A court may quash matrimonial FIRs where a court-sanctioned settlement was partly performed and the balance tendered.

The petitioners sought quashing of FIR No. 688/1999, registered at Police Station Samaipur Badli under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 IPC, on the basis of a matrimonial settlement.

Under a mediation settlement dated 3 August 2011, the petitioners agreed to pay respondent no. 2 ₹2,75,000 in full and final settlement of her claims, including maintenance, alimony and dowry/istridhan; they paid ₹1,00,000 and offered the balance of ₹1,75,000, which respondent no. 2 disputed as not including the return of stridhan.

The settlement was followed by a mutual-consent divorce and the disposal of maintenance proceedings on its terms.

During the pendency of the quashing petition, petitioner nos. 1 and 3 died; the remaining petitioners continued to offer the balance payment.

1. Whether the FIR and proceedings under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 IPC should be quashed in light of the mediated settlement and its subsequent partial performance.

2. Whether respondent no. 2’s objection to the settlement prevented quashing, notwithstanding the settlement’s acceptance in related proceedings and the petitioners’ offer to pay the balance.

The FIR invoked Sections 498A, 406 and 34 IPC.

The Court considered its power to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings in the circumstances of the case; however, the judgment does not specify the statutory provision governing that power or cite any precedent.

It treated the mediated settlement, its partial performance, its recognition in the divorce and maintenance proceedings, and the interests of justice as material considerations in deciding whether to quash.

The Court found that respondent no. 2 had retained the ₹1,00,000 already paid for more than a decade and that the petitioners remained willing to pay the ₹1,75,000 balance.

It noted that respondent no. 2’s objection before the trial court did not then assert that the settlement amount was additional to stridhan.

The settlement had also formed the basis of the mutual-consent divorce and had been accepted in the maintenance proceedings, where respondent no. 2 did not challenge it.

In view of these circumstances, the Court considered further prosecution oppressive and unjust, particularly given the petition’s prolonged pendency.

The trial court was directed to release the draft to respondent no. 2 expeditiously if she applied for it.

The accompanying application was disposed of.