Kataria Insurance Brokers Pvt Ltd vs Bhavesh Suresh Kataria Proprietor Of And Trading As Kataria Jewellary Insurance Consultancy

Court
Bombay High Court

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION
COMMERCIAL IP SUIT NO. 215 OF 2021
Bhavesh Suresh Kataria …Plaintiff
Versus
Kataria Insurance Brokers Pvt. Ltd. …Defendant
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 3457 OF 2026
IN
COMMERCIAL IP SUIT NO. 215 OF 2021
Kataria Insurance Brokers Pvt. Ltd. …Applicant
In The Matter Between
Bhavesh Suresh Kataria …Plaintiff
Versus
Kataria Insurance Brokers Pvt. Ltd. …Respondent
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1663 OF 2021
Digitally
signed by
ASHWINI
JANARDAN
VALLAKATI
Date:
2026.08.19
17:16:15
+0530
ASHWINI
JANARDAN
VALLAKATI
IN
COMMERCIAL IP SUIT NO. 215 OF 2021
Bhavesh Suresh Kataria …Applicant
In The Matter Between
Bhavesh Suresh Kataria …Plaintiff
Versus
Kataria Insurance Brokers Pvt. Ltd. …Respondent

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Dr. Birendra Saraf, Senior Advocate a/w Hiren Kamod, Deeksha Jani,
Jinay Jain, i/b Jani & Parikh, for Plaintiff.
Mr. J. P. Sen, Senior Advocate a/w Kunal Vaishnav, Monika Tanna,
Dhara Modi, Nandita Dethe, Harkiratkaur Ahluwalia, Ameya Gaurd,
i/b Singhania Legal Services, for Defendant.
CORAM : SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.
DATE : AUGUST 19, 2026
Judgement:
Context and Factual Background:
1. Interim Application No.3457 of 2026 (“ IA 3457 ”) is an Application
seeking vacation of an order dated December 8, 2025 (“ Interim Order ”)
passed by a Learned Single Judge of this Court in disposal of Interim
Application No.1663 of 2021 (“ IA 1663 ”) in Commercial IP Suit No.215 of 2021
(“ Suit ”).
2. IA 3457 has been filed, specifically pursuant to an order dated May 25,
2026 passed by the Supreme Court (“ Supreme Court Order ”) which was of the
view that the Interim Order ought not to have been challenged in an appeal
since it had been passed without the presence of the Applicant to contest the
Plaintiff when the hearing that led to the Interim Order was conducted. A
Learned Division Bench of this Court had set aside the Interim Order on
merits by an order dated February 23, 2026 (“ Division Bench Order ”), which
led to the challenge in the Supreme Court.
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3. The Supreme Court ruled that the Applicant in IA 3457, Kataria
Insurance Brokers Private Limited (“ Defendant ”) ought to have sought
vacation of the Interim Order before the Single Bench instead of proceeding to
appeal the Interim Order before the Division Bench on merits. The Interim
Order had granted expansive interim reliefs as prayed, to the Original
Plaintiff, Mr. Bhavesh Suresh Kataria, a proprietor of a firm trading as ‘Kataria
Jewellery Insurance Consultancy’ (“ Plaintiff ”).
4. The Plaintiff has registered the word mark “KATARIA”, bearing
Registration No. 4174551, in Class 36 in respect of insurance, financial affairs,
monetary affairs and real estate affairs. The Plaintiff has also registered a label
mark, bearing Registration No. 1969420, with the word “Kataria” written in a
distinctive manner with the letter “I” standing out, and the words “Jewellery
Insurance Consultancy” in a strap line below the word “Kataria” and a further
smaller strap line containing the words “Gold & Diamond Insurance”. The
label mark, also in Class 36, is registered in respect of real estate affairs,
insurance, financial affairs and monetary affairs. The label mark is registered
as of May 21, 2010 while the word mark is registered as of May 13, 2019.
5. The Interim Order, which disposed of Interim Application No. 1663 of
2021 (“ IA 1663 ”) granted the following prayers:
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(a) pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, the Defendant by itself, its
directors, employees, servants, agents and all persons claiming under it be
restrained by a temporary order and injunction of this Hon’ble Court from
infringing the Plaintiff's registered trade marks bearing Registration Numbers
1969420 and 4174551, both in Class 36 by using the impugned trade mark
KATARIA INSURANCE, the impugned domain name/webs
www.katarisinusrance.co.in and the impugned corporate name containing the mark
KATARIA INSURANCE and/or any other trade mark, domain name 10) website and
corporate name containing the word KATARIA or any other trade mark, domain
name, corporate name identical with and/or deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's
registered trade marks in respect of the services covered by the Plaintiff's
registrations or in any other manner whatsoever;
(b) pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, the Defendant by itself, its
directors, employees, servants, agents and all persons claiming through it be
restrained by a temporary order and injunction of this Hon’ble Court from
rendering, offering, promoting or advertising the impugned services or like services
under the impugned trade mark KATARIA INSURANCE, the impugned domain
name/ website www.katariainsurance.co.in and impugned corporate name
containing the mark KATARIA INSURANCE and/ or any other trade mark, domain
name/ website and corporate name containing the word KATARIA or any other
trade mark, domain name/ website and corporate name wading name and style
identical with and/or deceptively similar to the Plaintiff's said well-known trade
marks, domain name and said trading name and style containing the said trade
mark KATARIA so as to pass off or enable others to pass off the Defendant’s
impugned services and/or business as and for the said well-known services and/or
business of the Plaintiff or in any other manner whatsoever;
[Emphasis Supplied]
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6. To appreciate the context in which IA 3457 has been filed and to
examine the scope of jurisdiction of this Bench while considering IA 3457, an
extract of the Supreme Court Order would be appropriate:
….. We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties.
We have perused the material on record.
During the course of submissions, it was brought to our notice that the
respondent did not contest Interim Application No.1663 of 2021 filed by the
appellant herein in its suit viz., Commercial IP Suit No.215 of 2021. However, the
order dated 08.12.2025 granting temporary injunction in favour of - the appellant
herein was assailed before the Division Bench of the High Court on merits. The
High Court has not appreciated the fact the respondent herein had not contested the
aforesaid application and had simply filed the appeals even without seeking
vacating of the temporary injunction granted by the learned single Judge on
08.12.2025. However, the Division Bench of the High Court has set aside the order
dated 08.12.2025 on merits without appreciating the fact that the respondent herein
had not contested the Interim Application filed by the appellant herein before the
learned Single Judge.
On that short ground alone, we set aside the impugned judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court and remand the matter before the learned Single
Judge in order to enable the respondent herein to file an application seeking
vacating of the order of temporary injunction granted by the learned single Judge
on 08.12.2025.
Should an application for vacating the order of temporary injunction be made
by the respondent herein, the same shall be considered by the learned Single Judge
as expeditiously as possible and in accordance with law.
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In view of the nature of the order passed above, all contentions on both sides
are left open to be advanced before the learned Single Judge on the application to
be filed by the respondent seeking vacating of the interim order dated 08.12.2025.
Appeals are allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms”
[Emphasis Supplied]
7. IA 3457 has been filed under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (“ CPC ”) read with Section 151 of the CPC – specifically in
terms of the Supreme Court Order. A plain reading of the Supreme Court
Order would show that the Supreme Court has referred thrice, to the absence
of contest from the Defendant to IA 1663. The Supreme Court was of the view
that in view of the absence of contest, the Interim Order ought not to have
been directly appealed against before the Learned Division Bench on merits.
The Supreme Court was of the view that the Learned Division Bench ought to
have appreciated the fact that the Defendant had not contested IA 1663, and
had simply filed the Appeal without seeking vacation of the Interim Order. It is
apparent that the Supreme Court took a view that it was inappropriate for the
contest on merits to have been considered directly by the Division Bench
sitting in appeal, rather than by the Single Bench. On that “ short ground
alone ” the Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench Order and decided to
“ remand ” the matter to the Single Bench “to enable ” the Defendant to file an
Application seeking vacation of the Interim Order. The Supreme Court Order
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also records that “ in view of the nature of the order ” being passed, “ all
contentions on both sides are left open to be advanced ” before the Single
Bench on the Application seeking vacation of the Interim Order.
8. Indeed, in the view of the Supreme Court, its order was one of remand,
leaving all contentions on merits of both sides open for consideration by the
Single Bench. The cause of this decision was evidently the absence of the
Defendant to contest IA 1663 on merits, when it was heard by the Learned
Single Judge, which led to the Interim Order being passed. The Supreme
Court had perused the record and had heard the parties, which indicates that
the Supreme Court was conscious that a reply to IA 1663 had been filed by the
Defendant way back in 2021, which was dealt with in the Interim Order, in the
absence of the Defendant to contest the reliefs pressed by the Plaintiff.
9. The need for this prelude of the background is necessary because the
Suit and IA 1663 had been filed on March 10, 2021, over five years ago. A
limited and narrow ad interim injunction had been granted in IA 1663, by an
order dated March 23, 2021 (“ Ad Interim Order ”) limiting the prohibition to
the use of a website with the domain name ‘www.katariainsurance.co.in’,
which had been registered by the Defendant and was held to be deceptively
similar to the Plaintiff’s registered domain name ‘www.katariainsurance.com’.
Dissatisfied, the Defendant filed Commercial Appeal (L) No. 9760 of 2021
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against the Ad Interim Order, which came to be set aside by consent of the
parties recorded in an order dated May 19, 2021 before a Learned Division
Bench, with a request that the Single Bench hear IA 1663 afresh on merits
leaving all contentions open.
10. The Defendant then filed an Affidavit in Reply dated on May 27, 2021
(“ Affidavit in Reply ”) raising various defences to resist IA 1663. The Plaintiff
filed a rejoinder on June 16, 2021 and pleadings were recorded as being
complete by an order dated June 23, 2021. IA 1663 was listed for final hearing
and disposal on July 5, 2021. Thereafter, IA 1663 was not heard for over four
and half years. It was listed on multiple occasions but could not be heard
finally, and no injunction of any nature was in operation throughout this
period.
11. IA 1663 was indeed listed thereafter for the first time, after three years,
on September 12, 2024. Thereafter, on eight further occasions, the matter was
adjourned primarily due to paucity of time. The matter was called out on
August 25, 2025, when a Learned Single Bench noted that the Defendant was
not present. A final opportunity was given to both parties, and the Plaintiff
was directed to intimate that the matter would be finally heard on the next
date, to the Defendant. On November 26, 2025, IA 1663 was heard in the
Defendant's absence. After one more listing on December 3, 2025 when orders
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had been expected to be passed, the Interim Order was eventually passed
disposing of IA 1663 in terms of prayer classes (a) and (b), which have been
extracted above.
12. Owing to the absence of the Defendant, the Learned Single Judge dealt
with each of the contentions of the Defendant as set out in the Affidavit in
Reply filed four and a half years earlier, with the assistance of the Learned
Advocate for the Plaintiff, who presented why each head of contentions was
untenable. Therefore, IA 3457 is founded on the finding of the Supreme Court
that the Defendant had not contested IA 1663, and had left open all
contentions of both sides on merits. These were to be appropriately considered
by the Single Bench on a remand but subject to an application being filed by
the Defendant to vacate the Interim Order.
13. It became necessary to set out the aforesaid prefatory context because,
the Plaintiff has strenuously argued that IA 3457 is not even maintainable in
terms of Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC read with Section 151 of the CPC and
that the Supreme Court has directed that the matter be heard “in accordance
with law”.
14. The Plaintiff would contend that the facts that were available for the
Defendant to plead were set out in the Affidavit in Reply and every head of the
contentions has been meticulously dealt with in the Interim Order. There
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being no new circumstances that have come into existence, the Plaintiff would
contend that IA 3457 is a “second bite at the cherry” in the garb of Order
XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC.
15. The Defendant on the other hand would contend that the Supreme
Court had sent the parties back to the Single Bench by an explicit “ remand ”
leaving all contentions open and had indeed given liberty to file this Interim
Application, and therefore, all facets of the matter on merits fall within the
scope of consideration by this Court when adjudicating IA 3457, which also
invokes Section 151 of the CPC, which would deal with the peculiarity raised by
the Plaintiff’s objection on maintainability despite the Supreme Court Order.
16. At the core of an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 is the second
proviso , which essentially sets out two circumstances to enable a Court to
revisit and mould any interlocutory arrangements made earlier – first , a
change in circumstances; and second , undue hardship faced by the Defendant.
Analysis and Findings:
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17. In this round, I have had the benefit of detailed submissions as indeed
written submissions tendered by Mr. J.P. Sen, Learned Senior Advocate on
behalf of the Defendant and Dr. Birendra Saraf, Learned Senior Advocate on
behalf of the Plaintiff. With the assistance of Learned Senior Advocates I have
examined the record. The points for determination by me are:
A] Whether IA 3457 is maintainable under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of
the CPC read with Section 151 of the CPC; and
B] If maintainable, whether the Interim Order warrants a vacation or
a variation, having had the benefit of assistance from advocates for the
Defendant in this round of hearing.
Maintainability of IA 3457:
18. At the threshold, this issue must be dealt with in order to adjudicate the
contentions of the parties on merits.
19. Dr. Saraf would contend that the Interim Order cannot be regarded as
an ex parte order at all since the Affidavit in Reply was filed by the Defendant
and this has been extensively dealt with in the Interim Order. His objection on
maintainability of IA 3457 is based on the premise that there has been no
change in circumstances whatsoever since the passing of the Interim Order,
and the Defendant cannot merely invoke undue hardship without regard to
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any change in circumstances causing the hardship. He would submit that IA
3457 is admittedly filed invoking Order XXXIX Rule 4, and therefore, the
necessary ingredients for filing such an application not being present, it is
simply not maintainable. Dr. Saraf would contend that consideration of the
appropriateness of the reliefs granted in the Interim Order, even as of the date
on which it was passed, would be untenable because it would lead to a Single
Bench sitting in appeal over the view of a coordinate Single Bench (there has
been a change in the roster in the interregnum).
20. Mr. Sen would point out that given the efflux of time, the Advocates of
the Defendant had lost contact with the Defendant and did not alert the
Defendant about IA 1663 having come up for consideration after a lapse of
over four years. The Supreme Court having explicitly remanded the matter to
this Court, leaving contentions of both sides on merits, open for consideration
if any application to vacate the Interim Order is filed, permitting the
Defendant to explain why vacation of the Interim Order is warranted, and that
too taking into account the absence of the Defendant to contest IA 1663, the
present Application is indeed maintainable. In view of the express liberty and
direction of the Supreme Court, Mr. Sen would submit, there is no question of
treating this Bench’s consideration of IA 3457 as an appeal against the Interim
Order. He would point out that the Application is referable not just to Order
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XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC but also in the peculiar circumstances of the case, to
Section 151 of the CPC.
FINDINGS ON MAINTAINABILITY
Supreme Court Order:
21. Having heard the parties on the aspect of maintainability, in my view, IA
3457 simply has to be adjudicated. One has to be mindful of the context in
which IA 3457 has been filed. What is writ large in the Supreme Court Order is
the fact that after examining the material on record, the Supreme Court took
note of the fact that the Defendant had not been available to contest IA 1663
when it was heard. Considering the Affidavit in Reply being referred to in the
Interim Order, the Supreme Court, cognizant of the same, was of the view that
the matter of the nature of interim relief must be remanded to the Single
Bench.
22. Dr. Saraf may be right in stating that the Affidavit in Reply would point
to a written contest in response to IA 1663 but equally one cannot ignore the
fact that the Supreme Court was mindful that the Defendant was not present
at the hearing to contest the appropriateness of the reliefs granted in the
Interim Order. Had the Defendant been present, the inappropriateness of the
reliefs sought, as canvassed by the Defendant, would have been available to
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influence the adjudication, contesting the submissions on the appropriateness
of such reliefs as canvassed by the Plaintiff. Such a contest did not take place
in the passing of the Interim Order and this is what has led the Supreme Court
to direct the remand of the matter.
23. The Supreme Court has thought it fit, as the ultimate appellate court
that the issue of vacation of the Interim Order has to be considered by this
Court upon such remand. This is the issue the Supreme Court has explicitly
sent for consideration to the Single Bench, and in view of the nature of such a
direction, has explicitly left all contentions of the parties on merits open for
consideration. Effectively, the Supreme Court has remanded IA 1663 without
vacating the Interim Order but clearly granting liberty to move IA 3457 to
consider the request for vacation of the Interim Order. Therefore, to hold that
the present Application is not even maintainable would fly in the face of the
Supreme Court Order and render it nugatory.
24. It would also lead to an absurd and manifestly unjust consequence. The
Defendant who challenged the Interim Order on merits and prevailed when
both parties participated in a contest there, has been sent back to the Single
Bench by the Supreme Court leaving all contentions open, with the mandate of
deciding whether the Interim Order deserves to be vacated. To hold that
consideration of the need for vacating the Interim Order after the Supreme
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Court Order would still constitute an appellate review by a co-ordinate bench
is equivalent to contending that the Defendant cannot have IA 3457
adjudicated by a Single Bench on merits. In other words, even while the
Supreme Court has held that consideration of an appeal by a Division Bench is
inappropriate and has directed that the Single Bench should consider the
request for vacating the Interim Order on merits, there should be no ability to
stage the contest before this forum. In other words, this Bench must simply
make no change to the Interim Order, after which the matter could once again
go to a Division Bench on merits – it matters not that it is after such an
exercise that the Supreme Court found it fit to ask the Single Bench to consider
the prayer for vacation of the Interim Order.
25. Therefore, in my view, this Court is dutybound to examine whether,
after hearing the Defendant who is available to contest the matter, it would be
appropriate to continue the grant of the reliefs in terms of prayer clauses (a)
and (b) as granted in the Interim Order or to vacate it. Any contrary reading
would make a mockery of the Supreme Court Order, and that too in its
application inter-parties in the very same dispute.
Order XXXIX Rule 4 of CPC:
26. T he provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 4 of CPC are noteworthy:
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4. Order for injunction may be discharged, varied or set aside.—
Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside by the Court,
on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order:
Provided that if in an application for temporary injunction or in any affidavit
supporting such application, a party has knowingly made a false or misleading
statement in relation to a material particular and the injunction was granted
without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall vacate the injunction
unless, for reasons to be recorded, it considers that it is not necessary so to do in
the interest of justice:
Provided further that where an order for injunction has been passed after giving to
a party an opportunity of being heard, the order shall not be discharged, varied or
set aside on the application of that party except where such discharge, variation or
setting aside has been necessitated by a change in the circumstances, or unless the
Court is satisfied that the order has caused undue hardship to that party.
[Emphasis Supplied]
27. Rule 4 makes it clear that an injunction may be discharged, varied or set
aside by the Court that passed the interim order (under Order XXXIX Rule 1
and 2) at the request of the party that is dissatisfied by the interim order. This
is the very basis of the Supreme Court finding it odd that the Defendant filed
an appeal instead of coming back to the Single Bench. The ingredients of the
second proviso fall for interpretation on the issue of maintainability. The two
ingredients necessarily are – first , change in circumstances; and second ,
undue hardship.
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28. Before the second proviso can be applied, a logical question to answer is
whether this is a case in which the order for injunction was “ passed after
giving to a party an opportunity of being heard ”. Dr. Saraf would say that it
was, since the Affidavit in Reply was on record and was dealt with at length.
Mr. Sen would say that an opportunity to file a reply is not the same thing as
an opportunity of being heard, and that the Defendant was in fact not heard,
because, he would fairly state, the hearing was missed.
29. In my view, on the peculiar facts of this case, whether the second
proviso has to be strictly applied is rendered moot because of the terms on
which the Supreme Court has directed that this matter be heard. The Supreme
Court Order records thrice that the Defendant did not contest IA 1663. The
Interim Order itself records that Advocate for the Plaintiff was heard and that
the Defendant “ though having filed an Affidavit in Reply has not appeared ”. A
written counter alone, without being heard, is not what is contemplated in the
“opportunity of being heard” referred to in the second proviso , and that too
after the Supreme Court has explicitly sent the Defendant back to the Single
Bench to be heard.
30. Therefore, Order XXXIX Rule 4 would apply without the fetter of the
second proviso , and an application by a party “ dissatisfied with such order ”
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would be maintainable. In any case, this question is moot considering the
liberty granted by the Supreme Court Order.
31. The Supreme Court Order is itself a subsequent development which has,
for the first time, created both the occasion and the liberty for these defences
to be tested in an effective adversarial contest. The operation of the Interim
Order upon a regulated insurance market intermediary restrained from the
use of its own corporate name causes undue hardship of the nature envisaged
in the second proviso , as set out later in this judgement.
32. In any case, neither should the Interim Order be read as a firm and final
pronouncement on any facet of the matter (even if its effect is contended to
have repercussions associated with a final adjudication) nor do I intend to
make such a pronouncement in this judgement. On any facet of the matter, if
it is felt that the measures adopted in the Interim Order would have been
inappropriate or can be regarded as appropriate with some variation that
would be reasonable to expect had the Defendant’s perspectives been available
on the earlier occasion, then I must examine whether vacation or variation of
the Interim Order is warranted in the interests of justice.
33. I cannot help but notice that the absence of the Defendant at the hearing
led to the explicit pleadings in Paragraph 3 of the Plaint, which effectively
meant the Suit services were insurance services in the gems and jewellery
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industry , not being noticed, resulting in sweeping and expansive restraints
across any and every facet of insurance, coming about in the Interim Order.
Indeed, the role of the Plaintiff in the insurance sector formed the basis of the
Interim Order – the Interim Order holds that the field of insurance entails a
higher degree of trust and faith and that confusion in the minds of participants
in the insurance sector and the insurance consumer would necessitate an
intervention by the Court.
34. I have dealt with the merits of this element in the second segment of this
judgement. Suffice it to say, not only is IA 3457 maintainable, it makes out the
need for a consideration of the merits, quite consistent with what the Supreme
Court Order had in mind for this Court to do.
35. Dr. Saraf’s contention that floodgates would be opened with every
person dissatisfied by an interim order getting to take multiple bites at the
cherry in the garb of Order XXXIX Rule 4 simply has no appeal because in this
case, the Supreme Court Order has squarely remanded the matter to the Single
Bench. This specific situation in the matter in hand, is simply not comparable
with any and every case where a party hurt by an injunction that is passed
after it was heard, files an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 seeking to
be heard afresh about undue hardship or changed circumstances.
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Section 151 of CPC:
36. As regards the contention that the Supreme Court Order used the
phrase “in accordance with law” and Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the CPC in any
case does not permit the Interim Order to be revisited without a change in
circumstances and undue hardship owing to such change in circumstances,
the provisions of Section 151 of the CPC would fill any perceived gap. The
contents of Section 151 of the CPC are extracted below:
151. Saving of inherent powers of Court.—
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power
of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to
prevent abuse of the process of the Court.
[Emphasis Supplied]
37. Indeed, for the ends of justice to be met, quite apart from the rule of law
to be followed, this Bench is required to abide by the Supreme Court Order.
That apart, flinging out IA 3457 on the ground that it does not fit the second
proviso of Order XXXIX Rule 4 would lead to an evident abuse of process –
shutting the doors of the Court on the Defendant, who has been sent here by
the topmost Court of the land. Therefore, the gap perceived between what the
Supreme Court Order allowed the Defendant to pursue and what according to
the Plaintiff, Order XXXIX Rule 4 allows the Defendant to pursue, would be
filled by the provisions of Section 151 of the CPC.
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38. The Supreme Court Order directed a “ remand ” in order to “ enable ” an
attempt by the Defendant to vacate the Interim Order. Such power of the
Supreme Court itself is referable to the provisions of Section 151 of the CPC,
without even having to reach out to Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
Section 151 squarely provides that nothing in the CPC would erode the
inherent power of a civil court in make the ends of justice meet and to prevent
abuse of process. The Supreme Court Order and the adjudication of IA 3457
would fall within the parameters of Section 151 of the CPC. Therefore, the
contention that this Bench would be sitting in appeal over a coordinate
Bench’s order is an argument of overreach that is simply not borne out by the
contents of the Supreme Court Order. Whether newer documents and
material are being introduced in IA 3457 and whether that can at all be looked
into, is a matter of merits. Indeed, if this Court seeks to elicit answers from the
parties to questions and doubts that arise in its mind to better consider the
most appropriate interlocutory arrangement, that would not be shut out at all.
39. I must deal with Dr. Saraf’s reliance upon a judgement of the Madhya
1
Pradesh High Court in Ravishankar to indicate that a party that neglected to
put its case by its own fault at the original hearing cannot rely upon Order
XXXIX Rule 4 to have the case reopened. This contention would not turn the
1 th
Ravishankar & Anr. v. VII Additional District Judge, Bhopal & Ors. – 1994 SCC OnLine
MP 18
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needle in favour of dismissal of IA 3457 outright because in Ravishankar , there
was no intervening order of the Supreme Court enabling the Court that passed
the interim order to consider the merits of a prayer for vacating the interim
2 3
order. Likewise, the reliance on Pidilite and Pittie , in which this Court has
held that an order once passed is final and binding and cannot be reopened
except on presentation of any new matter that remained unavailable when the
original order was passed, while declaring the law, was not a declaration where
a specific order of the Supreme Court, the ultimate appellate court, remanding
the matter back to the original Court, intervened. Therefore, the reliance on
4 5
Pittie , Jairaj and Novartis , and the endorsement of Ravishankar in them
would not make any difference to the instant case.
Variation or Vacation of the Interim Order:
40. Since I hold that IA 3457 is indeed maintainable and in fact this Court is
duty bound to consider IA 3457, the next issue to consider is whether a
vacation of the Interim Order is warranted.
2
Pidilite Industries Limited v. Jubilant Agri and Consumer Products Limited in Notice of
Motion No.2168 of 2016 in Suit No.112 of 2014 - Judgement dated October 6, 2016 - para 8,
9 and 10
3
Madhavlal Narayanlal Pittie v. Madhavlal Narayanlal Pittie & Ors. – 2017 SCC OnLine
Bom 1796 – para 7
4
Jairaj Devidas v. Hirabhai Shinwar Jadhav – 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 13790
5
Novartis Ag & Anr. v. Natco Pharma Ltd. – 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2591
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41. Dr. Saraf would submit that the pivotal issue sought to be raised by the
Defendant is the correct interpretation of Section 35 of the Trade Marks Act,
1999 (“ TM Act ”). The Interim Order contains an extensive deliberation on this
issue. Dr. Saraf would point out that the Interim Order deals with Bajaj
6 7 8 9 10
Electricals ; Kirloskar , Mahindra , Mahendra Paper and MNM Marketing ,
and only then squarely holds that Section 35 of the TM Act does not apply to
incorporated entities that consciously choose their trade names, as opposed to
naturally born humans who do not get to choose their names. If the view
taken by the Learned Single Judge is a plausible view, he would submit, this
Court in consideration of the Interim Application, ought not to revisit that
view as if it were an appellate review.
42. The Plaintiff would contend that the Interim Order squarely holds that
the Defendant’s adoption of the KATARIA name in its corporate name with a
view to carry on its insurance broking activity was a dishonest adoption,
seeking to piggyback on the trade mark of the Plaintiff. Therefore, even
assuming Section 35 can be applied, he would contend, the Defendant would
6
Bajaj Electricals Limited, Bombay v. Metals & Allied Products, Bombay and another –
1987 SCC OnLine Bom 225
7
Kirloskar Diesel Recon (P) Ltd. & Ors v. Kirloskar Proprietary Ltd. & Ors – 1995 SCC
OnLine Bom 312
8 th
–
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Mahendra & Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd. Order dated 23
April 1998 in Notice of Motion No. 3143 of 1998 in Suit 4007 of 1998
9
Mahendra & Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. – (2002) 2 SCC
147
10
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. & Anr v. MNM Marketing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. – 2014 SCC
OnLine Bom 1343
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not be a beneficiary of the protection afforded by Section 35 of the TM Act,
which only protects a bona fide use of the family name.
43. Dr. Saraf would also submit that the Defendant seeking to now bring to
bear additional judgements in support of IA 3457, seeking to distinguish the
judgements relied upon by the Interim Order is impermissible, since allowing
reliance on such judgements would lead to IA 3457 becoming an appeal before
a coordinate Single Bench – this is an extension of the same premise that has
been dealt with in the earlier segment of this judgement.
44. For his part, Mr. Sen would contend that the Defendant is a beneficiary
of a statutorily-designed protection under Section 35 of the TM Act. The
family name of the Defendant’s promoters is Kataria and this is not a name
adopted by choice. That apart, Mr. Sen would point to the consistent legacy of
multiple businesses promoted by the same family using the KATARIA family
name in every business referred to in these proceedings.
45. Mr. Sen would also submit that the Plaintiff has actually pleaded that
his services as an insurance agent commenced in 1999 but around 2006, the
Plaintiff decided to concentrate on and develop a niche in the area of insuring
gems and jewellery, even adopting the trade name “Kataria Jewellery
Insurance Consultancy”, which clearly shows the intention was to focus on
insurance services in a very specific and niche sector. Yet, the Plaintiff has
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gone way beyond the very foundational scope of the Suit services, and as a
result, the Interim Order strikes at the very root of the Defendant’s long-
standing registered and licensed insurance broking activity, at the behest of a
person who is neither an insurer nor a broker, but an insurance agent who
solicits and procures policies of the insurers who appoint him. The Defendant
is not even occupying the same space as the Plaintiff and the Defendant is
willing to commit to stay away from any participation in any manner in the
field of insurance services in the gems and jewellery sector, to enable a fair and
equitable co-existence.
46. The Plaintiff’s domain name www.katariainsurance.com had been
created in September 2007. The label mark was registered as of May 21, 2010
and the word mark KATARIA was registered much later, as of May 13, 2019.
Mr. Sen would submit that the registrations point to a claim of usage only
from April 7, 2006 while the Plaint asserts on oath that the usage dates back to
2004.
47. Most vitally, Mr. Sen would be at pains to point out that the Section 35
is precisely meant to be a statutory protection for usage of a family’s name
which cannot be monopolised by someone else with the same family name by
claiming to have registered such family name as a trade mark. In this context,
Mr. Sen would submit that the Learned Single Judge never had an opportunity
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of considering how best to mould the relief sought by the Plaintiff because of
the Defendant’s absence. He would fairly state that there had been a
breakdown in communication and the Defendant simply was unaware of the
matter being listed and could not participate and assist the Court with the
Defendant’s perspective on what would be an appropriate means of assessing
the matter.
48. The linchpin of Mr. Sen’s submission is that the Defendant is part of a
bunch of family businesses with a consistent track record of using the
KATARIA name in the names of the businesses right since August 1955. The
group entities may have been in the field of automobiles and related activities
but the Defendant’s business is a natural extension and expansion of these
businesses – insuring automobiles sold by the Kataria Group and the use of an
inherited surname is precisely what is statutorily protected under Section 35
of the TM Act. The use is bona fide and there is nothing in the statute to such
protection being available only to individuals, i.e. naturally persons.
49. Mr. Sen would contend that this facet of the matter has been squarely
11
dealt with by the Supreme Court in Precious Jewels , where the Supreme
Court set aside the order of the High Court of Delhi that had interfered with
the use of a shared surname “Rakyan”, ruling in favour of members of a family
11
Precious Jewels & Anr. v. Varun Gems – (2015) 1 SCC 160
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who carried on business in their own names in the same field of jewellery. Mr.
Sen would also point to decisions of the Delhi High Court in Chandra
12 13 14
Engineers ; Jindal Industries and Vasundhra Jewellers to buttress the
contention that there is no discernible requirement at all for the benefit of
Section 35 to only be available to naturally born persons.
50. Mr. Sen would seek to distinguish the reliance upon Kirlosker , MNM
15
Marketing , and Montari by the Plaintiff, and also point out that all these
decisions predated the view of the Supreme Court in Precious Jewels .
Therefore, Mr. Sen would submit, had the Defendant been available to present
these perspectives to the Learned Single Judge, these could have been factored
in. That not having occurred, and the Supreme Court having sent the matter
back to the Single Bench precisely owing to the absence of the Defendant, this
Court must indeed examine these judgements and take a view afresh since
merits have been left open by the Supreme Court pursuant to such remand,
enabling the matter to be considered by the Single Bench.
12
M/s Chandra Engineers v. M/s Multifrig Marketing Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Anr RFA(COMM)
352/2025 & CM Appl. 36957/2025 Division Bench Delhi High Court Judgment dated
December 9, 2025
13
Jindal Industries Private Limited v. Suncity Sheets Private Limited and Another – 2024
SCC OnLine Del 1632
14
Vasundhra Jewellers Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Vasundhara Fashion Jewellery LLP & Anr FAO(OS)
(COMM) 232/2023 & CM APPL. 55117/2023 Division Bench Delhi High Court Judgement
dated August 18, 2025
15
Montari Overseas Limited v. Montari Industries Limited – 1995 SCC OnLine Del 865
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51. Referring to balance of convenience, Mr. Sen would point out that the
claim quantified in the Plaint is a mere Rs. 5 Lakhs. Therefore, he would
submit that the Interim Order is entirely disproportionate inasmuch as for
Plaint with such an admittedly low value, a prohibition has been imposed on
conduct of the Defendant’s business which has had an annual expenditure in
the region of Rs.1 Crore just on advertising and sales promotion expenditure.
52. Rebranding the Defendant’s business to move away from the trade
name that is consistent with all its businesses would inflict a serious cost and
also cause enormous confusion and mislead the Defendant’s wide-ranging
clients who know the Defendant and the Kataria Group by the registered
corporate names and the trade names, and this would cause irreparable harm
and injury that cannot be undone. If the Suit turns out in the Defendant’s
favour, for which there is a strong likelihood considering the statutory
protection under Section 35 of the Act, Mr. Sen would submit, the finding on
balance of convenience would change. He would contend that the conclusions
in Paragraph 43(G) of the Interim Order have been reached without any
assistance from the Defendant, and is therefore unmindful of the
extraordinary consequences, including regulatory consequences, and the
public interest dimensions that would follow.
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53. Mr. Sen would also point to the turnover of the entire Kataria Group as
being in the region of Rs.2,245 Crores in 2020-2021 rising to Rs.4,426.48
Crores in 2024-2025. The advertisement and sales promotion expenditure of
the Kataria Group rose from Rs.1.61 Crores in 2020-2021 to Rs.28.97 Crores
in 2024-25. He would further contend that in contrast, the Plaintiff’s claim of
having “a massive business of general insurance beyond jewellery insurance”
is entirely misleading simply because a detailed analysis of the policies said to
have been issued and annexed at Exhibits ‘F’ and ‘G’ in the Reply to IA 3457
would show that most of these are simply renewals of policies made by
individual clients and can be reduced to a small set of recurring customers.
That apart, he would submit that the aggregate premium represented across
the seven years ranging from 2015 to 2022 is a mere Rs.18 to Rs.19 Lakhs. The
majority of the individual premiums of such policies range from a few hundred
rupees to a few thousand rupees.
54. In sharp contrast, Mr. Sen would submit the Defendant’s certified
revenue in 2024-25 alone was Rs.13.28 Crores. A handful of incidental fire,
burglary and allied policies sold to a recurring set of customers over seven-
years cannot convert a self-professed specialized jewellery insurance agency
into a broad based general insurance business of a purportedly “massive”
scale. This contention, he submits has been adopted by the Plaintiff only to
rebuff the legitimate attempt to have the Interim Order vacated, contradicting
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the pleaded case set out at the threshold in Paragraph 3 of the Plaint, firmly
asserting that the suit services are insurance in the gems and jewellery sector.
55. Therefore, Mr. Sen would submit that the Interim Order deserves to be
vacated and discharged or in the alternative, varied so as to confine the
restraints contained therein to insurance services relating to the gems and
jewellery sector.
FINDINGS ON MERITS
Section 35 of the Act:
56. Having considered the rival contentions after having held that IA 3457
is indeed maintainable for the reasons set out in the earlier segment of this
judgement, to my mind the adjudication of merits would involve answering
the import of Section 35 of the TM Act. Likewise, considering that the Suit is
at an interim stage, taking into account the circumstances of the case, and
bearing in mind the objective of ensuring a balanced and fair ordering of an
equitable interlocutory measure, the historical conduct of the parties and its
implications for the situation at hand, has to also be considered.
57. Section 35 of the Act reads thus:
35. Saving for use of name, address or description of goods or services.—
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Nothing in this Act shall entitle the proprietor or a registered user of a registered
trade mark to interfere with any bona fide use by a person of his own name or that
of his place of business, or of the name, or of the name of the place of business, of
any of his predecessors in business, or the use by any person of any bona fide
description of the character or quality of his goods or services.
[Emphasis Supplied]
58. A plain reading of the foregoing would show that the provision overrides
all the other provisions of the TM Act. It negates the entitlements conferred
by the rest of the provisions of the TM Act from being asserted against bona
fide use by any person of his own name. Now, the bone of contention between
the parties is the interpretation of the term “person” and whether it would only
cover natural persons and necessarily exclude any and every corporate name.
The second facet is whether the use of the KATARIA family name for
incorporating the Defendant and the use of such name by the Defendant for
carrying on business is a bona fide use of the KATARIA family name of the
promoters of the Defendant.
59. On the first part, what has to be remembered is that this matter is
currently at an interim preliminary stage. It would not be appropriate to
pronounce upon any issue in a definitive final manner that makes the interim
arrangement akin to a final relief. Therefore, without intending to pronounce
upon this question authoritatively one way or the other, it is necessary to take
a prima facie view of the matter.
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60. A naturally born human being does not have a choice of his name upon
being born. A body corporate cannot even exist without a name for it to have a
choice in its name. That choice is made by someone else even before it is
incorporated. Indeed, the human being does not have a choice of name
selection at infancy but a human being can indeed make a choice to change the
given name later in accordance with law. On the other hand, it is
inconceivable for a company to be incorporated without a name or to change
its name without the approval of its shareholders. In that sense if one were to
solely focus on the entity, rather than take a commonsensical holistic view of
the usage of one’s own name, the body corporate has no agency at all of its
own for its name. A human being has sovereign agency to take a new name to
change it from the name given after birth. Therefore, it can be said that a
naturally born human being has stronger sovereign agency over choice of own
name.
61. Another perspective would be that the choice of name for a newborn
human and for a company to be formed, is a sovereign choice made by human
beings. If that choice for a body corporate is made by a human being by
adopting the family surname as the corporate name is bona fide , such use
cannot be lightly interfered with – certainly not on the basis that someone else
having the same family surname has registered that very surname as a trade
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mark. Section 35 of the TM Act is evidently designed to protect against such
an anomaly.
62. The registrant of the family surname as a trade mark would still have all
the entitlements to statutory protection under the TM Act against the world at
large. It is only against such other persons who use their own name in the
course of trade, that such entitlement to statutory protection would have no
effect.
63. There is a further nuance – even for a human being, between a given
name and a surname, there is an even lesser agency over the family surname.
One cannot choose the family one is born into. Unless personal sovereign
human agency is deployed to disown a family and thereby a surname, the
family name or a surname is inherited and has a high level of ‘stickiness’.
Therefore, where a business family has used the family surname for all its
businesses for generations, for conduct of a newer business in the course of a
natural progression, extension or further diversification, the consistent choice
of the family name inherited by generations of the family would be hard to
assail as not being bona fide .
64. One can understand an allegation of absence of bona fides in naming a
business enterprise with a family name if the promoter of that enterprise has
always conducted business using names other than the family name, peculiarly
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devised and arbitrarily chosen. Another example of absence of bona fides
would be where a person changes his own name to that of a trade mark
registrant in order to prey upon the goodwill and reputation of the registered
trade mark. In such cases, it would be possible to contend that only to enter a
certain business to piggyback on the reputation, a businessperson who
otherwise always devises a non-family name, has suddenly adopted the family
name, pointing to an intent to infringe the trade mark or to pass off.
65. In the instant case, the persons who have promoted and run the
Defendant have consistently used their family name Kataria for all their
businesses. The automobile businesses of the Kataria family are all named
after Kataria. When they extended this role to the connected area of
automobile insurance, consistent with past practice, they adopted the very
same KATARIA name.
66. In fact, all the trade mark registrations of the Defendant and its group
are in the name of Kataria Automobiles Pvt. Ltd. (“ KAPL ”) and KAPL had
given a no objection for the use of the KATARIA name when incorporating the
Defendant. This prima facie shows a strong bona fide use of the very same
KATARIA family name for setting up the Defendant, consistent with how the
other business enterprises were set up. To my mind such conduct cannot be
brushed aside as an intentional or deliberate choice of corporate name only to
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infringe the Plaintiff’s registered mark or to build on the Plaintiff’s reputation
and goodwill. Indeed, the Plaint does not set up the scale and size of the
Plaintiff’s business to present empirical indicia of its reputation and goodwill
for the Plaintiff to be regarded as a well-known name if not a household name
but the Plaint itself styles the Plaintiff as a niche specialist in the area of
insurance in the gems and jewellery sector.
67. As an overriding point, it must be remembered that all analysis on facets
of infringement are linked to Section 35, inasmuch as nothing in the TM Act
that confers entitlements to a registrant of a trade mark would enable
interference with the bona fide use of one’s own name. To avoid repetition,
this element should be taken as read in all analysis on implications of
registration set out later in this judgement.
Scope of the Suit Services:
68. Although the Plaintiff has only been an insurance agent and not a
broker, but is said to enjoy a niche reputation in gems and jewellery insurance,
indeed the Plaintiff is not restricted to these activities and may expand in
future. However, the foundation of the Suit, as is rightly pointed to in
Paragraph 3 of the Plaint, which reads thus:
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“3. Sometime in the year 1999, the Plaintiff started the business of offering life
and general insurance policies including Jewellers’ Block Insurance Policy.
Sometime in the year 2004, the Plaintiff started conducting his aforesaid business of
providing insurance policies under the name and style Kataria Insurance
Consultancy. Subsequently, since most of the Plaintiffs clients were from the
jewellery trade, from the year 2006 the Plaintiff decided to concentrate and develop
a niche in the jewellery market which needed specialized knowledge related to
books of accounts, jewellery trade, complex nature of claims among other matters
relating to jewellery insurance. Since then, the Plaintiff has been offering insurance
policies and related services for the Gems and Jewellery sector (hereinafter
referred to as “the said services’). The Plaintiff has even changed his trading name
and style from Kataria Insurance Consultancy to Kataria Jewellery Insurance
Consultancy. Till date, the Plaintiff has insured Stock of Diamonds, Gold, Silver,
Gem Stones, Cash etc. with other personal insurance for his clients. The Plaintiff
has a professionally computerized set-up with multi-city presence and has a record
of solving 98% of the claims referred to him including a claim of Rs.3.45 crore of
Dhanalaxmi Jewellers from Chennai. The Plaintiff along with his representatives
stationed in different cities across India is the largest jewellery consultant in India.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
69. Evidently, the Plaintiff’s claim to reputation and goodwill built
assiduously, is to its presence in the field of insurance of the gems and
jewellery sector. Even the trade name was changed to reflect its specialisation
in the gems and jewellery sector. The Plaintiff claims to have moved on from
being a mere insurance agent to assisting policyholders in the gems and
jewellery sector realise their claims.
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70. Before turning to the respective roles of the parties in the insurance
sector, it is necessary to record a finding on a contention that occupied a good
part of the hearing. In his Affidavit in Reply to IA 3457, relying on the policies
at Exhibits “F” and “G”, the Plaintiff asserts that he carries on a massive
business of general insurance beyond jewellery insurance and that the
jewellery niche “ is not the Plaintiff’s case and never was ”. I am unable to
accept the Plaintiff’s contention at this prima facie stage. This contention is
contrary to the case pleaded in Paragraph 3 of the Plaint, extracted above. The
contention is also in conflict with the trading style the Plaintiff himself claims
to have adopted in 2006 and indeed contrary to the registered label mark he
chose to register. At an interlocutory hearing, the foundation of the Suit
cannot be widened to expand the injunction obtained.
71. The Defendant’s answer, on a policy-by-policy analysis in its Rejoinder,
is that those policies reduce to a small and recurring set of customers, that a
substantial number of them are annual renewals, and that the aggregate
premium across the policy years 2015 to 2022 is in the region of Rs.18 to Rs.19
lakhs, which analysis is not countered with contrary data. A modest number of
incidental fire, burglary and allied policies procured for the same recurring
clients does not convert a self-described niche jewellery insurance consultancy
into a massive general insurance business. In much the same manner, the
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Defendant’s candid disclosure of some six or seven jewellery-related policies
issued since inception would not make the Defendant a participant in the
jewellery insurance market.
72. Indeed, this finding is prima facie and for the purposes of the
interlocutory arrangement alone; the true extent of the Plaintiff’s business is a
matter for trial.
Roles in the Insurance Sector:
73. One area of consideration is whether there would be any overlap in the
field of activity of the parties and the parties express strong disagreement on
this issue. Dr. Saraf would point to the Interim Order having clearly held that
under Section 29 of the TM Act, the Plaintiff has established that it had a
registration of the mark and the mark was being used for insurance under
Class 36. Therefore, it has been held that the “ Defendant's services are in the
very field of insurance covered by the Plaintiff’s registrations ”. Dr. Saraf
would also contend that the Interim Order rightly holds that both parties
being in the field of insurance, the usage by the Defendant is antithetical to the
canon of “ one mark one source ” which essentially would mean that the
similarity between the marks and the continued use by the Defendant would
“ inevitably lead to confusion ”, “ diversion of business and dilution of goodwill
and thus cause irreparable harm to the Plaintiff as also the consumer ”.
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74. Mr. Sen would contend that the Defendant is an insurance broker
registered with the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India
(“ IRDAI ”) to act as a registered market intermediary between the insurer and
the insured to negotiate premia for risk coverage. The Plaintiff’s registration is
not with IRDAI (agents need not be directly registered with the regulator) but
with the insurance companies that issue policies. He would submit that the
paths of the two parties would never cross and the observation about both
being in the insurance sector is an unduly expansive observation that is not
nuanced by the reality of their operations.
75. At this stage of the Suit, it may only be stated that it may not be proper
to sweep any and every role by any person having any role in the insurance
sector as something that would necessarily cause confusion in the mind of the
consumer of insurance. The regulatory framework in the insurance sector
entails multiple nuanced regulatory requirements for those playing specific
roles. An insurance agent (such as the Plaintiff) is an insurance company’s
selling agent and promotes purchase of insurance policies by the insured. An
insurance broker (such as the Defendant) is a market intermediary who is the
link between the insurance company and the insurance policy purchaser in
negotiating the risk premium. As regards assistance in processing of claims, a
third-party administrator is another form of market intermediary who has to
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be registered with IRDAI and may be engaged by the insurer to help
administer the claims.
76. As a matter of law, the position of an insurance agent is governed by
Section 42 of the Insurance Act, 1938, which entails appointment of an agent
by the insurance companies. No person may act as an insurance agent for
more than one life insurer, one general insurer, one health insurer and one of
each of the other mono-line insurers. Under the IRDAI (Appointment of
Insurance Agents) Regulations, 2016, such appointment of an insurance agent
is made by a “Designated Official” of the insurance company, who issues the
appointment letter. Therefore, insurance agents are not registered with the
IRDAI at all, their appointment being the act of the insurer. The principal of
the insurance agent is the insurance company.
77. In sharp contrast, insurance brokers have to be directly registered with
the IRDAI, such registration being governed by Section 42D of the Insurance
Act, 1938 read with the IRDAI (Insurance Brokers) Regulations, 2018.
Insurance brokers are governed by the statutory Code of Conduct set out in
Schedule I – Form H of those Regulations, which prohibits an insurance
broker from acting as an insurance agent of any insurance company, so as to
ensure that no conflict of interest can arise between the role of an insurance
broker (of negotiating the premium contracted) and the role of an insurance
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agent (whose performance is measured and rewarded by the scale of insurance
policies sold to customers).
78. Another way of looking at the issue dealt with above is whether for
purposes of adjudicating this matter, the protection flowing from the
registration sought to be enjoyed by the Plaintiff covers the entire breadth of
Class 36. Rather than answering this question in the abstract, what is
noteworthy is that the Plaintiff’s own pleaded case is that the Plaintiff is
engaged in services connected with insurance in the gems and jewellery sector.
The suit services having thus been defined by the Plaintiff, in the interplay
with Section 35 of the Act, at an interlocutory stage, in my view, it would not
be appropriate to confer a monopoly wider than the case set up by Plaintiff
himself. This is why it is difficult to treat the Defendant’s operations as being
in the very same field of insurance as covered by the Plaintiff’s registered
intellectual property – an observation in the Interim Order that has been
made without the benefit of the distinction being presented by the Defendant.
79. In the peculiar facts of this case, the discussion in this regard by the
16
Supreme Court in Vishnudas Trading , is attractive to consider. Indeed, the
Supreme Court held that a trader who deals in only some of the articles falling
under a broad classification and has no bona fide intention to deal in the
16
Vishnudas Trading vs. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. – (1997) 4 SCC 201
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others, should not be permitted to squat over the entire class claiming a
monopoly in respect of everything within that classification. The Plaintiff has
17 18
relied on Seamon Seeds and Mauj Mobile to indicate that Vishnudas
Trading can be distinguished because it was rendered in the case of
rectification proceedings and that would not be squarely applicable in an
infringement suit.
80. It is in this context that the Plaintiff’s own pleaded case would provide
guidance on the approach to be adopted at the interlocutory stage in the
peculiar facts of this case. The facts of this case are not akin to commodities
or the passing off with phonetically similar sounding trade names, such as the
facts involved in Seamon Seeds or Mauj Mobile . In contrast, in this case, the
name used and sought to be impugned is the KATARIA family name, with
implications under Section 35 of the Act. It is in that context that , prima facie ,
the principle underlying Vishnudas Trading may make a minor contribution to
the scales and that too at the interlocutory stage, bearing in mind that the
consideration of protection as claimed in the Suit is itself founded on the
services relating to insurance in the gems and jewellery sector.
17
Seamons Seeds Pvt. Ltd. vs. Mahyco Pvt. Ltd. – Interim Application (L) No. 33512 of 2024
– Order dated June 24, 2025
18
Mauj Mobile (P) Ltd, v. Mohalla Tech (P) Ltd. –2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1094
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81. Likewise, whether the registered mark is being used for any segment of
the class in which registration has been effected, as dealt with in Gujarat
19
Bottling too would be distinguishable in this case. The contention that the
Defendant ought to have sought rectification under Section 47 of the TM Act
too would not turn the needle since the reliance by the Defendant is on Section
35 of the Act, which provides that nothing in the Act would allow interference
with the use of one’s own name, in which case the remedy of rectification
would also not be necessary if the benefits of Section 28 themselves are under
cloud.
82. For the very same reason, at this stage, the principle of “one mark, one
source”, and the declaration of law in Power Control Appliances and in
Tilaknagar can be distinguished in this case. The fields here are distinct, with
the Plaintiff having focused on a niche field and even the label mark
confirming to such conscious choice, with a small smattering of having been
an insurance agent in issuance of insurance policies of other kinds by the
Plaintiff’s principals.
83. That apart, none of these cases involved an element of Section 35 of the
Act. If a strong prima facie case exists for bona fide use of one’s own name,
nothing in the Act would enable a registrant of a trade mark to interfere with
19
Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Ors. vs. Coca Cola Co. – (1995) 5 SCC 545
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such use. The analysis of case law cited by either side must not lead to
forgetting that the core issue in this case is the applicability of Section 35 of
the Act. The cases of Mahindra and Mahendra Paper too turned on the
element of bona fide use of one’s own name, which on facts of this case, is
distinguishable for the reasons set out in this judgement holding a strong
prima facie bona fide use of the KATARIA family name by the Defendant’s
promoters and by the Defendant. Indeed, KAPL has granted a right to the
Defendant to use the KATARIA name, and at this stage, it would be wholly
inappropriate to give no weightage to the consistent use of the KATARIA
family name in the operations of the Defendant in much the same way as done
hitherto with all other businesses.
84. Therefore, to summarise, at this prima facie stage, it is inappropriate to
sweep the roles of the two parties into one composite generic whole of
“insurance” – neither party is an insurer and as a matter of the regulatory
framework applicable to them, neither party is permitted to play the other
party’s role in the insurance sector. Therefore, the best approach is to examine
the Plaintiff’s own pleadings to see the substratum of the Suit – Paragraph 3 of
the Plaint extracted above clearly indicates that the subject matter of
protection is the goodwill and reputation claimed by the Plaintiff in the field of
insurance-related services in the gems and jewellery sector. This is not to shut
out the Plaintiff’s contentions for pursuit in the proceedings. The key issue is
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to fashion a reasonable measure of protection that would balance the
competing interests of the parties, pending the hearing and final disposal of
the Suit.
Precious Jewels and Implications:
85. The role of the decision of the Supreme Court in Precious Jewels needs
consideration. There is nothing in Section 35 to indicate that it protects only
human beings in the use of their own name and that too only those who carry
on business only in the form of a sole proprietorship, and that such protection
would be lost if the form of a body corporate is chosen to set up a business or
that a body corporate would never be able to use its very own name for
conduct of trade. Indeed, it is apparent that Precious Jewels was not shown to
the Court on the earlier occasion – perhaps because it was not considered
relevant by the Plaintiff. The Interim Order makes no reference to it.
86. The decision in Precious Jewels was rendered after the decisions relied
upon by the Plaintiff to contend that the benefit of Section 35 is restricted to
natural persons, the closest being the decision in MNM Marketing rendered
literally four days prior to Precious Jewels . In Precious Jewels , the partners of
the plaintiff firm and of the defendant firm belonged to the same family and
shared the surname “Rakyan”, and both firms carried on the family business
of jewellery in Delhi, with their shops abutting each other. The defendants
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traded in the name and style of “NEENA AND RAVI RAKYAN”, the partners of
that firm being Smt. Neena Rakyan and Shri Ravi Rakyan, while the plaintiff
firm traded as “Rakyan’s Fine Jewellery”. Interim relief had been granted
against the breakaway faction and the matter reached the Supreme Court at
the interlocutory stage. The Supreme Court took the view that it was unjust
and improper to prevent the defendants from carrying on business in their
own names. The Supreme Court held thus:
9. As stated hereinabove, Section 35 of the Act permits anyone to do his business
in his own name in a bona fide manner. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the
defendants are doing their business in their own name and their bona fides have not
been disputed. It is also not in dispute that the plaintiff and defendants are related to
each other and practically all the family members are in the business of jewellery. We
have perused the hoardings of the shops where they are doing the business and upon
perusal of the hoardings we do not find any similarity between them.
10. In our opinion, looking at the provisions of Section 35 of the Act, there is no
prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff and therefore, the defendants could not
have been restrained from doing their business. We, therefore, quash and set aside
the impugned order¹ granting interim relief in favour of the plaintiff and the appeal is
allowed with no order as to costs.
[Emphasis Supplied]
87. Vacating the interlocutory relief suffered by the business styled as
“NEENA AND RAVI RAKYAN”, the Supreme Court held that the partners
used their own names and that their bona fides had not been disputed. Both
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businesses were in the field of jewellery and abutted each other. Yet, the
Supreme Court considered the provisions of Section 35 and held that the use
of their own names could not be interfered with. The Supreme Court also
perused the hoardings of the two shops and found no similarity between them.
The trade name was “NEENA AND RAVI RAKYAN” while the appellant
partnership firm was called “Precious Jewels”. It is the use of names of the
partners (which included the RAKYAN surname, which was part of trade mark
of the registrant) that was considered and upheld at the prima facie stage. If
the usage was to be only by individual human beings, the partnership using
their names would be quite similar to the situation where they may have
formed a company called, say, Precious Jewels Ltd. and yet used the trade
name “NEENA AND RAVI RAKYAN”.
88. In my opinion, there is nothing in the provision itself to indicate any
relevance for the form of business enterprise that would be covered by Section
35, quite apart from whether a “person” can in its simplest meaning include
juridical persons such as bodies corporate. In my view, it would be difficult to
hold that when the Kataria Family set up the Defendant namely, Kataria
Insurance Brokers Pvt. Ltd., using the KATARIA name in much the same way
the family set up its other ventures, all titled Kataria, it would be absurd to
hold that the very same individuals who promoted the Defendant may have
used the KATARIA name if they ran the business as a proprietorship or as a
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partnership but would lose that right if they used the very same name to form
a company. Such a reading would wipe out and truncate the individuals’
substantive right to so use their own name merely on account of the form of
the business enterprise. The contention based on the premise that a body
corporate could never claim the benefit of Section 35 would have this outcome
as a necessary corollary, which does not lend itself to acceptance.
89. It cannot be said with any assurance that if Precious Jewels had been
presented to the Single Bench on the earlier occasion, the outcome would have
been the same. On being presented with Precious Jewels , what appeals to me
is that prima facie , the form of business organisation has no relevance to the
exclusion from monopoly granted under Section 35. I see no reason why there
should be an absolute and exhaustive intervention into the business activity of
the Defendant and that too at an interim stage, and for no reason other than
the fact that the KATARIA word mark, which is surname of many families, is
registered in the Plaintiff’s name. The Plaintiff indeed has protection against
the world at large owing to its registrations, but such protection cannot be
absolute and come in the way of even those with the same surname using their
own surname for the insurance business in much the same manner as they use
that very surname in their other businesses, which indicates bona fide use.
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90. The decisions relied upon by the Plaintiff are distinguishable on facts –
they did not deal with the case of a family that traded in its own surname
across business enterprises across decades. While Kirloskar relates to a
breakaway faction that suppressed its connection, Precious Jewels would
address the approach to be adopted. Montari dealt with company law and not
Section 35 of the Act while MNM Marketing did not entail use of a family
surname.
91. In contrast, Jindal Industries , Chandra Engineers and Vasundhara
engage with the subject in a manner that resonates with me and is indeed
consistent with the approach of the Supreme Court in Precious Jewels ,
namely, that using a name or surname is covered by the exclusion under
Section 35. Therefore, having a name or surname registered to claim statutory
protection, brings with it the risk of the statutory benefits of registration not
working against other families with that surname in view of the protection for
use of one’s own name under Section 35 being unequivocal. Indeed, the
statutory protections that flow from the registration would be available against
the rest of the world who do not have that name or surname. Even against
those who use the name or surname, unless it is shown that the adoption is not
bona fide , the protection would be available. In that context, those who
incorporated the Defendant have consistently used the KATARIA name in all
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their businesses. This is the most commonsensical reading of the law to my
mind, at least at this prima facie stage.
92. Precious Jewels was decided by the Supreme Court at an interlocutory
stage. Neither side has pointed out to me what transpired in the main matter
thereafter. It appears from publicly available case law that eventually, as a
matter of common law, a Learned Division Bench of the Delhi High Court set
aside an order of dismissal of the underlying suit by a Learned Single Bench,
moulding the relief that the legitimate use of “NEENA AND RAVI RAKYAN”
may continue but at a distance beyond a two-kilometre radius of the main
family’s shop.
93. Nothing in this subsequent decision is being commented upon by me in
this judgement except to state that at the interlocutory stage, an appropriate
moulding of relief would be warranted in the matter in hand, particularly
taking into account that the matter is at an interlocutory stage.
Passing Off Action:
94. As regards the contention that the goodwill and reputation of the
Plaintiff would lead to a valid allegation of passing off, and that a claim of
passing off being a common law right, would need consideration without
regard to the contours of the TM Act, it must be noted that the essence of the
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Suit is formulated to protect the goodwill and reputation said to have been
earned in the area of insurance in the gems and jewellery sector. The value of
the Suit is a mere Rs. 5 Lakhs. Even without empirical data, if the Plaintiff
could be regarded as having built a name and reputation in a niche field of
gems and jewellery insurance, and that the Plaintiff is entitled to further build
upon such reputation to enter into other areas of natural expansion, it still
begs the question as to whether that would disentitle those who incorporated
the Defendant from using their own Kataria family surname.
95. To my mind, at this prima facie stage, in view of the discussion above,
the breadth and sweep of the Interim Order goes well beyond the field of
operation of the Plaintiff. The Defendant has been a bona fide user of the
KATARIA family name, which has been used to set up the other enterprises of
the Kataria Group. The Defendant too has been set up by the Kataria Family to
enter the insurance sector as a natural progression of their automobile
dealership business. The strength of statutory protection under Section 35 by
way of exclusion from interference by registrants of the KATARIA name
cannot be wished away in absolute terms.
96. I have already made observations about whether the parties can be
conclusively said to be engaged in the “same services”. For the reasons already
recorded, a strong case of bona fide use has been made out to invoke the
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exclusion from restraint conferred by Section 35 of the Act, and the very same
analysis applies squarely to the contentions of passing off. It cannot be stated,
at this prima facie stage that the consistent use of the KATARIA family name
was aimed at feeding off the reputation and goodwill of the KATARIA trade
mark registered by the Plaintiff.
Prior User; Non-Joinder; and Delay:
97. A word about contentions of prior use and the plea of non-joinder of
KAPL, which is the registrant of the trade mark used by the Kataria Family,
would be in order. I am not convinced that one can take an approach of
looking solely to the Defendant, ignoring the Kataria Family, which admittedly
incorporated the Defendant using their own name. Indeed, the Defendant
came into existence only in 2014 but the very process of incorporating the
Defendant is a means of use of the Kataria Family’s own name in the course of
trade. In addition, Mr. Sen points to material on the record including KAPL’s
board resolution dated October 25, 2013 according no objection to the
formation of the Defendant; a Chartered Accountant’s certificate certifying
KAPL’s income from insurance services for the years 1997 to 2003; an invoice
dated August 24, 2002; an insurance policy dated March 14, 2002 and
correspondence of Maruti Insurance Brokers Limited, recording remuneration
for insurance services from January 2003. It is also claimed that KAPL
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registered the domain name www.kataria.co.in on February 12, 2004, prior to
the Plaintiff’s registering its domain name www.katariainsurance.com.
98. Prima facie , this material is relevant in furtherance of bona fides . The
Defendant was formed in 2014 to be an insurance broker, by the Kataria
Family whose automobile dealership had been placing insurance business
since the 1990s. Therefore, it is difficult to hold that the incorporation of the
Defendant or the choice of name for such incorporation is a contrivance or a
device aimed at feeding off the Plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation.
99. I have already stated my opinion on the use of the KATARIA name by
the Defendant’s promoter family constituting bona fide use of their own name
for purposes of Section 35. In my view, it would be appropriate to leave the
question of whether past usage by the Kataria Family would enure to the
benefit of the Defendant as a mixed question of fact and law for adjudication
in the course of the trial. The plea is a serious and arguable one and cannot be
rejected out of hand at this interim stage.
100. On the issue of non-joinder, the Plaintiff is dominus litis and has a right
to choose whom to arraign. Leaving out KAPL is the Plaintiff’s choice and any
infirmity, if perceived from such exclusion, is a matter of implications in the
trial of the Suit. In any case, the analysis at this stage does not rest on the
subsistence of KAPL’s registrations but whether documented past usage brings
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about a strength in the case for bona fide use. Therefore, I find it unnecessary
to decide the plea of non-joinder for purposes of an appropriate interlocutory
arrangement. Leaving this purely to as a matter for trial, I make no finding on
this issue at this stage.
101. Likewise, the competing contentions on the alleged delay in assailing
the Defendant does not need a conclusive finding at this stage. The Plaintiff
did become aware of the Defendant being incorporated in 2014 and engaged in
correspondence then. At this stage, the registration the Plaintiff relied upon
was the label mark. The next round of objections took place in 2019-2020 and
the KATARIA word mark was registered in 2019. The Suit was instituted in
2021. Delay alone would not defeat the action brought by the Suit, but
whether the adoption was dishonest would be material. For the reasons spelt
out above, I have held that prima facie , the use is bona fide and the adoption of
the KATARIA name for setting up the Defendant and the use of that name by
the Defendant is not dishonest. How the interlocutory arrangement must be
fashioned would however factor in the timelines emanating from the conduct
of the parties. The hardship and inconvenience that would arise from one or
another type of interlocutory arrangement is itself informed by the pace of
action of the parties. The Defendant is prima facie entitled to lean on the
sense of comfort that he may be legitimately expected to have had considering
that neither did the regulatory authorities moved by the Plaintiff take any
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decisive action on the basis of the Plaintiff’s grievances, nor did the Plaintiff
himself institute the Suit before 2021.
102. This is not to say that the reliefs granted would necessarily have to be
vacated in toto. The Plaintiff too has used www.katariainsurance.com as its
domain name for a significant length of time, with no quarrel from the
Defendant. The Defendant created a near-identical domain name
www.katariainsurance.co.in which may cause initial confusion which may be
resolved only after the user gets to know that the two operate in different
spheres. When approaching a business online, if the service provider does not
build traction with the consumer rapidly, the consumer would move on to
other competing service providers due to such initial confusion. This is not in
the best interests of either party. Therefore, specifically holding that the issue
of acquiescence too is a question of fact to be answered by trial of evidence to
be led, I have preferred to mould an appropriate interlocutory relief instead of
an absolute ban that is currently in operation.
Correspondence with the ROC:
103. Correspondence between the Defendant and the Registrar of
Companies, Ahmedabad has come up for consideration in the submissions by
both sides. At the threshold of registration of the company, in December 2013,
a conditional undertaking was taken from a proposed director of the
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Defendant. The Registrar of Companies, Ahmedabad (“ ROC ”) came to notice
the existence of the Plaintiff’s trade mark registration later upon the Plaintiff’s
Chartered Accountant objecting by a letter dated January 28, 2014. The
registration then enjoyed by the Plaintiff was the label mark, which puts it
beyond doubt that the registration was presented in connection with insurance
relating to gems and jewellery, although the specification of services in Class
36 was cast in wider terms.
104. The label mark registered by the Plaintiff in 2010, claiming use dating
back to 2006, is unmistakable in its scope. It uses the word “Kataria”, which
in itself could have been difficult to register as a word mark, but uses the letter
‘I’ in a distinctive manner evidently to emphasize that ‘I’ stands for insurance.
Lest there be any doubt, the legend below the name “Kataria” written as a
prominent and distinguishing feature of the label, makes it clear that the area
of operation was the gems and jewellery sector and that the trademark was
aimed at servicing the gems and jewellery sector.
105. At the time of incorporation of the Defendant, an undertaking was given
that “ if any objection regarding the name of the company arises in future, we
would take necessary actions and may consider alteration of the name of the
company, if required ”. Upon the Plaintiff’s objection, the ROC invoked that
undertaking by its letter dated February 25, 2014, calling upon the Defendant
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to change its name, failing which action would be initiated. The Defendant
replied to the ROC on March 27, 2014, setting out the history of the Kataria
Group since 1955 and asserting its entitlement to its promoters’ family
surname — the same assertions on the law as are made in answer to the Suit,
in reply to IA 1663 and in IA 3457. No further action, direction or penalty has
followed from the ROC in the period of over eleven years since.
106. Indeed, the word mark “KATARIA” came to be registered later in 2019,
also claiming user from 2006. The Plaintiff renewed its grievance in 2020 and
complained to the ROC as well as the IRDAI, this time, armed with the
registration of the word mark “Kataria”. Evidently, there is no sign of any
traction to these complaints. Whether the benefit of the registration, which
would be available against the world at large, would also be available against
the Defendant which is promoted by the Kataria Family, which used its own
name to incorporate the Defendant and to use the same name in its
operations, is the question to ask.
107. I have dealt with above, my opinion on the “ bona fide use by a person of
his own name ” as referred to in Section 35. The question really is whether the
engagement with the ROC in 2013-2014 would necessarily render the
Defendant’s use of the KATARIA name to fall in the bracket of not being a
bona fide use. The submission to the ROC in 2013-2014, that the Defendant
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would “ consider ”, changing its name “ if required ”, is not something that can
be seen as a binding absolute commitment to change the name without an
adjudication of whether such entitlement to use the family name has been
taken away by operation of Section 28 of the Act, notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 35 of the Act.
108. At this interlocutory stage of the Suit, I am not convinced that the
Defendant should be required to give up its very corporate name on the
ground that it wrote to the ROC that it would consider altering its name if
required. The requirement to so alter the name would arise if the Suit were
decreed against the Defendant or even if an interim relief were to be adverse to
the Defendant and that went unchallenged or challenge were rejected. Instead,
in this case, challenge led to the Interim Order being set aside by a Learned
Division Bench and a challenge of that appellate order being set aside by the
Supreme Court on the sole ground of an application being necessitated before
the Single Bench and not in appeal, leaving all contentions on merits open.
Summary of Findings and Appropriate Interim Measures:
109. The Supreme Court Order has explicitly kept all contentions on merits
open for consideration by this Court as a Single Bench to examine any
application for vacation of the Interim Order. I cannot but help notice that the
Defendant’s advocacy to even point to the scope of the Suit, was unavailable to
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assist the Court when IA 1663 was disposed of. This led to a wide and
expansive prohibition including restraint on the use of “Kataria Insurance”
even in the corporate name, despite the name being the use of the family
name. Likewise, the expanse and scope of the reliefs granted as prayed, goes
well beyond the field of insurance in the gems and jewellery sector and any
reasonable natural progression and expansion of the Plaintiff’s role in such
field.
110. Moreover, IA 1663 came to be heard four and a half years after
pleadings had been completed, and the Defendant, which fairly apologises for
the breakdown in its own arrangements, was not present. A robust adversarial
contest of ideas therefore did not take place. It was on that ground alone that
the Supreme Court effected a “ remand ” to “ enable ” the Defendant to seek a
vacation of the Interim Order, by directing that an application for vacation of
the Interim Order may be filed.
111. Now that this issue has been sent back to the Single Bench leaving all
contentions on merits open, in my view, for an appropriate order disposing of
IA 1663 (that has been remanded) along with IA 3457 (that seeks vacation of
the Interim Order), the scale and scope of interlocutory protection necessary
to preserve the subject matter of the Suit needs calibration.
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112. Having heard both sides, I have come to the following conclusions,
among which, all views on the merits are prima facie in nature, and made
solely for the purposes of the interlocutory arrangement:
A] IA 3457 is maintainable. The Interim Order having been passed
without the Defendant being heard when IA 1663 was finally heard, and
in any event, the Supreme Court Order is itself a change in
circumstances and a binding direction by the last court of the land. The
operation of the Interim Order upon a regulated market intermediary
restrained from the use of its own corporate name causes undue
hardship. Any gap perceived between what the Supreme Court Order
permitted and what Order XXXIX Rule 4 permits stands filled by
Section 151 of the CPC;
B] The foundation of the Suit, as set out in Paragraph 3 of the Plaint,
is insurance and related services for the gems and jewellery sector. The
Plaintiff’s contention in reply to IA 3457 that he carries on a massive
general insurance business and that the niche formed no part of his case
is prima facie not consistent with the explicit own pleadings in the Suit,
and one cannot expand the scope of the Suit in interlocutory
proceedings. The Plaintiff has himself pleaded as to the trading style he
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adopted in 2006 and to the label mark he chose to register to
demonstrate his reputation in the chosen niche area of operations;
C] Neither party is an insurer, and as a matter of the regulatory
framework applicable to them, neither is permitted to play the role of
the other — the Plaintiff being an insurance agent appointed by his
principals and the Defendant a broker registered with the IRDAI. The
roles of the two parties cannot be swept into one composite generic
whole of “insurance”;
D] The protection flowing from a registration in Class 36 does not, at
the interlocutory stage, extend across the entire breadth of that class.
On the principle in Vishnudas Trading , it would be inappropriate to
confer a monopoly wider than the case set up by the Plaintiff himself;
and for the same reason the canon of “one mark, one source” as declared
in Power Control Appliances and in Tilaknagar is distinguishable on the
facts of this case;
E] Section 35 is not restricted to natural persons in the conduct of
business and even if so, such natural person’s conduct of business would
include the activity of incorporating a company to conduct business with
the use of one’s own name;
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F] The use of the KATARIA family name by the promoters of the
Defendant, in incorporating it and in carrying on the business of
insurance broking through the Defendant, is prima facie a bona fide use
of their own name, consistent with the naming of every other enterprise
of the Kataria Group, and cannot be characterised as a contrivance to
feed off the Plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation. The decisions relied
upon by the Plaintiff are distinguishable on facts, while Precious Jewels ,
Jindal Industries , Chandra Engineers and Vasundhra Jewellers support
this reading;
G] The very same analysis applies to the claim in passing off. It
cannot be stated at this prima facie stage that the consistent use of the
family name was motivated by a design to feed off the reputation and
goodwill claimed by the Plaintiff;
H] The application of Section 35 of the Act to the facts of this case
necessarily involves answering mixed questions of fact and law that
would involve the leading of evidence at the trial of the Suit. Likewise,
the question of whether past usage by the Kataria Family enures to the
benefit of the Defendant, and whether there has been any acquiescence
by the Plaintiff, are matters that need to be tried. On the plea of non-
joinder, the Plaintiff being dominus litis , no finding is made and that
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plea is left entirely to the trial. Pending such trial, the competing
interests of the parties must be adjusted;
I] The Defendant’s engagement with the ROC in 2013-2014, in
which it stated that it would “ consider ” altering its name “ if required ”, is
not a binding and absolute commitment to change its name. In the
factual matrix involved, such a “requirement” can only arise when the
Suit is decreed, or when such an interim relief is granted and a challenge
to it fails;
J] The interim reliefs granted are, in their expanse and reach, an
absolute prohibition of a kind commensurate with a finding that no
defence to the Suit is possible, and would require the Defendant to
undergo a complete rebranding at an interim stage. Both the undue
hardship thereby occasioned and the balance of convenience call for a
recalibration of the Interim Order rather than either a blanket
prohibition or a complete vacation of it. Equities can be adjusted, even
accounting for the Defendant having been made aware that hurdles may
be placed in the path of the use of its name; and
K] The Plaintiff’s website www.katariainsurance.com using both
“KATARIA” and “insurance” was set up at a prior point of time, and the
Defendant states that it has taken down its website
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www.katariainsurance.co.in. Maintenance of that position, coupled with
a clear differentiation of the Defendant’s new domain name and
prospective social media presence and a clear disclosure that the
Defendant has nothing to do with the Plaintiff or with insurance services
relating to the gems and jewellery sector, is the appropriate way of
addressing the risk of initial confusion. The mechanics are set out in the
directions that follow.
113. Before setting out the arrangement, I must also record that Mr. Sen, on
instructions from the Defendant, has undertaken to this Court that, pending
the hearing and final disposal of the Suit, it shall not deal with any facet of
insurance in the jewellery and gems sector. The Defendant has also
undertaken to pay such damages or costs as this Court may award as
compensation for allowing IA 3457. Those undertakings are accepted and the
Defendant shall remain bound by them.
114. In the result, in substitution of the interim reliefs granted in the Interim
Order dated December 8, 2025, the following interim measures shall apply,
pending the hearing and final disposal of the Suit – each of these measures is
integrally interwoven with the rest since, in my opinion, this comprehensive
arrangement is necessary to achieve the best balance of competing interests of
the parties:
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A] The Defendant shall not engage in any manner whatsoever in
playing the role of any market intermediary in the field of insuring any
activity in the gems and jewellery sector;
B] The Defendant shall be free to continue to use its corporate name
without any alteration in it. The Defendant would not be required to
change its name in its insurance broking license issued by the IRDAI or
in the certificate of incorporation issued by the ROC;
C] As a counterbalancing measure, also taking on board the
Defendant’s commitment made to Court that Defendant will steer clear
of all insurance-related activity in the gems and jewellery sector, the
Defendant is also directed to keep safe distance in the formulation of a
new domain name on the internet and in its social media accounts, so as
to not cause any confusion even if such confusion may be regarded only
as initial confusion that may get resolved as and when the user of the
respective websites discovers that the two channels are different;
D] Towards this end, the smooth usage of the Plaintiff’s website
www.katariainsurance.com shall not be interfered with, and the
Defendant shall not revive, transfer or otherwise deal with the domain
name www.katariainsurance.co.in, which shall be kept dormant pending
the hearing and final disposal of the Suit. Instead, the Defendant shall
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set up a website with a domain name that distinctly differentiates itself
from the phrase “Kataria Insurance”, which is the only phrase used in
the Plaintiff’s domain name, namely, www.katariainsurance.com It is
clarified for the avoidance of doubt that the other website with domain
name www.policyleader.co.in may revive without any interference,
subject to compliance with this judgement;
E] The Defendant shall make it clear in its new domain name that it
is an insurance broker and has nothing to do with the field of insurance
in the gems and jewellery sector, and adopt a reasonable and discernible
communication approach to make this clear to the world at large.
Consistent with its commitment to steer clear of any facet of insurance
relating to the gems and jewellery sector, although the role of the
Defendant is different from the role of the Plaintiff in the field of
insurance, the Defendant shall prominently display on its website that it
has nothing to do with the Plaintiff or its proprietor and the business
activities of the Plaintiff;
F] The Defendant shall maintain true and faithful accounts of the
revenue earned by it in the conduct of its insurance broking business
under its corporate name, pending the hearing and final disposal of the
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Suit, and shall file in this Court a statement of such accounts, certified
by its statutory auditor, once in every six months;
G] Liberty is granted to either party to apply in the event of any
difficulty in operationalising this arrangement.
115. Because the Defendant has already been put to serious and undue
hardship, on reflection I am satisfied that my initial inclination to impose
severe costs on the Defendant for having missed the earlier round of hearing
of IA 1663, which has led to three more rounds of litigation at the same stage
(the appeal to the Division Bench; the appeal to the Supreme Court; and
consideration of IA 3457) needs to be tempered. Moreover, costs must
ordinarily follow the event.
116. Considering the reasons for which I have made a variation of the
Interim Order, it would be fair to defer the award of commercially reasonable
costs to the stage of trial for appropriate consideration at the stage of final
disposal.
117. In the result, IA 3457 is allowed in the aforesaid terms and the Interim
Order dated December 8, 2025 stands varied as above. IA 1663, which stood
remanded by the Supreme Court Order, is disposed of in the same terms,
varying and restating the interlocutory relief as above.
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118. Since the application of Section 35 of the TM Act to the facts of this case
will have to be determined upon evidence, it is desirable that the Suit itself
proceeds with expedition. The Registry shall list the Suit along with all the
remaining attendant applications, if any, under the caption “ For Directions ”
four weeks from today.
119. After the judgement was pronounced, Learned Advocate for the Plaintiff
sought a stay of the operation of the judgment for a period of four weeks.
However, for the reasons already set out in the judgement and in view of the
circumstances that have arisen, in my view, no such stay ought to be granted.
120. All actions required to be taken pursuant to this order shall be taken
upon receipt of a downloaded copy as available on this Court’s website.
[ SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.]
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