A charge memorandum cannot be quashed absent jurisdictional defect or demonstrable mala fides.

The applicant, an IPS officer, was suspended from 18 October 2022 following registration of an Economic Offences Unit criminal case against him.

The Tribunal had earlier, in O.A. No. 907/2024, declared extensions of his suspension beyond 17 October 2023 null and void for non-compliance with the applicable procedure, while remitting the question of his subsequent status to the State Government.

On 25 March 2025, the State issued a departmental charge memorandum alleging, among other things, misconduct under the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968 and unauthorised absence from headquarters.

The applicant challenged the memorandum as belated, mala fide, connected to the criminal case, and intended to prejudice his promotion prospects.

The respondents maintained that disciplinary action had been under consideration since December 2022 and that the applicant had been given an opportunity to submit his defence.

The applicant sought quashing of the memorandum and consequential service benefits.

Whether the charge memorandum dated 25 March 2025 was liable to be quashed at the threshold on grounds of mala fides, delay, or an extraneous purpose.

Whether the overlap between allegations in the departmental proceeding and the pending criminal case rendered the departmental proceeding impermissible.

Whether the applicant’s promotion-related relief could be granted while the departmental proceeding remained pending.

The Tribunal applied the principle that a charge memorandum is ordinarily not examined for the correctness of the allegations, sufficiency of evidence, or evidentiary value at the threshold; interference is exceptional, including where the issuing authority lacks jurisdiction, the proceeding is barred by law, or initiation is demonstrably vitiated by mala fides, bias, or an extraneous purpose.

Under State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna, judicial review may be exercised where mala fides or an extraneous purpose is established.

Union of India v. J. Ahmed did not justify quashing the memorandum where specific charges and supporting material were set out and their merits remained for inquiry.

Departmental and criminal proceedings operate in distinct fields and apply different standards of proof—preponderance of probabilities in the former and proof beyond reasonable doubt in the latter; pendency of a criminal case alone does not bar disciplinary proceedings.

The proceeding was initiated under Rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, with the alleged conduct assessed under the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968.

The Tribunal held that the timing of the charge memorandum, following the applicant’s success in his suspension challenge, did not by itself establish mala fides.

The respondents’ material showed that disciplinary action had been considered from December 2022, before that earlier order, although the subsequent delay called for expedition.

The memorandum contained specific charges, imputations, and proposed evidence; their truth and whether they constituted misconduct were matters for the inquiry, not threshold review.

The criminal case’s factual connection with some allegations did not make the departmental proceeding impermissible.

In particular, the allegation of unauthorised absence during suspension raised a distinct factual question for the departmental inquiry.

The applicant’s reliance on a charge-sheet quashed in another officer’s case was not determinative because that case concerned different facts and alleged official dereliction, whereas the present charges concerned alleged personal conduct.

The Tribunal therefore found no jurisdictional defect or demonstrable mala fides warranting quashing, while emphasising that it expressed no view on the merits of the charges.

It directed the respondents to endeavour to conclude the inquiry within six months, afford the applicant a fair opportunity to defend himself, and proceed ex parte in accordance with law if he failed to cooperate; any non-cooperation was not to be used to prolong the inquiry.

The merits of the charges and supporting evidence were left open, and no order as to costs was made.