A credible child victim’s sole testimony sustains POCSO conviction without medical corroboration.

The appellant was convicted by the Special Judge (POCSO), Sivasagar, in Special (POCSO) Case No. 50/2021, arising from Demow P.S. Case No. 192/2021, and sentenced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹5,000 under Section 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”).

The prosecution alleged that on 18 September 2021, the appellant went to the grocery shop where the 12-year-old victim was alone, asked for a cigarette, caught her from behind, pressed/touched her breasts, gagged her when she raised an alarm, and fled when her uncle approached.

The victim, her mother, the uncle and other witnesses were examined; the defence was one of total denial, and the appellant alternatively alleged false implication arising from monetary disputes.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the credibility of the victim, relied on her inability to name the accused in her Section 164 CrPC statement, pointed to the non-examination of the doctor and absence of external injuries, and sought acquittal or reduction of sentence based on custody already undergone.

Whether the conviction under Section 10 of the POCSO Act could be sustained primarily on the testimony of the 12-year-old victim, despite her not naming the appellant in her earlier statement under Section 164 CrPC.

Whether the non-examination of the examining doctor and the absence of external injuries created reasonable doubt regarding the alleged sexual assault.

Whether the statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act applied after the prosecution established the foundational facts, and whether the defence rebutted those presumptions.

Whether the sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment could be reduced on the ground that the appellant had already undergone approximately three years and eight months in custody.

The Court applied Section 10 of the POCSO Act, which prescribes punishment for aggravated sexual assault, and Sections 29 and 30, which create presumptions regarding culpable mental state and commission of specified offences once the prosecution establishes the foundational facts.

Under Section 118 of the Evidence Act, a child is a competent witness if capable of understanding questions and giving rational answers; a conviction may be based on the sole testimony of a child or prosecutrix where it is credible and inspires confidence.

The Court relied on Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2012 SC 3157, regarding the requirement of consistency and reliability for treating a witness as “sterling”.

Following Manirul Islam v. State of Assam, (2021) 6 GLR 55, the Court held that Sections 29 and 30 do not eliminate the prosecution’s initial burden to establish the charge on a prima facie basis.

It further applied the principle that bodily injury is not an essential consequence or proof of sexual assault, relying on Dilip Kumar @ Dalli v. State of Uttarakhand.

The Court relied on Moti Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 11 SCC 20, and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh, (1993) 2 SCC 622, for the principle that the credible testimony of a prosecutrix does not require corroboration as a matter of law.

The Court found the victim’s account consistent on the material particulars: the appellant came to the shop, paid for a cigarette, caught her from behind, pressed her breasts, gagged her, and fled when she raised an alarm.

Her inability to state the appellant’s name in her Section 164 CrPC statement was not treated as a material contradiction because she explained that he was previously unknown to her, although she could identify him when she later saw him in court.

The uncle’s evidence that he saw the appellant emerging from the shop and attempted to apprehend him provided immediate circumstantial support, while the prompt disclosure to the mother and lodging of the FIR on the same night further strengthened the prosecution case.

The defence suggestions of tutoring, prior enmity and monetary dispute were inconsistent and unsupported by evidence.

The Court held that the absence of external injuries and the doctor’s non-examination did not undermine the case because the allegation concerned non-penetrative sexual assault and no injury was inherently required in such circumstances.

Once the victim’s credible testimony established the foundational facts, the statutory presumptions arose, and the appellant failed to rebut them through cross-examination or defence evidence.

Finally, since the trial court had imposed the minimum five-year sentence under Section 10, the Court held that no further reduction was legally warranted.

The non-examination of the doctor and absence of external injuries were held immaterial, and the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act remained unrebutted.

The conviction under Section 10 of the POCSO Act and the sentence of five years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹5,000 were affirmed.

The plea for reduction of sentence based on custody already undergone was rejected because the sentence imposed was the statutory minimum.

The appeal was dismissed, and the trial court record was directed to be returned with a copy of the judgment.