BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. & Anr vs The Secretary Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission
- Court
- Appellate Tribunal For Electricity
IN THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR ELECTRICITY
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
APPEAL NO.21 OF 2020
Dated: 25.05.2026
Present: Hon’ble Ms. Seema Gupta, Officiating Chairperson
Hon’ble Mr. Virender Bhat, Judicial Member
In the matter of:
1. BSES Yamuna Power Ltd.
Shakti Kiran Building, Karkardooma
Opposite Karkardooma Courts,
Delhi - 110032
2. BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd.
BSES Bhawan, Nehru Place,
New Delhi - 110019 … Appellants
Versus
1. The Secretary
Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission
Viniyamak Bhawan, ‘C’ Block, Shivalik,
Malviya Nagar, New Delhi - 110017
2. Indraprastha Power Generation Company Ltd.
Through its Managing Director
Having its registered office
Himadri, Rajghat Power House Office Complex,
New Delhi – 110002
3. State Load Despatch Center
Through its Secretary
Delhi Transco Limited
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 1 of 25
33 KV Sub-Station Building,
Minto Road, New Delhi – 110002 … Respondent(s)
Counsel on record for the Appellant(s) : Hasan Murtaza
For App.1&2
Counsel on record for the Respondent(s) : Shantanu Singh
For Res. 1
Anand K. Ganesan
Swapna Seshadri
Ashwin Ramanathan
Utkarsh Singh
For Res. 2
Sangeeta Bharti
Ashish Kumar
Anju Shree Nair
Sushil Kumar Singh
Krishanu Adhikary
Anubha Dhulia
Shakti Verma
Roja Raphael
Jordan Rohminthanga
Mehak Kanwar
For Res. 3
J U D G M E N T
PER HON’BLE MR. VIRENDER BHAT, JUDICIAL MEMBER
1. The BSES Yamuna Power Limited and BSES Rajdhani Power
Limited, the two distribution licensees operating in the NCT of Delhi, have
st
come up in appeal against the order dated 10.12.2019 passed by the 1
respondent Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (hereinafter referred
to as the Commission) wherein the Commission while holding that the
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 2 of 25
nd
PPAs executed by the appellant with the 2 respondent M/s Indraprastha
Power Generation Company Limited for purchase of power from its
Rajghat Power House had expired in the months of May, 2015 and July,
nd
2015, held the appellants liable to pay energy bills raised by the 2
respondent till 31.12.2015 i.e. the date when the said Rajghat Power
House was finally closed as per the directions of Delhi Pollution Control
Committee (in short DPCC).
2. The main ground upon which the appellants have assailed the
impugned order of the Commission is that once the PPAs entered by them
with respondent no.2 have expired and were not renewed, they cannot be
made liable to pay capacity charges beyond the date of expiry of the
PPAs.
3.
The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that the Delhi Government
issued policy directions under Section 108 of Electricity Act, 2003 on
28.06.2006 to the Commission for making power arrangements in Delhi
beyond 01.04.2007. Accordingly, vide order dated 30.03.2007 the
Commission reassigned all the existing PPAs from Delhi Transco Limited
to the distribution licensees operating in the NCT of Delhi including the
appellants. Hence, the responsibility for arranging power in their
respective areas of distribution with effect from 01.04.2007 was vested in
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 3 of 25
the concerned distribution licensees including the appellants.
nd
Consequently, the appellants executed PPAs with the 2 respondent on
16.07.2012 for purchase of power from its Rajghat Power House on
mutually agreed terms and conditions as contained in the PPAs. Clause
13.1 of the PPAs provide that the validity of the agreements is till
completion of 25 years from the date of commercial operation of last
unit/GT/module of the power house unless it is specifically extended on
mutually agreed terms.
4. Since, according to the appellants, the PPAs expired in the months
of May, 2015 (in respect of BRPL) and July, 2015 (in respect of BYPL)
nd
and were not extended thereafter, they apprised the 2 respondent that
they do not have any intention to extend the PPAs, with further request
not to schedule as well as dispatch any power from the Rajghat Power
House to them. It appears that despite such communication from the
nd
appellant, 2 respondent continued to schedule and dispatch power from
the Rajghat Power House to them and accordingly, continued to raise
energy bills for the months of June, 2015 till December, 2015 and January
to February, 2016.
5. Accordingly, the appellants approached the Commission by way of
two separate petitions bearing nos.24/2016 and 28/2016 with the following
prayers: -
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 4 of 25
“a) Direct RPH to withdraw the energy bills raised upon
the petitioner w.e.f. August 2015 for BYPL and June 2015
for BRPL;
b) Restrain RPH from raising any energy bills as the
petitioner is not purchasing nor scheduling any power RPH
and RPH is not entitled to recover any cost from the
petitioner; and
c) Pass appropriate orders direct RPH and SLDC not
to schedule and dispatch power.”
6. The Commission, in the impugned order, holds that the PPAs
executed between the appellants and the 2nd respondent expired in the
months of May, 2015 and July, 2015 but also held the appellants liable to
pay energy bills raised by the 2nd respondent till 31.12.2015 i.e. the date
when the power house was finally closed as per the direction of DPCC,
on the following reasons: -
“b) The only issue remains to be adjudicated is about
energy bills of RPH till 31.12.2015. In normal
circumstances the power stations are not entitled to raise
bills after expiry of the PPA. The contention of the
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 5 of 25
petitioners is that even after expiry of PPAs, the RPH
continues to bill the fixed charges. The Respondent IPGCL
has submitted that the plant was kept in operational mode
and availability was indicated to SLDC
c) It is noted that a meeting was held on 05.06.2015 at
the State Government level attended by Petitioner also,
wherein, it was decided that allocation of power from RPH
would continue for at least six months after the stabilization
of 400 KV grid sub-station, under construction by Central
Sector, under Inter-State Transmission System Scheme.
The RPH was closed as per the directions of DPCC and no
further scheduling of the power was done thereafter. A
plant/station available for scheduling of power is entitled for
the fixed charge even if no energy is drawn from the
station. On the issue of scheduling of power from RPH
despite PPA being expired, SLDC has clarified that once
the generating station declares capacity, SLDC is bound to
schedule power and dispatch the same to the distribution
licensee for making it available within the state from that
station, and it was not its duty to verify whether there exist
a valid PPA under which scheduling is being done.
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 6 of 25
d) Keeping in view the fact that in wake of the
stabilization of the 400 KV grid sub-station it was decided
by the Government of Delhi to continue the allocation of
power from RPH till at least 6 months after the stabilization
of the 400 KV grid sub-station under construction at RPH
by Central Sector under ISTS Scheme and allocation of
power was made for the petitioner as well, the Petitioners
are liable to pay the bills in respect of RPH till 31.12.2015
i.e. the date the RPH was finally closed as per the direction
of DPCC.”
7. Accordingly, the appellants, feeling aggrieved by the said order of
the Commission, are in appeal before us.
8. We have heard Mr. Buddy Ranganadhan, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Shantanu Singh, learned
st
counsel for the 1 respondent, Shri Anand Ganesan, learned counsel for
nd
the 2 respondent, and Ms. Anju Shree Nair, learned counsel appearing
for the 3rd respondent. We have also perused the written submissions
filed by the learned counsels.
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 7 of 25
9. The impugned order, ex facie, does not appear to be legally sound
and acceptable. It is not in dispute that power was being supplied by the
nd
2 respondent to the appellants in accordance with the terms and
conditions contained in the PPAs dated 16.07.2012 executed between the
parties.
10. Clause 13.1 of the PPAs is with regards to the duration of these
agreements and is extracted hereinbelow: -
“13.1 The validity of the agreement shall be upto
completion of twenty five (25) years from the date of
commercial operation of last Unit/GT/Module of the station
unless it is specifically extended on mutually agreed
terms.”
11. Taking the same into consideration, the Commission held that the
PPAs expired in the months of May, 2015 and July, 2015. It is nowhere
the case of any of the parties that PPAs were renewed or extended after
their expiry. Therefore, the Commission ought to have accepted the
contention of the appellants that the scheduling or dispatch of power from
the Rajghat Power House to them by SLDC, even after the expiry of PPAs,
was unlawful and they were not liable to pay the energy bills post the
expiry date of the PPAs.
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 8 of 25
12. A Power Purchase Agreement between a power generator and a
distribution licensee is like any other commercial agreement whereunder
a generator agrees to sell power to the distribution licensee and the
distribution licensee agrees to purchase power from the generator on
mutually agreed terms which are mentioned in the PPAs. Of course, as
envisaged under Section 86(1)(b) of the Electricity Act, 2003, the PPA
needs to be approved by the concerned Regulatory Commission, which
is not the case with normal commercial contracts. However, it is equally
true that once approved, a PPA becomes akin to any other commercial
contract and rights and obligations of the parties are governed by the
terms and conditions contained therein. Duration of a PPA is an essential
term and binds the parties. Once the duration of the Power Purchase
Agreement comes to an end by efflux of time, the obligations on the
respective parties under the agreement also come to an end. In other
words, after the expiry of a PPA, the generator is no longer bound to
supply power to the distribution licensee any further and the distribution
licensee is not bound to receive power from the generator and to pay for
it. Thus, the rights and obligations of the parties to the PPA cease to exist
after its date of expiry unless the same is renewed or extended on
mutually agreed terms.
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 9 of 25
13. Concededly, in the instant case, the Power Purchase Agreements
nd
executed between the appellants and the 2 respondent were neither
renewed nor extended beyond the months of May, 2015 and July, 2015.
Therefore, the appellants were not under any obligation to receive power
nd
from the power house of 2 respondent as scheduled and dispatched by
rd
SLDC (the 3 respondent) and to pay for it.
nd
14. The energy bills raised by 2 respondent to the appellants post the
expiry of the PPAs are manifestly unlawful and contrary to the terms and
conditions as contained in the PPAs and thus not payable by the
appellants.
15. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent has vehemently argued
that the Commission has erred in counting the period of 25 years, as
mentioned in clause 13.1 of the PPAs, from May, 1990, when the Rajghat
Power House was commissioned. It is submitted that even though initial
commissioning of the power house had taken place in the month of May,
1990, a period of around 6 to 9 months was required for its stabilization
and declaring it commercially operational. It is further submitted that since
the date of actual commercial operation of the power house is not
available in their records, the period of 25 years ought to be reckoned from
December, 1990 for the reason that as per clause 13.1 of the PPA, it is
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 10 of 25
up to completion of 25 years from the date of commercial operation of the
last unit/GT/module of the power station.
16. It is, thus, argued that even if the contentions of the appellants in the
appeal are accepted, then also the PPAs shall be taken to have expired
in the month of December, 2015 and therefore, energy bills raised by the
2nd respondent till December, 2015 are payable. It is, thus, argued that
the impugned order does not call for any interference from this Tribunal in
this regard.
nd
17. On behalf of the appellants’, it is argued that since the 2
respondent has accepted the impugned order of the Commission as it has
not filed any appeal against it, it is precluded from challenging any findings
contained in the same in this appeal filed by the appellants. The
submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that in case, the
nd
2 respondent felt aggrieved by any finding contained in the impugned
order, it ought to have filed a separate appeal impugning those findings
and cannot be heard to contend in this appeal that any finding given by
the Commission in the impugned order is perverse and not tenable.
18. Relying upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Banarsi & Ors. v. Ram Phal (2003) 9 SCC 606 and RattanIndia Power
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 11 of 25
Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited and
Anr. in Civil Appeal No.8232 of 2023 decided on 10.12.2025, learned
nd nd
counsel for the 2 respondent argued that even though the 2
respondent has not filed any separate appeal against any finding
contained in the impugned order, it is still competent to support the
impugned order of the Commission to the extent it is already in its favour
by assailing any finding recorded in the impugned order which is against
it.
19. In the case of Banarsi & Ors. (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has observed and held as under: -
“ 9. Any respondent though he may not have filed an appeal
from any part of the decree may still support the decree to
the extent to which it is already in his favour by laying
challenge to a finding recorded in the impugned judgment
against him. Where a plaintiff seeks a decree against the
defendant on grounds (A) and (B), any one of the two
grounds being enough to entitle the plaintiff to a decree and
the court has passed a decree on ground (A) deciding it for
the plaintiff while ground (B) has been decided against the
plaintiff, in an appeal preferred by the defendant, in spite of
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 12 of 25
the finding on ground (A) being reversed the plaintiff as a
respondent can still seek to support the decree by
challenging the finding on ground (B) and persuade the
appellate court to form an opinion that in spite of the finding
on ground (A) being reversed to the benefit of the defendant-
appellant the decree could still be sustained by reversing the
finding on ground (B) though the plaintiff-respondent has
neither preferred an appeal of his own nor taken any cross-
objection. A right to file cross-objection is the exercise of
right to appeal though in a different form. It was observed in
Sahadu Gangaram Bhagade v. Special Dy. Collector,
Ahmednagar that the right given to a respondent in an
appeal to file cross-objection is a right given to the same
extent as is a right of appeal to lay challenge to the
impugned decree if he can be said to be aggrieved thereby.
Taking any cross-objection is the exercise of right of appeal
and takes the place of cross-appeal though the form differs.
Thus it is clear that just as an appeal is preferred by a person
aggrieved by the decree so also a cross-objection is
preferred by one who can be said to be aggrieved by the
decree. A party who has fully succeeded in the suit can and
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 13 of 25
needs to neither prefer an appeal nor take any cross-
objection though certain finding may be against him. Appeal
and cross-objection - both are filed against decree and not
against judgment and certainly not against any finding
recorded in a judgment. This was the well-settled position of
law under the unamended CPC. ”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Thus, where a court passes a decree against a party but the
judgment contains certain findings against that party, he may assail those
findings in an appeal filed by the opposite party and is not required to file
any cross-objections in that appeal or a separate appeal.
nd
21. In the instant case, the 2 respondent was not aggrieved by the
impugned order of the Commission as the same has been passed in its
favour. Therefore, there was no cause or occasion for it to either prefer a
separate appeal against the impugned order or to file cross objections in
nd
the present appeal of the appellants, even though the 2 respondent was
not happy about certain findings in the impugned order namely reckoning
of period of 25 years, as provided in clause 13.1 of the PPAs, from May,
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 14 of 25
1990 when the Rajghat Power House was commissioned. Therefore, as
nd nd
correctly submitted by learned counsel for the 2 respondent, the 2
respondent is competent to support the impugned order of the
Commission by assailing the findings of the Commission on the above
noted aspect, in case, the finding of the Commission in the impugned
order on other aspects is reversed by this Tribunal in this appeal.
nd
22. Having said so, we hasten to add that the argument on behalf of 2
respondent that the period of 25 years, as mentioned in clause 13.1 of the
PPAs ought to be reckoned from December, 1990 and not from May, 1990
as done by the Commission in the impugned order, has been raised for
the first time in this appeal. No submissions in this regard were made on
nd
behalf of 2 respondent during the hearing of the petition by the
nd
Commission. The contentions raised by the 2 respondent IPGCL before
the Commission, as noted in the impugned order, were as under: -
“4. Per contra the Respondent IPGCL made the
following submissions:
a) The actual Date of commercial operation (COD) of the
Plant is not certain and in the original PPA signed
between the parties the expiry date of the PPA was in
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 15 of 25
2017 whereas in the supplementary PPA signed
between the parties the expiry of the PPA was in 2015.
b) The Petitioner has sought to project as if the present
matter only involves the interpretation of Article 13 of
the Supplementary PPA and needs to be adjudicated
as a Section 86(1(f) dispute under the Electricity Act,
2003. However, this is not the case.
c) The Petitioner is selectively relying on certain
communications of SLDC/DTL to contend that there is
no requirement to operate the RPH to provide grid
security and stability. However, SLDC, DTL has at
several points of time taken the position that the
Islanding Scheme implemented for NCT of Delhi
requires substantial embedded generation including the
generation from RPH. This has also been concurred
with by the Central Electricity Authority (CEA). Also, the
SLDC has been scheduling the power RPH on a regular
basis.
d) In the Meeting held on 05.06.2015, the State
Government had directed as under:-
"2. Non-scheduling of power of Rajghat Power House
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 16 of 25
…..
The total share of NDMC and MES from 285 MW
BTPS which has been reallocated to UP was about
70MW, so as to meet the power requirement and
better flexibility and since it is a generation at the
load centre which may be handy in case of any
trouble or bottleneck in the grid, the same quantity
of power is allocated to NDMC and MES from RPH
and the balance power of RPH is reallocated to
other three DISCOMs in the same ration as
allocated earlier. Based upon the new allocation of
Power to different DISCOMs shall be as under:-
I) NDMC - 37.41%
II) MES - 14.96%
III) BRPL - 20.67%
IV) BYPL - 11.75%
V) TPDDL - 14.37%
VI) IP Station - 0.84%
The above allocation of power from RPH shall
continue till atleast 6 months after the stabilization
of the 400 KV grid substation under construction at
RPH by Central Sector under ISTS Scheme.
DISCOMs & IPGCL are accordingly requested to
take necessary actions for renewal of PPAs."
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 17 of 25
e) The petitioner's contention that Article 13.1 of the
PPA refers to station wise expiry of 25 years from the
commercial date is not correct. Till the time there is a
clear direction from the Government of NCT of Delhi,
the power allocation cannot be stopped or done away
with.
f) Further the power of scheduled by SLDC/availability
certified by SLDC during the period beyond alleged
expiry of PPA cannot be unilaterally decided by the
petitioner as illegal. The RPH power station of the
Respondent is situated as an embedded power station
in the National Capital grid. The power station is must
to operate for supply of power in the walled city of
National Capital. It is also one of the important elements
of islanding schemes of Delhi which has been finalized
by DTL in line with the recommendations of CEA to
avoid recurrence of the impact of the grid collapse
incidents on 30th and 31st July, 2012 leading to
complete darkness to National Capital. It is not merely
an interpretation of one terms of the PPA as being
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 18 of 25
contended by the Petitioner. The contentions and
averments to the contrary are wrong and are denied.”
nd
23. It was nowhere the case of the 2 respondent before the
Commission that in view of requirement of stabilization period of around 6
to 9 months from the power house from the date of initial commissioning,
the date of commercial operation of the power house as contemplated
under clause 13.1 of the PPAs ought to be taken as December, 1990 and
accordingly the period of 25 years as stipulated in the said clause of the
PPAs ought to be reckoned from December, 1990. It is for this reason that
there is no finding on this aspect by the Commission in the impugned
order. Since, the said plea has been raised for the first time in this appeal,
the same cannot be entertained or considered. It is a settled principle of
law that a party cannot be permitted to raise a fresh plea for the first time
during the hearing in the appeal when the same was not raised or agitated
before the original forum against the order of which the appeal has been
preferred.
24.
Hence, we decline to consider the said plea raised on behalf of the
nd
2 respondent.
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25. Even otherwise also, it is evident that the said argument on behalf
nd nd
of 2 respondent is only based upon conjectures. Concededly the 2
respondent itself also does not know the actual date of commercial
operation of the power house. It has nowhere been explained as to
whether the stabilization period of 6 to 9 months from the date of
commissioning of the power house is mandatory for every power house
or in some cases the commercial operation of the power house could be
achieved within a lesser period from the date of commissioning.
nd
Therefore, the submissions of the 2 respondent in this context also lack
merit and cannot be countenanced.
nd
26. On behalf of the 2 respondent, a reference is also made to meeting
convened by the Department of Power, Govt. of Delhi on 05.06.2015
wherein the representative of the appellants was also present and wherein
the decision about fresh allocation of power from the Rajghat Power
House to NDMC, MES, BRPL, BYPL, TPDDL and IPGCL was taken and
it was further decided that such allocation of power shall continue till at
least six months after the stabilization of 400kV grid substation under
construction at the power house under ISTS scheme. It is argued that
thus, the appellants consented to such allocation of power from Rajghat
Power House for period of six months i.e. till December, 2015 and
therefore, they are liable to pay the energy bills till December, 2015 as
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 20 of 25
held by the Commission in the impugned order. We do not find any force
in these submissions. In the concluding Paragraph of the minutes of the
nd
said meeting, it has been stated that the discoms and IPGCL (the 2
respondent) are requested to take necessary action for renewal of PPAs.
This is indicative of the fact that renewal of PPAs was necessary in order
to give effect to such reallocation of power as decided in the said meeting.
nd
Undisputedly, the 2 respondent did not take any steps to get the PPAs
with the appellants renewed in pursuance to minutes of this meeting. No
nd
correspondence appears to have been exchanged between 2
respondent and the appellants in this context after the said meeting.
Clause 13.1 of the PPAs, which has already been extracted in Paragraph
No.11 hereinabove, also mandates that the validity of the agreement shall
be 25 years from the date of commercial operation of the last
unit/GT/module of the power house unless it is specifically extended on
mutually agreed terms. So, the parties had never agreed for automatic
extension of PPAs. There had to be a fresh meeting of minds between
the parties in order to agree upon the terms and conditions to be specified
in the extended PPAs. In the absence of such meeting of minds between
the parties for extension of the PPAs, it cannot be said that the reallocation
of power decided in the meeting dated 05.06.2015 was accepted by the
appellants.
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27. Strange and incongruous submission has been made on behalf of
rd
the 3 respondent SLDC to the effect that SLDC is not required to
independently examine the extensions or validity of the PPAs before
undertaking scheduling and dispatch of power. It is argued that the
functions of SLDC are operational as well as technical in nature and are
not governed by contractual arrangements entered into between
generating companies and distribution licensees. It is further submitted
that SLDC cannot stop scheduling merely on the basis of unilateral
assertion by the distribution licensee before the expiry or the termination
of the Power Purchase Agreement.
28. In our view, these assertions made on behalf of SLDC are fallacious,
to say the least. Section 32 of the Electricity Act, 2003 specifies the
functions of SLDC and the same is extracted hereinbelow: -
“Section 32. (Functions of State Load Despatch Centres): --
- (1) The State Load Despatch Centre shall be the apex body
to ensure integrated operation of the power system in a
State.
(2) The State Load Despatch Centre shall –
(a) be responsible for optimum scheduling and despatch of
electricity within a State, in accordance with the contracts
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 22 of 25
entered into with the licensees or the generating companies
operating in that State;
(b) monitor grid operations;
(c) keep accounts of the quantity of electricity transmitted
through the State grid;
(d) exercise supervision and control over the intra-State
transmission system; and
(e) be responsible for carrying out real time operations for
grid control and despatch of electricity within the State
through secure and economic operation of the State grid in
accordance with the Grid Standards and the State Grid
Code.
(3) The State Load Despatch Centre may levy and collect
such fee and charges from the generating companies and
licensees engaged in intra-State transmission of electricity
as may be specified by the State Commission.”
29. Sub-section 2(a) of Section 32 clearly provides that the SLDC is
responsible for scheduling and dispatch of electricity within a state in
accordance with the contracts entered into between the licensees and the
generating companies. Therefore, the existence of a PPA between a
generating company and a distribution licensee in a state forms the basis
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 23 of 25
upon which scheduling and dispatch of power is to be made by SLDC.
Therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of SLDC to state that its functions
are not governed by the contractual arrangements between generating
companies and distribution licensees. The contention on behalf of the
SLDC that scheduling cannot be refused merely on the basis of unilateral
assertion by a distribution licensee regarding the expiry or termination of
the PPA is not legally tenable. Once a distribution licensee informs SLDC
that PPA executed by it with a generating company has already expired,
it can, at best, verify the factum of expiry of PPA from the concerned
generating company and upon such verification stop forthwith scheduling
and dispatch of power from the generating station of the generating
company to the distribution licensee. Since this scheduling and dispatch
of power is to be done by SLDC in accordance with the PPA executed
between the distribution licensee and a generating station, it cannot close
its eyes and continue such scheduling and dispatch of power even when
it is informed by a distribution licensee or a generating company that the
PPA has expired. The judgment dated 05.09.2014 in appeal no.171/2013
Ravikiran Power Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. SLDC & Ors., which has been relied
rd
upon by learned counsel for the 3 respondent SLDC, has been rendered
in a different context and is not applicable to the facts of the instant case.
Conclusion: -
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Appeal No.21 of 2020 Page 24 of 25
30. Considering the above discussion, we are unable to sustain the
impugned order of the Commission. The same is hereby set aside. We
nd
hold that the appellants are not liable to pay any energy charges to 2
respondent beyond May, 2015 (in case of appellant no.2 BRPL) and July,
2015 (in case of appellant no.1 BYPL). Accordingly, we further hold that
nd
the energy bills raised by 2 respondent to the appellants beyond the
months of May, 2015 (in case of BRPL) and July, 2015 (in case of BYPL)
are unlawful and not legally tenable. The same are hereby quashed.
31. The appeal stands allowed in above terms. Pending IAs, if any,
stand disposed of accordingly.
th
Pronounced in the open court on this the 25 day of May, 2026.
(Virender Bhat)
Judicial Member
(Seema Gupta)
Officiating Chairperson
✓
REPORTABLE / NON-REPORATBLE
tp
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