A circumstantial-evidence conviction cannot stand unless every link is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Ajay Shukla died after sustaining a firearm injury to the head.

The prosecution alleged that Dinesh Shukla took Ajay away shortly before the incident and killed him, motivated by Ajay’s alleged relationship with Anju, sister of Dinesh and daughter of Jagdish. It further alleged that Rakesh, Rajesh and Jagdish conspired in the offence

The trial court convicted Dinesh under Sections 364 and 302 IPC and the other appellants under Sections 364 and 302 read with Section 120-B IPC.

The High Court heard the appellants’ appeals together. The prosecution case rested on circumstantial evidence, including the alleged threats, Dinesh taking Ajay away, the recovery of a scooter, and the account of PW-4, whose cross-examination was not completed for all accused.

1. Whether the prosecution proved a complete and reliable chain of circumstantial evidence establishing Dinesh’s guilt for kidnapping and murder beyond reasonable doubt

2. Whether the evidence established that Rakesh, Rajesh and Jagdish conspired with Dinesh to commit the offences

3. Whether the trial court could rely on PW-4’s incomplete and disputed testimony, and on evidence concerning the alleged scooter recovery, diary and album

Under Sections 364, 302 and 120-B IPC, the prosecution must prove the elements of the charged offences beyond reasonable doubt. For a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must be fully established, consistent only with guilt, conclusive, exclude other reasonable hypotheses, and form a complete chain pointing to the accused’s guilt (Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra).

Suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute for proof (Kamal v. State (NCT of Delhi)).

Under Section 114, illustration (g), of the Evidence Act, a court may draw an adverse inference where material evidence is withheld; whether to do so depends on the witness’s importance and the evidence already on record (Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing, quoted in Davinder Singh v. State of Punjab).

A statement under Section 313 CrPC is not substantive evidence and cannot fill gaps in the prosecution case; an adverse inference is available only where the incriminating material is established (Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Rajasthan).

A court must consider an accused’s Section 313 defence and give reasons for accepting or rejecting it (Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam).

Chance-witness testimony requires close scrutiny and an adequate explanation for the witness’s presence (Manoj v. State of M.P.).

The Court found material contradictions in the accounts of PW-1 and PW-2 about when and how the alleged love affair, threats and telephone warning were disclosed, and whether PW-2 heard the call.

Ratna, the alleged recipient of the warning, and Devendra, who could have supported other material parts of the case, were not examined; the Court considered their absence significant in light of the gaps in the prosecution evidence.

The alleged scooter recovery was not supported by a recovery memo, and the trial court failed to address the appellants’ Section 313 explanation that the scooter had been taken from their residence.

The Court also found PW-4’s account doubtful: he did not complete cross-examination for Rakesh and Rajesh, his evidence was contradicted by PW-8, and the trial court had improperly described the unspecified weapon he allegedly saw as a firearm.

The unproduced diary and album, and the accused’s failure to answer a Section 313 question about them, could not repair the deficiencies in proof.

Since the evidence did not establish the underlying offences, it also did not establish conspiracy on the same evidentiary basis.

It allowed both appeals, set aside the convictions and sentences, and acquitted all appellants.

Dinesh was directed to be released on furnishing the bonds and sureties required under Section 437-A CrPC; the other appellants’ bail bonds were discharged subject to the same appearance requirement.

Dinesh’s third bail application was disposed of as infructuous.