A direction to adjourn proceedings constitutes limited interim restraint, not an indefinite stay.

The petitioner-husband filed a criminal revision petition seeking dismissal/quashing of the respondent-wife’s complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“PWDV Act”), pending before the learned Magistrate, Mahila Court-01, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi.

The respondent sought clarification of the High Court’s order dated 28 October 2025, contending that, in the absence of a subsisting stay, the Trial Court could hear and decide her application for interim relief under Section 23 of the PWDV Act.

On 28 October 2025, the High Court had directed the Magistrate to adjourn the matter to a date in the fourth week of November 2025; this direction was subsequently continued on 10 November 2025, 21 January 2026 and 30 March 2026.

Whether the High Court’s order dated 28 October 2025, directing the Trial Court to adjourn the matter, operated as an interim restraint on continuation of the proceedings under Section 12 of the PWDV Act.

Whether the said interim restraint amounted to an indefinite or blanket stay preventing the Trial Court from proceeding during the pendency of the criminal revision petition.

Whether the Trial Court should be permitted to hear and decide the respondent’s application for interim relief under Section 23 of the PWDV Act during the pendency of the revision petition.

The Court applied Sections 12 and 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: Section 12 provides for an application to the Magistrate seeking relief under the PWDV Act, while Section 23 empowers the Magistrate to grant interim and ex parte relief.

The Court further applied the procedural principle that an interim restraint must be derived from an express judicial direction and operates according to its terms; however, an order directing adjournment of proceedings may constitute a limited interim restraint even if it does not use the expression “stay”.

The Court also recognised that the mere pendency of a revision petition does not automatically result in a stay of proceedings, and that the continuation of any interim restraint must be determined by the competent Roster Bench.

The Court held that the direction dated 28 October 2025—“the learned Magistrate will adjourn the matter to a date in the fourth week of November, 2025”—was not merely an administrative adjournment but operated as a limited interim restraint on continuation of the Trial Court proceedings during the period contemplated by the order.

This restraint was subsequently continued by orders dated 10 November 2025, 21 January 2026 and 30 March 2026.

However, the Court clarified that the restraint was issued only as an interim arrangement to prevent the Trial Court proceedings from rendering the revision petition infructuous; it was not an indefinite or blanket stay applicable for the entire duration of the revision petition.

Since the present Bench was not the concerned Roster Bench, it declined to determine whether the restraint should continue and left that question to the Roster Bench.

The Court also noted that the application seeking stay of proceedings had neither been heard on merits nor decided.

The parties were granted liberty to raise before the concerned Roster Bench, on the next listed date of 17 November 2026, whether the Trial Court should be permitted to proceed or whether the interim restraint should continue.

The clarification application, CRL.M.A. 11865/2026, was accordingly disposed of, without deciding the stay application on merits.