A determinable contract for personal professional services cannot be specifically enforced through injunction.

The plaintiff, an independent neurosurgeon associated with the defendant hospital for several years, sued for specific performance of an alleged oral agreement made in November 2005 and challenged a 2026 termination/pre-closure notice.

He also sought interim restraint against enforcement of a purported written agreement dated 2 April 2025 and the notice, and sought to continue providing services at the hospital.

The Trial Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from acting on the documents or disturbing his services.

On appeal, the hospital challenged the injunction, relying, among other things, on additional agreements and an email from the plaintiff; the appellate court declined to consider new documents not before the Trial Court when it made the order.

1. Whether the ex parte ad interim injunction could stand where the pleaded agreement was, on its face, not specifically enforceable under the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

2. Whether the appellate court could consider documents produced for the first time on appeal to establish suppression or otherwise challenge the injunction.

3. Whether the plaintiff’s pleadings and the materials before the Trial Court established a prima facie case, irreparable injury, and a balance of convenience warranting the injunction.

Sections 14(b), 14(c) and 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 exclude specific performance of, respectively, contracts involving continuous duties the court cannot supervise, contracts dependent on personal qualifications, and contracts determinable by nature; under Section 41(e), an injunction cannot be granted to prevent breach of a contract that is not specifically enforceable.

An ex parte ad interim injunction must be assessed on the pleadings and materials before the Trial Court when the order was made; a challenge based on suppression or misleading the court may be pursued under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and new documents cannot ordinarily be introduced for the first time in an appeal against that order.

The court applied Percept D’Mark (India) (P) Ltd. v. Zaheer Khan, (2006) 4 SCC 227, on non-enforceability of personal-service contracts, and Purna Chandra Das v. Warren Industrial Ltd., 1991 SCC OnLine Cal 183, on the limited scope for judicial intervention in service contracts absent a public-law element.

It also relied on Muktakesi Dawn v. Haripada Mazumdar, AIR 1988 Cal 25, and Jitesh Pandey v. Urmilata Sinha, 1999 SCC OnLine Cal 460, concerning the limited appellate review of ex parte ad interim injunctions, while noting the conflicting view in Bengal Club Ltd. v. Susanta Kumar Chowdhary, AIR 2003 Cal 96.

The alleged oral agreement was pleaded only as having been made in November 2005, without a specific date or particulars of the circumstances in which it was concluded; the court considered this insufficient, even at the pleading stage, to support the asserted agreement.

As pleaded, the arrangement concerned an independent doctor’s professional services to the hospital and was determinable, dependent on his personal skills, and involved duties requiring ongoing supervision; the court therefore found the suit’s requested relief prima facie barred by Sections 14 and 41(e).

The court also considered that the plaintiff’s email acknowledged the pre-closure notice and sought three months to continue treating patients, undermining his challenge to the notice and his contention that the notice period was inadequate.

It found no prima facie irreparable injury or favourable balance of convenience, particularly in light of the submission that the plaintiff had joined another hospital and the potential disruption to the hospital’s patient-care arrangements.

The additional agreements tendered on appeal were not considered because they had not been before the Trial Court.

The connected application was disposed of, with no order as to costs.

The court clarified that its findings were tentative and would not bind the Trial Court’s determination of the injunction application or suit; it directed the defendants to file objections by 15 October 2026 and requested an expedited decision on the injunction application.