Bharat Ramani vs The State of Telangana
- Court
- High Court for the State of Telangana
*THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
+ WRIT PETITION Nos.8527 and 8552 of 2024 and 924 of 2021
Between :
Bharat Ramani and another …. Petitioners
AND
The State of Telangana represented by the
Principal Secretary, Home Department,
Secretariat, Hyderabad and others …. Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 03.09.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
1. Whether Reporters of Local
newspapers may be allowed to see
the Judgment ?
: Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of judgment
: Yes/No
may be marked to Law
Reports/Journals
3.
Whether Their Lordship/Ladyship
wish to see the fair copy of
judgment
:
Yes/No
___________________________________
VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J
-2-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
WRIT PETITION Nos.8527 and 8552 of 2024 and 924 of 2021
% 03.09.2026
Between:
# Bharat Ramani and another …. Petitioners
AND
$ The State of Telangana represented by the
Principal Secretary, Home Department,
Secretariat, Hyderabad and others …. Respondents
! Counsel for the Petitioners : Sri Sunil B. Ganu, learned
Sr. Counsel, representing
Smt. Manjari S. Ganu
^ Counsel for respondents : Sri E. Ramesh Chandra Goud,
learned Government Pleader
for Land Acquisition
< GIST :
> HEAD NOTE :
? Cases referred :
1. (2002) 3 SCC 533 (Constitution Bench)
2. AIR 1936 PC 253 (2)
3. AIR 1964 SC 358
4. AIR 1952 SC 16
5. (1978) 1 SCC 405
6. (2013) 1 SCC 353
7. (2020) 2 SCC 569
8. (1994) 1 SCC 44
9. (1982) 1 SCC 39
10. (2011) 9 SCC 1
11. (2011) 9 SCC 354
12. (2020) 9 SCC 356
13. (2024) 10 SCC 533
-3-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
WRIT PETITION Nos.8527 and 8552 of 2024 and 924 of 2021
Date: 03.09.2026
WRIT PETITION No.8527 of 2024
(CNR No.HBHC010165302024)
Between:
Bharat Ramani and another …. Petitioners
AND
The State of Telangana represented by the
Principal Secretary, Home Department,
Secretariat, Hyderabad and others …. Respondents
WRIT PETITION No.8552 of 2024
(CNR No.HBHC010165012024)
Between:
Mrs. Iffat Shafique Ahmadi and another …. Petitioners
AND
The State of Telangana represented by the
Principal Secretary, Home Department,
Secretariat, Hyderabad and others …. Respondents
WRIT PETITION No.924 of 2021
(CNR No.HBHC010013122021)
Between:
M/s. Kancharla Constructions Private Limited,
Represented by its Managing Director
Sri K. Prithvi Reddy and others …. Petitioners
-4-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
AND
The State of Telangana represented by the
Principal Secretary to Government,
Revenue, Secretariat, Hyderabad and others …. Respondents
COMMON ORDER:
Heard Sri Sunil B. Ganu, learned Senior Counsel,
representing Smt. Manjari S. Ganu, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioners in all the three writ petitions, and Sri E.
Ramesh Chandra Goud, learned Government Pleader for Land
Acquisition, appearing on behalf of the respondents. With the
consent of the learned counsel on either side, the writ petitions are
taken up together for final disposal.
2. The subject matter of all these writ petitions is the very same
extent of land situated in Sy.Nos.362, 373 and 374 of
Manchirevula Village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy
District. The acquisition assailed is one and the same, the
respondent authorities are common, and the questions arising for
determination substantially overlap. These writ petitions are,
therefore, being heard together and are disposed of by this
common order.
3. Broadly, the challenge falls into two parts. W.P.No.924 of
2021 is concerned with the alleged interference with, and the
-5-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
attempted forcible dispossession of, the petitioners during the
pendency of the acquisition proceedings. W.P.Nos.8527 and 8552
of 2024 are directed against the continuance of the acquisition
proceedings initiated pursuant to Gazette Notification No.R.R.42,
dated 29.05.2019, and seek a declaration that those proceedings
have lapsed.
4. In W.P.No.924 of 2021 , the petitioners seek a declaration
that the alleged attempts of the respondents to forcibly dispossess
them, to interfere with or disturb their possession and enjoyment,
and to fell trees standing in their plots bearing Plot Nos.99, 100,
101, 106, 107, 121 to 123, 129 and 130, forming part of
Sy.Nos.362/4, 373/4 and 374/4 of Manchirevula Village,
Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, during the pendency
of the acquisition proceedings, are arbitrary, illegal and a
colourable exercise of power, contrary to the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, 'the Act 30 of
2013') and violative of Articles 14, 19 and 300-A of the Constitution
of India, and for a consequential direction restraining the
respondents from dispossessing them or otherwise interfering with
their possession and enjoyment of the subject plots.
-6-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
5. In W.P.No.8527 of 2024 , the petitioners seek a declaration
that Land Acquisition Gazette Notification No.R.R.42, dated
29.05.2019, issued for acquisition of Ac.10-10 guntas in
Sy.Nos.362, 373 and 374 of Manchirevula Village, has lapsed in
view of Sections 19(7) and 25 of the Act 30 of 2013 and is violative
of Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. Consequential
directions are sought for removal of the subject lands from the
prohibitory list maintained under Section 22-A of the Registration
Act, 1908, and for removal of a two-feet wall allegedly constructed
by the Greyhounds authorities over the subject lands without
acquisition and without payment of compensation.
6. In W.P.No.8552 of 2024 , the petitioners seek substantially
the same reliefs as are sought in W.P.No.8527 of 2024, namely, a
declaration that Gazette Notification No.R.R.42, dated 29.05.2019,
has lapsed under Sections 19(7) and 25 of the Act 30 of 2013 and
is violative of Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India,
together with the same consequential directions relating to Section
22-A of the Registration Act, 1908 and removal of the alleged two-
feet wall.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
7. The lands in question form part of Sy.Nos.362, 373 and 374
of Manchirevula Village. They were originally agricultural lands
-7-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
held by Sri Md. Sharfuddin @ Sri Md. Sheriff, who is stated to have
laid the lands out into plots and alienated them to various
purchasers under registered sale deeds in the year 1996. The
petitioners claim to be purchasers, or successors of purchasers, in
that layout. It is their case that portions of the lands continue to be
put to agricultural and horticultural use and that they and their
predecessors have remained in possession and enjoyment
pursuant to their registered transactions.
8. In W.P.No.8527 of 2024, the petitioner No.1 claims Ac.0-
09.91 guntas in Plot No.55 under registered Sale Deed No.2394 of
1996, dated 20.07.1996, and the petitioner No.2 claims Ac.0-09.91
guntas in Plot No.54 under registered Sale Deed No.2392 of 1996,
dated 20.07.1996. In W.P.No.8552 of 2024, the petitioner No.1
claims Ac.1-03 guntas in Plot Nos.140, 141, 142 and 143 under
registered Sale Deed No.3978 of 1996, dated 16.11.1996, and the
petitioner No.2 claims Ac.0-09.91 guntas in Plot No.95 under
registered Sale Deed No.3421 of 1996, dated 23.11.1996.
9. In W.P.No.924 of 2021, the petitioner No.1 claims land
admeasuring 6,773 square yards comprising Plot Nos.99, 100,
101, 106 and 107, having acquired the same under a registered
Deed of Exchange dated 31.07.2018, bearing Document No.7486 of
2018, from Sri Shankar Mani @ G.V.S. Mani, who had earlier
-8-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
purchased the property under registered Sale Deed Nos.1567 of
1996, dated 28.05.1996, and 1979 of 1996, dated 16.11.1996. The
remaining petitioners claim various extents in Plot Nos.121 to 123,
129 and 130.
10. The acquisition history of the subject lands is long and it is
necessary to set it out, because much of the argument on either
side turns upon it. The history discloses three successive attempts
to acquire the very same lands for the very same requisitioning
authority, spread over more than two decades.
11. The first attempt commenced in the years 1999-2000, when
the Greyhounds authorities requisitioned acquisition of land in
Sy.Nos.362, 373 and 374 for a Greyhounds Training Centre. The
original requisition covered Ac.10-24 guntas, comprising Ac.6-06
guntas in Sy.No.362, Ac.1-33 guntas in Sy.No.373 and Ac.2-25
guntas in Sy.No.374. Subsequently, upon a complaint made by the
pattadar, the requisitioning authority was found to be in excess
possession of Ac.4-22 guntas, comprising Ac.2-26 guntas in
Sy.No.362, Ac.1-10 guntas in Sy.No.373 and Ac.0-26 guntas in
Sy.No.374, and that excess extent was also sought to be acquired
from M/s. Dream Valley Resorts Private Limited, stated to be its
owner.
-9-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
12. The Government thereafter issued a notification under
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act,
1894'), vide G.O.Rt.No.225, dated 23.02.2004, published in the
Gazette on 08.03.2004. Several individual plot owners assailed the
said notification in W.P.No.10872 of 2005. By order dated
01.02.2006, this Court quashed the notification insofar as it
dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, 1894, and
directed a fresh enquiry. The plot owners, including the vendors of
the present petitioners, thereafter submitted detailed objections.
13. While those proceedings were pending, the Government
issued G.O.Ms.No.902, dated 31.12.2007, providing for
regularisation of unapproved layouts. The purchasers in the
subject layout, including the petitioners, applied for regularisation.
Those applications were rejected by the Hyderabad Metropolitan
Development Authority (for short, 'the HMDA') on the sole ground
that the lands in the subject survey numbers were under
acquisition. The rejection was assailed in W.P.Nos.24248 of 2009
and 13705 of 2009 and batch.
14. By order dated 09.12.2009, this Court allowed those writ
petitions and held that, as no declaration under Section 6 of the
Act, 1894 had been published within the period prescribed, the
notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 had ceased
-10-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
to be effective. This Court accordingly declared that the lands in
Sy.Nos.362, 366, 373 and 374 of Manchirevula Village were no
longer under acquisition and directed the HMDA to process the
applications for regularisation in accordance with law.
15. Notwithstanding the said judgment, a draft declaration
under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 came to be issued and
G.O.Ms.No.91, dated 17.04.2011, was published. Contempt
proceedings were thereupon initiated in C.C.No.979 of 2010,
pursuant to which G.O.Ms.No.200, dated 03.08.2011, was issued
withdrawing G.O.Ms.No.91, dated 17.04.2011, and the draft
declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 was also
withdrawn.
16. The order dated 09.12.2009 was carried in appeal in
W.A.Nos.993 of 2010 and batch. By order dated 15.02.2012, a
Division Bench of this Court dismissed the writ appeals. The
Division Bench rejected the contention that the alleged taking of
possession would permit the Government to issue a declaration
under Section 6 at any point of time irrespective of the statutory
limitation, and observed that the possession claimed was only
possession on paper, physical possession having continued with
the land owners.
-11-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
17. The second attempt followed. A fresh draft notification under
Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 was issued on 19.01.2013 and
published on 30.01.2013, and a declaration under Section 6 of the
Act, 1894 was issued vide G.O.Ms.No.280, dated 12.12.2013.
Those proceedings were assailed in W.P.No.38610 of 2013 and
batch and, by common order dated 08.03.2018, this Court allowed
the writ petitions and set aside the acquisition proceedings,
including the declaration issued vide G.O.Ms.No.280, dated
12.12.2013.
18. The third and present attempt commenced thereafter. The
Inspector General of Police, Greyhounds, Telangana State,
Hyderabad, vide Ref.C.No.45/B2/GHs/Ts/2000-18, dated
23.10.2018, submitted a requisition to the District Collector,
Ranga Reddy District, for acquisition of Ac.10-10 guntas,
equivalent to 49,610 square yards, in Sy.Nos.362/4, 373/4 and
374/4 of Manchirevula Village, for construction of a Commando
Training Centre. The Government, vide notification dated
26.10.2018, exempted the project from the provisions of Chapter II
and Chapter III of the Act 30 of 2013 in exercise of the power
conferred by Section 10-A, which was inserted in the principal Act,
in its application to this State, by the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
-12-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
Resettlement (Telangana Amendment) Act, 2016, being Act 21 of
2017. After obtaining a preliminary enquiry report from the
Tahsildar, the Preliminary Notification under Section 11(1) of the
Act 30 of 2013 was prepared and published in the District Gazette
vide Gazette No.R.R.42, dated 29.05.2019.
19. It is not in dispute that a large number of objections were
received pursuant to the Preliminary Notification, that the
objectors were heard by the Collector, and that an inspection of the
lands was carried out. The petitioners state that further objections
were thereafter submitted before the Land Acquisition Officer.
20. The respondents rely upon Proceedings No.G2/4576/2018,
dated 21.01.2020, by which, according to them, the Preliminary
Notification/Form-C was extended for a further period of twelve
months under Section 19(7) of the Act 30 of 2013.
21. W.P.No.924 of 2021 came to be filed in January, 2021. By
interim order dated 12.01.2021, this Court directed maintenance
of status quo. The respondents state that, pursuant to the said
order, the further process of acquisition, including issuance of the
declaration under Section 19(1) of the Act 30 of 2013, was stopped.
22. The position which obtains as on the date of hearing is not in
dispute, and it may usefully be recorded at the outset. The
-13-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
Preliminary Notification dated 29.05.2019 has not been followed by
any declaration under Section 19(1) of the Act 30 of 2013. No
award has been made under Section 25 of the Act 30 of 2013. No
compensation has been paid or deposited. The subject lands
continue to figure in the prohibitory list maintained under Section
22-A of the Registration Act, 1908. More than seven years have
elapsed since the publication of the Preliminary Notification.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
23. Sri Sunil B. Ganu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioners, submitted that the Preliminary Notification under
Section 11(1) of the Act 30 of 2013 was published on 29.05.2019
and that no declaration under Section 19(1) of the Act was made
within twelve months therefrom. Section 19(7) of the Act attaches a
specific statutory consequence to that failure, namely, that the
Preliminary Notification shall be deemed to have been rescinded.
The consequence, it is submitted, follows by operation of law and
requires no declaration by any authority.
24. It was submitted that the extension said to have been
granted by Proceedings No.G2/4576/2018, dated 21.01.2020, does
not assist the respondents. The proceedings have not been placed
on record. They do not disclose the opinion of the appropriate
Government that circumstances existed justifying an extension.
-14-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
There is no material to show that any such decision was recorded
in writing, notified, and uploaded on the website of the authority
concerned, as the third proviso to Section 19(7) requires. The
power under the second proviso, moreover, is conferred upon the
appropriate Government and not upon the District Collector.
25. On the interim order dated 12.01.2021, it was submitted
that the first proviso to Section 19(7) permits exclusion only of
such period during which the proceedings for acquisition were held
up on account of a stay or injunction granted by a Court.
W.P.No.924 of 2021 did not assail Gazette Notification No.R.R.42,
dated 29.05.2019, and did not seek any order staying the
acquisition. The order of status quo was confined to the possession
and enjoyment of the plots of the petitioners therein. Nothing in
that order prevented the respondents from publishing a declaration
under Section 19(1) of the Act, whether in respect of the entire
notified extent or in respect of the remaining parcels.
26. It was further submitted that the original statutory period
expired on 28.05.2020, long before the order of status quo came to
be passed on 12.01.2021. An order passed after the statutory
period has run out cannot exclude a period which has already
expired, nor can it revive a notification which already stood
rescinded by operation of law.
-15-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
27. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the acquisition
history demonstrates a persistent failure on the part of the
respondents to complete an acquisition of these very lands. Three
successive rounds of acquisition, spread over more than twenty
years, have each failed at the very same stage, namely, the stage of
the declaration. In the meanwhile, the petitioners have been denied
regularisation of their layout on the ground of a pending
acquisition, their lands have been placed in the prohibitory list
under Section 22-A of the Registration Act, 1908, and they have
received neither their land nor compensation for it.
28. It was submitted that the right to property, though no longer
a fundamental right, remains a constitutional right under Article
300-A of the Constitution of India and a human right, and that
deprivation of property can only be by authority of law. Where the
law itself prescribes timelines and attaches consequences to their
breach, compliance with those timelines is part of the authority of
law. Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court on Article 300-A, to which reference is made in the course of
the discussion hereafter.
29. On the consequential reliefs, it was submitted that, once the
acquisition ceases to have legal effect, the continued inclusion of
-16-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
the subject lands in the prohibitory list under Section 22-A of the
Registration Act, 1908, on the strength of that acquisition, cannot
be sustained, and that the respondents ought to be directed to
remove the entry so as to enable the petitioners to deal with their
properties. It was also submitted that the two-feet wall allegedly
raised by the Greyhounds authorities over portions of the subject
lands, without acquisition and without payment of compensation,
is liable to be removed.
30. So far as W.P.No.924 of 2021 is concerned, it was submitted
that the petitioners therein hold registered title and are in
possession, that the respondents have not completed any
acquisition of the said plots, and that the possession claimed by
the authorities in the earlier rounds was found by the Division
Bench to be possession on paper only. In those circumstances, it
was submitted, the respondents can have no right to dispossess
the petitioners, to interfere with their possession and enjoyment, or
to fell trees standing on the plots.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
31. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent
No.5. The averments therein, and the submissions of the learned
Government Pleader founded upon them, may be summarised as
follows.
-17-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
32. It is stated that the Inspector General of Police, Greyhounds,
Telangana State, Hyderabad, vide Ref.C.No.45/B2/GHs/Ts/2000-
18, dated 23.10.2018, submitted a requisition to the District
Collector, Ranga Reddy District, for acquisition of Ac.10-10 guntas,
equivalent to 49,610 square yards, in Sy.Nos.362/4, 373/4 and
374/4 of Manchirevula Village, for construction of a Commando
Training Centre; that the Government, vide notification dated
26.10.2018, accorded exemption under Section 10-A of the Act 30
of 2013 from the provisions of Chapter II and Chapter III of that
Act; and that, after obtaining the preliminary enquiry report of the
Tahsildar, the Preliminary Notification under Section 11(1) of the
Act was published in the District Gazette vide Gazette No.R.R.42,
dated 29.05.2019.
33. It is stated that several objections were received pursuant to
the Preliminary Notification and that the same could not be
disposed of within the stipulated period on account of Municipal
Elections and Co-operative Elections, which resulted in delay in
publication of the declaration under Section 19(1) of the Act. It is
admitted that the period of twelve months expired on 28.05.2020.
It is stated that the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, was
requested to extend the period of twelve months for publication of
the declaration under Section 19(1), and that the Preliminary
-18-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
Notification/Form-C was extended for a further period of twelve
months under Section 19(7) of the Act 30 of 2013, as amended by
the Telangana Amendment Act 21 of 2017, vide Proceedings
No.G2/4576/2018, dated 21.01.2020.
34. It is stated that this Court passed an interim order of status
quo dated 12.01.2021 in W.P.No.924 of 2021 and that, pursuant
thereto, the further process of acquisition, including issuance of
the declaration under Section 19(1) of the Act, was stopped. It is
expressly admitted that the declaration under Section 19(1) is yet
to be issued. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the
declaration could not be issued during the pendency of the
aforesaid proceedings and that the petitioners cannot take
advantage of an order obtained at their own instance.
35. The respondents deny that any compound wall or two-feet
wall was constructed by the Greyhounds authorities over the
subject lands, and contend that the consequential relief sought for
its removal is, therefore, not maintainable.
36. It is finally submitted that the acquisition was initiated for a
genuine public purpose, namely, construction of a Commando
Training Centre for a specialised anti-insurgency force, that the
procedure prescribed under the Act 30 of 2013 is being followed,
-19-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
and that the writ petitions seeking a declaration of lapse are devoid
of merit and are liable to be dismissed.
POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION
37. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on either side
and having perused the material placed on record, the following
points arise for consideration in these writ petitions:
(i) Whether the Preliminary Notification bearing Gazette
No.R.R.42, dated 29.05.2019, issued under Section 11(1) of
the Act 30 of 2013, stood rescinded by operation of Section
19(7) of the said Act on account of the failure to publish a
declaration under Section 19(1) within the period
prescribed?
(ii) Whether Proceedings No.G2/4576/2018, dated
21.01.2020, relied upon by the respondents, constitutes a
valid exercise of the power of extension conferred by the
second proviso to Section 19(7) of the Act 30 of 2013, and,
if so, with what effect upon the Preliminary Notification?
(iii) Whether the interim order of status quo dated 12.01.2021
passed in W.P.No.924 of 2021 attracts the first proviso to
Section 19(7) of the Act 30 of 2013 so as to exclude the
period during which it operated, and whether such an
order could preserve or revive the Preliminary Notification?
(iv) Whether the respondents can, on the strength of the earlier
acquisition proceedings taken under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, or of the possession claimed thereunder, sustain
-20-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
the present acquisition or resist the reliefs claimed in these
writ petitions?
(v) Whether the petitioners in W.P.No.924 of 2021 are entitled
to protection against dispossession, against interference
with their possession and enjoyment, and against felling of
trees, otherwise than in accordance with law?
(vi) To what relief are the petitioners entitled, including the
consequential reliefs relating to Section 22-A of the
Registration Act, 1908, and the alleged two-feet wall?
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The statutory scheme
38. Before the points framed above are taken up, it is necessary
to notice the scheme of the Act 30 of 2013 in so far as it governs
the progression of an acquisition from notification to award. The
scheme is important because the entire controversy turns upon the
time limits which the statute prescribes and the consequences
which it attaches to their breach.
39. The process begins with Section 11(1) of the Act 30 of 2013,
which provides for publication of the preliminary notification. It
reads as follows:
11. (1) Whenever, it appears to the appropriate
Government that land in any area is required or likely to
be required for any public purpose, a notification
(hereinafter referred to as preliminary notification) to that
effect along with details of the land to be acquired in
-21-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
rural and urban areas shall be published in the following
manner, namely:—
(a) in the Official Gazette;
(b) in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality of
such area of which one shall be in the regional language;
(c) in the local language in the Panchayat, Municipality or
Municipal Corporation, as the case may be and in the
offices of the District Collector, the Sub-divisional
Magistrate and the Tehsil;
(d) uploaded on the website of the appropriate
Government;
(e) in the affected areas, in such manner as may be
prescribed.
40. Section 15 of the Act 30 of 2013 then confers upon any
person interested in the notified land the right to object, within
sixty days of publication of the preliminary notification, to the area
and suitability of the land proposed to be acquired, to the
justification offered for the public purpose, and to the findings of
the Social Impact Assessment report. The Collector is obliged to
hear such objections and to submit his report, with his
recommendations, for the decision of the appropriate Government.
41. Section 19(1) of the Act 30 of 2013 marks the next and
decisive stage. It reads as follows:
19. (1) When the appropriate Government is satisfied,
after considering the report, if any, made under sub-
section (2) of section 15, that any particular land is
needed for a public purpose, a declaration shall be made
to that effect, along with a declaration of an area
identified as the "resettlement area" for the purposes of
-22-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
rehabilitation and resettlement of the affected families,
under the hand and seal of a Secretary to such
Government or of any other officer duly authorised to
certify its orders and different declarations may be made
from time to time in respect of different parcels of any
land covered by the same preliminary notification
irrespective of whether one report or different reports has
or have been made (wherever required).
42. Two features of Section 19(1) call for notice at this stage. The
first is that the declaration is not a formality; it embodies the
satisfaction of the appropriate Government, arrived at after
consideration of the Collector's report on the objections, that the
particular land is needed for a public purpose. It is the statutory
decision to acquire. The second is that the concluding limb of
Section 19(1) expressly permits different declarations to be made
from time to time in respect of different parcels of land covered by
the same preliminary notification. The relevance of this feature will
become apparent when point (iii) is considered.
43. Section 19(7) prescribes the time within which the
declaration must be made and the consequence of a failure to do
so. It reads as follows:
“(7) Where no declaration is made under sub-section (1)
within twelve months from the date of preliminary
notification, then such notification shall be deemed to
have been rescinded:
Provided that in computing the period referred to in this
sub-section, any period or periods during which the
-23-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up
on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any
Court shall be excluded:
Provided further that the appropriate Government shall
have the power to extend the period of twelve months, if
in its opinion circumstances exist justifying the same:
Provided also that any such decision to extend the period
shall be recorded in writing and the same shall be
notified and be uploaded on the website of the authority
concerned.
44. Section 25 of the Act 30 of 2013 governs the stage which
follows the declaration. It reads as follows:
“25. The Collector shall make an award within a period
of twelve months from the date of publication of the
declaration under section 19 and if no award is made
within that period, the entire proceedings for the
acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that the appropriate Government shall have the
power to extend the period of twelve months if in its
opinion, circumstances exist justifying the same:
Provided further that any such decision to extend the
period shall be recorded in writing and the same shall be
notified and be uploaded on the website of the authority
concerned.”
45. Read together, Sections 11, 15, 19 and 25 of the Act 30 of
2013 disclose a scheme of successive stages, each of which is
governed by an outer time limit, and each of which carries an
express statutory consequence if that limit is not observed. Twelve
months are allowed from the preliminary notification for the
declaration, failing which the preliminary notification is deemed
-24-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
rescinded. Twelve further months are allowed from the declaration
for the award, failing which the entire proceedings lapse. In each
case, the appropriate Government may extend the period, but only
upon forming an opinion that circumstances justify it, and only by
a decision recorded in writing, notified and uploaded on the
website of the authority concerned.
46. These timelines are not incidental to the Act 30 of 2013.
They are among its principal reforms. Under the repealed Act, 1894
land owners were often left for years, and sometimes for decades,
under the shadow of an acquisition which neither reached an
award nor was given up. They could not develop their land, could
not deal with it, and did not receive compensation either. By fixing
an outer limit at each stage, and by attaching an automatic
consequence to a breach of that limit, the Legislature has sought to
ensure that an acquisition is either carried through or brought to
an end. A construction which allows a preliminary notification to
remain alive indefinitely would defeat that purpose.
The Telangana Amendment Act 21 of 2017
47. The respondents assert in their counter-affidavit that the
extension was granted under Section 19(7) of the Act 30 of 2013
"as amended by the Telangana Amendment Act, 21 of 2017". Since
the respondents rest their case upon that Amendment Act, its
-25-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
provisions have been examined. The Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement (Telangana Amendment) Act, 2016, published as Act
No.21 of 2017, received the assent of the President on 12.05.2017
and was first published in the Telangana Gazette on 17.05.2017.
By Section 1(2) it is deemed to have come into effect on
01.01.2014. Section 1(3) thereof reads as follows:
(3) The provisions of this Amendment Act shall have
effect notwithstanding anything contained in any law or
judgment or order of any Court or authority, without
affecting the vested rights.
48. The Amendment Act contains twelve sections. It amends
Section 2 of the principal Act, inserts Chapter III-A containing
Section 10-A, inserts Section 23-A, amends Section 24(2), inserts
Chapter IV-A containing Section 30-A, inserts Sections 31-A and
33-A, amends Section 46, substitutes Section 87, and amends
Sections 101 and 109. It does not amend Section 19 of the Act 30
of 2013 in any respect. Section 19(7), and the three provisos to it
which have been set out above, therefore apply in this State in the
very terms in which Parliament enacted them. The premise on
which the respondents have proceeded is thus mistaken, and the
consequences of that error are considered when point (ii) is taken
up.
-26-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
49. Two of the amendments actually made are relevant to the
questions arising in these writ petitions, and they are set out here
for that reason and for no other. The first is Section 10-A, inserted
by Section 3 of the Amendment Act, under which the exemption
dated 26.10.2018 relied upon by the respondents was granted. Its
opening words are as follows:
10A. The State Government may, in the public interest,
by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any of the
following projects from the application of the provisions of
Chapter II and Chapter III of this Act, namely:-
50. The categories which follow include, in clause (a), projects
vital to national security or defence of India and every part thereof,
including preparation for defence or defence production. What
requires notice is the reach of the exemption which Section 10-A
permits. It is an exemption from Chapter II, which provides for the
Social Impact Assessment, and from Chapter III, which contains
the special provision to safeguard food security. It is not an
exemption from Chapter IV, in which Sections 11, 15 and 19 are
found, nor from Chapter V, in which Section 25 is found. An
exemption granted under Section 10-A therefore leaves the
procedure and the time limits governing the preliminary
notification, the declaration and the award wholly untouched. The
notification dated 26.10.2018 did not, and could not, relieve the
respondents of the obligation to comply with Section 19(7).
-27-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
51. The second is the amendment of Section 24(2) made by
Section 5 of the Amendment Act, by which the following further
proviso was added to that sub-section:
Provided further that in computing the period referred to
in this sub-section, any period or periods during which
the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up
on account of any order, stay, suspension or injunction
issued by any Court or the period specified in the award
of a Tribunal for taking possession or such period where
possession has been taken but the compensation is lying
deposited in a Court or in any designated account
maintained for this purpose, shall be excluded.
52. This proviso is set out because the words which the State
Legislature chose in it are materially wider than the words of the
first proviso to Section 19(7), and the contrast between the two is
relevant when point (iii) is considered. No other provision of the
Amendment Act has any bearing on the questions arising here, and
none is therefore extracted.
Point (i): Whether the Preliminary Notification dated
29.05.2019 stood rescinded under Section 19(7)
53. The primary facts relevant to this point are not in dispute
and are, indeed, admitted in the counter-affidavit. The Preliminary
Notification under Section 11(1) of the Act 30 of 2013 was
published in Gazette No.R.R.42 on 29.05.2019. The period of
twelve months computed from that date expired on 28.05.2020. No
declaration under Section 19(1) of the Act was made or published
-28-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
within that period. The counter-affidavit itself states, in terms, that
the period of twelve months expired on 28.05.2020 and that the
declaration under Section 19(1) is yet to be issued.
54. The language of Section 19(7) is plain and admits of no
discretion. It provides that where no declaration is made under
sub-section (1) within twelve months from the date of the
preliminary notification, "then such notification shall be deemed to
have been rescinded". The provision is self-executing. It does not
contemplate an order of any authority, nor a declaration by any
Court, to bring about the result. Upon the expiry of the prescribed
period without a declaration, the preliminary notification ceases to
exist in the eye of law, and a Court asked to pronounce upon the
matter does no more than recognise a consequence which the
statute has already brought about.
55. Where the Legislature prescribes a period for the doing of an
act and, in the same breath, prescribes the consequence of a
failure to do that act within the period, the provision is mandatory
and the consequence is not open to being softened on grounds of
hardship or administrative inconvenience. That is elementary. The
provision would otherwise be reduced to a mere exhortation, and
the protection which the Legislature intended for the land owner
-29-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
would be left at the mercy of the very authority whose default the
provision is aimed at.
56. The principle has a direct analogue in the law under the
repealed Act, 1894. The proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act, 1894
prescribed an outer limit for making a declaration reckoned from
the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). In Padma
1
Sundara Rao (dead) v. State of Tamil Nadu , a Constitution Bench
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the period so prescribed is
inflexible, that it cannot be enlarged by reading into the statute
words which the Legislature has not used, and that a fresh
declaration must be made within the period counted from the
original notification under Section 4(1). The Hon'ble Supreme
Court at paragraph Nos.12, 14 and 17 held as follows:
“12. The rival pleas regarding rewriting of statute and casus
omissus need careful consideration. It is well-settled principle in law
that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is
plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The
language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of
legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the
intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the
legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has
been intended but what has been said.
"Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid", Judge
Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some
imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley
1
(2002) 3 SCC 533 (Constitution Bench)
-30-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
Coal Co. v. Yensavage'1.) The view was reiterated in Union of India v.
Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama.
14. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets
the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and
subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to
amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Rishabh Agro
Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd. 4) The legislative casus
omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process.
Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope
for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah case. In
Nanjudaiah case the period was further stretched to have the time
period run from date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view
cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is
accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clause
(i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-
prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent.
17. The view expressed in Narasimhaiah's case (supra)
and Nanjudaiah's case (supra), is not correct and is over-ruled while
that expressed in A.S. Naidu's case (supra) and Oxford's case (supra)
is affirmed.”
57. If anything, the case for strict construction is stronger under
the Act 30 of 2013 than it was under the Act, 1894. Section 19(7)
does not merely prescribe a period; it declares the consequence of
default in terms of a deeming fiction, and it simultaneously
provides the two, and only two, routes by which the operation of
that fiction can be avoided, namely, exclusion of time under the
first proviso and extension of time under the second and third
provisos. Where the Legislature has itself provided the exceptions,
-31-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
an authority which has not brought itself within one of them
cannot ask the Court to devise a further exception in its favour.
58. It is equally well settled that where a statute requires a thing
to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner
or not at all, and that other modes of performance are necessarily
forbidden. That principle, laid down in Nazir Ahmad v. King
2
Emperor and adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of
3
Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh , applies with full force to the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, which is one of the most
drastic powers the State exercises over the property of a citizen.
59. It also follows from the structure of Section 19(7) that the
burden of establishing that a preliminary notification has survived
the expiry of twelve months lies upon the authority which asserts
it. The general rule in the sub-section is rescission. Exclusion and
extension are exceptions to that rule, and they depend upon facts
peculiarly within the knowledge of the acquiring authority, namely,
whether a decision to extend was taken, by whom, upon what
opinion, whether it was recorded in writing, whether it was notified
and uploaded, and whether and to what extent the proceedings
were in fact held up by an order of Court. The landowner cannot be
asked to prove a negative.
2
AIR 1936 PC 253 (2)
3
AIR 1964 SC 358
-32-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
60. Applying these principles, the position on the admitted facts
is that the twelve-month period prescribed by Section 19(7) expired
on 28.05.2020 without a declaration under Section 19(1), and the
Preliminary Notification dated 29.05.2019 was, in consequence,
deemed to have been rescinded on that date, unless the
respondents establish either a valid extension under the second
and third provisos or a permissible exclusion of time under the
first proviso. Those are precisely the questions raised by points (ii)
and (iii), and point (i) must therefore be answered subject to the
findings recorded on them.
61. Subject to what is held on points (ii) and (iii), point (i) is
answered in favour of the petitioners and against the respondents.
Point (ii): Whether the extension dated 21.01.2020 is a valid
exercise of power under the second proviso to Section 19(7)
62. The respondents rely upon Proceedings No.G2/4576/2018,
dated 21.01.2020, as having extended the Preliminary Notification
for a further period of twelve months. The petitioners dispute the
validity of that extension. The question must be decided, and not
merely assumed one way or the other, because a valid extension
would alter the date from which the consequences under Section
19(7) are to be reckoned.
-33-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
63. The second and third provisos to Section 19(7), read
together, impose four requirements upon a valid extension. First,
the power is conferred upon "the appropriate Government" and
upon no one else. Secondly, the appropriate Government must
form an opinion that circumstances exist justifying an extension;
the power is not one of routine or automatic enlargement. Thirdly,
the decision to extend must be recorded in writing. Fourthly, the
decision must be notified and uploaded on the website of the
authority concerned. These requirements are cumulative, and each
of them serves a purpose.
64. The purpose of the third proviso deserves particular
emphasis. Because the consequence under the main limb of
Section 19(7) is automatic, a landowner who finds that twelve
months have gone by without a declaration is entitled to proceed
on the footing that the notification over his land has ceased to
operate. If that position is to be displaced, he is entitled to know it,
and to know it from a public source. That is why the Legislature
has required the decision to extend to be notified and uploaded,
and not merely to be made. An extension kept in the files of the
department, unknown to the person whose property it affects, is
not the extension which Section 19(7) contemplates.
-34-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
65. Judged by these requirements, the material placed before
this Court is not sufficient to sustain the extension. The
Proceedings dated 21.01.2020 have not been produced. Their text
is not on record. The counter-affidavit does not set out the reasons
recorded therein. There is no averment, and no material, to show
that the decision was notified in any manner or uploaded on the
website of the authority concerned. Nor has any Gazette
publication been placed before this Court.
66. There is a further and more basic difficulty in the
respondents' way, and it goes to the competence of the authority
which is said to have granted the extension. The counter-affidavit
states that "the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, was
accordingly requested to extend the period of twelve months for
publication of the declaration under Section 19(1)" and that the
Preliminary Notification/Form-C "was extended for a further period
of twelve months under Section 19(7) of the Act 30 of 2013, as
amended by the Telangana Amendment Act, 21 of 2017".
67. That plea does not survive an examination of the
Amendment Act, which has been set out earlier in this order. Act
No.21 of 2017 does not amend Section 19 of the Act 30 of 2013 at
all. The very foundation of the respondents' case, namely, that the
power under Section 19(7) stood altered by the State amendment,
-35-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
is therefore mistaken. The second proviso to Section 19(7)
continues to vest the power of extension in the appropriate
Government, that is to say, the State Government, and in no other
authority. No notification delegating that power to the District
Collector has been placed before this Court, and none was said to
exist. An extension granted by an authority on whom the statute
does not confer the power is no extension at all.
68. The reasons offered for the delay do not, in any event,
answer the description of circumstances justifying an extension.
The counter-affidavit attributes the failure to dispose of the
objections to Municipal Elections and Co-operative Elections.
Elections are a recurring and foreseeable feature of administration.
They are the State's own business, and holding them does not
prevent the Collector, over a period of twelve months, from hearing
objections already received and forwarding his report. If ordinary
administrative pressure of this kind were accepted as a
circumstance justifying extension, the exception would defeat the
rule, and the outer limit which the Legislature has fixed for the
protection of the land owner would have no meaning.
69. It is well settled that the validity of an order of a public
authority must be judged upon the reasons which it itself records,
and that such reasons cannot be supplemented later by affidavit or
-36-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
by argument at the Bar. That principle, laid down in Commissioner
4
of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji and reiterated in
5
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner , is directly
attracted here, where the order relied upon is not before the Court
at all and the only account of its reasons is that contained in the
counter-affidavit filed years afterwards.
70. For these reasons, this Court is unable to hold that
Proceedings No.G2/4576/2018, dated 21.01.2020, constitutes a
valid exercise of the power of extension conferred by the second
proviso to Section 19(7) of the Act 30 of 2013. It follows that the
period of twelve months prescribed by Section 19(7) was never
validly enlarged, and that the Preliminary Notification dated
29.05.2019 stood rescinded upon the expiry of 28.05.2020.
71. Lest the matter be thought to rest on these findings alone,
this Court has considered the position on the assumption, contrary
to what is held above, that the extension was valid. Even on that
assumption, the respondents are no better placed. There is, at the
outset, an ambiguity in their own case as to when the extended
period came to an end. If the further period of twelve months is
reckoned from the expiry of the original period on 28.05.2020, the
extended period ended on 28.05.2021. If it is reckoned from the
4
AIR 1952 SC 16
5
(1978) 1 SCC 405
-37-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
date of the proceedings themselves, it ended on 20.01.2021. It is
unnecessary to resolve the ambiguity, because on either reckoning
the extended period expired without any declaration under Section
19(1) having been published, and more than five years have gone
by since the latter of the two dates.
72. The second proviso confers a power to extend the period of
twelve months. It does not confer a power to keep a preliminary
notification alive indefinitely. Nor is there anything on record to
show that any second or further extension was ever granted. At its
highest, therefore, the proceedings dated 21.01.2020 could have
carried the Preliminary Notification to 28.05.2021 and no further.
Thereafter, the statutory consequence would attach unless the
respondents established a permissible exclusion of time under the
first proviso, which is the subject of point (iii).
73. Point (ii) is accordingly answered against the respondents. It
is held that the extension relied upon has not been shown to be a
valid exercise of power under the second and third provisos to
Section 19(7) of the Act 30 of 2013 and that, even if it were valid, it
would not have preserved the Preliminary Notification beyond
28.05.2021.
-38-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
Point (iii): Whether the order of status quo dated 12.01.2021
attracts the first proviso to Section 19(7)
74. The defence which remains, and upon which the
respondents principally rely, is that the acquisition could not be
carried forward because of the interim order of status quo dated
12.01.2021 passed in W.P.No.924 of 2021, and that the period
during which that order has operated must be excluded under the
first proviso to Section 19(7).
75. The first proviso permits exclusion of "any period or periods
during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were
held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any
Court". Three conditions are embedded in that language. There
must be a stay or an injunction granted by an order of a Court.
The proceedings for acquisition must have been held up. And the
holding up must have been on account of that order. It is not
enough that an order of some kind was in force. It must be shown
that it was that order which brought the acquisition to a halt.
76. That the first proviso is narrow in its reach is confirmed by
the course which the State Legislature itself took. When it wished
to widen the exclusion available under a comparable provision of
the same Act, it did so in plain words. By Section 5 of the
Amendment Act it added to Section 24(2) a proviso excluding any
-39-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
period during which the proceedings for acquisition were held up
"on account of any order, stay, suspension or injunction issued by
any Court", together with certain further periods. It made no
corresponding change to the first proviso to Section 19(7), which
continues to speak only of a stay or an injunction, by the order of a
Court, which held up the proceedings for acquisition. The
Legislature having turned its attention to the Act 30 of 2013 and
having enlarged the exclusion in one place while leaving it as it
stood in the other, the narrower words of Section 19(7) must be
given their plain meaning.
77. The nature and scope of the order dated 12.01.2021 must
therefore be examined. W.P.No.924 of 2021 was instituted by
persons claiming Plot Nos.99, 100, 101, 106, 107, 121 to 123, 129
and 130. The relief sought therein was a declaration that the
attempts of the respondents to forcibly dispossess the petitioners,
to interfere with their possession and enjoyment, and to fell trees
on their plots were illegal, and a consequential direction restraining
such interference. That writ petition did not assail Gazette
Notification No.R.R.42, dated 29.05.2019. It did not seek
suspension of the acquisition proceedings. It did not seek to
restrain the appropriate Government from considering the
-40-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
Collector's report or from publishing a declaration under Section
19(1) of the Act.
78. An interim order must be read in the light of the relief
claimed in the proceeding in which it is made. An order directing
maintenance of status quo requires the parties to preserve the
existing state of affairs in relation to the subject matter of the lis.
Here, the subject matter was the possession and enjoyment of the
specified plots and the trees standing upon them. The order
accordingly restrained disturbance of that state of affairs. It did
not, and on its own terms could not, operate as a stay of the
statutory process of acquisition.
79. That conclusion is reinforced by the nature of the act which
the respondents say they were prevented from performing. The
publication of a declaration under Section 19(1) of the Act 30 of
2013 is a decision of the appropriate Government recorded upon
the Collector's report. It does not, of itself, disturb anybody's
possession. Possession under the Act 30 of 2013 is taken at a later
stage, after the award is made and compensation is paid, and the
land vests in the Government only thereafter. There was,
accordingly, nothing in an order preserving possession which stood
in the way of the publication of a declaration.
-41-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
80. There is a further and independent answer. The concluding
limb of Section 19(1) expressly permits different declarations to be
made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land
covered by the same preliminary notification. The notified extent is
Ac.10-10 guntas, equivalent to 49,610 square yards. The
petitioners in W.P.No.924 of 2021 claim 6,773 square yards in Plot
Nos.99, 100, 101, 106 and 107, together with certain further
extents in Plot Nos.121 to 123, 129 and 130. Even on the most
generous view of the interim order, it could have touched only
those plots. Nothing prevented the appropriate Government from
publishing a declaration in respect of the remaining parcels. The
Legislature has expressly provided for precisely this contingency,
and the respondents did not avail themselves of it.
81. It follows that the proceedings for acquisition were not held
up on account of the order dated 12.01.2021 within the meaning of
the first proviso. What the counter-affidavit discloses is that the
respondents, of their own volition, stopped the acquisition process
after that order was passed. A stoppage which an authority
imposes on itself, however cautious it may be, is not the same
thing as proceedings being held up on account of an order of
Court. The first proviso is therefore not attracted at all, and no part
of the period is liable to be excluded.
-42-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
82. Even if the contrary view were taken and some exclusions
were held to be available, it would not save the acquisition. An
exclusion of time presupposes a period which is still running and
which is to be extended by the excluded interval. It cannot operate
upon a period which has already run out. On the finding recorded
on point (ii), the Preliminary Notification stood rescinded on
28.05.2020, nearly eight months before the order of status quo was
made on 12.01.2021. Once the statutory fiction had operated,
there was no notification left in existence to which an exclusion
could apply. A rescinded notification is not revived by a subsequent
order of Court passed in a proceeding to which it was not even the
subject matter.
83. It is also relevant that the respondents have taken no step
whatsoever, in the more than five years since 12.01.2021, to have
the interim order vacated, modified or clarified, notwithstanding
that they now assert that the order brought a public purpose of
some importance to a standstill. An authority which claims that it
was disabled from acting by an order of Court must show that it
acted with reasonable diligence to have the disability removed.
There is nothing on record to that effect.
84. Finally, this Court is unable to accept the submission that
the petitioners cannot take advantage of an order obtained at their
-43-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
own instance. The order dated 12.01.2021 was made to protect the
petitioners from being dispossessed, and their trees from being
felled, at a time when the respondents held no declaration, no
award and no title. The State cannot convert an order made to
protect a citizen's possession into a licence to keep his land under
acquisition indefinitely. To hold otherwise would place the
landowner in an impossible position, obliged to choose between
protecting his possession and preserving his statutory right to have
the acquisition brought to an end within the time the Legislature
has fixed.
85. Point (iii) is accordingly answered against the respondents. It
is held that the interim order of status quo dated 12.01.2021 did
not stay the acquisition proceedings, that the proceedings were not
held up on account of it, that no period falls to be excluded under
the first proviso to Section 19(7) of the Act 30 of 2013, and that the
said order neither preserved nor revived the Preliminary
Notification dated 29.05.2019.
86. On the findings recorded on points (i), (ii) and (iii), the
conclusion is that the Preliminary Notification bearing Gazette
No.R.R.42, dated 29.05.2019, stood rescinded by operation of
Section 19(7) of the Act 30 of 2013 upon the expiry of 28.05.2020,
and that, on the respondents' own case at its highest, it could not
-44-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
in any event have survived beyond 28.05.2021. The acquisition
never reached the stage of a declaration under Section 19(1), and
the question of computing the twelve-month period for an award
under Section 25 of the Act therefore does not arise, that provision
operating only from the date of publication of a declaration under
Section 19.
Point (iv): Whether the earlier proceedings under the Act, 1894
assist the respondents
87. The respondents sought to draw support from the long
history of acquisition of these lands, and in particular from the
possession said to have been taken in the earlier rounds. That
history, when examined, tells against them rather than for them.
88. The first round commenced with the notification under
Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 issued vide G.O.Rt.No.225, dated
23.02.2004. This Court, by order dated 01.02.2006 in
W.P.No.10872 of 2005, quashed the notification insofar as it
dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5-A. Thereafter, by order
dated 09.12.2009 in W.P.Nos.24248 of 2009 and 13705 of 2009
and batch, this Court held that, in the absence of a declaration
under Section 6 within the prescribed period, the notification
under Section 4(1) had ceased to be effective, and declared that the
lands were no longer under acquisition. That order was affirmed by
-45-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
the Division Bench on 15.02.2012 in W.A.Nos.993 of 2010 and
batch.
89. The second round, commenced by the notification under
Section 4(1) dated 19.01.2013 and the declaration under Section 6
issued vide G.O.Ms.No.280, dated 12.12.2013, was set aside by
this Court by common order dated 08.03.2018 in W.P.No.38610 of
2013 and batch.
90. The result is that there is no subsisting acquisition under
the Act, 1894 in respect of these lands. Section 24 of the Act 30 of
2013 has no application, for it operates upon acquisition
proceedings initiated under the Act, 1894 which were pending on
the date of commencement of the Act 30 of 2013. Proceedings
which had ceased to be effective, and proceedings which have been
set aside by a Court, are not proceedings which Section 24 carries
forward. The respondents cannot, therefore, invoke Section 24 as a
source of any continuing right over the subject lands.
91. Since the respondents rely upon the Telangana Amendment
Act 21 of 2017, it is necessary to notice Section 1(3) thereof, which
has been set out earlier, and which gives the provisions of that Act
effect notwithstanding anything contained in any law or judgment
or order of any Court or authority. That provision does not assist
-46-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
the respondents. It gives an overriding effect to the provisions
which the Amendment Act enacts. It does not revive acquisition
proceedings which had ceased to be effective for want of a
declaration within time, nor does it restore proceedings which this
Court had set aside on grounds having nothing to do with anything
the Amendment Act contains. The provision is, moreover, expressly
subject to vested rights, and the rights of the petitioners in their
respective plots, declared free of acquisition by orders which have
become final, are rights of that character.
92. It also follows that the acquisition initiated by the
Preliminary Notification dated 29.05.2019 is not a continuation of
anything. It is a fresh acquisition under a different enactment, and
it must stand or fall upon its own compliance with the Act 30 of
2013. The failure of earlier attempts cannot enlarge the time
available for the present one, and the length of the respondents'
pursuit of these lands cannot be a substitute for compliance with
the statute.
93. As regards the possession claimed in the earlier rounds, the
Division Bench, by its order dated 15.02.2012, rejected the
contention that the alleged taking of possession would permit a
declaration under Section 6 to be issued at any time irrespective of
the statutory limitation, and observed that the possession claimed
-47-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
was possession on paper only, physical possession having
remained with the land owners. That finding binds the
respondents. In any event, possession taken by the State otherwise
than under a completed acquisition confers no right. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court has repeatedly deprecated the practice of the State
retaining possession of private land without acquisition and
without payment of compensation; see Tukaram Kana Joshi v.
6
Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Vidya Devi v.
7
State of Himachal Pradesh .
94. The history is relevant in one further respect. For more than
twenty years these lands have been kept under the shadow of an
acquisition which has never been completed. The petitioners'
applications for regularisation of their layout under
G.O.Ms.No.902, dated 31.12.2007, were rejected on the sole
ground that the lands were under acquisition. The lands were
placed in the prohibitory list under Section 22-A of the Registration
Act, 1908, and have remained there. The petitioners have neither
been able to deal with their property nor been paid for it. In Ram
8
Chand v. Union of India , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had occasion
to consider the plight of owners whose lands were kept under
acquisition for many years without the proceedings being
6
(2013) 1 SCC 353
7
(2020) 2 SCC 569
8
(1994) 1 SCC 44
-48-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
concluded, and observed that such inordinate delay is itself a
matter which calls for relief. The observations are apposite to the
facts of the present case.
95. Point (iv) is accordingly answered against the respondents. It
is held that the earlier acquisition proceedings under the Act, 1894
have ceased to be effective or have been set aside, that they confer
no continuing right upon the respondents, that the possession
claimed thereunder was possession on paper, and that the
Preliminary Notification dated 29.05.2019 must be judged solely by
reference to compliance with the Act 30 of 2013.
Point (v): Whether the petitioners in W.P.No.924 of 2021 are
entitled to protection of their possession
96. W.P.No.924 of 2021 stands on a footing distinct from that of
the other two writ petitions. The grievance there is not merely that
the acquisition has lapsed, but that the respondents were
attempting to dispossess the petitioners, to interfere with their
possession and enjoyment, and to fell trees standing on their plots,
at a time when they held no declaration, no award and no title.
97. The petitioners in that writ petition rely upon registered
instruments. The petitioner No.1 claims 6,773 square yards in Plot
Nos.99, 100, 101, 106 and 107 under a registered Deed of
Exchange dated 31.07.2018, bearing Document No.7486 of 2018,
-49-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
executed by Sri Shankar Mani @ G.V.S. Mani, who had himself
purchased under registered sale deeds of the year 1996. The
remaining petitioners assert their respective claims to Plot Nos.121
to 123, 129 and 130 upon registered documents of the same
layout.
98. This Court is conscious that the exercise of writ jurisdiction
is not the occasion for a final adjudication of title, and nothing in
this order is to be read as such an adjudication. But that is not
what the relief in W.P.No.924 of 2021 requires. The question is a
narrower one, namely, whether the respondents, holding no
completed acquisition, may dispossess persons who are in
possession under registered instruments, or interfere with that
possession, otherwise than in accordance with law. So framed, the
question answers itself.
99. The respondents claim no completed acquisition. Their own
counter-affidavit admits that only the Preliminary Notification
under Section 11(1) was issued, that the declaration under Section
19(1) is yet to be issued, and that the acquisition process was
stopped. They do not point to any award, to any payment or
deposit of compensation, or to any order of a competent authority
by which possession of these plots was taken from the petitioners.
They cannot, in the same breath, contend that the acquisition is
-50-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
incomplete and assert a right to take possession as though it were
complete.
100. The position is governed by Article 300-A of the Constitution
of India, which provides that no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law. In Bishambhar Dayal Chandra
9
Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that the State cannot deprive a person of his property by a mere
executive fiat or order and that such deprivation must have the
authority of law. In K.T. Plantation Private Limited v. State of
10
Karnataka , a Constitution Bench explained the content of the
expression "authority of law" in Article 300-A and held that the law
authorising deprivation must be a valid law, and that deprivation
must be for a public purpose and in accordance with such law.
101. In Delhi Airtech Services Private Limited v. State of Uttar
11
Pradesh , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the statutory
safeguards which protect the land owner in a compulsory
acquisition are not empty formalities but are a substantive
protection against arbitrary deprivation, and that a law which
authorises deprivation of property must give the owner a fair, just
and reasonable procedure.
9
(1982) 1 SCC 39
10
(2011) 9 SCC 1
11
(2011) 9 SCC 354
-51-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
102. In Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh (supra), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that, although the right to
property ceased to be a fundamental right upon the Constitution
(Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, it continues to be a human
right in a welfare State and a constitutional right under Article
300-A, and that the State cannot take the property of a citizen
without following the procedure prescribed by law. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court held as follows:
“12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right
by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it
continued to be a human right 2 in a welfare State, and a
Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article 300
A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property
except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The
obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in
Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article.
12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property,
without following due process of law, would be violative of a human
right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300 A of the
Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan
Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai4, wherein this
Court held that:
“6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article
300A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of "eminent
domain" may interfere with the right of property of a person by
acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and
reasonable compensation therefor must be paid.”
(emphasis supplied)
-52-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, this Court
held that:
“21. If the right of property is a human right as also a
constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in
accordance with law. Article 300A of the Constitution protects such
right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in
view of the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India,
must be strictly construed.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P.
& Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as a basic human
right in the following words:
“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different
political thinkers that some amount of property right is an
indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression
of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long
subsist without the support of property. "Property must be secured,
else liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed
the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved
if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among
political thinkers and jurists.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7 this
Court held as follows:
“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the powers of
the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction
of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking
possession under Article 300A. In other words, if there is no law,
there is no deprivation.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have been forcibly
dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without
following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just
compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible
dispossession in 1967.
-53-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her
predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely
baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in
compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State.
12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the
State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the
sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in
Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was held
that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition,
requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a
welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a
status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.
12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held
that the right to property is now considered to be not only a
constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights
have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to
shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained
a multifaceted dimension.
12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before
the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the
land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse” possession.
The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea
of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty
of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over
12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the
land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the
property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case.
12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and
laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected.
Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of
action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the
Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which
must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and
-54-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of
fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the
delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to
exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.”
103. The same principle was applied in Hari Krishna Mandir Trust
12
v. State of Maharashtra
, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that the State cannot retain land of a citizen without lawful
acquisition and without payment of compensation.
104. Most directly in point is the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
13
Court in Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah , in
which the constituents of the right guaranteed by Article 300-A in
a compulsory acquisition were identified. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that Article 300-A takes in, among its sub-rights, the
duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his
property, the duty to hear his objections, the duty to inform him of
the decision to acquire, the duty to show that the acquisition is for
a public purpose, the duty to restitute and rehabilitate, the duty to
conduct the acquisition efficiently and within the timelines
prescribed, and the requirement that the proceedings be brought to
a conclusion. Failure to comply with these requirements makes the
deprivation open to challenge as being without the authority of law.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
12
(2020) 9 SCC 356
13
(2024) 10 SCC 533
-55-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
“30. What then are these sub-rights or strands of this
swadeshi constitutional fabric constituting the right to property?
Seven such sub-rights can be identified, albeit non-exhaustive.
These are:
i) duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire
his property – the right to notice,
ii) the duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition – the
right to be heard,
iii) the duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to
acquire – the right to a reasoned decision,
iv) the duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is for
public purpose – the duty to acquire only for public purpose,
v) the duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate – the right of
restitution or fair compensation,
vi) the duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition
efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings – the
right to an efficient and expeditious process, and
vii) final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting – the
right of conclusion.
31. These seven rights are foundational components of a
law that is tune with Article 300A, and the absence of one of
these or some of them would render the law susceptible to
challenge. The judgment of this Court in K.T. Plantations (supra)13
declares that the law envisaged under Article 300A must be in
line with the overarching principles of rule of law, and must be
just, fair, and reasonable. It is, of course, precedentially sound to
describe some of these sub-rights as ‘procedural’, a nomenclature
that often tends to undermine the inherent worth of these
safeguards. These seven sub-rights may be procedures, but they
do constitute the real content of the right to property under Article
300A, non- compliance of these will amount to violation of the
right, being without the authority of law.”
105. The sixth and seventh of the constituents so identified,
namely, the right to an efficient and expeditious process and the
-56-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
right of conclusion, are directly engaged by the facts of this case. A
preliminary notification published in May, 2019, which has not
advanced by a single statutory step in more than seven years, and
which the acquiring authority itself describes as having been
stopped, is the very mischief which those constituents are directed
against. The timelines in Sections 19(7) and 25 of the Act 30 of
2013 are the legislative expression of the same principle, and they
cannot be treated as directory when their consequence is the land
owner being kept out of the enjoyment of his property for years
together.
106. Applying these principles, the petitioners in W.P.No.924 of
2021 are entitled to protection. So long as the respondents have
not lawfully acquired the subject plots and paid compensation,
they cannot dispossess the petitioners, interfere with their
possession and enjoyment, or fell trees standing upon the plots, on
the strength of the acquisition proceedings covered by Gazette
Notification No.R.R.42, dated 29.05.2019, which have ceased to
have legal effect. The public purpose relied upon, however
important, does not authorise the authorities to bypass the
acquisition procedure and take possession of private property by
executive action.
-57-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
107. This protection is, however, subject to two clarifications.
First, it is not an adjudication of the petitioners' title, and it does
not preclude any competent forum from deciding a dispute as to
title between the petitioners and any other claimant. Secondly, it
does not preclude the respondents from taking possession
pursuant to a lawful acquisition completed hereafter in accordance
with the Act 30 of 2013, or otherwise in accordance with law.
108. Point (v) is accordingly answered in favour of the petitioners
in W.P.No.924 of 2021 to the extent indicated above.
Point (vi): Relief, including the consequential reliefs
109. On the findings recorded above, the petitioners in
W.P.Nos.8527 and 8552 of 2024 are entitled to a declaration that
the acquisition proceedings initiated pursuant to Gazette
Notification No.R.R.42, dated 29.05.2019, have ceased to have
legal effect by operation of Section 19(7) of the Act 30 of 2013, and
the petitioners in W.P.No.924 of 2021 are entitled to the protection
indicated under point (v).
110. As regards the relief concerning Section 22-A of the
Registration Act, 1908, the subject lands are said to have been
included in the prohibitory list on account of the acquisition. To
the extent that the entry rests upon Gazette Notification No.R.R.42,
-58-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
dated 29.05.2019, its foundation has gone. This Court is not,
however, in a position to say upon the present record whether the
entry rests upon that acquisition alone or upon some other ground
as well, and it would not be appropriate for this Court to direct
deletion of an entry without that being examined by the authority
upon whom the statute confers the function. The appropriate
course is to direct the competent authority to consider the matter
and pass a reasoned order within a stipulated time.
111. As regards the alleged two-feet wall, the petitioners assert
that it was constructed by the Greyhounds authorities over
portions of the subject lands, and the respondents deny that any
such wall was constructed by them. There is no material before
this Court as to the existence, location, dimensions or alignment of
any such structure, or as to the authority under which it is said to
have been raised. That is a disputed question of fact which cannot
be resolved in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. No positive direction for removal can,
therefore, be issued. It is, however, necessary to make it clear that
the respondents shall not raise any further construction upon the
subject lands except in accordance with law, and the petitioners
are left free to pursue such remedies as may be available to them
in respect of the alleged structure.
-59-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
112. The petitioners also raised contentions founded upon the
proximity of the subject lands to the Chilkur Reserve Forest and
the Mrugavani National Park, and upon the alleged failure to
comply with the requirements relating to social and environmental
impact. The notification dated 26.10.2018, by which the State
Government granted exemption under Section 10-A of the Act 30 of
2013 from the provisions of Chapter II and Chapter III, has not
been assailed in these writ petitions. So long as that notification
stands, the requirements of the Social Impact Assessment do not
govern this acquisition, and the grievance on that score cannot be
examined. It is, at the same time, necessary to repeat that the
exemption operates only upon Chapter II and Chapter III, and
leaves untouched the obligations under Chapter IV, including
Section 19(7), which are the obligations the respondents have
failed to discharge. In view of the findings recorded on points (i) to
(iii), it is in any event unnecessary to go into these contentions,
and all questions on this aspect are left open, to be raised and
considered in any fresh proceedings, should occasion arise.
113. Finally, it is necessary to say a word about the liberty to be
reserved to the State. The public purpose relied upon, namely, the
construction of a Commando Training Centre for a specialised
force, is a matter of evident public importance, and nothing in this
-60-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
order is intended to stand in the way of it. What this order holds is
that the purpose must be achieved by following the law which the
Legislature has enacted, within the timelines which it has fixed,
and upon payment of the compensation and rehabilitation and
resettlement entitlements for which it provides. Liberty is
accordingly reserved to the respondents to initiate fresh acquisition
proceedings in accordance with the Act 30 of 2013.
114. It is, however, necessary to record that the subject lands
have now been the object of three successive acquisitions over a
period exceeding two decades, each of which has failed at the very
same stage. During that period the petitioners and their
predecessors have been refused regularisation of their layout on
the ground of a pending acquisition, have found their lands
entered in the prohibitory list, and have received no compensation.
Should the respondents choose to initiate fresh proceedings, they
are expected to pursue them with diligence and to complete them
within the periods which the statute prescribes.
115. Point (vi) is answered accordingly.
CONCLUSION
116. For the reasons recorded in the foregoing discussion, the
conclusions of this Court may be summarised as follows.
-61-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
117. Firstly, the Preliminary Notification bearing Gazette
No.R.R.42, dated 29.05.2019, was published under Section 11(1) of
the Act 30 of 2013 on 29.05.2019, and the period of twelve months
prescribed by Section 19(7) expired on 28.05.2020 without any
declaration under Section 19(1) having been made. The
consequence prescribed by Section 19(7), namely, that the
notification shall be deemed to have been rescinded, is automatic
and self-executing, and operates unless the acquiring authority
brings itself within the exclusion under the first proviso or the
extension under the second and third provisos.
118. Secondly, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Telangana
Amendment) Act, 2016, published as Act No.21 of 2017, does not
amend Section 19 of the Act 30 of 2013 in any respect. The plea in
the counter-affidavit that the extension was granted under Section
19(7) "as amended by the Telangana Amendment Act, 21 of 2017"
therefore rests on a mistaken premise. The power of extension
under the second proviso continues to vest in the appropriate
Government alone, and the District Collector, who is said to have
granted the extension, had no power to do so.
119. Thirdly, and independently, Proceedings No.G2/4576/2018,
dated 21.01.2020, has not been shown to be a valid exercise of the
-62-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
power of extension for other reasons as well. The proceedings have
not been produced, the reasons recorded in them are not on
record, and there is no material to show that the decision was
notified or uploaded as the third proviso requires. The reason
offered, namely, the conduct of Municipal Elections and Co-
operative Elections, is not a circumstance justifying extension of a
period fixed for the protection of the land owner. Even assuming
the extension to be valid, the extended period expired without a
declaration, whether it is taken to have ended on 20.01.2021 or on
28.05.2021.
120. Fourthly, the exemption granted by notification dated
26.10.2018 under Section 10-A of the Act 30 of 2013, as inserted
by the Amendment Act, operates only upon Chapter II and Chapter
III of the Act. It does not touch Chapter IV, in which Sections 11,
15 and 19 are found. The acquisition therefore remained subject to
Section 19(7) throughout.
121. Fifthly, the interim order of status quo dated 12.01.2021
passed in W.P.No.924 of 2021 did not stay the operation of the
Gazette Notification dated 29.05.2019 and did not restrain
publication of a declaration under Section 19(1). It was confined to
the possession and enjoyment of the plots of the petitioners in that
writ petition. Publication of a declaration would not have disturbed
-63-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
possession, and Section 19(1) in terms permits separate
declarations in respect of different parcels covered by the same
preliminary notification. The proceedings were therefore not held
up on account of that order, and no period falls to be excluded
under the first proviso, the language of which the State Legislature
left unaltered even while widening the comparable exclusion in
Section 24(2). In any event, an exclusion of time cannot operate
upon a period which has already expired, and the said order,
having been passed after 28.05.2020, could neither preserve nor
revive a notification which stood rescinded.
122. Sixthly, the earlier acquisition proceedings under the Act,
1894 have either ceased to be effective or have been set aside by
orders of this Court which have attained finality. Section 24 of the
Act 30 of 2013 has no application. The possession claimed by the
authorities in those rounds was found by the Division Bench to be
possession on paper. The respondents can derive no right from
those proceedings, and the acquisition of 2019 must stand or fall
upon its own compliance with the Act 30 of 2013.
123. Seventhly, in the absence of a declaration under Section
19(1), an award under Section 25 and payment of compensation,
the respondents have no right to dispossess the petitioners in
W.P.No.924 of 2021, to interfere with their possession and
-64-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
enjoyment, or to fell trees standing on their plots. Article 300-A of
the Constitution of India requires that deprivation of property be by
authority of law, and the authority of law in a compulsory
acquisition includes adherence to the procedure and to the
timelines which the acquisition statute prescribes.
124. Eighthly, the question of lapse under Section 25 of the Act
30 of 2013 does not arise for determination, that provision
operating only from the date of publication of a declaration under
Section 19, which was never published.
125. Ninthly, the reliefs relating to Section 22-A of the
Registration Act, 1908 are to be worked out by the competent
authority in the light of the declaration granted, and the relief
relating to the alleged two-feet wall cannot be granted upon the
present record, which discloses a disputed question of fact.
126. Lastly, nothing in this order precludes the respondents from
initiating fresh acquisition proceedings in respect of the subject
lands for a genuine public purpose, provided such proceedings are
initiated and completed strictly in accordance with the Act 30 of
2013 and other applicable law.
-65-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
RESULT
127. In the result:
128. W.P.Nos.8527 and 8552 of 2024 are allowed. It is declared
that the land acquisition proceedings initiated pursuant to Gazette
Notification No.R.R.42, dated 29.05.2019, in respect of Ac.10-10
guntas in Sy.Nos.362, 373 and 374 of Manchirevula Village,
Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, stood rescinded and
have ceased to have legal effect by operation of Section 19(7) of the
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
129. Consequently, the continuance of the said acquisition
proceedings by the respondent authorities, and any action taken or
proposed to be taken on the strength thereof, is declared to be
without authority of law.
130. The respondent authorities are directed to consider and pass
a reasoned order, within a period of eight weeks from the date of
receipt of a copy of this order, upon the question of deletion of the
subject lands from the prohibitory list maintained under Section
22-A of the Registration Act, 1908, in so far as their inclusion rests
upon Gazette Notification No.R.R.42, dated 29.05.2019, and to
communicate the order so passed to the petitioners.
-66-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
131. W.P.No.924 of 2021 is allowed to the extent that the
respondents shall not dispossess the petitioners from Plot Nos.99,
100, 101, 106, 107, 121 to 123, 129 and 130, forming part of
Sy.Nos.362/4, 373/4 and 374/4 of Manchirevula Village, shall not
interfere with their possession and enjoyment thereof, and shall
not fell trees standing thereon, on the strength of the acquisition
proceedings covered by Gazette Notification No.R.R.42, dated
29.05.2019, except in accordance with law.
132. The relief sought for removal of the alleged two-feet wall is
declined, the same involving a disputed question of fact, with
liberty to the petitioners to pursue such remedies as may be
available to them in that regard. The respondents shall not raise
any further construction upon the subject lands except in
accordance with law.
133. It is clarified that this order does not constitute an
adjudication of the title of the petitioners to the subject lands, and
shall not preclude any competent forum from determining a
dispute as to title in accordance with law.
134. It is further clarified that this order shall not preclude the
respondents from initiating fresh acquisition proceedings in respect
of the subject lands, if they are genuinely required for a public
-67-
VRKR,J
WP_8527_2024 & BATCH
purpose, provided that such proceedings are initiated and
completed strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and other applicable
law.
135. There shall be no order as to costs.
136. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in
these writ petitions shall stand closed.
____________________________________
VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J
Date: 03.09.2026
AS