​​Public​​Prosecutor​​Grade​​I​​on​​27.07.2023,​​in​​the​​pay​
​scale​​of​​₹63,700​​to​​₹1,23,700,​​as​​evidenced​​by​​Ext.​​P2​​service​​certificate​
​produced before this Court in the writ petition.​
​c.​ ​According​​to​​the​​1st​​respondent,​​her​​mother​​joined​​the​​Kerala​​State​​Higher​
​Judicial​​Service​​on​​16.07.2021​​as​​an​​Additional​​District​​and​​Sessions​​Judge​

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​and​ ​is​ ​presently​ ​serving​ ​as​ ​Additional​ ​District​ ​and​ ​Sessions​ ​Judge​ ​IV,​
​Kollam,​ ​when​ ​she​ ​was​ ​41​ ​years​ ​of​ ​age.​ ​She​ ​contends​​that,​​prior​​to​​her​
​appointment​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Kerala​ ​State​​Higher​​Judicial​​Service,​​her​​mother​​was​
​practising​ ​as​​an​​advocate​​and​​that,​​during​​the​​financial​​year​​2019–2020,​
​her​​gross​​income​​was​​approximately​​₹1,20,130,​​as​​evidenced​​by​​Ext.​​P4,​​a​
​copy of her Income Tax Return.​
​d.​ ​In​​the​​meantime,​​Ext.​​P5​​press​​release​​was​​issued​​by​​the​​5th​​respondent,​
​inviting​ ​applications​ ​for​ ​CLAT​ ​2027.​ ​In​ ​order​ ​to​ ​produce​ ​the​ ​requisite​
​certificate​ ​and​ ​claim​ ​the​ ​benefit​ ​of​ ​reservation,​ ​the​ ​1st​ ​respondent​
​submitted Ext. P7 application before the Tahsildar, Kunnamkulam Taluk.​
​e.​ ​The​​1st​​respondent​​asserts​​that​​the​​Tahsildar​​rejected​​her​​application​​on​
​the​ ​ground​ ​that​ ​her​ ​mother​ ​was​ ​a​ ​directly​ ​recruited​ ​Class​​I​​officer​​and,​
​therefore,​ ​she​ ​was​ ​not​ ​entitled​ ​to​ ​an​ ​OBC​ ​Non-Creamy​​Layer​​Certificate​
​under​ ​Ext.​ ​P9,​ ​Office​ ​Memorandum​ ​No.​ ​36012/22/93​ ​Estt.​ ​(SCT)​ ​dated​
​08.09.1993,​​issued​​by​​the​​Government​​of​​India​​(hereinafter​​referred​​to​​as​
​the “1993 Office Memorandum”).​
​f.​ ​According​ ​to​ ​the​ ​1st​ ​respondent,​ ​the​ ​1993​ ​Office​ ​Memorandum​ ​was​
​subsequently​ ​clarified​ ​by​ ​the​ ​competent​ ​authority​ ​through​ ​Ext.​ ​P10​
​clarification​​letter.​​The​​said​​clarification​​specifically​​provides​​that,​​where​​the​
​father​ ​was​ ​directly​ ​recruited​ ​as​ ​a​​Class​​III/Group​​C​​or​​Class​​IV/Group​​D​
​employee​​and​​subsequently​​entered​​Class​​I/Group​​A​​service​​at​​the​​age​​of​

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​40​ ​years​ ​or​ ​earlier,​ ​his​ ​sons​ ​and​ ​daughters​ ​shall​ ​not​ ​be​ ​treated​ ​as​
​belonging to the creamy layer.​
​g.​ ​The​​1st​​respondent​​further​​contends​​that​​her​​mother​​was​​practising​​as​​an​
​advocate​ ​before​ ​her​ ​appointment​ ​to​ ​the​ ​Kerala​ ​State​ ​Higher​ ​Judicial​
​Service​​in​​2021​​and​​was​​appointed​​as​​an​​Additional​​District​​and​​Sessions​
​Judge​ ​only​ ​at​ ​the​ ​age​ ​of​ ​41​ ​years.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​contended​ ​that,​ ​in​​view​​of​​the​
​specific​​terms​​of​​Ext.​​P9​​Office​​Memorandum​​and​​Ext.​​P10​​clarification,​​the​
​rejection of Ext. P7 application by the Tahsildar is unsustainable.​
​6.​ ​It​​was​​on​​the​​aforesaid​​assertions​​that​​the​​writ​​petition​​was​​filed,​​seeking​
​the following reliefs:​
​i.​ ​Issue​​a​​writ​​of​​certiorari​​calling​​for​​the​​records​​leading​​to​​Exhibit​
​P8​​rejection​​order,​​and​​pass​​an​​appropriate​​order​​quashing​​Exhibit​
​P8​​as​​illegal,​​arbitrary​​and​​contrary​​to​​the​​criteria​​prescribed​​under​
​Exhibits P9 and P10;​
​ii.​ ​declare​ ​that​ ​the​ ​determination​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Petitioner's​ ​creamy-layer​
​status​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​made​ ​solely​ ​on​ ​the​ ​basis​ ​that​ ​her​ ​mother​
​presently​ ​holds​ ​a​ ​Class​ ​I/Group​ ​A​ ​post,​​without​​considering​​the​
​applicable​ ​criteria​ ​under​​Exhibit​​P9,​​the​​clarification​​contained​​in​
​Exhibit​​P10,​​and​​the​​relevant​​circumstances​​concerning​​the​​mode,​
​stage​ ​and​ ​age​ ​of​ ​entry​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Petitioner's​ ​mother​ ​into​ ​Class​
​I/Group A service.​
​iii.​​issue​​a​​writ​​of​​mandamus​​or​​any​​other​​appropriate​​writ,​​order​​or​
​direction​ ​directing​ ​the​ ​7th​ ​Respondent​ ​to​ ​reconsider​ ​Exhibit​ ​P7​
​application​​afresh,​​in​​accordance​​with​​the​​criteria​​prescribed​​under​
​Office​ ​Memorandum​ ​No.​ ​36012/22/93-SCT​ ​dated​ ​08.09.1993​

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​(Exhibit​ ​P9)​ ​and​ ​Letter​ ​No.​ ​36033/5/2004-Estt.(Res.)​ ​dated​
​14.10.2004 (Exhibit P10), within a time frame.​
​iv.​​To​​issue​​a​​direction​​to​​the​​5​​th​​respondent​​to​​permit​​the​​Petitioner​
​to​ ​claim​ ​the​ ​applicable​ ​SEBC/OBC​ ​reservation​ ​benefit​ ​in​ ​CLAT​
​2027,​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​production​ ​of​ ​the​ ​requisite​ ​Non-Creamy​ ​Layer​
​Certificate at a later stage, or at the time of admission;​
​7.​ ​A​ ​counter-affidavit​​was​​filed​​by​​the​​7th​​respondent​​in​​the​​writ​​petition,​
​controverting​ ​the​ ​contentions​ ​advanced​ ​by​ ​the​ ​1st​ ​respondent.​ ​The​ ​following​
​contentions were raised.​
​a.​ ​The​ ​determination​ ​of​ ​whether​ ​the​ ​children​ ​of​ ​a​ ​person​ ​fall​ ​within​ ​the​
​Non-Creamy​​Layer​​is​​required​​to​​be​​made​​in​​accordance​​with​​the​​criteria​
​prescribed by the competent authority of the Government of India.​
​b.​ ​The​ ​Office​ ​Memorandum​ ​dated​ ​08.09.1993​​lays​​down​​the​​framework​​for​
​identifying​ ​the​ ​creamy​ ​layer​ ​among​ ​the​ ​Other​ ​Backward​ ​Classes​ ​and​
​prescribes​​separate​​categories​​and​​criteria,​​including​​those​​relating​​to​​the​
​status​​of​​parents​​holding​​posts​​in​​Government​​service​​and​​those​​relating​​to​
​professionals​ ​and​ ​persons​ ​engaged​ ​in​ ​trade​ ​and​ ​industry.​ ​The​ ​various​
​clarifications​ ​issued​ ​by​ ​the​ ​competent​ ​authority​ ​are​ ​required​ ​to​ ​be​
​understood​ ​and​ ​applied​ ​within​ ​the​ ​framework​ ​of​ ​the​ ​said​ ​Office​
​Memorandum.​ ​The​ ​attempt​ ​to​ ​rely​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​provisions​ ​relating​ ​to​
​professionals​​and​​their​​income,​​so​​as​​to​​displace​​the​​specific​​service​​status​
​criterion​​applicable​​to​​her​​mother​​after​​direct​​recruitment​​to​​Class​​I/Group​

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​A,​​cannot​​be​​accepted.​​It​​is​​also​​asserted​​that​​the​​categories​​prescribed​​in​
​the​ ​Office​​Memorandum​​cannot​​be​​combined​​in​​a​​manner​​which​​renders​
​the​​specific​​provision​​relating​​to​​directly​​recruited​​Class​​I/Group​​A​​officers​
​redundant.​
​c.​ ​The​ ​reliance​ ​placed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​petitioner​ ​on​ ​the​ ​Ext.P10​ ​clarification​ ​to​ ​the​
​Office​​Memorandum,​​issued​​on​​14.10.2004,​​to​​bring​​home​​the​​point​​that​
​the​​circumstances​​prevailing​​prior​​to​​the​​entry​​of​​the​​mother​​into​​Group​​A/​
​Class​ ​1​ ​services​ ​are​ ​relevant​ ​for​ ​determining​ ​the​ ​creamy​ ​layer​ ​status​
​cannot​​be​​accepted.​​It​​is​​stated​​that​​the​​mother​​of​​the​​petitioner​​was​​not​​a​
​Group​ ​B/Class​ ​II,​ ​Group​ ​C/Class​ ​III​ ​or​ ​Group​ ​D/Class​ ​IV​ ​Government​
​employee who subsequently entered Group A/Class I service.​
​d.​ ​The​​rejection​​of​​the​​application​​was​​not​​based​​on​​the​​professional​​income​
​of​​the​​mother​​alone,​​nor​​was​​the​​application​​rejected​​without​​consideration​
​of​​the​​service​​history​​of​​the​​parents.​​The​​application​​was​​examined​​on​​the​
​basis​ ​of​ ​the​ ​records​ ​obtained​ ​through​ ​verification,​ ​including​ ​the​ ​service​
​particulars​​of​​the​​parents,​​and​​the​​mother's​​status​​as​​a​​directly​​recruited​
​Group A/Class I Officer was found to attract the applicable exclusion.​
​8.​ ​The​​learned​​Single​​Judge,​​after​​consideration​​of​​the​ ​Office​​Memorandum​
​as​​well​​as​​the​​subsequent​​clarification,​​came​​to​​the​​conclusion​​that​​a​​bare​​reading​​of​
​Category​ ​II​ ​Service​ ​Category​ ​A,​ ​makes​ ​it​​clear​​that,​​if​​parents,​​either​​of​​whom​​is​​a​

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​Group​​A/Class​​I​​Officer,​​the​​rule​​would​​exclude​​them.​​The​ ​Court​​also​​noted​​that​​there​
​is​​no​​dispute​​that​​the​​1st​​respondent's​​mother​​is​​a​​Group​​A/Class​​I​​Officer.​​However,​
​the​​learned​​Single​​Judge​​perused​​the​​various​​other​​categories,​​i.e,​​Category​​II,​​Service​
​Category​​B​ ​dealing​​with​​Group​​B/Class​​II​​Officers,​​as​​well​​as​​Ext.P10​​clarification,​​and​
​also​ ​the​ ​observations​ ​made​ ​by​ ​a​ ​Division​ ​Bench​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Delhi​ ​High​ ​Court​ ​in​ ​the​
​judgment​ ​dated​ ​27.11.2018​ ​in​ ​W.P.(C)​ ​No.​ ​12598​ ​of​ ​2018,​ ​and​ ​also​ ​the​ ​judgment​
​dated​ ​21.10.2024​ ​in​ ​W.P.(C)​ ​No.14557​ ​of​ ​2024​ ​and​ ​connected​​cases,​​and​​held​​that​
​Exts.P9​​and​​Ext.P10​​are​​to​​be​​harmoniously​​read​​in​​favour​​of​​the​​1st​​respondent,​​and​
​if​ ​the​ ​same​ ​is​ ​not​ ​done,​ ​that​ ​would​ ​be​ ​a​ ​clear​ ​case​ ​of​ ​discrimination.​ ​The​​learned​
​Single​​Judge​​took​​note​​of​​the​​assertion​​made​​in​​the​​Writ​​Petition​​that​​those​​individuals​
​who​ ​are​ ​promoted​ ​to​ ​the​ ​post​ ​of​ ​District​ ​Judge​ ​and​ ​started​​their​​career​​as​​Munsiff​
​Magistrate​​do​​get​​the​​benefit​​of​​OBC​​(NCL)​​Certificate​​if​​they​​are​​promoted​​as​​District​
​Judge​​after​​the​​age​​of​​40​​years.​​However,​​the​​said​​benefit​​is​​denied​​merely​​because​​of​
​the​​fact​​that​​the​​1st​​respondent's​​mother​​was​​directly​​recruited​​as​​Additional​​District​
​and​​Sessions​​Judge.​​According​​to​​the​​learned​​Single​​Judge,​​this​​also​​was​​a​​clear​​case​
​of​​discrimination.​​The​​learned​​Single​​Judge​​went​​on​​to​​add​​that​​being​​a​​lawyer​​and​
​receiving​​direct​​appointment​​to​​a​​Class​​I​​post​​is​​not​​a​​disadvantage.​​Holding​​so,​​the​
​learned​​Single​​Judge​​held​​that​​the​​1st​​respondent​​is​​entitled​​to​​succeed​​in​​the​​light​​of​
​Exts.​​P9,​​P10​​and​​ordered​​the​​quashing​​of​​Ext.​​P8​​and​​the​​Tahsildar​​was​​directed​​to​
​issue an OBC (NCL) Certificate to the 1st respondent within three working days.​
​9.​ ​We​​have​​heard​​the​​submissions​​advanced​​by​​both​​sides​​and​​have​​gone​

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​through​ ​the​ ​precedents​ ​cited,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​the​ ​judgment​ ​rendered​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Hon’ble​
​1​
​Supreme​​Court​​in​ ​Union​​of​​India​​v.​​Rohith​​Nathan​ ​,​ ​which​​was​​placed​​before​​us.​
​We have also carefully considered the submissions advanced.​
​10.​ ​Certain​​undisputed​​facts​​require​​to​​be​​stated​​at​​the​​outset.​​The​​father​​of​
​the​ ​1st​ ​respondent​ ​was​ ​appointed​ ​as​ ​Assistant​ ​Public​ ​Prosecutor​ ​Grade​ ​II​ ​at​ ​Gram​
​Nyayalaya,​ ​Azhutha,​ ​Peerumedu,​ ​on​ ​31.07.2018,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​pay​ ​scale​ ​of​ ​₹40,500​ ​to​
​₹85,000.​ ​He​ ​was​​promoted​​as​​Assistant​​Public​​Prosecutor​​Grade​​I​​on​​27.07.2023,​​in​
​the​ ​pay​​scale​​of​​₹63,700​​to​​₹1,23,700.​​These​​facts​​are​​evident​​from​​Ext.​​P2​​service​
​certificate​​produced​​before​​this​​Court​​in​​the​​writ​​petition.​​No​​claim​​for​​the​​benefit​​of​
​reservation was advanced on the basis of the father's service.​
​11.​ ​The​​entire​​controversy​​revolves​​around​​the​​question​​whether​​the​​mother​
​of​ ​the​ ​1st​ ​respondent,​ ​who​ ​joined​ ​the​ ​Kerala​ ​State​ ​Higher​ ​Judicial​ ​Service​ ​on​
​16.07.2021​​as​​an​​Additional​​District​​and​​Sessions​​Judge​​at​​the​​age​​of​​41​​years,​​falls​
​within​ ​the​ ​exclusionary​ ​criteria​ ​prescribed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​1993​ ​Office​ ​Memorandum.​ ​She​
​continues​​to​​serve​​as​​Additional​​District​​and​​Sessions​​Judge​​IV,​​Kollam,​​as​​evidenced​
​by​ ​Ext.​ ​P3​ ​service​ ​certificate.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​also​ ​undisputed​ ​that,​​before​​her​​appointment​​as​
​Additional​​District​​and​​Sessions​​Judge​​in​​2021,​​the​​mother​​of​​the​​1st​​respondent​​was​
​practising​ ​as​ ​an​ ​advocate​ ​at​ ​Thrissur​ ​and​ ​that​ ​her​​income​​during​​the​​financial​​year​
​2019–2020 was approximately ₹1,20,130.​
​1​
​[(2026) 6 SCC 1]​

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​12.​ ​Insofar​ ​as​ ​the​ ​parameters​ ​for​ ​determining​ ​the​ ​“creamy​​layer”​​group​​is​
​concerned,​ ​it​ ​was​ ​after​ ​the​ ​decision​ ​in​ ​Indra​ ​Sawhney​ ​and​ ​others​ ​v.​ ​Union​ ​of​
​2​
​India​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Government​ ​of​ ​India,​ ​Ministry​ ​of​ ​Personnel,​ ​Public​ ​Grievances​ ​and​
​Pensions​ ​(Department​ ​of​ ​Personnel​ ​and​ ​Training)​ ​issued​ ​Office​ ​Memorandum​ ​dated​
​8-9-1993​​providing​​for​​27%​​reservation​​for​​Other​​Backward​​Classes.​​The​​1993​​Office​
​Memorandum​ ​codified​ ​the​ ​structural​ ​framework.​ ​For​ ​better​ ​appreciation,​ ​the​ ​1993​
​Office Memorandum is reproduced below:​
​“No. 36012/22/93-Estt. (SCT)​
​Government of India​
​Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions​
​(Department of​ ​Personnel & Training)​
​New Delhi, the 8th September, 1993​
​OFFICE MEMORANDUM​
​Subject:-​ ​Reservation​ ​for​ ​Other​ ​Backward​ ​Classes​ ​in​ ​Civil​ ​Posts​ ​and​
​Services under the Government of India - Regarding.​
​The​​undersigned​​is​​directed​​to​​refer​​to​​this​​Department’s​​O.​​M.​​No.​
​36012/31/90-Estt(STCT),​ ​dated​ ​the​ ​13th​ ​August,1990​ ​and​ ​25th​
​September​ ​1991​ ​regarding​ ​reservation​ ​for​ ​Socially​ ​and​ ​Educationally​
​Backward​​Classes​​in​​Civil​​Posts​​and​​Services​​under​​the​​Govt.​​of​​India​​and​
​to​​say​​that​​following​​the​​Supreme​​Court​​judgment​​in​​the​​Indra​​Sawhney​
​and​​others​​vs​​Union​​of​​India​​and​​others​​case​​[Writ​​Petition​​(Civil)​​No.​
​930​ ​of​ ​1990]​ ​the​ ​Govt.​ ​of​ ​India​ ​appointed​ ​an​ ​Expert​ ​Committee​ ​to​
​recommend​ ​the​ ​criteria​ ​for​ ​exclusion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​socially​ ​advanced​
​persons/sections​ ​from​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​of​ ​reservation​ ​for​ ​Other​ ​Backward​
​Classes in civil posts and services under the Govt. of India.​
​2​
​1992 Supp (3) SCC 217​

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​2.​ ​Consequent​ ​to​ ​the​ ​consideration​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Expert​ ​Committee’s​
​recommendations​ ​this​ ​Department’s​ ​Office​ ​Memorandum​ ​No.​
​36012/31/90-Estt(SCT),​​dated​​13.8.90​​referred​​to​​in​​para(1)​​above​​is​
​hereby modified to provide as follows:​
​(​a​)​ ​27%​​(twenty-seven​​per​​cent)​​of​​the​​vacancies​​in​​civil​​posts​​and​
​services​ ​under​ ​the​ ​Government​ ​of​ ​India,​ ​to​ ​be​ ​filled​ ​through​
​direct​ ​recruitment,​ ​shall​ ​be​ ​reserved​ ​for​ ​the​ ​Other​ ​Backward​
​Classes.​ ​Detailed​ ​instructions​ ​relating​ ​to​ ​the​ ​procedure​ ​to​ ​be​
​followed for enforcing reservation will be issued separately.​
​(​b​)​ ​Candidates​​belonging​​to​​OBCs​​recruited​​on​​the​​basis​​of​​merit​​in​
​an​​open​​competition​​on​​the​​same​​standards​​prescribed​​for​​the​
​general​​candidates​​shall​​not​​be​​adjusted​​against​​the​​reservation​
​quota of 27%.​
​(​c​)(​i​)​ ​The​ ​aforesaid​ ​reservation​ ​shall​ ​not​ ​apply​ ​to​
​persons/sections​ ​mentioned​ ​in​ ​Column​ ​3​ ​of​ ​the​
​Schedule to this office memorandum​ .​
​(​ii​)​ ​The​ ​rule​​of​​exclusion​​will​​not​​apply​​to​​persons​​working​​as​
​artisans​​or​​engaged​​in​​hereditary​​occupations,​​callings.​​A​​list​
​of​​such​​occupations,​​callings​​will​​be​​issued​​separately​​by​​the​
​Ministry of Welfare.​
​(​d​)​ ​The​ ​OBCs​ ​for​ ​the​ ​purpose​ ​of​ ​the​ ​aforesaid​ ​reservation​ ​would​
​comprise,​​in​​the​​first​​phase,​​the​​castes​​and​​communities​​which​
​are​​common​​to​​both​​the​​report​​of​​the​​Mandal​​Commission​​and​
​the​ ​State​ ​Government's​ ​Lists.​ ​A​ ​list​ ​of​ ​such​ ​castes​ ​and​
​communities​ ​is​ ​being​ ​issued​ ​separately​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Ministry​ ​of​
​Welfare.​
​(​e​)​ ​The​ ​aforesaid​​reservation​​shall​​take​​immediate​​effect.​​However,​
​this​ ​will​ ​not​​apply​​to​​vacancies​​where​​the​​recruitment​​process​
​has already been initiated prior to the issue of this order.​
​(i)​ ​Similar​ ​instructions​ ​in​ ​respect​ ​of​​public​​sector​​undertaking​​and​
​financial​​institutions​​including​​public​​sector​​banks​​will​​be​​issued​​by​​the​
​Department​ ​of​ ​Public​ ​Enterprises​ ​and​ ​by​ ​the​ ​Ministry​ ​of​ ​Finance,​

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​respectively, effective from the date of this Office Memorandum.​
​sd/- (Smt Sarita Prasad)​
​Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India​
​( emphasis supplied)​
​13.​ ​The​ ​relevant​ ​clauses​ ​of​ ​the​ ​schedule​ ​attached​ ​to​ ​the​ ​1993​ ​Office​
​Memorandum are extracted below for easy reference.​
​II​ ​SERVICE CATEGORY​
​Son(s) and daughter(s) of​
​A.​​Group A/Class I​
​officers​ ​of the All​
​India Central and State​
​Services (Direct​
​Recruits).​
​(a) parents, both of whom are Class I officers;​
​(b)​ ​parents, either of whom is a Class I officer;​
​(c)​​Parents,​​both​​of​​whom​​are​​Class​​I​​officers,​​but​​one​​of​
​them dies or suffers permanent incapacitation.​
​(d)​​Parents,​​either​​of​​whom​​is​​a​​Class​​I​​officer​​and​​such​
​parent​ ​dies​ ​or​ ​suffers​ ​permanent​ ​incapacitation​ ​and​
​before​​such​​death​​or​​such​​incapacitation​​has​​had​​the​
​benefit​ ​of​ ​employment​ ​in​ ​any​ ​International​
​Organisation​ ​like​ ​UN,​ ​IMF,​ ​World​ ​Bank,​ ​etc.​ ​for​ ​a​
​period of not less than 5 years.​
​(e)​​Parents,​​both​​of​​whom​​are​​Class​​I​​officers​​die​​or​​suffer​
​permanent​ ​incapacitation​ ​and​ ​before​ ​such​ ​death​ ​or​
​such​​incapacitation​​of​​the​​both,​​either​​of​​them​​has​​had​
​the​ ​benefit​ ​of​ ​employment​ ​in​ ​any​ ​International​
​Organisation​ ​like​ ​UN,​ ​IMF,​ ​World​ ​Bank,​ ​etc.​ ​for​ ​a​
​period of not less than 5 years.​
​Provided​​that​​the​​rule​​of​​exclusion​​shall​​not​​apply​​in​​the​
​following cases:​
​(a)​ ​Sons​ ​and​ ​daughters​ ​of​ ​parents​ ​either​ ​of​ ​whom​ ​or​
​both​​of​​whom​​are​​Class​​I​​officers​​and​​such​​parent(s)​
​dies/die or suffer permanent incapacitation.​
​(b)​​A​​lady​​belonging​​to​​OBC​​category​​has​​got​​married​​to​
​a​ ​Class​ ​I​ ​officer,​​and​​may​​herself​​like​​to​​apply​​for​​a​
​job.​

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​B​ . Group B/Class II​
​officers of the Central​
​and State Services​
​(Direct Recruitment)​
​Son(s) and daughter(s) of​
​(a) Parents both of whom are Class II officers.​
​(b)​​Parents​​of​​whom​​only​​the​​husband​​is​​a​​Class​​II​​officer​
​and he gets into Class I at the age of 40 or earlier.​
​(c)​​Parents,​​both​​of​​whom​​are​​Class​​II​​officers​​and​​one​​of​
​them​ ​dies​ ​or​ ​suffers​ ​permanent​ ​incapacitation​ ​and​
​either​​one​​of​​them​​has​​had​​the​​benefit​​of​​employment​
​in​​any​​International​​Organisation​​like​​UN,​​IMF,​​World​
​Bank,​​etc.​​for​​a​​period​​of​​not​​less​​than​​5​​years​​before​
​such death or permanent incapacitation;​
​(d)​ ​parents​ ​of​ ​whom​ ​the​ ​husband​ ​is​ ​a​ ​Class​ ​I​ ​officer​
​(direct​​recruit​​or​​pre-​​forty​​promoted)​​and​​the​​wife​​is​​a​
​Class​​II​​officer​​and​​the​​wife​​dies;​​or​​suffers​​permanent​
​incapacitation; and​
​(e)​​parents,​​of​​whom​​the​​wife​​is​​a​​Class​​I​​officer​​(Direct​
​Recruit​ ​or​ ​pre-forty​​promoted)​​and​​the​​husband​​is​​a​
​Class​ ​II​ ​officer​ ​and​ ​the​ ​husband​ ​dies​ ​or​ ​suffers​
​permanent incapacitation​
​Provided​​that​​the​​rule​​of​​exclusion​​shall​​not​​apply​​in​​the​
​following cases:​
​Sons and daughters of​
​(a)​​Parents​​both​​of​​whom​​are​​Class​​II​​officers​​and​​one​​of​
​them dies or suffers permanent incapacitation.​
​(b)​​Parents,​​both​​of​​whom​​are​​Class​​II​​officers​​and​​both​​of​
​them​ ​die​ ​or​ ​suffer​ ​permanent​ ​incapacitation,​ ​even​
​though​ ​either​ ​of​ ​them​ ​has​ ​had​ ​the​ ​benefit​ ​of​
​employment​​in​​any​​International​​Organisation​​like​​UN,​
​IMF,​​World​​Bank,​​etc.​​for​​a​​period​​of​​not​​less​​than​​5​
​years before their death or permanent incapacitation.​
​14.​ ​In​ ​Rohith​​Nathan​ ​(supra),​​the​​Hon'ble​​Supreme​​Court​​considered​​the​
​legal​ ​framework​ ​governing​ ​the​ ​exclusion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​'creamy​ ​layer'​ ​from​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​of​
​reservation​​for​​Other​​Backward​​Classes.​​The​​Court​​held​​that​​the​​doctrine​​of​​exclusion​
​of​ ​the​ ​creamy​ ​layer,​ ​crystallised​ ​in​ ​Indra​ ​Sawhney​ ​(supra),​ ​constitutes​ ​the​

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​constitutional​​foundation​​of​​the​​Office​​Memorandum​​dated​​08.09.1993.​​The​​said​​Office​
​Memorandum​ ​was​ ​issued​ ​to​ ​operationalise​ ​the​ ​constitutional​​mandate​​by​​identifying​
​the​​socially​​advanced​​sections​​within​​the​​Other​​Backward​​Classes​​who​​would​​not​​be​
​entitled​ ​to​​the​​benefits​​of​​reservation.​​The​​criteria​​prescribed​​therein​​are​​not​​merely​
​indicative​​guidelines,​​but​​constitute​​the​​framework​​within​​which​​the​​determination​​of​
​creamy layer status is required to be made.​
​15.​ ​In​ ​paragraph​ ​No.​ ​59​ ​of​ ​Rohith​​Nathan​ ​(supra),​​the​​Hon'ble​​Supreme​
​Court​ ​observed​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Schedule​ ​appended​ ​to​ ​the​ ​1993​ ​Office​ ​Memorandum​
​enumerates​ ​specific​ ​categories​ ​for​ ​exclusion​ ​and​ ​gives​ ​effect​ ​to​ ​the​ ​status-based​
​criteria​​prescribed​​therein,​​while​​also​​providing​​for​​a​​residual​​income​​and​​wealth​​test​
​under​ ​Category​ ​VI.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​evident​ ​that​ ​the​ ​scheme​ ​contemplates​ ​distinct​ ​and​
​independent​ ​criteria​ ​for​ ​determining​ ​exclusion​ ​from​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​of​​reservation.​​The​
​applicability​​of​​a​​particular​​criterion​​must​​be​​determined​​with​​reference​​to​​the​​category​
​under​ ​which​ ​the​ ​individual​ ​concerned​ ​falls.​ ​The​ ​various​ ​categories​ ​cannot​ ​be​
​indiscriminately​​combined,​​nor​​can​​a​​criterion​​applicable​​to​​one​​category​​be​​extended​
​to​ ​another​ ​in​ ​a​ ​manner​ ​that​ ​alters​ ​the​ ​scheme​​of​​exclusion​​laid​​down​​in​​the​​Office​
​Memorandum.​
​16.​ ​A​ ​perusal​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Schedule​ ​appended​ ​to​ ​the​ ​1993​ ​Office​ ​Memorandum​
​would​ ​reveal​ ​that​ ​Category​ ​II,​ ​dealing​ ​with​ ​service​ ​status,​ ​classifies​ ​Government​
​servants​​into​​distinct​​subcategories,​​namely,​​Category​​II​​A,​​relating​​to​​directly​​recruited​

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​Class​​I/Group​​A​​officers,​​and​​Category​​II​​B,​​relating​​to​​directly​​recruited​​Class​​II/Group​
​B​ ​officers.​ ​The​ ​distinction​ ​between​ ​these​ ​categories​ ​is​ ​material​ ​and​ ​has​ ​a​ ​direct​
​bearing on the determination of creamy layer status.​
​17.​ ​Under​​Category​​II​​A,​​the​​children​​of​​parents,​​either​​of​​whom​​is​​a​​Class​
​I/Group​ ​A​ ​officer,​ ​fall​ ​within​ ​the​ ​specified​ ​exclusionary​ ​category,​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​the​
​exceptions​ ​expressly​ ​provided​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Schedule.​ ​Category​ ​II​ ​B,​ ​on​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand,​
​prescribes​ ​separate​ ​conditions​ ​for​ ​determining​ ​the​ ​creamy​ ​layer​ ​status​ ​of​ ​children​
​whose​​parents​​hold​​Class​​II/Group​​B​​posts.​​In​​particular,​​clause​​(b)​​of​​Category​​II​​B​
​deals​​with​​the​​situation​​in​​which​​only​​the​​husband​​is​​a​​Class​​II​​officer​​and​​enters​​Class​
​I/Group A service at the age of 40 years or earlier.​
​18.​ ​The​ ​express​ ​provision​​of​​different​​criteria​​for​​these​​categories​​indicates​
​that​ ​the​ ​nature​ ​of​​the​​post​​held​​by​​the​​parent​​and​​the​​manner​​in​​which​​the​​parent​
​entered​​the​​relevant​​service​​category​​are​​material​​considerations​​under​​the​​scheme.​​In​
​other​​words,​​the​​provisions​​relating​​to​​Class​​II/Group​​B​​officers​​cannot,​​therefore,​​be​
​applied​​indiscriminately​​to​​persons​​whose​​parents​​fall​​within​​Class​​I/Group​​A​​service.​
​Any​ ​interpretation​ ​that​ ​disregards​ ​this​ ​distinction​ ​would​ ​defeat​ ​the​ ​purpose​ ​of​
​prescribing​​separate​​categories​​and​​would​​render​​the​​specific​​conditions​​contained​​in​
​the Schedule ineffective.​
​19.​ ​A​​plain​​reading​​of​​the​​1993​​Office​​Memorandum​​makes​​it​​clear​​that​​the​
​children​ ​of​ ​persons​​holding​​Class​​I/Group​​A​​posts​​in​​the​​civil​​services​​of​​the​​Central​

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​and​ ​State​ ​Governments​ ​are​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​exclusion​ ​in​ ​accordance​ ​with​ ​the​ ​criteria​
​prescribed​​under​​Category​​II​​A​​of​​the​​Schedule.​​Clause​​(b)​​expressly​​refers​​to​​parents,​
​either​​of​​whom​​is​​a​​Class​​I​​officer.​​The​​provision​​is​​framed​​in​​terms​​of​​the​​status​​of​​the​
​parent​ ​and​ ​does​ ​not,​ ​in​ ​itself,​ ​make​ ​the​ ​application​ ​of​ ​the​ ​exclusionary​ ​criterion​
​dependent​ ​upon​ ​the​ ​parent's​ ​having​ ​entered​ ​service​ ​through​ ​promotion​ ​or​ ​direct​
​recruitment​​from​​a​​particular​​lower​​category.​​It​​is,​​therefore,​​necessary​​to​​distinguish​
​between​​the​​general​​exclusionary​​criterion​​applicable​​to​​Class​​I/Group​​A​​officers​​and​
​the​​specific​​conditions​​prescribed​​for​​other​​service​​categories.​​Where​​the​​parent​​falls​
​within​​a​​category​​expressly​​covered​​by​​the​​Schedule,​​the​​determination​​must​​ordinarily​
​be​ ​made​ ​by​ ​applying​ ​the​ ​criterion​ ​prescribed​ ​for​ ​that​ ​category,​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​any​
​applicable​ ​exception.​ ​The​ ​circumstances​ ​that​ ​may​ ​be​ ​relevant​ ​under​ ​a​ ​different​
​category​ ​cannot,​​merely​​on​​grounds​​of​​perceived​​similarity​​or​​hardship,​​be​​imported​
​into​ ​the​ ​category​ ​governing​ ​the​ ​case​ ​at​ ​hand.​ ​Such​ ​an​ ​approach​ ​would​ ​amount​​to​
​introducing a qualification that is not contained in the applicable provision.​
​20.​ ​In​ ​2004,​ ​Ext.​ ​P10​ ​letter​ ​of​ ​clarification​ ​was​ ​issued​ ​to​ ​address​ ​certain​
​practical​ ​questions​ ​that​ ​had​ ​arisen​ ​in​ ​the​ ​implementation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​1993​ ​Office​
​Memorandum.​ ​The​ ​learned​ ​Single​ ​Judge​ ​placed​ ​considerable​ ​reliance​ ​on​ ​this​
​clarification​ ​in​ ​granting​ ​relief​ ​to​ ​the​ ​1st​ ​respondent.​ ​It​ ​is,​ ​therefore,​ ​necessary​ ​to​
​examine​ ​the​ ​precise​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​the​ ​clarification​ ​and​ ​the​ ​circumstances​ ​to​ ​which​ ​it​
​applies.​

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​4.​​Following​​questions​​have​​been​​raised​​from​​time​​to​​time​​about​
​the application of the above provisions to determine creamy layer:-​
​(v)​​Will​​the​​sons​​and​​daughters​​of​​parents​​of​​whose​​husband​
​is​ ​directly​ ​recruited​ ​Class​ ​III​ ​/​ ​Group​ ​'C'​ ​or​ ​Class​ ​IV​ ​/​ ​Group​ ​'D'​
​employee​​and​​he​​gets​​into​​Class​​I​​/Group​​'A'​​at​​the​​age​​of​​40​​or​​earlier​
​be treated to be falling in creamy layer?​
​The answer to the same is clarified as under:​
​In​​regard​​to​​Clause​​(v)​​of​​Para.4,​​it​​is​​clarified​​that​​the​​sons​
​and​ ​daughters​ ​of​ ​parents​ ​of​ ​whom​ ​only​ ​the​ ​husband​ ​is​ ​a​ ​directly​
​recruited​​Class​​II​​/​​Group​​'B'​​officer​​who​​gets​​into​​Class​​I​​/​​Group​​'A'​​at​
​the​​age​​of​​40​​or​​earlier​​are​​treated​​to​​be​​in​​creamy​​layer.​​If​​the​​father​
​is​ ​directly​ ​recruited​ ​Class​ ​III​ ​/​ ​Group​ ​'C'​ ​or​ ​Class​ ​IV​ ​/​ ​Group​ ​'D'​
​employee​ ​and​ ​he​ ​gets​ ​into​ ​Class​ ​I​ ​/​ ​Group​ ​'A'​​at​​the​​age​​of​​40​​or​
​earlier,​ ​his​ ​sons​ ​and​ ​daughters​ ​shall​ ​not​ ​be​ ​treated​ ​to​​be​​falling​​in​
​creamy layer.​
​21.​ ​Question​​No.​​4(v)​​of​​Ext.​​P10​​specifically​​raises​​the​​issue​​whether​​the​​sons​
​and​ ​daughters​ ​of​ ​parents​ ​where​ ​the​ ​husband​ ​was​ ​directly​ ​recruited​ ​as​ ​a​ ​Class​
​III/Group​​C​​or​​Class​​IV/Group​​D​​employee​​and​​subsequently​​entered​​Class​​I/Group​​A​
​service​​at​​the​​age​​of​​40​​years​​or​​earlier,​​would​​be​​treated​​as​​belonging​​to​​the​​creamy​
​layer.​ ​The​ ​answer​ ​distinguishes​ ​between​ ​two​ ​situations.​ ​Where​ ​the​ ​husband​ ​was​
​directly​​recruited​​as​​a​​Class​​II/Group​​B​​officer​​and​​subsequently​​entered​​Class​​I/Group​
​A​​service​​at​​the​​age​​of​​40​​years​​or​​earlier,​​the​​children​​are​​treated​​as​​belonging​​to​​the​
​creamy​​layer.​​Conversely,​​where​​the​​father​​was​​directly​​recruited​​as​​a​​Class​​III/Group​​C​
​or​​Class​​IV/Group​​D​​employee​​and​​subsequently​​entered​​Class​​I/Group​​A​​service​​at​​the​
​age​​of​​40​​years​​or​​earlier,​​the​​children​​shall​​not​​be​​treated​​as​​belonging​​to​​the​​creamy​
​layer.​

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​22.​ ​The​​above​​clarification​​thus​​addresses​​a​​specific​​factual​​situation​​in​​which​​a​
​person​​initially​​enters​​Government​​service​​in​​a​​lower​​category​​and​​subsequently​​enters​
​Class​ ​I/Group​ ​A​ ​service.​ ​It​ ​recognises​ ​a​​distinction​​between​​such​​a​​person​​and​​one​
​who​ ​was​ ​directly​ ​recruited​ ​to​ ​Class​ ​II/Group​ ​B​ ​service​​and​​thereafter​​entered​​Class​
​I/Group​​A​​service​​at​​the​​age​​of​​40​​years​​or​​earlier.​​The​​clarification​​cannot​​be​​read​​as​
​laying​​down​​a​​general​​principle​​that​​the​​age​​at​​which​​a​​parent​​enters​​Class​​I/Group​​A​
​service is, by itself, decisive in every case involving a parent who holds such a post.​
​23.​ ​The​​distinction​​drawn​​in​​Ext.​​P10​​is​​significant.​​The​​clarification​​does​​not​
​dispense​ ​with​ ​the​ ​service​ ​category-based​ ​criteria​ ​prescribed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​1993​ ​Office​
​Memorandum,​ ​nor​ ​does​ ​it​ ​provide​ ​that​ ​every​ ​person​ ​who​ ​enters​ ​Class​ ​I/Group​ ​A​
​service​ ​after​ ​the​ ​age​ ​of​ ​40​ ​years​ ​must​ ​necessarily​ ​be​ ​treated​ ​as​ ​belonging​ ​to​ ​the​
​Non-Creamy​ ​Layer.​ ​Its​ ​scope​ ​is​ ​confined​ ​to​ ​the​ ​particular​ ​circumstances​ ​addressed​
​therein,​​namely,​​the​​subsequent​​entry​​into​​Class​​I/Group​​A​​service​​of​​a​​person​​initially​
​recruited​ ​to​ ​Class​ ​III/Group​ ​C​ ​or​ ​Class​ ​IV/Group​ ​D​ ​service.​ ​The​ ​clarification​ ​must,​
​therefore,​ ​be​ ​read​​in​​the​​context​​of​​the​​question​​to​​which​​it​​responds.​​It​​cannot​​be​
​applied​ ​merely​ ​because​​the​​parent​​concerned​​entered​​Class​​I/Group​​A​​service​​at​​an​
​age​ ​exceeding​ ​40​ ​years.​ ​The​ ​clarification​ ​does​ ​not​ ​expressly​ ​address​ ​the​ ​case​​of​​a​
​practising​ ​advocate​ ​who​ ​is​ ​directly​ ​recruited​ ​to​ ​a​ ​Class​ ​I/Group​ ​A​ ​post​ ​in​ ​judicial​
​service​​at​​the​​age​​of​​41​​years.​​Such​​a​​person​​does​​not​​fall​​within​​the​​service​​categories​
​expressly​​referred​​to​​in​​Question​​No.​​4(v),​​and​​the​​circumstances​​of​​such​​appointment​

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​cannot​ ​be​ ​equated​ ​with​ ​the​ ​subsequent​ ​entry​ ​into​ ​Class​ ​I/Group​ ​A​ ​service​ ​of​ ​a​
​Government servant initially recruited to Class III/Group C or Class IV/Group D service.​
​24.​ ​In​​the​​present​​case,​​the​​mother​​of​​the​​1st​​respondent​​was​​practising​​as​
​an​ ​advocate​ ​before​ ​her​​appointment​​as​​an​​Additional​​District​​and​​Sessions​​Judge​​in​
​2021.​​She​​was​​not​​a​​Government​​employee​​initially​​recruited​​to​​Class​​III/Group​​C​​or​
​Class​​IV/Group​​D​​service​​who​​subsequently​​entered​​Class​​I/Group​​A​​service.​​Nor​​is​​it​
​the​​case​​of​​the​​1st​​respondent​​that​​her​​mother​​falls​​within​​the​​category​​of​​a​​directly​
​recruited​​Class​​II/Group​​B​​officer​​contemplated​​by​​the​​clarification.​​The​​factual​​basis​
​on which Ext. P10 operates is, therefore, absent in the case on hand.​
​25.​ ​In​​the​​said​​circumstances,​​the​​1st​​respondent​​cannot​​claim​​the​​benefit​​of​
​Ext.​​P10​​merely​​for​​the​​reason​​that​​her​​mother​​entered​​Class​​I/Group​​A​​service​​at​​the​
​age​​of​​41​​years.​​The​​relevant​​consideration​​is​​not​​the​​age​​of​​entry​​into​​Class​​I/Group​​A​
​service​ ​in​ ​isolation,​​but​​whether​​the​​circumstances​​of​​the​​parent's​​service​​fall​​within​
​the category addressed by the clarification.​
​26.​ ​The​​learned​​Single​​Judge,​​while​​recognising​​that​​the​​mother​​of​​the​​1st​
​respondent​ ​was​ ​a​ ​Class​ ​I/Group​ ​A​ ​officer,​ ​proceeded​ ​to​ ​read​ ​Exts.​ ​P9​ ​and​ ​P10​
​harmoniously​​so​​as​​to​​extend​​the​​benefit​​of​​the​​clarification​​to​​the​​1st​​respondent.​​In​
​our​ ​considered​ ​view,​ ​such​ ​an​ ​exercise​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​carried​ ​out​ ​when​ ​the​ ​factual​
​circumstances​ ​of​ ​the​ ​case​ ​do​ ​not​ ​fall​ ​within​ ​the​ ​class​ ​of​ ​persons​ ​to​ ​whom​ ​the​
​clarification​ ​applies.​ ​The​ ​principle​ ​of​ ​harmonious​ ​construction​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​invoked​ ​to​

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​extend​​the​​scope​​of​​a​​clarification​​beyond​​its​​express​​terms​​or​​to​​create​​an​​exception​
​to​​the​​governing​​Office​​Memorandum​​where​​no​​such​​exception​​has​​been​​prescribed.​
​The​​learned​​Single​​Judge,​​therefore,​​erred​​in​​concluding​​that​​a​​harmonious​​reading​​of​
​Exts.​ ​P9​ ​and​ ​P10​ ​required​ ​the​ ​benefit​ ​of​​the​​clarification​​to​​be​​extended​​to​​the​​1st​
​respondent.​
​27.​ ​In​ ​Rohith​ ​Nathan​ ​(Supra),​ ​the​ ​Hon'ble​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​considered​
​whether​ ​the​ ​clarificatory​ ​letter​ ​dated​ ​14.10.2004​ ​could​ ​have​ ​an​ ​overriding​ ​or​
​superseding​​effect​​over​​the​​Office​​Memorandum​​dated​​08.09.1993.​​The​​Hon'ble​​Court​
​examined​ ​the​ ​legal​ ​relationship​ ​between​ ​the​ ​original​ ​Office​ ​Memorandum,​ ​which​
​prescribes​​the​​criteria​​for​​exclusion​​from​​the​​benefits​​of​​reservation​​for​​OBCs,​​and​​the​
​subsequent​​clarification​​issued​​to​​explain​​the​​application​​of​​those​​criteria.​​In​​paragraph​
​No.​ ​66​ ​of​ ​the​ ​judgment,​ ​the​​Hon'ble​​Supreme​​Court​​reiterated​​that​​the​​1993​​Office​
​Memorandum​ ​expressly​ ​identifies​ ​categories​ ​of​ ​persons,​ ​including​ ​the​ ​sons​ ​and​
​daughters​ ​of​ ​those​ ​holding​ ​Class​ ​I/Group​ ​A​ ​or​ ​Class​ ​II/Group​ ​B​ ​posts​ ​in​ ​the​ ​civil​
​services​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Central​ ​and​ ​State​ ​Governments,​ ​who​ ​are​ ​subject​ ​to​ ​exclusion​ ​in​
​accordance​ ​with​ ​the​ ​prescribed​ ​criteria.​ ​The​ ​Court​ ​emphasised​ ​that​ ​the​​subsequent​
​clarificatory​ ​letter​ ​must​ ​be​ ​understood​ ​within​ ​the​ ​framework​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Office​
​Memorandum​ ​and​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​construed​ ​as​ ​displacing​ ​or​ ​overriding​ ​its​ ​substantive​
​provisions.​ ​The​ ​Hon'ble​ ​Court​ ​further​ ​reiterated​ ​the​ ​well-established​ ​principle​​that​​a​
​mere​ ​Government​ ​letter​ ​cannot​ ​override,​ ​overrule​ ​or​ ​supersede​ ​an​ ​executive​
​instruction​​or​​Office​​Memorandum​​issued​​in​​exercise​​of​​executive​​power​​under​​Article​

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​162​​(sic)​​of​​the​​Constitution.​​A​​clarification​​may​​explain​​the​​meaning​​and​​application​​of​
​an​​existing​​provision,​​resolve​​an​​ambiguity​​or​​address​​practical​​difficulties​​encountered​
​in​​implementation.​​It​​cannot,​​however,​​be​​interpreted​​as​​altering​​the​​substantive​​policy​
​embodied​ ​in​ ​the​ ​original​ ​instrument​ ​or​ ​as​ ​creating​ ​an​ ​independent​ ​basis​ ​for​
​determining eligibility that is inconsistent with the governing framework.​
​28.​ ​The​​distinction​​between​​clarification​​and​​amendment​​is​​material.​​Where​​a​
​subsequent​​instruction​​merely​​explains​​the​​manner​​in​​which​​an​​existing​​criterion​​is​​to​
​be​ ​applied,​ ​it​ ​remains​ ​within​ ​the​ ​permissible​ ​scope​ ​of​​clarification.​​If,​​however,​​it​​is​
​construed​ ​as​ ​introducing​ ​a​ ​new​ ​substantive​ ​condition,​ ​enlarging​ ​an​ ​exception​ ​or​
​altering​ ​the​ ​class​ ​of​ ​persons​ ​covered​​by​​the​​original​​provision,​​it​​would​​cease​​to​​be​
​merely​ ​explanatory​ ​in​ ​nature.​ ​The​ ​2004​ ​letter​ ​must,​ ​therefore,​ ​be​ ​construed​ ​in​ ​a​
​manner​​that​​gives​​effect​​to​​its​​clarificatory​​purpose​​without​​permitting​​it​​to​​dilute​​or​
​displace the substantive criteria prescribed in the 1993 Office Memorandum.​
​29.​ ​Consequently,​ ​Ext.P10​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​relied​ ​upon​ ​in​ ​isolation​ ​to​ ​create​ ​an​
​exception​​in​​favour​​of​​a​​person​​who​​does​​not​​fall​​within​​the​​category​​addressed​​by​​the​
​clarification.​​Any​​interpretation​​that​​treats​​the​​clarification​​as​​an​​independent​​source​​of​
​entitlement,​ ​divorced​ ​from​ ​the​ ​scheme​ ​of​ ​the​ ​1993​ ​Office​ ​Memorandum,​ ​would​ ​be​
​contrary​​to​​the​​principle​​laid​​down​​by​​the​​Hon'ble​​Supreme​​Court​​in​ ​Rohith​​Nathan​
​(supra).​
​30.​ ​The​​question​​that​​the​​Tahsildar,​​the​​7th​​respondent​​in​​the​​writ​​petition,​

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​was​ ​required​ ​to​ ​consider​ ​upon​ ​receipt​ ​of​ ​the​ ​application​ ​was​ ​whether​ ​the​ ​1st​
​respondent​​fell​​within​​any​​of​​the​​exclusionary​​categories​​specified​​in​​the​​Schedule​​to​
​the​​1993​​Office​​Memorandum.​​The​​determination​​had​​to​​be​​made​​by​​examining​​the​
​service​ ​status​ ​of​ ​the​ ​parents​ ​and​ ​applying​ ​the​ ​criterion​ ​relevant​ ​to​ ​the​ ​category​ ​in​
​which​​the​​parent​​concerned​​fell.​​The​​authority​​was​​not​​required​​to​​determine​​eligibility​
​by​ ​applying​ ​a​ ​criterion​ ​drawn​ ​from​ ​a​ ​different​​service​​category​​or​​by​​extending​​the​
​scope of a clarification beyond the circumstances contemplated therein.​
​31.​ ​The​ ​authority​ ​was​ ​therefore​ ​justified​ ​in​ ​examining​ ​the​ ​application​​with​
​reference​ ​to​ ​the​ ​exclusionary​ ​criterion​ ​applicable​ ​to​ ​Class​ ​I/Group​ ​A​ ​officers.​ ​The​
​mother's​​professional​​income​​during​​the​​financial​​year​​2019–2020​​does​​not,​​by​​itself,​
​displace​ ​the​ ​specific​ ​service​ ​status​ ​criterion​ ​applicable​ ​to​ ​her.​ ​The​ ​question​ ​is​ ​not​
​whether​​the​​income​​earned​​by​​the​​mother​​before​​entering​​judicial​​service​​was​​low,​​but​
​whether​​the​​1st​​respondent​​falls​​within​​an​​exclusionary​​category​​under​​the​​governing​
​Office​ ​Memorandum.​ ​Where​ ​the​ ​applicable​ ​service​ ​category​ ​prescribes​ ​a​ ​distinct​
​criterion, that criterion must be applied in accordance with its terms.​
​32.​ ​We​ ​have​ ​no​ ​doubt​​in​​our​​mind​​that​​the​​reliance​​placed​​by​​the​​learned​
​Single​​Judge​​on​​the​​judgments​​rendered​​by​​the​​Delhi​​High​​Court​​was​​misplaced.​​Those​
​decisions​ ​concerned​ ​factual​ ​circumstances​ ​in​ ​which​ ​the​ ​persons​ ​concerned​ ​were​
​entitled​​to​​rely​​upon​​the​​clarification​​contained​​in​​the​​2004​​letter.​​The​​mother​​of​​the​
​1st​ ​respondent,​ ​however,​​does​​not​​fall​​within​​the​​category​​of​​persons​​to​​whom​​that​

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​clarification​ ​applies.​ ​The​ ​decisions​ ​relied​ ​upon​ ​by​ ​the​ ​learned​ ​Single​ ​Judge​ ​are,​
​therefore,​​distinguishable​​on​​facts​​and​​cannot​​be​​treated​​as​​authority​​for​​extending​​the​
​clarification to a case that falls outside its express scope.​
​33.​ ​The​ ​contention​ ​that​ ​the​ ​1st​ ​respondent​ ​has​ ​been​ ​discriminated​ ​against​
​merely​​because​​her​​mother​​was​​directly​​recruited​​as​​an​​Additional​​District​​and​​Sessions​
​Judge,​​whereas​​persons​​who​​entered​​judicial​​service​​as​​Munsiff​​Magistrates​​and​​were​
​subsequently​ ​promoted​ ​to​ ​the​ ​post​ ​of​ ​District​ ​Judge​ ​may,​ ​in​ ​certain​ ​circumstances,​
​obtain​ ​Non​ ​Creamy​ ​Layer​ ​Certificates,​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​accepted​ ​without​ ​examining​ ​the​
​governing​ ​criteria​ ​applicable​ ​to​ ​each​ ​category.​ ​The​ ​principle​ ​of​ ​equality​ ​does​ ​not​
​require​ ​persons​ ​falling​ ​within​ ​materially​ ​different​ ​service​ ​categories​ ​to​ ​be​ ​treated​
​identically,​ ​irrespective​ ​of​ ​the​ ​distinctions​ ​expressly​ ​recognised​ ​under​ ​the​ ​applicable​
​policy.​​In​​any​​event,​​a​​perusal​​of​​the​​writ​​petition​​and​​the​​reliefs​​sought​​therein​​would​
​reveal​ ​that​ ​the​ ​1st​ ​respondent's​ ​case​ ​was​ ​founded​ ​on​ ​the​ ​interpretation​ ​and​
​implementation​ ​of​ ​Exts.​ ​P9​ ​and​ ​P10.​ ​She​ ​had​ ​not​ ​raised​ ​any​ ​contention​ ​that​ ​the​
​criteria​ ​prescribed​ ​therein​ ​were​ ​discriminatory​ ​or​ ​unconstitutional.​​No​​challenge​​was​
​mounted​​against​​the​​validity​​of​​Ext.​​P9​​or​​any​​of​​the​​criteria​​prescribed​​therein.​​In​​the​
​absence​ ​of​ ​such​​a​​challenge,​​the​​learned​​Single​​Judge​​could​​not​​have​​proceeded​​to​
​extend​ ​the​ ​benefit​​of​​Ext.​​P10​​to​​the​​1st​​respondent​​on​​the​​premise​​that​​any​​other​
​interpretation​​of​​Exts.​​P9​​and​​P10​​would​​result​​in​​discrimination.​​The​​issue​​that​​arose​
​for​​consideration​​was​​confined​​to​​the​​applicability​​of​​the​​existing​​criteria​​and​​the​​scope​
​of​ ​the​ ​clarification​ ​contained​ ​in​ ​Ext.​ ​P10,​ ​and​ ​not​ ​the​ ​constitutional​ ​validity​ ​of​ ​the​

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​classification embodied in Ext. P9.​
​34.​ ​The​ ​1993​ ​Office​ ​Memorandum​ ​must​ ​be​ ​construed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​light​ ​of​ ​the​
​constitutional​ ​objective​ ​underlying​ ​Article​ ​16(4),​ ​which​ ​is​ ​to​ ​secure​ ​adequate​
​representation​​for​​genuinely​​backward​​classes​​while​​excluding​​those​​who​​fall​​within​​the​
​prescribed​ ​creamy​ ​layer​ ​criteria.​ ​The​ ​exclusion​ ​is​ ​an​​integral​​part​​of​​the​​reservation​
​framework​ ​and​ ​is​ ​intended​ ​to​ ​ensure​ ​that​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​reach​ ​those​ ​for​ ​whom​ ​the​
​constitutional​​guarantee​​is​​designed.​​The​​courts​​must,​​therefore,​​apply​​the​​prescribed​
​criteria​​faithfully​​and​​cannot​​enlarge​​an​​exception​​beyond​​its​​intended​​scope​​merely​​on​
​the​​ground​​that​​a​​different​​interpretation​​may​​appear​​more​​beneficial​​to​​an​​individual​
​claimant.​
​3​
​35.​ ​In​ ​Ashoka​​Kumar​​Thakur​​v.​​State​​of​​Bihar​​and​​Others​ ​,​​the​​Hon'ble​
​Supreme​​Court​​emphasised​​the​​need​​to​​exclude​​the​​creamy​​layer​​to​​ensure​​that​​the​
​benefits​​of​​reservation​​reach​​the​​most​​deserving​​sections​​of​​the​​backward​​classes.​​The​
​Court observed in paragraph 3 of the judgment as follows:​
​"3.​​The​​protective​​discrimination​​in​​the​​shape​​of​​job​​reservations​
​under​​Article​​16(4)​​has​​to​​be​​programmed​​in​​such​​a​​manner​​that​​the​
​most​​deserving​​section​​of​​the​​backward​​class​​is​​benefited.​​Means​​test​
​by​ ​which​ ​“creamy​ ​layer”​ ​is​ ​excluded,​ ​ensures​ ​such​ ​a​ ​result.​ ​The​
​process​​of​​identifying​​backward​​class​​cannot​​be​​perfected​​to​​the​​extent​
​that​ ​every​ ​member​​of​​the​​said​​class​​is​​equally​​backward.​​There​​are​
​bound​​to​​be​​disparities​​in​​the​​class​​itself.​​Some​​of​​the​​members​​of​​the​
​class​​may​​have​​individually​​crossed​​the​​barriers​​of​​backwardness​​but​
​while​​identifying​​the​​class​​they​​may​​have​​come​​within​​the​​collectivity.​
​3​
​[(1995) 5 SCC 403]​

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​It​​is​​often​​seen​​that​​comparatively​​rich​​persons​​in​​the​​backward​​class​
​are​ ​able​ ​to​​move​​in​​the​​society​​without​​being​​discriminated​​socially.​
​The​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​ ​backward​ ​class​ ​are​​differentiated​​into​​superior​
​and​ ​inferior.​​The​​discrimination​​which​​was​​practised​​on​​them​​by​​the​
​higher​ ​class​ ​is​ ​in​ ​turn​ ​practised​ ​by​ ​the​ ​affluent​ ​members​ ​of​ ​the​
​backward​​class​​on​​the​​poorer​​members​​of​​the​​same​​class.​​The​​benefits​
​of​​social​​privileges​​like​​job​​reservations​​are​​mostly​​chewed​​up​​by​​the​
​richer​​or​​more​​affluent​​sections​​of​​the​​backward​​class​​and​​the​​poorer​
​and​​the​​really​​backward​​sections​​among​​them​​keep​​on​​getting​​poorer​
​and​​more​​backward.​​It​​is​​only​​at​​the​​lowest​​level​​of​​the​​backward​​class​
​where​ ​the​ ​standards​ ​of​​deprivation​​and​​the​​extent​​of​​backwardness​
​may​ ​be​ ​uniform.​ ​The​ ​jobs​ ​are​ ​so​ ​very​ ​few​ ​in​ ​comparison​ ​to​ ​the​
​population​ ​of​ ​the​ ​backward​ ​classes​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​difficult​ ​to​ ​give​ ​them​
​adequate​ ​representation​ ​in​ ​the​ ​State​ ​services.​ ​It​ ​is,​ ​therefore,​
​necessary​ ​that​ ​the​ ​benefit​​of​​the​​reservation​​must​​reach​​the​​poorer​
​and​​the​​weakest​​section​​of​​the​​backward​​class.​​Economic​​ceiling​​to​​cut​
​off​​the​​backward​​class​​for​​the​​purpose​​of​​job​​reservations​​is​​necessary​
​to​ ​benefit​ ​the​ ​needy​ ​sections​ ​of​ ​the​ ​class.​ ​The​ ​means​ ​test​ ​is,​
​therefore,​​imperative​​to​​skim​​off​​the​​affluent​​section​​of​​the​​backward​
​class."​
​36.​ ​The​ ​observations​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Hon'ble​ ​Supreme​ ​Court​ ​underline​ ​the​
​constitutional​​rationale​​for​​identifying​​and​​excluding​​the​​creamy​​layer.​​The​​reservation​
​policy​ ​is​ ​not​ ​intended​ ​to​ ​extend​ ​an​ ​undifferentiated​ ​benefit​ ​to​ ​every​ ​member​ ​of​ ​a​
​backward​​class,​​irrespective​​of​​the​​person's​​circumstances.​​Rather,​​it​​seeks​​to​​ensure​
​that​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​reach​ ​those​ ​who​ ​continue​ ​to​ ​suffer​ ​from​ ​social​ ​and​ ​educational​
​backwardness​ ​and​ ​who​ ​require​ ​the​ ​protective​ ​measures​ ​contemplated​ ​by​ ​the​
​Constitution.​​At​​the​​same​​time,​​the​​objective​​of​​excluding​​the​​creamy​​layer​​must​​be​
​implemented​ ​through​ ​the​ ​criteria​ ​prescribed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​competent​ ​authority.​ ​The​

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​constitutional​​purpose​​cannot​​be​​used​​to​​disregard​​the​​terms​​of​​the​​governing​​Office​
​Memorandum​ ​or​ ​to​ ​substitute​ ​a​ ​different​ ​test​ ​for​ ​the​ ​one​ ​prescribed​ ​therein.​ ​The​
​judicial​​function​​is​​to​​interpret​​and​​apply​​the​​policy​​in​​accordance​​with​​its​​terms​​and​
​constitutional​​purpose,​​not​​to​​introduce​​exceptions​​or​​conditions​​that​​the​​policy​​itself​
​does not recognise.​
​37.​ ​Though​​we​​are​​conscious​​of​​the​​fact​​that​​the​​issue​​concerns​​the​​future​​of​
​a​​young​​child,​​sympathy,​​however​​genuine,​​cannot​​justify​​a​​departure​​from​​the​​criteria​
​prescribed​ ​by​ ​law.​ ​Extending​ ​the​ ​benefit​ ​of​ ​reservation​ ​to​ ​a​ ​person​ ​who​ ​does​ ​not​
​satisfy​​the​​prescribed​​conditions​​would​​be​​at​​the​​cost​​of​​another​​more​​deserving​​child​
​who​ ​is​ ​entitled​ ​to​ ​claim​ ​that​ ​benefit​ ​in​ ​accordance​ ​with​ ​the​ ​governing​ ​norms.​ ​The​
​equitable​ ​considerations​ ​arising​ ​from​ ​the​​circumstances​​of​​an​​individual​​case​​cannot​
​prevail over the lawful and consistent application of the reservation policy.​
​38.​ ​In​​the​​light​​of​​the​​foregoing​​discussion,​​we​​are​​of​​the​​considered​​opinion​
​that​ ​the​ ​learned​ ​Single​ ​Judge​ ​erred​ ​in​ ​holding​ ​that​ ​Exts.​ ​P9​ ​and​ ​P10​ ​had​ ​to​ ​be​
​harmoniously​​construed​​in​​a​​manner​​that​​extended​​the​​benefit​​of​​the​​2004​​clarification​
​to​ ​the​ ​1st​ ​respondent.​ ​The​ ​1st​ ​respondent​ ​does​ ​not​ ​fall​ ​within​ ​the​ ​categories​
​specifically​​contemplated​​by​​Ext.​​P10,​​and​​there​​is​​no​​basis​​for​​extending​​the​​benefit​​of​
​that​​clarification​​to​​her​​by​​treating​​her​​mother's​​direct​​appointment​​to​​a​​Class​​I/Group​
​A​ ​post​ ​as​ ​equivalent​ ​to​ ​the​ ​subsequent​ ​promotion​​of​​a​​Government​​servant​​initially​
​recruited​​to​​Class​​III/Group​​C​​or​​Class​​IV/Group​​D​​service.​​The​​learned​​Single​​Judge​

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​also​​erred​​in​​treating​​the​​difference​​between​​direct​​recruitment​​to​​judicial​​service​​and​
​promotion​​from​​a​​lower​​judicial​​post​​as​​sufficient,​​by​​itself,​​to​​establish​​discrimination.​
​The​​entitlement​​to​​a​​Non​​Creamy​​Layer​​Certificate​​must​​be​​determined​​by​​applying​​the​
​criteria prescribed in the governing Office Memorandum.​
​39.​ ​In​ ​that​ ​view​ ​of​ ​the​​matter,​​the​​judgment​​passed​​by​​the​​learned​​Single​
​Judge​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​sustained​ ​and​ ​is​ ​accordingly​ ​set​ ​aside.​ ​The​ ​rejection​ ​of​ ​the​ ​1st​
​respondent's​ ​application​ ​for​ ​an​ ​OBC​ ​Non​ ​Creamy​ ​Layer​ ​Certificate​ ​by​ ​the​ ​7th​
​respondent,​ ​the​ ​Tahsildar,​​is​​upheld.​​The​​writ​​petitioner​​is​​not​​entitled​​to​​any​​of​​the​
​reliefs sought in the writ petition.​
​This Writ Appeal is allowed.​
​Sd/-​
​RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN​​V,​
​JUDGE​
​Sd/-​
​K.V. JAYAKUMAR,​
​APM​ ​JUDGE​