State Of U.P. vs Raghvendra Nath Srivastava

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 601

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. __________________ OF 2026
(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 38495-38496 of 2025)


STATE OF U.P. & ORS. … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

RAGHVENDRA NATH
SRIVASTAVA & ORS. ... RESPONDENT(S)



J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.
Leave Granted.
2. The power of the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India to order enhancement of rent in a petition arising
out of an order of the Rent Control Authority, is in dispute. The State of
U.P. contends that the High Court could not haof assumed the function
of the prescribed Authority to order the enhancement, whereas the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SOURAV PAL
Date: 2026.05.29
18:15:42 IST
Reason:
respondent-landlords assert that the protections as provided for under
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Section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Building (Regulation of Letting,
1
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 is not available to the appellant – tenants.
3. The forebears of the respondent-landlords let out the building in
question to the Trade Tax Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh
back in the year 1966. After some attempts to have the said property
vacated in the 1990s, an application came to be filed for enhancement
2
of rent . The total area of the plot was 5866 sq.ft. and covered area is
3645.06 sq.ft. in total. A perusal of the order reveals that the primary
consideration in ordering enhancement of rent was that the location of
the property being prime and central, along with taking note of the fact
that the same Government Authority is paying a much higher rate for
another, much smaller building. The Authority also recorded that a
similarly placed building was rented out at a particular rate and then
applied the same rate to the present case. At the rate Rs.4/- per sq.ft.,
therefore, Rs.14,400/- per month was fixed as the rent.
4. On appeal by the landlord – respondent, the Additional District
Judge, Bahraich observed that:-
“…while passing the impugned judgement, the learned
subordinate court did not record any finding regarding the
date and year from which the enhancement be applicable,
nor dated give any conclusion regarding rent enhancement
at intervals of five years. in this regard, the decision of the
learned subordinate court is erroneous file passing the
impugned order, learned subordinate courts should have
considered the long delay disposal of the case and should
have issued appropriate directions regarding enhancement
of rent at intervals of five years as well as regarding the
payment of the enhancement keeping in mind the date of
filing a suit by the appellants,…”

1
The Act
2
Case No.05/2008 before the City Magistrate/Rent Control Officer, Bahraich
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The matter was remanded back to the Rent Control Authority for
rehearing and passing a fresh order within six months .
5. The respondent-landlords challenged this remand order before
3 th
the High Court which is the impugned order before us dated 5 May
2025. The High Court accepted the contention of the landlord that since
the rent payable on the adjacent premises, also taken by the appellant-
tenants, is Rs.14 per sq.ft. they would be satisfied. It was so ordered
that the determination of the Court below would stand modified
accordingly and the same would be payable from the date of filing of
the application under Section21(8) of the Act. This was done in view
of the fact that remanding the matter once again would lead to further
delay. The appellant-tenants filed a Special Appeal under Chapter VIII
Rule V of the Allahabad High Court Rules 1952 which was dismissed
by the Division Bench as non-maintainable.
6. Aggrieved, the appellant-tenants are before us. In our order issuing
th
notice dated 19 December 2025 the question that was to be considered
by us was recorded in following terms:
“ The issue which arises for consideration is as to whether,
with the omission of Clauses (ii) and (iv) contained in
subsection 1 of Section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban
Buildings(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)Act,
1972, the proviso contained in Section 8 would be
operative and continue to govern the premises let out by
the respondents to the petitioners . ”
7. Since the dispute revolves around interpretation of Section 21 of
the Act the same is reproduced as under:
“21 Proceedings for release of building under occupation of
tenant - (1) The prescribed authority may, on an application
of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant
from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof

3
Writ-A No. 7889 of 2016
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if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists;
namely: --
(a) that the building is bona fide required either in its existing
form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord
for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any
person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for
residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade
or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public
charitable trust, for the objects of the trust ;
(b) that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is
required for purposes of demolition and new construction :
Provided that where the building was in the occupation of a
tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such
purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no
application shall be entertained on the grounds mentioned in
clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the
date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice in
that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such
application, and such notice may be given even before the
expiration of the aforesaid period of three years :
Provided further that if any application under clause (a) is
made in respect of [any building let out exclusively for non-
residential purposes] , the prescribed authority while making
the order of eviction shall, after considering all relevant facts
of the case, award against the landlord to the tenant [an
amount not exceeding two years rent] as compensation and
may, subject to rules, impose such other conditions as he
thinks fit :
Provided also that no application under clause (a) shall be
entertained
(i) for the purposes of a charitable trust, the objects of which
provide for discrimination in respect of its beneficiaries on
the ground of religion, castes or place of birth ;
(ii)in the case of any residential building, for occupation for
business purposes ;
(iii) in the case of any residential building, against any tenant
who is a member of the armed forces of the Union and in
whose favour the prescribed authority under the Indian
Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 has issued a certificate that he
is serving under special conditions within the meaning of
section 3 of that Act, or where he has died by enemy action
while so serving then against his heirs :
[Provided also that the prescribed authority shall, except in
cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account the
likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application
as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal
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of the application and for that purpose shall have regard to
such factors as may be prescribed.]
Explanation-- In the case of a residential building :
(i) where the tenant or [who has been normally
residing with or is wholly dependent on him]
has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant
state or has got vacated after acquisition a
residential building in the same city,
municipality, notified area or town area, no
objection by the tenant against an application
under this sub-section shall be entertained;
[Note-- For the purposes of this clause a person shall be
deemed to have otherwise acquired a building, if he is
occupying a public building for residential purposes as a
tenant, allottee or licensee.]
(ii)[*]
…
(iv) [*]
…
(8) Nothing in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall apply to a
building let out to the State Government or to a local authority
or to a public sector corporation or to a recognized
educational institution unless the Prescribe Authority is
satisfied that the landlord is a person to whom clause (ii) or
clause (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) is applicable:
Provided that in the case of such a building the District
Magistrate may, on the application of the landlord, enhance
the monthly rent payable therefor to a sum equivalent to one-
twelfth of ten per cent of the market value of the building
under tenancy, and the rent so enhanced shall be payable from
the commencement of the month of tenancy following the
date of the application:
Provided further that a similar application for further
enhancement may be made after the expiration of a period of
five years from the date of the last order of enhancement.”

4
Let us look to the two deleted clauses, clause (ii) and (iv) . They have
been quoted in the respondent- landlord’s counter affidavit as follows:
Clause (ii)
“where the landlord was engaged in any profession, trade,
calling or employment, away from the city, municipality,
notified area or town area within which the building is
situate and by reason of cessation of engagement, he needs
the building for occupation by himself for residential

4
Both these sections were omitted by section 14(i)(c)(2) of UP Act No 28 of 1976.
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purposes, such need shall be deemed sufficient for the
purpose of clause (a).
Clause (iv)
“the fact that the building under tenancy is part of a building
the remaining part thereof is in occupation of the landlord
for residential purposes, shall be conclusive to prove that the
building is bona fide required by the landlord.”

8. Turning our attention to sub-section 8 of the Act, a perusal thereof
reveals that the requirement of bonafide need is stipulated thereby to be
inapplicable in cases where the State Government or local Government
or a public sector corporation or an educational institution is the tenant.
This Rule is however qualified by recognising that there are two
situations in which even the above named tenants can be asked to leave
the premises i.e., one when the landlord relocates to the locality of the
tenancy after conclusion of their source of employment at other
city/town and second , where the above named tenants are in part
occupation of the particular premises and the landlord retains the other
parts thereof for his own use and subsequently needs the remainder of
the property. Given that only particular situations were provided for
where the tenants as above could be asked to vacate, in order to balance
the scales which are otherwise heavily tilted towards the tenants, the
proviso to the Section stipulated that the landlord could apply for
enhancement of rent albeit even this was circumscribed-to one-twelfth
of ten percent of market value of the building. The next enhancement
can only be made after five years of the previous enhancement order. By
way of the 1976 amendment however, even these two exceptional
scenarios were removed. Now, the abovenamed tenants cannot be
removed other than specified grounds set up in the statute. Only
application for enhancement of rent can be made.
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Before answering the question framed by us in the order issuing notice,
it is important to note that sub-section 7 and 8 of Section 21 of the Act
were brought in through the very same amendment that removed clause
(ii) and (iv) of explanation of sub-section (1) The reason and logic for
the same is incomprehensible. Be that as it may, we proceed further. The
conclusion is that the proviso is the only recourse available to the
landlord and bonafide requirement as a ground stands completely
extinguished. To answer the question strictly as it was posed, we hold
that the deletion of clauses (ii) and (iv) does not impact the
operationality of the proviso . We are of this firm view for the reason that
if the contention of the appellant-State is accepted in so far as the
interpretation of the clause is concerned it would amount to virtually
making the tenant into the landlord. No bonafide requirement; no
enhancement of rent: means no way for the landlord to reclaim his own
property either physically or financially. No provision can be read so
restrictively only because on the other side of the equation, is the
Government itself which would defeat the very purpose of the landlord-
tenant relationship.
9. The next question we are required to consider is whether the High
Court under Article 227 could have ordered the enhancement of rent.
Following are the aspects regarding exercise of this power as can be
understood from a perusal of a number of judgments of this Court.
[ See: Ouseph Mathai v. M. Abdul Khadir, (2002) 1 SCC 319; State v.
Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai,
(2003) 6 SCC 675; Waryam Singh v. Amarnath AIR 1954 SC 215; L.
Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261; Laxmikant
Revchand Bhojwani v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi [(1995) 6 SCC
576]; Koyilerian Janaki v. Rent Controller (Munsiff) [(2000) 9 SCC
406; Shalini Shyam Shetty [(2010) 8 SCC 329 ]
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(i) High Courts being the apex of the judiciary in
the State, have been conferred a power of
superintendence over the courts and tribunals in
their jurisdiction;
(ii) Although this power has found pride of place
in the Constitution and is even recognised as a part
of the basic structure, its origins are found
somewhere in the Government of India Act 1915.
Under the successor legislation, Government of
India 1935, the scope of this power was limited to
be exercised in those cases where the power of
appeal or revision had not been provided for, but the
power as came to be adopted by the Constitution
framers removed that limitation and made it a
generally exercisable power.
(iii) They are tasked with the responsibility to
ensure that each Court/Tribunal functions within
the confines of the power as provided by the
governing statute;
(iv) The overarching principle for exercise f the
power is not the correctness of a particular decision
but the effect of the decision in terms of abuse of
power, dereliction of duty or perpetration of grave
injustice to parties;
(v) Three scenarios are often recognised as being
justified exercises of this supervisory power:-
(a) where the Court or Tribunal has exercised
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power that it does not possess; (b) it has failed to
exercise power that it does have; and (c) where the
manner of exercise of power has amounted to
transgression of jurisdiction.
(vi) Given the above limits, the power is to be
exercised cautiously and sparingly and not at all as
a power of appeal;
(vii) Owing to its constitutional origin, statutorily
placed limitations on powers such as revision, will
not affect this power;
(viii) A Court can exercise this power on its own
motion, both administratively and judicially
however, the same is not meant to substitute the
decision of the High Court for that arrived at by the
Court or Tribunal subject to its supervision;
(ix) Much like Article 226, this power is also
discretionary in nature and does not confer a right
upon any litigant to have it exercised by the court;
(x) With specific reference to property or rent it
may be noted that the Court under this power is, in
the case of the former limited to cases where there
is some statutory infraction or alleged collusion
with the concerned Authority. In the case of the
latter, it has been held that routine exercise of this
power would be unwarranted since the special
statute provides for the manner of exercise of
powers by a particular Authority.
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10. In light of the above principles it be observed that although the
interference of the High Court under Article 227 in rent matters is not
completely barred, it is to be exercised judiciously, sparingly
particularly since rent control legislations are considered to be special
laws. In this case, it is submitted by the appellant-tenants that there
exists no material on record on which the impugned order can stand, or
in other words that the respondent-landlords had not appended any
material to conclusively show that an adjoining premises was taken on
rent at the rate of Rs.14 per sq. ft. It was a mere statement by the
respondent- landlords’ counsel, and it is specifically recorded that the
latter would be satisfied if this is done. There is no statement opposing
this or even accepting the same recorded on behalf of the appellant-
tenants.
11. In the result, we hold that an application for enhancement of rent
made under the proviso of Section 21(8) of the Act is permissible and
maintainable. We also hold that the High Court can in exceptional
circumstances exercise its supervisory power in matters arising out of
rent control legislations however in the facts of this case, and in view of
the absence of material on record, the impugned judgment is set aside.
12. Having concluded thus and before parting with the matter we do
however record that the learned Single Judge’s hesitation in remanding
the matter to the Rent Control Officer, Bahraich, was quite possibly well
founded in as much as it would have taken a long time for the matter to
have been conclusively decided once again and as such while we do
remand the matter to the above said Authority to decide the question of
rent payable by the appellant-tenants afresh as also the particulars as
th
pointed out by the Appellate Authority in its order dated 28 March
2016, we direct that the same shall be decided within four months from
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the date of this order. The order once made, shall be applicable from the
date of the institution of the original application in the year 2008.
The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent. Let a copy of this
order be communicated through the Registrar General, High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad to the Rent Control Officer, Bahraich for
necessary follow up action.
Pending application(s) if any shall stand disposed of. Parties to
bear their own costs.


……………………………………………...J.
(SANJAY KAROL)




………………………………………………J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
New Delhi;
May 29, 2026








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