Sukhjinder Singh vs Pb State Cooperative Supply & Marketing Fed Ltd & Anr

HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

CWP-7516-2013 (O&M)

Sukhjinder Singh ... Petitioner

VS.

Punjab State Coop. Supply &
Marketing Fed. Ltd. & Anr. ... Respondents

1. Judgment reserved on 12.08.2026
2. Judgment pronounced on 02.09.2026
3. Judgment uploaded on 03.09.2026
4. Whether operative or full judgment Full
5. Delay in pronouncement of full judgment and reasons, if any NA

CORAM: HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE SANDEEP MOUDGIL

Present: Mr. Udayveer Singh Brar, Advocate for the petitioner
Mr. Animesh Sharma, Advocate for respondent No.1
Mr. TPS Walia, AAG Punjab

Sandeep Moudgil, J.


(1). The petitioner, who is the son of late Shri MS Cheema has
approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a
writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 06.07.2005, whereby his father,
while in service of respondent No.1, was visited with the punishment of
reduction by two stages in the time scale of pay for the purpose of calculating
his retiral dues, the appellate order dated 20.07.2010 and the order dated
16.08.2012 passed by the revisional authority. A further direction is sought to
respondent No.1 to release all the pensionary benefits. The controversy
essentially arises out of shortage of paddy stocks pertaining to crop year 1997-
98 stored at the premises of M/s N.G.T. Rice Mill, Banur.

(2). The controversy in the present petition essentially arises out of the
disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner's father, Shri M.S.
V VISHAL SHONKAR
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Cheema, who was serving as Branch Officer with respondent-Markfed and
retired from service w.e.f. 31.12.2004, in relation to shortage of paddy crop of
the year 1997-98 lying at the premises of M/s N.G.T. Rice Mill, Banur.

(3). On the basis of the enquiry report dated 03.03.2003, the
disciplinary authority, vide order dated 06.07.2005, imposed the punishment of
bringing down the petitioner's father by two stages in the time scale of pay for
the purpose of calculating his retiral dues and as regards the stocks lying in
joint custody of the petitioner and the miller, in the event the loss was not
recovered from the miller through arbitration/legal proceedings, the same
would be recovered from the charged officials along with interest in equal
proportion.

(4). The record further shows that respondent-Markfed proceeded
independently against the miller under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act followed by an FIR under Sections 379, 406 and 420 IPC and
Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act registered on 10.03.2000.
Arbitration proceedings were also initiated, culminating initially in an award
dated 02.04.2003 in favour of Markfed for Rs.41,04,665.70 along with interest.
The said award was subsequently set aside by the learned District Judge on
05.02.2013 in proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996, whereafter the matter was considered by the Managing Director,
Markfed, who vide order dated 31.03.2013 determined the claim at
Rs.1,68,78,443/- with interest. Pursuant thereto, Markfed instituted a recovery
suit before the competent Civil Court at Patiala claiming Rs.1,92,20,790/- with
future interest against the miller.
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(5). Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
orders cannot be sustained as the enquiry did not establish misappropriation or
embezzlement against the petitioner's father and the finding was confined to
negligence. It is further submitted that the stock in question was lying with the
miller in joint custody and the respondents themselves treated the miller as
primarily liable for the financial loss by initiating criminal, arbitration and
recovery proceedings against him. It is contended that the punishment order
itself made recovery from the charged officials conditional upon failure to
recover the loss from the miller and that such contingency had not arisen,
particularly when substantial recovery had already been made and the
remaining claim against the miller was pending adjudication. It is also
submitted that the petitioner's father died on 26.09.2009 during pendency of his
appeal and, therefore, in view of the resolution dated 29.09.1989, the
proceedings ought not to have been continued to the prejudice of his estate.

(6). Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the
disciplinary proceedings had culminated in the punishment order dated
06.07.2005 during the lifetime of the petitioner's father and, therefore, his
subsequent death could not invalidate a punishment already imposed. It is
submitted that the resolution dated 29.09.1989 itself distinguishes between a
case where disciplinary proceedings are pending at the time of death and a case
where an order of recovery has already been passed during the lifetime of the
employee. In the latter situation, subsequent death does not affect recovery,
which can be adjusted from the dues payable to the employee or pursued
through other legal remedies. It is further submitted that the Inquiry Officer had
found negligence on the part of the charged officials in safeguarding the paddy
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stocks and that, after considering the enquiry report, representations and
personal hearing, the disciplinary authority rightly imposed the punishment of
reduction by two stages.

(7). Heard learned counsel for the parties and the judgment was kept
reserved on 12.08.2026.

(8). The first aspect which requires notice is that the enquiry did not
establish that the petitioner's father had himself misappropriated or embezzled
the paddy or derived any personal benefit from the shortage. The charge of
misappropriation was not proved. Nevertheless, the Inquiry Officer found the
charged officials negligent in the discharge of their duties and held that such
negligence had enabled the miller to convert the paddy unauthorisedly. The
disciplinary authority was, therefore, entitled to take disciplinary action for the
misconduct actually found proved. The mere fact that the allegation of
misappropriation was not established does not mean that the finding of
negligence stood obliterated or that the disciplinary authority was precluded
from imposing an appropriate penalty for such negligence.

(9). The punishment imposed also cannot be said, in the circumstances
of the case, to be wholly disproportionate. The record concerns a substantial
shortage of paddy valued at about Rs.26 lakhs and the Inquiry Officer found
failure on the part of the charged officials to adequately discharge their duties
in safeguarding the stocks. The punishment imposed was not dismissal from
service or a direction to personally bear the entire loss forthwith, but reduction
by two stages in the time scale of pay for the purpose of calculating retiral dues.
The disciplinary authority further made recovery in respect of joint-custody
stocks expressly conditional upon failure to recover the loss from the miller
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through arbitration/legal proceedings. The penalty, therefore, cannot be
characterised as one which travels wholly beyond the misconduct proved.

(10). The subsequent death of the petitioner's father during pendency of
the appeal also does not, by itself, render the punishment order dated
06.07.2005 non-existent. In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in
Bitola Devi v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No.7717 of 2019 , decided on
30.09.2019, is instructive. The Supreme Court, while considering a circular
providing for closure of disciplinary proceedings on the death of an employee,
held:
“We are of the view that the said Circular providing for the
disciplinary proceedings to be closed immediately on the death of
the charged Railway employee, would apply in a disciplinary case
in which disciplinary proceedings are pending consideration. This
is so as the employee would not be able to defend himself and the
legal heirs may not be able to do so but would have no application
to a case where the enquiry is completed and finding has been
arrived at. Thus, in case an appeal or revision is pending, this
Circular would have no application.”

(11). The principle emerging from the aforesaid decision is that where
the disciplinary enquiry has already culminated and a punishment has been
imposed during the lifetime of the employee, the subsequent death of the
employee during pendency of an appeal does not automatically nullify the
punishment already imposed.

(12). In the present case, the punishment order was passed on
06.07.2005, whereas the petitioner's father expired on 26.09.2009. Thus, the
death occurred almost four years after the disciplinary authority had concluded
the proceedings and imposed the punishment. The appellate authority could,
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therefore, examine the legality of the punishment already imposed and the mere
pendency of the appeal at the time of death did not extinguish the disciplinary
order.

(13). The resolution dated 29.09.1989 does not lead to a different
conclusion. On the contrary, the resolution itself distinguishes between a case
where departmental proceedings are pending at the time of death and a case
where recovery orders have already been passed during the lifetime of the
employee. In the latter case, it expressly contemplates continuation of the
recovery process against the dues of the employee or through other legal
remedies. Since, in the present case, the punishment order had already been
passed during the lifetime of the petitioner's father, his subsequent death cannot
by itself invalidate the said order or the appellate consideration thereof.

(14). Consequently, the challenge to the orders dated 06.07.2005,
20.07.2010 and 16.08.2012 is devoid of merit.

(15). Dismissed.

(16). Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

02.09.2026
(Sandeep Moudgil)
V.Vishal

Judge
Yes/No
1. Whether speaking/reasoned? :
2. Whether reportable? : Yes/No
V VISHAL SHONKAR
2026.09.03 10:47
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document