A bank manager may face an alternative Section 409 charge on prima facie dishonest dominion.

The respondent-complainant alleged that a bank account had been opened in her name without her knowledge or consent and that, on the basis of forged documents, loan amounts were disbursed into that account and subsequently withdrawn.

The petitioner was the Manager of the concerned Sarva Haryana Gramin Bank branch and was alleged to have acted in connivance with the co-accused in facilitating the transaction.

An FIR was registered for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A read with Section 120-B IPC.

Although Section 409 IPC was included in the challan, the petitioner was not initially charge-sheeted under that provision.

The trial Court framed charges under the aforementioned provisions but discharged the petitioner under Section 409 IPC.

In revision, the Additional Sessions Judge modified the order and directed framing of an alternative charge under Section 409 read with Section 120-B IPC by invoking Section 221 Cr.P.C.

The Court applied Section 409 IPC as an aggravated form of criminal breach of trust, requiring the ingredients of Section 405 IPC—entrustment of property or dominion over it, dishonest misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal, or wilful suffering of such conduct in violation of law or contract—together with the accused acting in the capacity of a public servant, banker or other specified person.

Entrustment includes dominion or control over property, and at the stage of framing charge the Court must determine whether the material raises a strong prima facie suspicion rather than finally adjudicate guilt.

Section 221 Cr.P.C. permits alternative charges where the facts may constitute more than one offence or where it is uncertain which offence the evidence will ultimately establish.

The Court distinguished Asoke Basak v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 (10) SCC 660, and Robert John D’Souza v. Stephen V. Gomes, 2015 (2) PLJ (Criminal) 385, which require specific material showing entrustment or dominion coupled with dishonest misappropriation or conversion.

The Court held that the allegations, taken at face value, went beyond mere negligence in loan processing.

The petitioner was allegedly the bank manager who, in conspiracy with the co-accused, facilitated the opening of an account in the complainant’s name without her consent, enabled the disbursement of ₹59,75,000 on the basis of forged documents, and allowed the amount to be withdrawn.

His position as bank manager supplied the requisite dominion over the bank’s funds; personal entrustment of a specifically identifiable amount was not necessary at this stage.

The alleged opening of the account, use of forged documents, loan sanction, disbursement and subsequent withdrawal constituted a connected chain of circumstances capable of supporting a prima facie inference of dishonest participation and conspiracy.

The existing charges for cheating and forgery did not preclude an alternative charge under Section 409 IPC, since the precise offence established could only be determined after evidence and Section 221 Cr.P.C. permitted such alternative framing.

Delay in the FIR and civil recovery proceedings did not negate the separate criminal allegations concerning forged documents and dishonest handling of bank funds.

It held that the material disclosed a prima facie case requiring the petitioner to face trial and that the revisional Court had committed neither patent illegality nor jurisdictional error.

The Court clarified that framing the alternative charge did not amount to a finding of guilt, and that the ultimate applicability of Section 409 IPC would be determined after trial.