A fixed five-year AC waiting hall contract creates no right to renewal or extension.

The Appellant was awarded a five-year contract for the upgradation, maintenance and management of the AC Upper Class Waiting Room at Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Terminus, Mumbai, along with allied passenger facilities. He invested approximately Rs.40,00,000/- in the project and contended that the contract contemplated the possibility of a longer tenure under applicable Railway Board policies.

No complaints regarding his performance were raised during the contractual period, and the Appellant claimed that his investment had become part of the railway property.

The Appellant sought renewal for a further five years, relying principally on the Delhi Division Model and Railway Board policies. The Respondents did not grant the requested renewal and instead floated a fresh tender, although two temporary extensions had been granted at enhanced licence fees.

The Appellant filed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking interim protection pending arbitration. The learned Single Judge rejected the petition on 3 August 2026. The present appeal was filed under Section 37(1)(b) challenging that order.

Whether the Appellant was entitled to a further five-year extension of the contract under Railway Board Circular No. 11 of 2022, particularly Clause 8.1(v), or under the Delhi Division Model and related contractual policies?

Whether the learned Single Judge exceeded the permissible scope of proceedings under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by deciding disputed contractual issues while refusing interim protection?

Whether the Appellant’s legitimate expectation, investment, satisfactory performance or alleged arbitrariness justified interim protection or preservation of the existing contract pending arbitration?

The Court applied Section 37(1)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, governing appeals from orders granting or refusing interim measures under Section 9, and held that appellate interference must remain confined to examining whether the court below acted within the statutory limits.

The Court interpreted Clause 8 of Railway Board Circular No. 11 of 2022, under which AC Waiting Hall Management falls under Clause 8.1(iii), prescribing a five-year contractual duration, whereas Clause 8.1(v) concerns Pay-and-Use Toilets, with separate durations for normal operation, ROMT and BOT arrangements.

Clause 9.1 of the Circular states that extensions are ordinarily impermissible, though temporary extensions of up to three months may be granted in specified circumstances pending finalisation of a new contract.

The Court also relied on M.P. Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor (P) Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1001, for the principle that appellate jurisdiction in arbitration matters is narrow and courts should not interfere merely because another interpretation of the facts or contract is possible.

The Court held that the Appellant had misconstrued Circular No. 11 of 2022. His contract concerned AC Waiting Hall Management and therefore fell under Clause 8.1(iii), which prescribed a five-year duration; Clause 8.1(v), relied upon by the Appellant, applied only to Pay-and-Use Toilets and was unrelated to the contract in question.

The contractual scope also confirmed a five-year term. Further, the Circular did not confer a right to renewal: extensions were ordinarily prohibited, and the two extensions granted to the Appellant were temporary concessions rather than recognition of an entitlement to a further term.

The Court found that the learned Single Judge had considered the relevant contractual and policy materials and had not travelled beyond the scope of Section 9 by assessing the Appellant’s prima facie case and request for interim protection.

Although the Appellant’s legitimate expectation arising from his investment and satisfactory performance was understandable, it could not override the fixed contractual term or convert a discretionary extension into a legal right.

Applying the restricted scope of appellate review, the Division Bench found no error of law or fact warranting interference.

The refusal of interim protection under Section 9 was within jurisdiction and legally sustainable. The appeal under Section 37(1)(b) was dismissed, with no order as to costs.