A criminal acquittal does not bar disciplinary punishment based on a preponderance of probabilities.

The petitioner, a retired Administrative Officer, challenged a pension-cut penalty of ₹500 per month for two years, imposed after a disciplinary inquiry found him guilty of removing and selling office furniture without authority, failing to maintain sale records, and failing to remit the proceeds to the Treasury

He argued that the proceedings were mala fide, that a Revenue Divisional Officer’s inquiry report exonerated him of several accusations, and that he had been acquitted in a related criminal case.

He sought to quash the penalty, reimbursement of the recovered amount, and regularisation of his suspension period as duty.

Whether the disciplinary penalty should be set aside in light of the petitioner’s allegations of mala fides and the Revenue Divisional Officer’s report.

Whether the petitioner’s acquittal in the criminal case warranted interference with the disciplinary penalty.

Whether the Court should grant the consequential reliefs sought, including reimbursement and regularisation of the suspension period.

The Court applied the principle that disciplinary proceedings are distinct from criminal proceedings and that the standard of proof in a disciplinary inquiry is the preponderance of probabilities.

It also held that an allegation of mala fides could not be entertained where the officer accused of acting mala fide had not been impleaded in his personal capacity.

The Court considered the Revenue Divisional Officer’s report irrelevant to the disciplinary proceedings because it found no authority for that officer to conduct an inquiry into the petitioner’s complaint, given the petitioner’s role in the Health Services Department.

No statute or precedent was cited in the order.

The Court found that the petitioner had participated in the disciplinary proceedings and had identified no procedural defect in their conduct.

It rejected reliance on the Revenue Divisional Officer’s report as having no bearing on the disciplinary inquiry, and declined to consider the mala fides allegation because the superior officer concerned was not impleaded personally.

The petitioner’s criminal acquittal did not displace the disciplinary findings, since the proceedings were independent and applied the lower standard of proof of preponderance of probabilities.

The requested reimbursement and regularisation of the suspension period were not granted.