A fresh execution petition beyond Article 136’s twelve-year limitation is barred, despite an earlier dismissed petition.

The petitioner, a decree-holder, filed Special Civil Suit No. 34 of 2002 for recovery of an amount arising from alleged theft of electricity. The suit was decreed in the petitioner’s favour on 22 February 2005.

The petitioner thereafter filed Execution Petition No. 58 of 2006 on 19 July 2006, but it was dismissed on 12 August 2012 because notice could not be served on the judgment-debtor.

The petitioner subsequently filed Special Execution Petition No. 11 of 2017 on 24 October 2017. The judgment-debtor objected that the execution petition was filed beyond the 12-year limitation period prescribed for execution of the decree. The Executing Court allowed the objection and dismissed the execution petition on 1 July 2025.

The decree-holder challenged that order under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the second execution petition filed on 24 October 2017, for execution of a decree dated 22 February 2005, was barred by limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

Whether the second execution petition could be treated as a continuation of the earlier execution petition, which had been dismissed for non-service of notice, so as to avoid the limitation bar?

Whether the delay in filing the second execution petition could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, or through the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution?

The Court applied Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a limitation period of 12 years for execution of a decree, ordinarily computed from the date when the decree becomes enforceable.

It further held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which permits condonation of delay in specified proceedings, does not apply to execution proceedings instituted under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

A subsequent execution petition filed after dismissal of an earlier petition for non-service of notice cannot automatically be treated as a continuation of the earlier proceeding.

Civil-court orders are subject to supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, rather than writ jurisdiction under Article 226; however, such jurisdiction cannot be used to circumvent a statutory limitation bar or to achieve indirectly what cannot be done directly.

The decree was passed on 22 February 2005, whereas the second execution petition was filed on 24 October 2017—after expiry of the 12-year period under Article 136.

The earlier execution petition did not preserve the petitioner’s right to initiate a fresh execution petition because it had been dismissed for failure to serve notice on the judgment-debtor and was no longer pending.

Consequently, the 2017 petition was an independent execution proceeding filed beyond limitation, not a continuation of the 2006 proceeding.

Section 5 could not be invoked to condone the delay in an execution proceeding, and the High Court’s Article 227 jurisdiction could not be exercised to override the express statutory limitation period.

It further held that the petition was not a continuation of the earlier execution proceeding and that the delay could not be condoned under Section 5 or through constitutional supervisory jurisdiction.

The impugned order dated 1 July 2025 dismissing the execution petition was affirmed, and the Special Civil Application was dismissed in limine without an order as to costs.