A criminal revision barred by limitation cannot be entertained without express condonation of delay.

The petitioner challenged, under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the order dated 14 May 2025 by which the Sessions Judge, Bokaro allowed Criminal Revision No. 264 of 2024 and set aside the Magistrate’s order dated 22 July 2024.

The Magistrate had found a prima facie case against Opposite Parties Nos. 2–4 for offences under Sections 323, 341, 379, 384 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code and had summoned them in C.P. Case No. 310 of 2024.

The criminal revision before the Sessions Judge had been filed with delay, accompanied by an application for condonation.

Although the Sessions Judge had initially noted that the revision was time-barred and that limitation would be considered at the final hearing, the order dated 14 May 2025 did not expressly decide or condone the delay before adjudicating the revision on merits.

Whether a criminal revision barred by limitation could be entertained and decided on merits without an express order condoning the delay.

Whether the Sessions Judge’s order dated 14 May 2025, passed without first determining the limitation issue, was legally sustainable.

The Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

It applied the settled principle that limitation goes to the root of jurisdiction and that a court cannot entertain or decide a time-barred proceeding unless the delay is expressly condoned.

The Court relied on Noharlal Verma v. District Co-operative Central Bank Limited, Jagdalpur, 2008 Supreme (SC) 1538, wherein the Supreme Court held that if a suit, appeal or application is barred by limitation, the court or adjudicating authority lacks jurisdiction to entertain and decide it on merits unless the limitation defect is addressed.

The offences forming the subject matter of the Magistrate’s summoning order were under Sections 323, 341, 379, 384 and 506/34 of the Indian Penal Code.

The criminal revision was admittedly filed beyond the prescribed limitation period and was accompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay.

Since limitation is a jurisdictional threshold, the Sessions Judge was required to first determine whether the delay should be condoned by an express order.

The Sessions Judge’s failure to decide that question, followed by exercise of revisional jurisdiction on the merits, meant that the revision had been entertained without establishing jurisdiction to do so.

The Court therefore held that the impugned revisional order could not be sustained, without examining the merits of the underlying complaint or the summoning order.

The matter was remitted to the Sessions Judge, Bokaro, with a direction to first decide the application for condonation of delay.

The Court expressly clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of the case.