A bargadar’s unauthorized transfer of cultivation to third parties justifies termination under Section 17.

The petitioners challenged a common judgment of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal affirming the Appellate Authority’s decision setting aside orders passed under Section 17 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, whereby the private respondents’ cultivation as bargadars was terminated on the ground that they had ceased to cultivate the lands personally.

Earlier, orders under Section 16 had directed the private respondents to deliver the petitioners’ share of the produce. The petitioners subsequently applied under Section 17, alleging that the respondents had parted with possession and cultivation in favour of third parties.

The Bhag Chas Officer conducted proceedings, directed field enquiry by the S.D.O. and B.L. & L.R.O., and considered evidence from persons found cultivating the lands. One such person admitted that he had entered into a financial arrangement with the private respondents to cultivate the lands.

The Appellate Authority and Tribunal nevertheless relied substantially on later reports alleging that the private respondents had been forcibly evicted by the petitioners with police and paramilitary assistance.

Whether the Section 17 proceedings were initiated validly on the petitioners’ applications and whether the private respondents were afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Whether execution of the termination order was a prerequisite to the validity of proceedings under Section 17.

Whether the evidence established that the private respondents had ceased to cultivate the lands personally by parting with cultivation in favour of third parties, thereby attracting Section 17(1)(b) of the 1955 Act.

Whether subsequent reports alleging forcible dispossession could retrospectively displace the contemporaneous evidence and findings supporting the Bhag Chas Officer’s orders.

The Court applied Section 17(1)(b) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, under which a bargadar’s cultivation may be terminated where the bargadar does not personally cultivate the land and has improperly parted with cultivation in favour of another person.

Section 16 was relevant to the earlier determination of the bargadar’s obligation to deliver the landowner’s share of produce, while Section 19B provides a statutory remedy for restoration where a bargadar alleges dispossession.

The Court further applied the principles of natural justice, holding that adequate opportunity is satisfied where repeated notices and opportunities to participate are given, even if a party elects not to appear.

It also applied the rule that appellate or revisional findings based on conjecture, surmise, and belated material unsupported by contemporaneous evidence may be interfered with as perverse.

The petitioners relied on an unreported coordinate Bench decision in WPLRT 39 of 2024 concerning non-cultivation for two consecutive years and non-payment of the bargadar’s share as grounds under Section 17.

The Court found that the proceedings were not suo motu but were initiated on specific applications by the petitioners, and that repeated directions had been issued to serve Sk. Ali Hossain. His brother Niyamat actively contested the matter, and there was no evidence of any conflict of interest between them; consequently, the objection based on denial of hearing failed.

The Court rejected the contention that execution of the termination order was a statutory precondition, holding that Section 17 directly addresses termination where the bargadar is not personally cultivating the land.

On the merits, the Court relied on the independent field enquiry conducted by the S.D.O. and B.L. & L.R.O., the identification of third-party cultivators, and the admission of a third party regarding a financial cultivation arrangement with the private respondents.

This evidence demonstrated that the respondents had parted with cultivation and attracted Section 17(1)(b).

By contrast, the reports alleging forcible eviction were prepared approximately seven years later, were not supported by contemporaneous complaints or evidence, and were never raised before the Bhag Chas Officer. The absence of any application by the respondents under Section 19B seeking restoration of possession further weakened that case.

The Tribunal and Appellate Authority therefore acted perversely in preferring belated and uncorroborated reports over the contemporaneous record.

The petitioners were granted liberty to seek correction of the Records of Rights consistently with those termination orders, with the authorities directed to decide any such application by reasoned orders in accordance with law.

There was no order as to costs.