A doubtful dying declaration unsupported by evidence of continuous cruelty cannot sustain conviction for abetment of suicide.

The complainant, Sonalben, was married to respondent No. 1, Maheshbhai Parmar, approximately one-and-a-half years before the incident and had a daughter from the marriage.

The prosecution alleged that her husband suspected her character, abused and assaulted her, and that her mother-in-law and sister-in-law jointly harassed and instigated such conduct.

On 2 October 2010, the husband allegedly came home intoxicated, questioned her about telephone calls, pulled her by the hair, slapped her and struck her head against a wall.

The complainant thereafter poured kerosene on herself and set herself ablaze. She was taken to hospital, where a police statement/FIR and a dying declaration were recorded. She subsequently died from her burn injuries.

The accused were charged under Sections 306, 498A, 323, 294(b) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code.

The prosecution examined thirteen witnesses and produced documentary evidence, including the alleged dying declaration.

The trial court acquitted all the accused in Sessions Case No. 34 of 2011 by judgment dated 26 December 2011.

The State preferred the present appeal under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

1. Whether the trial court was justified in acquitting the respondents of the offences under Sections 306, 498A, 323, 294(b) and 114 IPC?

2. Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence, particularly the alleged FIR and dying declaration?

3. Whether the acquittal suffered from illegality, perversity or any manifest error warranting interference by the appellate court under Section 378 CrPC?

4. Whether the evidence established the essential ingredients of abetment of suicide under Sections 306 and 107 IPC and cruelty under Section 498A IPC?

The court applied Sections 306, 107 and 498A IPC, holding that conviction for abetment of suicide requires proof of instigation or intentional aid, while Section 498A requires proof of legally cognisable cruelty or harassment; a death within seven years of marriage, by itself, does not automatically attract Sections 306 or 498A IPC.

Sections 113A and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act were held inapplicable in the absence of foundational evidence of cruelty, harassment or dowry-related conduct.

Relying on Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, [2002] 6 SCC 710, the court reiterated that a dying declaration may independently support conviction only when it is voluntary, truthful, reliable and inspires confidence.

For an appeal against acquittal, the court applied Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415, as reaffirmed in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, [2022] 3 SCC 471, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, [2024] 9 SCC 169: although an appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, the accused enjoy a strengthened double presumption of innocence, and an acquittal should not be disturbed where two reasonable views are possible.

The High Court found material uncertainty regarding the chronology and authenticity of the FIR and dying declaration.

The police witness stated that the dying declaration had been recorded before registration of the FIR, while the Executive Magistrate’s evidence did not satisfactorily explain how or when he had been requisitioned to record it; the relevant station diary entry, requisition and testimony of the concerned police officer were not produced.

The Magistrate also did not obtain a medical opinion from the attending doctor regarding the deceased’s fitness, and the medical evidence indicated extensive burns over the entire body, including both hands and fingers, creating doubt about the signatures appearing on the documents.

The close relatives of the deceased were hostile, the panch witnesses did not support the prosecution, and no independent witness corroborated the allegations.

Even on the contents of the alleged statements, the deceased reportedly referred to only one incident of assault, denied any earlier assault by her husband, and did not provide material particulars establishing continuous cruelty, instigation or intentional aid.

The court therefore held that a solitary incident, without evidence of sustained harassment or a proximate act of instigation, did not establish Sections 306 or 498A IPC.

Applying the restrictive standard governing appeals against acquittal, the High Court concluded that the trial court’s view was a reasonable one and was neither perverse nor manifestly illegal.

The alleged dying declaration and police statement were found insufficiently reliable, and the evidence did not establish cruelty under Section 498A IPC or abetment of suicide under Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC.

The appeal was dismissed, the trial court’s judgment of acquittal dated 26 December 2011 was confirmed, the bail bonds were cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial court.