A breach of a marriage promise, without deception at inception, does not constitute cheating.

The appellant and the victim, who were closely related, had a romantic and continuous physical relationship from 2011.

The victim alleged that she consented to sexual intercourse because the appellant promised to marry her, but that he later refused.

The trial court acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 376 IPC but convicted him under Section 417 IPC and sentenced him to one year’s simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50,000.

The appellant appealed against the conviction.

The High Court noted that the relationship had continued for about five years and considered the victim’s testimony and the evidence of the other witnesses.

1. Whether the evidence established that the appellant deceived the victim from the inception of the relationship by making a false promise to marry, so as to sustain the conviction under Section 417 IPC.

2. Whether the evidence instead disclosed a consensual relationship that later ended in a breach of promise, insufficient to establish cheating.

Section 417 IPC penalises cheating. For cheating, the prosecution must establish deception at the inception; a subsequent breach of a promise, without proof that the promise was false when made, is not equivalent to a false representation.

The Court relied on Ameen Batcha v. State, (2025) 1 MLJ (Crl) 391, which relied on Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 378, in assessing whether consent to a prolonged physical relationship was induced by a false promise of marriage.

The Court found that the evidence showed a prolonged, consensual relationship shaped by mutual affection, rather than consent obtained solely through a false promise of marriage.

The victim’s testimony described the relationship and repeated physical intimacy over several years; the other evidence likewise showed a close relationship.

On these facts, the Court found no proof of deception at the inception and treated the appellant’s later refusal to marry as, at most, a breach of promise.

The reasoning in Ameen Batcha was held applicable.

It set aside the trial court’s judgment and allowed the appeal, acquitting the appellant.

The fine amount already paid as compensation to the victim was not to be recovered from her, and any bail bond executed by the appellant was discharged.