A belated challenge to appointments is barred by delay, laches, and non-joinder of affected appointees.

The petitioners challenged the selection and appointment of 81 Armourer Constables, contending that their selection violated the reservation roster and adversely affected the petitioners’ seniority and promotional prospects.

A three-member selection committee had been constituted in 2014 for conducting the written examination and interview for Armourer Constables, with selection to be made according to merit, available vacancies, and the applicable reservation roster.

Although 213 candidates appeared and 132 were initially selected after roster clearance, the remaining 81 candidates were subsequently selected pursuant to a Home (Police) Department communication dated 9 March 2015, which opined that roster clearance was unnecessary because the process was neither direct recruitment nor promotion.

The seniority list was notified on 15 October 2015.

The present writ petition was filed on 21 August 2026, seeking cancellation of the appointments of the 81 Armourer Constables, restoration of the petitioners’ seniority, consideration for promotion, and other consequential reliefs.

None of the 81 affected Armourer Constables was impleaded as a respondent.

Whether the writ petition challenging the selection and seniority of the 81 Armourer Constables was liable to be dismissed for delay and laches, having been filed approximately 11 years after the relevant selection, appointment, and seniority-list proceedings?

Whether the writ petition was maintainable in the absence of impleadment of the 81 Armourer Constables whose selection, seniority, and service rights would be directly affected by the relief sought?

Whether the petitioners could claim relief on the basis of the judgment dated 26 November 2025 in CWJC No. 15998 of 2025 despite not having challenged the earlier selection and seniority proceedings within a reasonable time?

The Court applied the doctrine of delay and laches, including the principles of acquiescence, waiver, and prejudice arising from a change of position over time.

Relying on State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Shrivastav, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347, the Court held that persons who fail to challenge an adverse action promptly and approach the Court only after similarly situated persons obtain relief may be treated as “fence-sitters,” and delay, laches, and acquiescence constitute valid grounds for dismissal.

The Court also relied on State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jameet Singh, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1648, for the principle that a belated claim, filed years after the cause of action and subsequent judicial developments, may not be regarded as bona fide conduct.

Further, the principles of natural justice and necessary-party procedure required impleadment of persons whose selection and seniority would be directly and adversely affected by the requested relief.

The Court noted that the impugned selection was completed in 2014–2015, the Home Department’s decision was communicated on 9 March 2015, and the seniority list was published on 15 October 2015.

The petitioners did not challenge either the decision permitting selection of the additional 81 candidates or the seniority list for nearly 11 years.

Their approach to the Court only after the judgment in CWJC No. 15998 of 2025 was treated as a belated attempt to obtain the benefit of a subsequent decision, rather than a timely challenge to the original action.

Applying the principles in Arvind Kumar Shrivastav and Jameet Singh, the Court held that such delay, coupled with acquiescence and the potential prejudice to persons who had been selected and serving for years, disentitled the petitioners to discretionary writ relief.

The Court further held that the petition was defective for non-joinder of necessary parties.

Since the petitioners sought cancellation of the 81 appointments and a declaration that they were senior to those appointees, the affected Armourer Constables had a direct and substantial interest in the proceedings.

Their absence prevented the Court from granting the requested relief without violating principles of natural justice.

No relief was granted regarding cancellation of appointments, restoration of seniority, promotion, or suspension of the affected Armourer Constables.

Pending applications, if any, were also disposed of.