A coordinate revisional authority cannot set aside a final judgment without statutory review power.

Bhagauti Singh, the recorded bhumidhar of the disputed land, died issueless on 24 January 1994. Several persons claimed mutation on the basis of different registered and unregistered Wills, including the petitioners, who relied on an unregistered Will dated 21 January 1994.

The Naib Tehsildar rejected all mutation claims on 26 September 1997, finding that the alleged Wills had not been satisfactorily proved, and directed that the land be recorded in the name of the State Government and managed by the Land Management Committee.

The petitioners’ appeal under Section 210 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, was dismissed on 30 May 1998.

The petitioners thereafter filed Revision No. 1014/1997-98 under Section 219 of the Act, which was allowed on 15 February 1999, and their mutation claim was accepted.

Other claimants subsequently filed separate revisions arising from the same appellate order, including Revision No. 640/1999-2000. While deciding that revision, the Additional Commissioner, by order dated 24 September 2004, set aside the judgment dated 15 February 1999 passed in the petitioners’ revision.

The petitioners’ recall application against the order dated 24 September 2004 was dismissed on 22 March 2005.

Whether the Additional Commissioner, while deciding a separate revision under Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act against the same appellate order, could set aside the final judgment dated 15 February 1999 rendered in the petitioners’ separate revision.

Whether the fact that the earlier judgment was allegedly passed ex parte against other claimants conferred jurisdiction upon the subsequent revisional authority to recall or nullify that judgment.

Whether the impugned orders could be sustained notwithstanding that mutation proceedings are summary and do not finally determine title.

Section 219(1) of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, empowers specified revenue authorities to examine the legality or propriety of an order or proceeding of a subordinate revenue court where no appeal lies, or where an available appeal has not been preferred, and to exercise the statutory revisional powers in cases of jurisdictional error, illegality, or material irregularity.

Section 219(2) bars a further revision by the same person, but does not prevent another independently aggrieved person from filing a revision against the same underlying order.

However, revisional jurisdiction does not include an unlimited power to review or annul a final judgment rendered by another authority of coordinate jurisdiction; such interference requires express statutory authority.

The principle of finality of judicial proceedings prevents one coordinate revisional authority from sitting in appeal over or reviewing the final judgment of another coordinate authority.

Mutation proceedings are summary and do not confer or finally determine title; substantive title disputes remain open for adjudication by the competent civil court.

The Court distinguished between the maintainability of a separate revision by another claimant and the jurisdiction to set aside an earlier final revisional judgment.

Revision No. 640/1999-2000 was independently maintainable because Section 219(2) prohibits only a further revision by the same person.

Nevertheless, the Additional Commissioner’s jurisdiction was confined to examining the appellate order dated 30 May 1998 in the revision before him.

The judgment dated 15 February 1999 had finally disposed of the petitioners’ separate revision and could not be treated as non-existent merely because it arose from the same appellate order.

The Additional Commissioner was not an appellate or reviewing authority over that earlier judgment and had no statutory power under Section 219 to nullify it.

The allegation that the earlier judgment was ex parte might have entitled the affected claimants to pursue an appropriate remedy against that judgment, but it could not enlarge the jurisdiction of the authority deciding a different revision.

The summary nature of mutation proceedings likewise did not validate an order passed beyond jurisdiction; it only meant that restoration of the earlier judgment would operate within the revenue proceedings and would not amount to a declaration of title.

The order dated 24 September 2004 was quashed to the extent that it interfered with the petitioners’ earlier judgment, and the consequential order dated 22 March 2005 dismissing the recall application was quashed to the same extent.

The judgment dated 15 February 1999 was restored, subject to the clarification that it operated only for mutation and revenue-record purposes and did not finally adjudicate title.

The parties remained at liberty to seek declaration of their substantive rights before the competent court.

The writ petition was accordingly allowed, with no order as to costs.